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THE JOURNAL

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PHILOLOGY.

HOW WERE THE BODIES OF CRIMINALS AT ATHENS DISPOSED OF AFTER DEATH?

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, February 8th, 1877.)

'Αλλὰ τό γε ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ μὴ ἐξεῖναι ταφῆναι, πῶς οὐκ ὄνειδος; Καὶ πῶς μέλλει τοῦτο ὄνειδος εἶναι ὃ τοῖς ἀρίστοις πολλάκις συνέβη;

Teles *περὶ φυγῆς.*

THIS question is answered by the Rev. Prof. J. P. Mahaffy, 'Social Life in Greece,' p. 266, in the following way: 'The corpses of criminals were either given back to their relatives to be decently and privately buried, as was the case with Socrates; or when there was added to the simple sentence of death the refusal of funeral rites',—which he considers however to have been outside the strict letter of the law—'they were cast into the barathrum.' This answer implies what the learned author states more fully in a review of Prof. C. Wachsmuth, 'Die Stadt Athen im Alterthume' (in the *Academy*, May 22nd, 1875): 'Executions were always, I believe, conducted in prison, and then if the relatives did not recover the body, it was carried out to the barathrum.'

There was however a third way of disposing of the corpses of criminals, viz. they were allowed to be buried, but not in Attica. The sentence passed on Archeptolemus and Antiphon, who had been found guilty of treason, contained the clause: 'That they be delivered to the Eleven,—that it shall not be lawful to bury Arch. and Ant. at Athens, or in any land of which the Athenians are masters[1].' This sentence was in all probability in Craterus *συναγωγὴ ψηφισμάτων* (cf. Harpocr. s. v. *Ἄνδρων*). Caecilius most likely copied it thence and so it found its way into the Lives of the x Orators wrongly ascribed to Plutarch (*ψήφισμα καθ' ὃ ἔδοξεν Ἀντιφῶντα κριθῆναι ὁ Καικίλιος παρατέθειται*). To the same law Euryptolemus refers in his speech in favour of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, 'that if any one either betray the state or steal what is holy, he shall be tried in a court of justice, and if condemned, shall be refused burial in Attica[2].' And we learn from Lycurgus c. Leocr. 113[3], that traitors might be proceeded against even after their death; this was done at least in the case of Phrynichus: condemnation was formally passed upon him, his bones were dug up and cast out of Attica, and those who had pleaded for him were likewise refused burial within the boundaries of Attica. The same refusal of burial in Attica seems to me to have been the lot of those who were proceeded against by an eisangelia and

[1] *τούτοιν ἐτιμήθη τοῖς ἕνδεκα παραδοθῆναι...καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι θάψαι Ἀρχ. καὶ Ἀντ. Ἀθήνησι μηδ' ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι.* [Plut.] vitae x oratt. p. 833 D; cf. vit. Antiph. *εἰσαγγελθεὶς δὲ ἑάλω καὶ τοῖς τῶν προδοτῶν ὑπαχθεὶς ἐπιτιμίοις ἄταφος ἐῤῥίφη.*

[2] *ἐάν τις ἢ τὴν πόλιν προδιδῷ ἢ τὰ ἱερὰ κλέπτῃ, κριθέντα ἐν δικαστηρίῳ, ἂν καταγνωσθῇ, μὴ ταφῆναι ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ*; cf. Stob. Floril. ii. p. 68, Meineke *καὶ Σωκράτην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὅταν ἐπιλαμβανόμενος Ἀθηναίων λέγῃ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγοὶ ἐφ' οἷς καλλωπίζονται ὑπερόριοι τεθαμμένοι εἰσί.*—Diod. Sic. xvi. 25, *οἱ δὲ Λοκροὶ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν οὐ συγχωροῦντες, ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκαν ὅτι παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι κοινὸς νόμος ἐστὶν ἀτάφους ῥίπτεσθαι τοὺς ἱεροσύλους.*

[3] *καὶ ψηφίζεται ὁ δῆμος Κριτίου εἰπόντος τὸν μὲν νεκρὸν κρίνειν προδοσίας, κἂν δόξῃ προδότης ὢν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τεθάφθαι, τά τε ὀστᾶ αὐτοῦ ἀνορύξαι καὶ ἐξορίσαι ἔξω τῆς Ἀττικῆς, ὅπως ἂν μὴ κέηται ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μηδὲ τὰ ὀστᾶ τοῦ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν προδιδόντος*, and § 114, 115 *ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀπολογῶνταί τινες περὶ τοῦ τετελευτηκότος, ἐὰν ἀλῷ ὁ τεθνηκώς, ἐνόχους εἶναι καὶ τούτους τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις...καὶ τοὺς ἀπολογουμένους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ Ἀρίσταρχον καὶ Ἀλεξικλέα ἀπέκτειναν καὶ οὐδ' ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν.*

condemned by a court or the assembly of the people, as I have attempted to show in a paper printed in the *Journal of Philol.* No. 7, p. 105: *ἀγωνιζομένῳ καὶ κινδυνεύοντι οὐ μόνον περὶ θανάτου—ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐξορισθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανόντα μηδὲ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ταφῆναι* Hyper. pro Lyc. c. 16; cf. pro Eux. c. 31 *τὸν δὲ κατακλιθέντα εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ δήμου κελεύσαντος μηδ' ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ δεῖ τεθάφθαι* and Aesch. iii. 252 *ἕτερος δ'* (i. e. Leocrates) *πρῴην ποτ' εἰσηγγέλθη καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ ἐγένοντο· εἰ δὲ μία μόνον μετέπεσεν ὑπερώριστ' ἄν.* *Ἐξορίζειν* and *ὑπερορίζειν* are used in this sense of throwing the corpse beyond the frontier after sentence of death has been executed. Thus Suidas (s. v. *ὑπερόριον*) explains *ὑπερόριον τὸ σῶμα ῥῖψαι* by *μάκρον ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως* or *ἔξω τῶν ὅρων*; and *ὑπερορίζειν* is used in the sense of removing the instruments of homicide beyond the frontier (Aesch. iii. 244; Pausan. vi. 11. 6; Poll. viii. 120). The whole proceeding is illustrated by Plut. Phocion c. 37[1]: Phocion's enemies decreed that his dead body should be excluded from burial within the boundaries of the country and that none of the Athenians should light a funeral pile. None of his friends, therefore, ventured to concern himself about the corpse, but a certain Conopion who used to do these offices for hire, carried it beyond Eleusis and procuring fire from over the frontier of Megara burned it.

Prof. G. F. Schoemann[2] mentions the refusal of burial in

[1] *τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἔδοξε καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἐξορίσαι καὶ μηδὲ πῦρ ἐναῦσαι μηδένα πρὸς τὴν ταφὴν Ἀθηναίων. διὸ φίλος μὲν οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμησεν ἅψασθαι τοῦ σώματος, Κωνωπίων δέ τις ὑπουργεῖν εἰθισμένος τὰ τοιαῦτα μισθοῦ κομισθέντα τὸν νεκρὸν ὑπὲρ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα πῦρ λαβὼν ἐκ τῆς Μεγαρικῆς ἔκαυσεν*; cf. Diod. Sic. xviii. 67 *διὰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ κωνείου πόσεως κατὰ τὸ πάτριον ἔθος τὸν βίον καταλύσαντες ἐῤῥίφησαν ἄταφοι πάντες ἐκ τῶν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὅρων* and Corn. Nep. Phoc. 6. See also Valesius on Harpocr. s. v. *ὀργάς*· Helladius Besantinous iii. *ὅτι ὀργὰς μὲν κοινῶς φησι πᾶσα ἡ γῆ, ὅση ἐπιτήδεια πρὸς καρπῶν γονάς. ὀργάδα δὲ ἰδίως ἐκάλουν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ταῖν θεαῖν ἀνειμένην τῆς Ἀττικῆς μεταξὺ καὶ τῆς Μεγαρίδος.* In eum locum projiciebantur sacrilegi et proditores, quos in agro Attico sepeliri jus non erat. Teles quidam in libro de exilio ap. Stobaeum serm. 158 *οὐκ ἀηδῶς γάρ τις τῶν Ἀττικῶν φυγάδων λοιδορουμένου τινὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ λέγοντος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ταφήσῃ ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἀσεβεῖς Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Μεγαρικῇ, ὥσπερ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἱ εὐσεβεῖς Μεγαρέων ἐν τῇ Μεγαρικῇ.*

[2] Griech. Alterth. ii. p. 508: Verweigert wurde ein Grab in der Heimath nur schweren Verbrechern: solche wurden, wenn sie schon begraben und erst nachher schuldig befunden waren,

Attic soil and the throwing of the bodies of criminals down the barathrum, without attempting to determine when the one was done rather than the other. It seems to me, however, that we are not without evidence to settle this point. These two practices existed side by side at the time the generals were brought to trial after the battle of Arginusae. For Euryptolemus quotes two laws by which they could be tried: the decree of Cannonus[1] ordering, 'that if any one wrong the people of the Athenians, he shall plead his cause in chains before the people and, if condemned as guilty, shall be put to death and thrown into the barathrum,' and the law against traitors and sacrilegious men, which orders that such should be tried in a court of justice and if condemned, shall be refused burial in Attica. But since the practice of casting into the barathrum is not mentioned after that trial, whilst the law against traitors, refusing them burial in Attica, was in force shortly before (in 411) and continued to be so ever after that time, the conclusion may be drawn, that some time after the trial of the generals the practice of throwing the bodies of criminals into the barathrum was discontinued. Other circumstances which point to the same conclusion, will present themselves in the course of our inquiry.

We have an instance recorded of the substitution at Sparta of a kind of burial for the throwing of a corpse into a pit, in the case of Pausanias. The Spartans relented, the intention of casting his body into the Caeadas was abandoned, and he was buried somewhere near according to Thucydides, whilst according to Aelianus who quotes from Epitimides, they cast his corpse out of the country[2].

auch wieder ausgegraben und über die Grenze geschafft: Hingerichtete wurden bisweilen an einen dazu bestimmten Platz, eine Schlucht, wie das Barathron bei Athen war, hingeworfen.

[1] ὃ κελεύει, ἐάν τις τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ἀδικῇ, δεδεμένον ἀποδικεῖν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ ἐὰν καταγνωσθῇ ἀδικεῖν, ἀποθανόντα εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθῆναι Xen. Hell. i. 7, 20.

[2] Thuc. i. 134: καὶ ἐξαχθεὶς ἀπέθανε παραχρῆμα· καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέλλησαν μὲν εἰς τὸν Καιάδαν, οὗπερ τοὺς κακούργους, ἐμβάλλειν· ἔπειτα ἔδοξε πλησίον που κατορύξαι. Ael. V. H. iv. 7: Λακεδαιμόνιοι Παυσανίαν μηδίσαντα οὐ μόνον λιμῷ ἀπέκτειναν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ἐξέβαλον αὐτοῦ ἐκτὸς τῶν ὅρων.

Lysias[1] has the following in his speech against Eratosthenes: 'And when his (i. e. Polemarchus') dead body was carried away from prison, although we had three houses, they (i.e. the Thirty Tyrants) did not allow him to be buried from any one of them, but having hired a shed, there they laid out the corpse.' The regular mode of procedure would have been for the relations or friends to remove the body from prison and bury him; thus Crito provided for Socrates' burial (Plat. Phaedo, p. 115 D. E.[2]); but here as in some other instances, the Thirty Tyrants themselves had the corpses laid out and the interment arranged, probably to prevent a gathering of the relatives and friends of the deceased. Yet without these a funeral was not *ταφὴ νομιζομένη*, and Lysias calls those who were buried in this way *ἀτάφους*[3].

When on the other hand burial within the boundaries of Attica was forbidden, the corpses were probably carried out from prison by the *ἱερὰ πύλη* to where the *δήμιος* lived and there they were exposed. Thus Leontius as he was walking up from the Piraeus and approaching the northern wall from the outside, observed some dead bodies on the ground and the executioner standing by them[4]. Thence the relations or friends, I suppose, removed the corpses to bury them beyond the frontier or commissioned others to do so; it is a significant fact that a man like Conopion could make a trade of providing such burial for pay.

[1] *καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπεφέρετο ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου τεθνεώς, τριῶν ἡμῖν οἰκιῶν οὐσῶν ἐξ οὐδεμίας εἴασαν ἐξενεχθῆναι, ἀλλὰ κλείσιον μισθωσάμενοι προὔθεντο αὐτόν.* § 18.

[2] *ἀλλὰ θαῤῥεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τοὺμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἄν σοι φίλον ᾖ καὶ μάλιστα ἠγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι.*

[3] Aesch. iii. 235 *ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν τριάκοντ' ἐγένοντο, οἱ—καὶ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰς ταφὰς καὶ ἐκφορὰς τῶν τελευτησάντων εἴων τοὺς προσήκοντας παραγενέσθαι*; for *τῆς ταφῆς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παραδίδοσθαι εἰκός ἐστι τοῖς οἰκείοις* Dem. xliv. 32.—Lys. xii. 21 *οὗτοι γὰρ—πολλοὺς δ' ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντες ἀτάφους ἐποίησαν*, and 96 *οὐδὲ ταφῆς τῆς νομιζομένης εἴασαν τυχεῖν.*

[4] *Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιὼν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτὸς αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους* etc. Rep. iv. p. 439 E, cf. Plut. Them. 22 *πλησίον δὲ τῆς οἰκίας κατεσκεύασεν ἐν Μελίτῃ τὸ ἱερὸν, οὗ νῦν τὰ σώματα τῶν θανατουμένων οἱ δήμιοι προβάλλουσι καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια καὶ τοὺς βρόχους τῶν ἀπαγχομένων καὶ καθαιρεθέντων ἐκφέρουσιν.*

I spoke above of the corpses being removed from prison; for there can be no doubt that hemlock was administered in prison, and it seems very probable that criminals were strangled there as well—in Rome strangling always took place in prison, and generally in the Tullianum. A sentence of death by ἀποτυμπανισμός, however, was probably not carried out there, but near the abode of the executioner. For from the name χαρώνειος[1] being given to one door of the prison, it is evident that criminals must in some cases have been led out to execution by that door, and no sentence of death is so likely from its very nature to have been carried out without the prison as ἀποτυμπανισμός. Thus we understand also why according to Bekk. Anecd. p. 28, 10 the dwelling-places of the δήμιοι might be called ἀνδροκτονεῖα[2]. I should not like to go so far as to think with M. G. Perrot (Daremberg and Saglio, 'Dict. des Antiquités,' s. v.), that this mode of judicial death was confined to slaves and foreigners—this seems to be inconsistent with Lys. xiii. 56; yet in by far the majority of instances it was the lower classes at Athens who were dispatched in that way, and if nobody claimed their bodies, I suppose they were buried in some sort of way. The demiarchi, who were required to bury or cause to be buried any dead bodies found in their district ([Dem.] xliii. 58), had perhaps to look after these corpses also. I may mention here that in the United States of America, after death has been officially testified, the corpses are regularly restored to the relatives; if they are not claimed, they are disposed of in a way only possible in our time, viz. they are sent to the medical schools.

Prof. E. Curtius[3] is of opinion that originally criminals

[1] Pollux viii. 102—τοῦ δὲ νομοφυλακίου θύρα μία χαρώνειον ἐκαλεῖτο, δι' ἧς τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἀπήγοντο; cf. Suid. s. v. χαρώνειος θύρα etc.

[2] λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἀνδροκτονεῖα καὶ τὰ τῶν δημίων ἐνδιαιτήματα, ἐν οἷς τοὺς τῶν ἐπιθανάτων καταδικασθέντας καταχρῶνται. As to the dwelling-place of the δήμιος, Mr Mahaffy says in a letter with which he has favoured me: 'There is in the N.E. side of the barathrum a deep cavern, in which I suspect the δημόσιος lived. This cavern is near the top, and easily accessible as you come from the city.'

[3] Attische Studien (Abhandl. der Göttinger Ges. der Wissensch. xi. 1862—63, p. 59 foll.): 'Es wurden in Melite auch die Todesstrafen ursprünglich gewiss so vollzogen, dass sie den Charakter von Gottesurtheilen trugen. Später wurde die Todesart,

were thrown into the barathrum alive and that this mode of execution bore the character of a trial by ordeal; but he adds: 'Later on that peculiar mode of execution, for which the spot on account of its physical features had been used, was discontinued,' yet the place remained what he calls 'die Richtstätte,' or 'der Leichenanger' and 'die Scharfrichterei.'

When the practice of killing a criminal by hurling him down the barathrum was discontinued, it seems impossible to determine for want of information. I scarcely think that we can draw an inference on that point from the fate of Darius' herald at Athens[1]. It is true, he was cast into the barathrum, but this was evidently an instance of the people taking the law into their own hands in a moment of intense excitement; for as Mr Grote has it ('Hist. of Greece,' iii. p. 272), 'The inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such an outrage.' Nor can any conclusion as to the *mode* of death, be drawn from Plat. Gorg. p. 516 D Μιλτιάδην εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν, Plato's language being too vague. Dr W. H. Thompson is of opinion, that if this decree had been carried out, his corpse would have been thrown down the barathrum after execution. If we adopt this interpretation, we shall find that the same offence—according to Herod. vi. 136, Miltiades was charged with having deceived the people—which in the days of Miltiades was punishable with death and throwing the body into the pit, was visited at a later period with death and refusal of burial in Attic soil; for Demosthenes quotes an old law ordaining death for that offence, and states that it was to be proceeded against by an eisangelia[2]. Accord-

zu welcher das Local seiner Eigenthümlichkeit nach benutzt worden war, aufgegeben; aber der Ort blieb bis in die späteste Zeit die Richtstätte der Athener.' Cf. Erläuternder Text der 7 Karten z. Topogr. v. Athen, p. 11.

[1] Herod. vii. 133 πρότερον Δαρείου πέμψαντος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τοὺς αἰτέοντας ἐς τὸ βάραθρον,—ἐμβαλόντες ἐκέλευον etc.

[2] xx. 135 ἔστιν ὑμῖν νόμος ἀρχαῖος, ἄν τις ὑποσχόμενός τι τὸν δῆμον ἐξαπατήσῃ, κρίνειν, κἂν ἁλῷ, θανάτῳ ζημιοῦν, cf. § 100; and xix. 103 ὑμᾶς ἐξηπάτηκεν, ἀδοξεῖ, δίκαιος ἀπολωλέναι κρίνεται. εἴ γέ τι τῶν προσηκόντων ἐγίγνετο, ἐν

ing to the Scholiast on Arist. Rhet. p. 232 the Athenians

εἰσαγγελίᾳ πάλαι ἂν ἦν, and xlix. 67 ὃς οὖν οὕθ' ὑμᾶς ἠσχύνθη ἐξαπατῆσαι ὑποσχόμενος, νόμων ὄντων, ἐάν τις τὸν δῆμον ὑποσχόμενος ἐξαπατήσῃ, εἰσαγγελίαν εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ. I must have overlooked these passages, when in my paper on the Eisangelia, p. 96, I wrote that Demosthenes does not mention that delusion of the people by false promises was to be proceeded against by eisangelia. I take this opportunity to add also a passage from Plut. Pericl. 32 where we learn that Diopeithes of Aristophanic fame (Vesp. 380) proposed εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας.—Whilst this paper was passing through the press I received the dissertatio inauguralis of Dr M. Bohm, entitled 'de εἰσαγγελίαις ad comitia Atheniensium delatis.' I had maintained in my Quaestiones Hyperideae that the prosecutor who had resorted to an eisangelia was ἀκίνδυνος, if he failed to get the fifth part of the votes, until this impunity was discontinued, as Pollux says διὰ τοὺς ῥᾳδίως εἰσαγγέλλοντας, and that at the time when Demosthenes was assailed by prosecutions of all kinds after the disaster of Chaeronea, this impunity had already been abolished. Of this Dr Bohm approves; yet from the case of Dioclides he concludes that there was a time when capital punishment awaited the prosecutor. I cannot follow Dr Bohm in his conclusion; for Dioclides' case seems to me to have nothing to do with the question before us, cf. Andoc. i. 65, ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα Διοκλείδην μὲν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παραδόντες ἀπεκτείνατε. My second point in my Quaest. was to show that eisangelia was not applicable to καινὰ αἰ ἀγραφα ἀδικήματα, as Caecilius says, but to such crimes only as were enumerated in the νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός and to all others when referred to some section of that law and proceeded against under the name of that section. Dr Bohm takes exception to this opinion; he distinguishes three periods: the first reaching to the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, the second to the wars with Philip, and the third to the end of Athenian jurisdiction. In the second the νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός, as reconstructed, so far as our knowledge admits, in my paper, was in force, but in the first period Dr Bohm believes εἰσαγγελίαι were applicable to all crimes committed against the people, without any reference to any law, in other words κατὰ καινῶν καὶ ἀγράφων ἀδικημάτων. Thus with regard to the trial of the Generals after the seafight of Arginusae he has: 'ut duces accusati sunt διότι οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ναυαγούς, ita ob idem crimen nullius legis disertae ratione habita, capitis damnantur. Ne in ceteris quidem εἰσαγγελίαις ex illo tempore memoriae traditis, ut in Alcibiadis accusatione, ad certam legem crimen refertur.' I still think the charge in the former case was προδοσία, cf. Xen. Hellen. i. 7, 33 προδοσίαν καταγνόντες ἀντὶ τῆς ἀδυναμίας etc., and as regards the charge brought against Alcibiades etc. the ζητηταὶ loudly proclaimed that the whole had been done ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δήμου καταλύσει (Andoc. 1, 36, cf. Thuc. vi. 61, Isocr. xvi. 6). Even at the time when Hyperides defended Euxenippus, he had to complain that by eisangelia many crimes were prosecuted, which did not come under the νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός, and to quote one instance, the fact that the adulterer Lycophron was proceeded against by an εἰσαγγελία καταλύσεως τοῦ δήμου shows how lax the practice was and that almost any crime might

would have had Miltiades thrown down the pit alive, but I think that as Dr Thompson very justly remarks the more sanguinary view of the uses of the barathrum has found favour with scholiasts generally. The Schol. on Arist. Plut. 431[1] describes the barathrum as a pit in the sides of which spikes were fixed at various distances, which tore to pieces those who were thrown into it; but he informs us also that it had been filled up after a Phrygian was thrown into it. The Schol. on Arist. Eccles. 1081, quotes the decree of Cannonus as follows: *Ξενοφῶν δὲ εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθέντα ἀποθανεῖν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαντα*; but this authority alone did not warrant Prof. L. Dindorf in altering the reading of the MSS. of Xenophon (Hell. i. 7, 46) from *ἀποθανόντα εἰς τὸ β. ἐμβληθῆναι* to *ἀποθανεῖν εἰς τὸ β. ἐμβληθέντα*. Already in 430 the Peloponnesian ambassadors to the court of Persia who had been seized in Thrace, were *first* killed and *then* thrown down a precipice; and considering that these men were condemned *ἄκριτοι* in retaliation for similar acts committed by the Spartans, we may safely conclude that if a more cruel mode of death, viz. throwing a criminal alive into the barathrum, had still existed at that time, it would have been resorted to in this case (Thuc. vii. 67[2]). The main difference between

be referred to some section or other of the law. The definition of Caecilius seems to have taken its rise in the schools of the rhetoricians, the term *καινὰ καὶ ἄγραφα ἀδικήματα* being quite foreign to the language of the law-courts. Cf. Schoemann de com. Athen. p. 183. We have, as it were, two versions of this definition in the Lex. Rhet. Cantabr. s.v. *εἰσαγγελία· κατὰ καινῶν καὶ ἀγράφων ἀδικημάτων*—K. *δὲ οὕτως ὡρίσατο· εἰσαγγελία ἐστὶν ὃ περὶ καινῶν ἀδικημάτων δεδώκασιν ἀπενεγκεῖν οἱ νόμοι. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μελετώμενον ἐν ταῖς τῶν σοφιστῶν διατριβαῖς.*—Dr Bohm thinks that eisangeliae against traitors and sacrilegious men were sometimes submitted to the Areopagus, that the law against traitors and sacrilegious men quoted by Xen. Hell. i. 7, 22 was passed about 460, and that soon after 415 an old law about *ἀδικεῖν τὸν δῆμον* was reenacted by Cannonus; but this is not the place to enter into a full review of his pamphlet. If Dr Bohm had read my paper on the eisangelia in this Journal (1872) he would have found, besides many additions, the correction of some inaccuracies into which I had fallen when writing my Quaest. Hyp.

[1] *χάσμα τι φρεατῶδες καὶ σκοτεινὸν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ—ἐν δὲ τῷ χάσματι τούτῳ ὑπῆρχον ὀγκίνοι, οἱ μὲν ἄνω, οἱ δὲ κάτω.*

[2] *ἀκρίτους καὶ βουλομένους ἔστιν ἃ εἰπεῖν αὐθημερὸν ἀπέκτειναν πάντας καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσέβαλον*, etc.

the decree of Cannonus and the law against treason, for our present inquiry, seems to me to lie not in the *mode* of death but in the way of disposing of the corpse, and this also points to the decree of Cannonus as the older of the two, forming as it were the link between killing a criminal by hurling him down the barathrum alive, and the practice of later times as stated in the law against treason.

There can be no doubt that *κώνειον* was by this time in use as the mode of inflicting judicial death from the well-known joke in Arist. Frogs, 123 (B. C. 405):

> ΗΡ. *ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀτραπὸς ξύντομος τετριμμένη*
> *ἡ διὰ θυείας.* ΔΙ. *ἆρα κώνειον λέγεις;*
> ΗΡ. *μάλιστά γε.* ΔΙ. *ψυχράν γε καὶ δυσχείμερον.*
> *εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀποπήγνυσι τἀντικνήμια.*

Cf. Andoc. iii. 10; Lys. xviii. 24; Xen. Hell. ii. 3, 56; and the experience of the executioner as given in Plato's Phaedo. —The word *βάραθρον* is often used by Aristophanes[1] but I believe in a metaphorical sense only; the gloss of the Cod. Dorvill. to Plut. 431 and 1110 being *ὁ ᾅδης*. Demosthenes similarly limits the use of the word; viii. 45 and [x], 16[2], cf. Harpocr. s. v. *βάραθρον*. *Δημοσθένης δὲ ἐν Φιλιππικοῖς οὐ κυρίως αὐτὸ λέγει, ἀλλ' ἐκ μεταφορᾶς, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὀλέθρῳ.* When Plutarch puts the following words in the mouth of Aristides, there could be no safety for Athens, *εἰ μὴ καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβάλοιεν* (Arist. 3); he may likewise be supposed to have used the term in a non-literal sense, unless we assume that he is reproducing exactly what he had found in an older writer, and then Dr Thompson's explanation of Plat. Gorg. 516 D may be applied to this passage also. He evidently does so in Coriol. 13

[1] Nub. 1449 *οὐδέν σε κωλύσει σεαυτὸν ἐμβαλεῖν ἐς τὸ βάραθρον μετὰ Σωκράτους καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἥττω*: equit. 1362; ran. 574. Cf. Hemsterhusius to the gloss Cod. Dorvill. to Plaut. 1110: hoc quidem in Aristophane declarando nimis Christiane: orcum inferorumque sedes infaustas *βάραθρον* adpellant ecclesiastici scriptores, neque rarum *εἰς βάραθρον τοῦ ᾅδου* vel *τῆς γεέννης ἐμβληθῆναι*, alias non secus ac Graeci pro *certissima pernicie*, vel *exitio* ponunt.

[2] [xxv] 76: *τούτῳ δ' οὐδένα ὁρῶ τῶν τόπων τούτων βάσιμον ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀπόκρημνα, φάραγγας, βάραθρα.*

ἐνίσταντο δὲ λοιπὸν οἱ περὶ Σικίννιον καὶ Βροῦτον δημαγωγοὶ, βοῶντες — ἀνθρώπους πένητας ὥσπερ εἰς βάραθρον ὠθεῖν, ἐκπέμποντας εἰς πόλιν ἀέρος τε νυσεροῦ καὶ νεκρῶν ἀτάφων γέμουσαν, etc.

The orators call the pit in question *ὄρυγμα*[1] from which the executioner derived his euphemistic name of 'the man at the pit,' by which he is known to the orators[2]. In this we see the same tendency at work which made Plato use the phrase *ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον,* etc. to avoid the repulsive term *δήμιος*, and speak of *φάρμακον* instead of *κώνειον* (Phaedo, p. 63 D etc.), and which induced the Athenians to call the prison *οἴκημα* (Plut. Sol. 15). Prof. E. Curtius is of opinion that the same pit is called *φάραγγες* by Thuc. ii. 67, whilst Dr K. W. Krüger doubts this assumption, as in that case the article would be required. That other pits occasionally served the same purpose as *the* barathrum, seems to me not improbable. The story that the barathrum had been filled up, could only arise in this way. The Schol. on Arist. Plut. 431 informs us that it was filled up after a Phrygian had been thrown into it[3]. Suidas[4] gives a fuller account of the Phrygian's death, and by means of the buildings which according to him were erected on the ground gained by filling up this pit (*βουλευτήριον* and *μητρῷον*[5]),

[1] Harp. s. v. *ὄρυγμα· ἰδίως οὕτω ἐκαλεῖτο ἐφ' οὗ οἱ κακοῦργοι ἐκολάζοντο Ἀθήνησι.*

[2] Lyc. c. Leocr. 120 *ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀρύγματος*; Din. c. Dem. 62 *ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι*; cf. Poll. viii. 71 *ὁ πρὸς τῷ ὀρύγματι.*

[3] *ἐνταῦθα τὸν Φρύγα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς τῶν θεῶν ἐνέβαλον ὡς μεμηνότα, ἐπειδὴ προέλεγεν ὅτι ἔρχεται ἡ μήτηρ εἰς ἐπιζήτησιν τῆς Κόρης. ἡ δὲ θεὸς ὀργισθεῖσα ἀκαρπίας ἔπεμψε τῇ χώρᾳ· καὶ γνόντες τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ χρησμοῦ τὸ μὲν χάσμα κατέχωσαν, τὴν δὲ θεὸν θυσίαις ἵλαον ἐποίησαν.*

[4] s. v. *μητραγύρτης· ἐλθών τις εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐμύει τὰς γυναῖκας τῇ μητρὶ τῶν θεῶν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοί φασιν. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέκτειναν αὐτὸν, ἐμβαλόντες εἰς βάραθρον ἐπὶ κεφαλήν. λοιμοῦ δὲ γενομένου ἔλαβον χρησμὸν, ἱλάσασθαι τὸν πεφονευμένον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ᾠκοδόμησαν βουλευτήριον, ἐν ᾧ ἀνεῖλον τὸν μητραγύρτην, καὶ περιφράττοντες αὐτὸ καθιέρωσαν τῇ μητρὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἀναστήσαντες καὶ ἀνδριάντα τοῦ μητραγύρτου. ἐχρῶντο δὲ τῷ μητρῴῳ ἀρχείῳ καὶ νομοφυλακείῳ, καταχώσαντες καὶ τὸ βάραθρον.*

[5] Am Kerameikos wurden die am Stadtmarkte unentbehrlichen Staatsgebäude eingerichtet. Ihre Lage und Reihenfolge gehört zu den sichersten Punkten der attischen Topographie. Sie bildeten eine nahe verbundene Gruppe am Südrande des Marktes, unterhalb des Areopags, dessen Fel-

we are enabled to fix its locality and to say that the Schol. and Suid. s. v. *βάραθρον*, etc. have confounded *the barathrum* with some other pit far more to the east; for *the barathrum* is on the west side of the Hill of the Nymphs.

To sum up, in very early times criminals were thrown down the pit alive—then, sentences of death were carried out in prison, and the corpses were thrown into the barathrum —until at last, they were allowed to be buried, but not within the boundaries of Attica, those cases excepted when the bodies were restored to the relatives to be buried in Attic soil itself. It was for sanitary reasons, according to Mr Mahaffy, that the Athenians discontinued the practice of throwing the corpses into the barathrum[1]. May we not just as well see in this another proof of that humanity which prompted the Athenians to fix upon poisoning by hemlock as that mode of judicial death which was, as Grote happily puts it, 'the minimum of pain, as well as the minimum of indignity;' a humanity which also led them to accord to a suicide the burial which was denied him in other States of Greece (cf. K. F. Hermann, Privatalt. 62, 28), the law stipulating only that the right hand should be severed from the body and buried separately (Aesch. iii. 244)?

sen nach dieser Seite hin, wie man heute noch sieht, geradlinicht bearbeitet sind. Hier lagen von Westen nach Osten die 3 Gebäude: Metroon, Buleuterion, Tholos, etc. Prof. E. Curtius Erläuternder Text, etc. p. 27.

[1] Since this paper was read before the Cambridge Philological Society I have received a note from Mr Mahaffy, by which he has placed me under very great obligations. He writes, 'I since examined the barathrum again with two friends. We made it out about 200 yards long, 60 wide at the widest part, and at the same place, which is also the deepest, about 35 feet deep. Near the steepest part of the rock is the little cave, which I hold to be the den of the *δημόκοινος*.'—To this I add, with Mr Mahaffy's permission, a suggestion made in a former letter to me, 'If you will examine Soph. Antig. 1015 sqq. you will see that one great objection to having bodies unburied was the possible pollution of altars etc. by birds of prey which had just left the bodies. Hence I feel sure the *δημόκοινος* was obliged to bury the bodies in some sort of way in the barathrum and not to leave them unguarded for a prey. Sanitary reasons point to this, and is it not possible that the gradual filling in of the barathrum may have caused the change you have so clearly shown? This too would account for its being now shallower.'

To be deprived of a last resting-place in Attica appeared a great hardship to an Athenian; this may account for the fact that, contrary to law, after the death of Themistocles his relations brought his bones to Athens and buried them secretly (Thuc. i. 138, and Corn. Nep. Them. 10, Pausan. i. 1, 2) and that the same was done with Hyperides ([Plut.] p. 849 c) and Phocion (Plut. Phoc. 38).

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UPON NOTICES OF ARMY-SURGEONS IN ANCIENT GREEK WARFARE.

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, November 29, 1877.)

My attention was drawn some time ago to the question *whether the Greek armies in their expeditions were accompanied by surgeons.* In all books I was able to consult, I found no answer to this question and indeed have never seen it discussed at all, except in an article on 'Pre-Christian Dispensaries and Hospitals' in the last number of the Westminster Review (No. civ. p. 442): 'We read of military surgeons as early as the time of Homer. "In those days," says Plato (Rep. iii. 406), "the sons of Asclepius were heroes as well as physicians; for when the arrow of Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they sucked the blood out of his wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies (Il. iv. 218): these remedies they thought to be enough to heal any man whose constitution was healthy and sound." The state physicians of Egypt were forbidden to take fees, when attached to the army in time of war (Diod. i. 82). Cyrus employed surgeons to march with his army; so did the Spartans. Among the Romans, soldiers dressed each others' wounds until the time of Augustus, when we first hear of military surgeons.'—However since the writer of this most instructive article necessarily only touches on this subject, I will not refrain from laying before you these notes which I had put together before, and inviting your opinion on the point in question. To begin with Homer, where we find the *ἰητρὸς* highly appreciated:

ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων,

Λ. 514. In B. 732 Podaleirios and Machaon are called *ἰητῆρ' ἀγαθώ*, but when Diod. Sic. says *ἀτελεῖς δ' αὐτοὺς ἀφεῖναι τῶν κατὰ τὰς μάχας κινδύνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λειτουργιῶν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἐν τῷ θεραπεύειν εὐχρηστίας* (iv. 71), he seems to me to transfer what was true of a later period to the Homeric age. For these two men were leaders as well as *ἰητροὶ* and shared in the fight, as Paley has it on Λ. 518, 'like Asclepius himself in Pind. Pyth. iii. 6, 7, he (Machaon) is a warrior as well as a leech.' When Menelaus was wounded and the herald looked out for Machaon, he found him surrounded by the brave ranks of the shield-bearing hosts that followed him from Trica, Δ. 207, and Λ. 835 we learn that Machaon lay in his tent

χρηΐζων καὶ αὐτὸς ἀμύμονος ἰητῆρος,

while Podaleirios was yet engaged in warfare. From the wording of this passage it might appear that these two were the only *ἰητροὶ* with the Greek army; for Eurypylos, after mentioning that he cannot get any professional assistance from them, asks Patroclos to cut out the arrow, &c., whilst in N. 213 *ἰητροὶ* are mentioned as receiving instructions from Idomeneus, where Machaon at all events cannot have been meant (cf. Ξ. init.), and Π. 28 Patroclos speaks of *ἰητροὶ πολυφάρμακοι* employed about the persons of Diomedes, Odysseus, Agamemnon and Eurypylos. Is Faesi's suggestion (to Π. 28) that possibly the different parts of the army had their respective *ἰητροὶ*, likely to contain any truth, or must we not look upon the *ἰητροὶ* rather as warriors who possessed some knowledge of surgery?

In Xenophon there are several passages bearing on the question. In the Anabasis (iii. 4. 30) we read that the Greeks who had been considerably harassed by the enemy in their march through hilly country, on arriving at villages *ἰατροὺς κατέστησαν ὀκτώ· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ τετρωμένοι.* Were these professional surgeons, or merely soldiers who had gained some experience in the treatment of wounds, as Rehdantz, if I remember rightly, suggests? In another passage (de Laced. rep. xiii. 7) *ἰατροὶ* are mentioned as a distinct class accompanying the Lacedaemonian army, by the side of *μάντεις* and *αὐληταί*, &c. In the discourse on the art of war which Cyrus has with his

father before starting for Media, the following occurs: *περὶ δὲ ὑγιείας ἀκούων καὶ ὁρῶν ὅτι καὶ πόλεις αἱ χρήζουσαι ὑγιαίνειν ἰατροὺς αἱροῦνται καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἕνεκεν ἰατροὺς ἐξάγουσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐγὼ—εὐθὺς τούτου ἐπεμελήθην*, &c. (Cyr. i. 6. 16). By Cyrus' order, these surgeons attend to the wounded prisoners (iii. 2. 12: *ἐν δὲ τούτῳ προσάγουσι τῷ Κύρῳ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους δεδεμένους, τοὺς δέ τινας καὶ τετρωμένους. ὡς δὲ εἶδεν, εὐθὺς λύειν μὲν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς δεδεμένους, τοὺς δὲ τετρωμένους ἰατροὺς καλέσας θεραπεύειν ἐκέλευσεν*); and as an illustration of the treatment of the wounded I refer to v. 4. 17: *Κῦρος δὲ ὡς ᾔσθετο τὸ γεγονός, ἀπήντα τε τοῖς Καδουσίοις καὶ ὄντινα ἴδοι τετρωμένον, ἀναλαμβάνων τοῦτον μὲν ὡς Γαδάταν ἔπεμψεν, ὅπως θεραπεύοιτο, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους συγκατεσκήνου καὶ ὅπως τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσι συνεπεμελεῖτο, παραλαμβάνων Περσῶν τῶν ὁμοτίμων συνεπιμελητάς· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐπιπονεῖν ἐθέλουσι*[1]. Now whatever we may think of the historical value of the Cyropaedeia, we must allow that these passages go a long way towards proving that in Xenophon's days surgeons were with the armies in the field; granted that the picture he draws of Cyrus is ideal—then he would only ascribe to him, perhaps in a higher degree, the humane qualities of generals in his own time as shown in their care for the wounded. From Cyrop. i. 6. 16 it would appear that it was the general's duty to choose the *ἰατροὶ* who were to accompany him, yet nothing of the kind is mentioned in the long dissertation on the duties of a general in Memor. iii. 1. From this silence, however, we need not, I think, conclude that the Athenian armies were unaccompanied by surgeons; for is it not possible that, as at that time the armies were composed of citizens, the state-paid physicians and their assistants would accompany them as a matter of course? Thus it seems to have been in Egypt: *κατὰ δὲ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς τῆς χώρας ἐκδημίας θεραπεύονται πάντες οὐδένα μισθὸν ἰδίᾳ διδόντες· οἱ γὰρ ἰατροὶ τὰς μὲν τροφὰς ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαμβάνουσι*, &c., Diod. Sic. i. 82. Kings and generals were probably

[1] See Liv. ii. 47, 12 (Fabius) saucios milites curandos dividit patribus. Fabiis plurimi dati, nec alibi majore cura habiti: and Caes. de B. Civ. iii. 78, Caesari, ad saucios deponendos—necesse erat adire Apolloniam, &c.

attended by their own physicians during a campaign; see Xen. Anab. i. 8. 26; Plut. Cato 70; when Alexander the Great was wounded, he was treated by Critodemus *ἰατρὸς Κῷος τὸ γένος Ἀσκληπιάδης*, or, as others say, by Perdiccas of the body-guard *οὐ παρόντος ἐν τῷ δεινῷ ἰατροῦ* (Arrian vi. 11), whilst Qu. Curtius (ix. 5) calls the medical attendant Critobulus 'inter medicos artis eximiae.'

H. HAGER.

Since this paper went to press, my attention has been directed to two articles bearing on the question: one by M. Ch. Daremberg, *La Médecine dans Homère* (Paris, 1865), an exhaustive treatment of the state of medicine at the time of Homer; and the other by Dr M. Schmiedt, "Das Militär-Sanitäts-Wesen der Alten," in the *Allgemeine Militärärztliche Zeitung* (Wien, 1866). The latter believes with me that the Athenian armies were likewise accompanied by surgeons; he says: "ausserdem (besides these state-paid surgeons) dürfte es wahrscheinlich sein, dass manche vornehmere Ärzte um chirurgische Erfahrungen zu sammeln, dem Heere sich anschlossen. So schlug z. B. Hippocrates den Athenern zur Begleitung auf einer Expedition nach Sizilien seinen Sohn Thessalus vor, den er selbst ausstatten und unterhalten wollte." This is, I suppose, founded on a passage from the *πρεσβευτικὸς Θεσσαλοῦ Ἱπποκράτους υἱοῦ* (Dr Schmiedt does not quote his authority): *ὅτε γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐξέπεμπεν ἐπὶ Σικελίης πολλῇ μὲν δυνάμει—ἐν ἐκκλησίῃ ὑπὲρ ἰητροῦ προσπεσόντος ὃν δέοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ στρατεύματι, παρελθὼν ὁ πατὴρ ὑπέσχετο ἐμὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα σώματα δώσειν, τοῖς ἰδίοις δαπανήμασι κατεσκευασμένον*, etc. (Hippocr. *Op.* ed. Kühn, iii. p. 844).

H. H.

'SHALL' AND 'SHOULD' IN PROTASIS, AND THEIR GREEK EQUIVALENTS.

Professor J. B. Sewall and Professor C. D. Morris, in the "Transactions of the American Philological Association" for 1874 and 1875, have criticised especially that part of my classification of conditional sentences in which I maintain that the optative in ordinary protasis (i.e. in all conditions in which it does not express a past general supposition) is "merely a vaguer or less vivid form than the subjunctive for stating a future supposition[1]." In opposition to this view, they agree in maintaining *some* form (though not quite agreed upon the precise form) of the distinction commonly made between the two moods in protasis, based upon the greater or less *possibility* or *probability* that is implied, or upon the presence or absence of an *expectation* or *anticipation* of the fulfilment of the condition. Professor Morris further suggests an important limitation to the use of the subjunctive in protasis, by expressing "a strong opinion that no case can be adduced from the best writers in which a future supposition demanding for its fulfilment *a violation of physical laws* is expressed by ἐάν with the subjunctive."

These attacks are both directed against what I have always felt to be the weakest point in my classification, a point on which I am myself a convert from the doctrines of my opponents. And although I find myself now unable to see the distinction which I once thought I could see, and which most scholars still think they can see, between ἐὰν γένηται and εἰ γένοιτο, I am by no means disposed to be intolerant toward those who are of a different opinion. One gain has thus far

[1] See *Journal of Philology*, Vol. v. No. 10, pp. 186—205.

come from the discussion—the clearer statement of one important point in the controversy; for I understand it to be generally admitted that the difference between ἐάν with the subjunctive and εἰ with the optative is essentially the same as that between 'if he shall' and 'if he should' in English, and that if we can determine the principle that underlies the latter construction, we have the key to the former. The use which all scholars constantly make of these English forms to translate and explain the Greek constructions in question, whatever may be their theories of the latter, shows the general feeling on this point. If this is once admitted, it will aid us greatly in understanding the Greek form of protasis to ask ourselves what distinction we are in the habit of making between 'if he shall go' and 'if he should go' in English. But here unfortunately we meet an obstacle. The modern English, in which we think and express our thoughts, has substituted for the future form 'shall' in protasis the colorless present, so that we now say 'if he goes,' 'if he reads,' etc. for the more exact 'if he shall go' (or 'if he go'), 'if he shall read' (or 'if he read'), etc., which the translators of the Bible in the seventeenth century would have used. Further, this same present form, though we seldom use it to express a purely present condition (for which we should generally say 'if he is reading,' not 'if he reads'), is yet constantly used in general present conditions like 'if any one (ever) reads,' which are entirely distinct from the future conditions we are considering. We must therefore confine ourselves to cases in which we use either 'if he goes,' etc., in the sense of 'if he shall go,' etc., or the latter form itself. Fortunately the translation of the Bible makes every English scholar familiar with the older and more exact form, even if he never uses it in speaking or writing.

It will be understood that, when I compare the optative with the subjunctive in conditions in this paper, I shall confine myself to the optative in its fixed usage in Attic prose, excluding, for example, all notice of the present optative in Homer used to express a present unfulfilled condition, like the imperfect indicative in Attic Greek.

Professor Morris very properly asks for a more exact definition of the term 'vividness,' which I use in stating the distinction between the subjunctive and optative in protasis. I have generally called the statement of a future condition which is made by the subjunctive, corresponding to 'if he shall go' (or 'if he go') in English, "more distinct and vivid" than that which is made by the optative, corresponding to 'if he should go.' By this I mean that the picture (so to speak) of the event or the circumstances supposed which is presented to the mind when the former expression is used is a "more distinct and vivid" one, a picture with outlines more sharply defined and more distinct and definite in its whole conception, than that which the latter form presents. On the other hand, as it seems to me, when the optative form is used, i.e. when we state a supposition in the form 'if he should,' the whole conception is vaguer and presents to the hearer a "less distinct and vivid" picture of the event supposed. For example, it seems to me that the supposition 'if some barbarian *shall* ever drag thee away weeping into slavery,' differs from 'if some barbarian *should* ever drag thee away weeping into slavery,' simply in this, that the former presents a more distinct and vivid conception of the event than the latter; and I do not believe that any one who had no theory of Greek syntax in view would ever think of distinguishing them by saying that one implies "an anticipation of the possible realization" of the supposition, while the other implies "an imagination of the possible realization" of the supposition; or that the one is "a supposition relating to contingent fact," while the other is "a supposition of conceived fact." I say merely that *it seems to me so*; and the more I think of the matter, the less I am able to see either of the last mentioned distinctions in the two expressions. If, however, others, when they use such expressions, feel that either of these distinctions is in their mind, it is impossible to appeal from this decision to any tribunal which will have higher authority with them. Let it be understood that I doubt whether any one who thought merely of the English expressions in question would ever make either of these distinctions between them *by his own suggestion*; I do not doubt that wit-

nesses without number, if they were asked directly whether they *did not make* these distinctions, would testify that they did so; for where it is so difficult to state or conceive clearly a distinction in language, it is extremely easy to imagine it to be almost any one which is plausibly given on high authority. We need not go far from the subject now under discussion for striking examples of this tendency. How many have quietly and in perfect confidence assented to the doctrine that the subjunctive in final clauses after past tenses "brings the action of its verb down to the present time," although there is hardly a page of Thucydides which would not demonstrate its utter absurdity! It seems to me, further, that the distinction of the optative as a "less distinct and vivid" form of expression than the subjunctive and equivalent forms (e.g. the imperative) appears in most of the constructions which admit the optative. In independent sentences, compare *μὴ πάθητε*, Dem. Lept. § 50 (p. 472), with the common *μὴ πάθοιτε*, the former being *do not suffer*, the latter *may you not suffer*. The same may be seen in the Homeric use of the independent optative compared with the imperative; e.g. in Ἑλένην Μενέλαος *ἄγοιτο*, Il. IV. 19, and *γυναῖκά τε οἶκαδ' ἀγέσθω*, Il. III. 72, the former being *may he carry*, the latter *let him carry*. In the double construction of oratio obliqua after past tenses, where an option is allowed between a subjunctive of the direct form and the same tense of the optative, the latter is evidently the weaker and less vivid form of expression, differing in no other respect from the former. The fact that two cases of this distinction have been inadvertently cited to illustrate the assumed distinction between the subjunctive and optative in protasis, although the direct forms in both cases would have been identical in construction, has been already used by me[1] to confirm my argument against

[1] See the remarks in *Journal of Philology*, Vol. v. No. 10, p. 198, on *εἰ συμπείθοι* and *εἰ εἰσηγοῖτο* as compared with *ἐὰν αἱρεθῇ* and *ἐὰν ᾖ* in Dem. Cor. p. 276, §§ 147, 148, where the two optatives are due entirely to the oratio obliqua and represent *ἐὰν συμπείθῃ* and *ἐὰν εἰσηγῆται* of the direct discourse. And yet these are standing examples of the "essential and inherent distinction" between the subjunctive and the optative! See, for instance, Dissen's and Holmes's notes on the passage, and Kühner, § 576, Anm. 7.

admitting any other distinction in direct discourse than is generally allowed to exist in these indirect quotations. The principles of oratio obliqua, as regards the choice of moods, apply, as I have already shown[1], to the distinction between the subjunctive and optative in final and object clauses (with ἵνα, ὅπως, μή, etc.) after past tenses, to which I have referred above. These analogies drawn from the other uses of the optative have given a strong and (I may add) an unexpected confirmation to the opinion to which I was led originally by a consideration of the subjunctive and optative in protasis and relative clauses alone.

If now the distinction which I have tried to establish is the true one, the question recurs, when will a speaker naturally use the subjunctive and when the optative in stating a future condition? In most cases he will use the more vivid form to express a supposition which *for any reason* is more vividly conceived and so more prominent in his own mind, or one which he wishes to bring more distinctly before the mind of the hearer; and the less vivid form for one which for any reason is less prominent or which he wishes to present less distinctly. His choice, therefore, may be influenced by various considerations. He will naturally form a more vivid conception of a supposition which he thinks highly probable in its nature or likely to be realized in a particular case, or of one which he especially desires or especially dreads to have realized. He will naturally express with greater distinctness a supposition which he wishes to mark as especially absurd; or one which for any reason he wishes to make especially emphatic in comparison with others in the same sentence, whatever may be the nature of the supposition itself; while he will naturally express with less distinctness one which he wishes to make less emphatic. Cases in which the subjunctive and optative in protasis are brought into contrast in successive sentences are very rare, so that we can generally supply the alternative form only in imagination. It must be remembered too that neither the subjunctive nor the optative expresses any *absolute* amount of

[1] See *Journal of Philology*, Vol. v. No. 10, p. 199.

vividness or distinctness, still less any absolute amount of probability or desire; these qualities are merely relative, and are made obvious chiefly by contrast. We must not be surprised, therefore, to find precisely the same supposition expressed in different forms by different persons who need not differ in their opinion of the nature of the supposition, or by the same person at different times without any necessity of a change of mind on his part: of this examples will be given below. Now if the distinction between the two moods were essential and fundamental, as Professor Sewall and Professor Morris believe it to be, it seems to me hardly possible that this variety of expression could be allowed: in that case, most conditions would fall by a fixed principle into one class or the other, and any change in the form would involve a grammatical error of the same nature (though of course not of the same degree) as that which an Athenian would have committed if he had said εἰ ἔλθοιμι in the sense of 'if I had gone.' There are some conditions, involving an extreme amount of absurdity or improbability, which would more naturally be stated by the optative alone unless special emphasis were intended; to this class belong most of the excellent and pertinent examples collected by Professor Morris,—*if the house should find a voice,—if the moon should never rise again,—if I should go on with my story for ten days,—if they should get a power like that of Gyges,—if a man should have three talents of gold in his stomach, one in his head, and a stater of gold in each eye.* In English as well as in Greek such conditions would in most cases be stated in the vaguest possible form, to correspond to the vagueness of such conceptions in the mind. But I hope to show below that all these conditions might under certain circumstances be stated in the more vivid form, without involving any grammatical or logical absurdity.

Before proceeding to state another consideration which often influenced the choice of mood in conditions, I will give examples of suppositions in which the choice of mood appears to be affected by one or more of the considerations already mentioned.

1. In Plato's Republic (VI. 494 B—E) we have a famous description of the career of a bright and handsome young man, of high birth and great wealth, exposed to the flattery and

adulation of a populous city, and of the fate of any philosophic friend who may attempt to divert him into the path of wisdom. We should say that this might be selected as a strong case of "conceived fact" as opposed to "contingent fact," or of the "imagination" rather than the "anticipation" or "expectation" of the condition being realized. If this case had been supposed in the optative form, all would have called it a striking instance of a purely ideal supposition. But here it is plain that Plato had in mind the career of Alcibiades and the relation of the fast young Athenian to Socrates; and he adds a most striking dramatic effect to his sketch by making Socrates imagine the course of the young man in the more graphic and impressive form of supposition. I feel sure that Professor Morris will agree with me in saying that it was optional with Plato to give or withhold this artistic touch; and we shall agree in thinking that the use of the subjunctive makes the sketch more life-like and implies that it is less of a fancy sketch than the optative would have done. He will, however, maintain (I fear) that the "expectant" form, the subjunctive, implies *by its own nature* necessarily a looking forward to realization; while I hold that the "vivid and distinct" form can be used to express emphasis in many other ways, even when there is no thought of realization; as in I. Cor. xii. 15, 16: ἐὰν εἴπῃ ὁ πούς, *if the foot shall say;* ἐὰν εἴπῃ τὸ οὖς, *if the ear shall say;* or in Matth. xv. 14: τυφλὸς δὲ τυφλὸν ἐὰν ὁδηγῇ, ἀμφότεροι εἰς βόθυνον πεσοῦνται, *and if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.* Let us see what effect would be produced by a change of mood: e.g. by substituting εἴ τις ἠρέμα προσελθὼν ταληθῆ λέγοι,...ἆρ' εὐπετὲς ἂν οἴει εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι; for ἐάν τις λέγῃ, κ.τ.λ., i.e. *if some one should go to him and tell him the truth,* for *if some one shall go to him and tell him the truth.* I can see in the former only the natural form of expression for such a supposition, which any of us would use in a similar case, and which any Greek would have used who had never known a career like the one supposed or who had no desire to make his sketch particularly impressive; in the present case, however, Plato wishes to paint as impressive a picture as he can of a most striking historical event, and he therefore uses a more vivid form of

statement, precisely as an artist might have used brighter colors in a real picture for an analogous purpose. That Plato could not have felt that the optative form would have been absurd here appears plainly from a parallel passage (Rep. VII. 517 A), where Socrates is made to refer to himself quite as pointedly as before, under the character of the man who attempts to release the prisoners in the cave and to lead them up to the light, and whom they would kill *if they could in any way get him into their hands*, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνειν ἄν. This could have been expressed by ἐάν πως δύνωνται ἀποκτενεῖν, i.e. *will they not kill him if they can?* If it had this form, it would be simply a more lively picture of the fate of Socrates than we now have, and this would explain (as in the other case) what might otherwise seem too distinct and vivid a statement of a condition which in itself seems eminently fitted for the other form of expression.

2. In Plat. Gorg. 521, 522, Socrates is represented as predicting his own trial and condemnation; and in contrast with this definite foreboding he supposes, merely for illustration, the case of a physician tried by a jury of boys with a pastry-cook as accuser. The outline of the construction is as follows (521 C—522 A): τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον, πονηρός τίς με ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον (sc. ἂν εἴη) εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι....οὐχ ἕξω ὅ τι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ. σκόπει γὰρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθεὶς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι, κ.τ.λ....τί ὂν οἴει ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁπόσον οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; Here we have a marked distinction between the more vivid form in which Socrates imagines himself brought before a court and the less vivid conception of the physician on his trial; and I believe that this distinction was based upon anticipation in one case and imagination in the other, a contrast in feeling which found its most natural expression in this contrast of forms. Further, I have no doubt that the change to εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι in the second supposition, where ἐὰν ἀποθάνω would certainly have been permitted, if not

expected, indicates a less vivid anticipation of being condemned to death than of being brought to trial. Just below (522 B) he applies the comparison to his own case by an apodosis in the optative: *τοσοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον.* But he returns immediately to the other form, with which he began: *οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς...ἔξω λέγειν· ...ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν...ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν.. οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν...οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως ὅ τι ἂν τύχω τοῦτο πείσομαι.* In replying to the next question of Callicles, however, Socrates uses the optative form in reference to the same subject, his anticipated trial: *εἰ μὲν οἶν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν..., καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον.* All these conditions could have been expressed in the subjunctive form quite as properly as the earlier ones; indeed the last one, *εἰ δὲ...τελευτῴην,* might naturally have had a subjunctive to express contrast with the preceding *εἰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.*, since one makes a supposition abhorrent to the speaker's feelings, which he regards as impossible, while the other refers to what actually took place and had already taken place when Plato wrote the words. It seems to me that no theory of the two forms of condition which assumes that there is in almost all cases a predetermined form in which alone a given future condition can be properly expressed can be applied consistently to these cases.

3. In Plat. Phædr. 259 A, Socrates imagines that the cicadæ are watching his conversation with Phædrus to see whether their chirping will lull the speakers into a noonday nap. He naturally hopes this will not be the case; and his change from the less vivid to the more vivid form of supposition seems to indicate this hope. He says: *εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν καὶ νῷ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ μὴ διαλεγομένους, ἀλλὰ νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ὑφ' αὑτῶν δι' ἀργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἂν καταγελῷεν·...ἐὰν δὲ ὁρῶσι διαλεγομένους...τάχ' ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες.* It may perhaps be thought that the antithesis here implies a stronger expectation of the latter condition

being realized; and such examples are too rare to decide the question. In most cases, however, in which expectation, desire, or hope is more prominent in one of the two successive conditions, the same form is found in both, as in Dem. Cor. § 178 (pp. 287, 288): *ἐὰν μὲν δέξωνται ταῦτα καὶ πεισθῶσιν ἡμῖν*, and *ἂν δ' ἄρα μὴ συμβῇ κατατυχεῖν.*

4. Cases of the more vivid form in suppositions the realization of which the speaker strongly dreads, and is trying by his argument to prevent, are found in Dem. Aphob. I. § 67 (p. 834): *ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποφύγῃ με οὗτος, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, τὴν ἐπωβελίαν ἰφλήσω μνᾶς ἕκατον.* But the use of this form was optional here also; for we find in Aph. II. § 18 (p. 841) *ποῖ δ' ἂν τραποίμεθα, εἴ τι ἄλλο ψηφίσαισθε* (referring to the same danger of an adverse vote), and within three lines of this we have *τούτου γίγνεται, τὴν ἐπωβελίαν ἐὰν ὄφλωμεν,* and still again in § 21 (p. 842), referring to the orator's sister in the same contingency, *εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς ἄλλο τι γνώσεσθε, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, τίνα οἴεσθε αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἕξειν, ὅταν ἐμὲ μὲν ἴδῃ, κ.τ.λ.*; I shall speak of these passages again below.

5. Cases in which the more vivid form is chosen to heighten the absurdity of an already absurd supposition sometimes occur, although they are naturally rare. Such seems to me to be Plat. Repub. X. 610 A: *ἐὰν μὴ σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ, unless a bodily vice shall engender in a soul a mental vice,*—a supposition which is at once stigmatized as absurd in 610 C: *τοῦτό γε οὐδείς ποτε δείξει.* Even after this the supposition follows: *ἐὰν δέ τις ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι καὶ λέγειν, κ.τ.λ.* Again, in 612 B, it is said of the soul *καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάν τ' ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον ἐάν τε μή, καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ τὴν Ἅϊδος κυνῆν,* i.e., *that the soul must do what is just, whether she have or have not the ring of Gyges, and besides such a ring the cap of Hades.* In a previous passage (359 C) the former miracle had been mentioned in the other form: *εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἵαν ποτέ φασι δύναμιν τῷ τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι,* and again (360 B): *εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίω γενοίσθην, κ.τ.λ.*, but with less emphasis. See also Eurip. Phœniss. 1215, 1216: ΑΓΓ. *οὐκ ἄν γε λέξαιμ' ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖσι σοῖς κακά.* ΙΟΚ. *ἦν μή γε φεύγων*

ἐκφύγῃς πρὸς αἰθέρα. And Orest. 1592, 1593: OP. φησὶν σιωπῶν· ἀρκέσω δ' ἐγὼ λέγων. MEN. ἀλλ' οὔτι χαίρων, ἤν γε μὴ φύγῃς πτεροῖς. Under this head, as it seems to me, might very properly come a Greek version of the proverb, 'If the sky fall, we shall catch larks,' in which the absurdity of the condition is heightened by expressing it in the more vivid form in English, and I feel confident (after carefully considering Mr Morris's argument) that the effect would be the same in Greek. Similar to the examples just quoted is the sarcastic reply of Socrates (Plat. Gorg. 470 C) to the taunt of Polus that even a child could show him to be in the wrong; to which Socrates replies: πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοὶ, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας, i.e. *I shall be much obliged to the child, and equally so to you too, if you shall refute me*, etc. I will refer also to two conditions from Plat. Euthyd. 299 B, C, which are quoted below (p. 32), one of which supposes a cartload of hellebore to be given at one dose, and the other supposes the patient who drinks it to be as big as the "statue at Delphi." Both are expressed by the subjunctive with ἐάν.

6. Occasionally the subjunctive form seems to mark a supposition as more emphatic than others with which it is contrasted, and the optative form to mark one as less emphatic than others, when there is no apparent distinction on the score of probability, expectation, desire, fear, or sarcasm. Thus in Plat. Protag. 330 C—331 A we have a series of conditions stated by Socrates in the optative form: εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμὲ, ἀποκριναίμην ἄν,—εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτο, φαίμεν ἄν,—εἰ οὖν εἴποι, εἴποιμ' ἄν,—εἰ οὖν εἴποι, τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; But here all at once he changes to the subjunctive form, and says: τί οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται, κ.τ.λ.; The argument had here reached a point at which Socrates felt he had gained an advantage, and he therefore puts this question with special emphasis. The whole conversation is purely imaginary, and certainly there was no greater probability or expectation of this question being asked than of the others, which indeed were a necessary introduction to this; the simple truth, as it seems to me, is that a more vivid form

was chosen to state a supposition which was to be made more prominent in the argument than the others. After this vivid statement of the condition, with a repetition of the apodosis *τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα*; Socrates returns to the other form and says: *ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν...καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δὲ, εἴ με ἐᾷς, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην.* In Plat. Crit. 51 D the laws are supposed to say: *καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν ... ἀπαγορεύει, ἐάν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐλθὼν, ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὑτοῦ.* There the single optative seems to indicate a condition which is less emphatic than the main one, although there is no other apparent ground for the change of form. We may produce the same effect in English: *and if any one of you shall want to go off to some colony,—supposing we and the state should fail to please him,—or if he shall want to go to some foreign country and live, none of us forbid him to go,* etc. No one would have been offended surely if any of the conditions quoted under this head had been expressed in the other form.

In the passages already quoted, the choice of mood in the protasis appears to have been affected more or less by the considerations mentioned, sometimes perhaps by several of them at once, and in each case some peculiar effect is produced by the mood chosen. Now it seems to me that these various considerations can hardly be reduced to the single one of 'probability,' 'expectation,' or 'anticipation of realization,' although I admit that this is one of the most common grounds of distinction where any can be seen. I have already stated[1] that this and the other grounds of distinction "seem to me to stand to the more comprehensive one of greater and less vividness in the relation (if I may be allowed the expression) of species to a genus"; in other words, I think the mistake commonly made here lies in confounding a very common (perhaps the *most* common) use of the distinction between the subjunctive and optative in protasis with the distinction itself. It will hardly be denied, I think, that, with the exception of the one relating

[1] See *Journal of Philology*, Vol. v. No. 10, p. 197.

to the physician before the jury of children, in Plat. Gorg. 521 E (of which below), all these conditions could have been stated in the other form without *essential* change of meaning, though often not without the loss of some special emphasis or effect. Now, if there were "a distinction in essence and fundamental" between the two forms, I hold that this interchange would be impossible, except on the assumption that the examples quoted are exceptional and too infrequent to cast doubt on an established principle of the language. But if the distinction is such as I have stated it, this interchange is just what would naturally be expected.

It will still be urged, however, that exceptions are as fatal to my principle as to the other, and that, if there is no essential and fundamental distinction between the two forms, every future supposition should admit of a double statement. I have indeed said that most of the conditions quoted by Professor Morris are more naturally stated in the optative form, because this vaguer form is in most cases better adapted to an improbable supposition, which must needs be more vaguely conceived than one which is distinctly anticipated. But I have given cases of the subjunctive in conditions which are quite as improbable and even absurd as any in Mr Morris's list. Surely 'escaping into the air,' 'taking flight on wings,' and 'having the ring of Gyges with the cap of Hades' could not be expressed by the subjunctive if absurdity or violation of physical laws were a bar. And yet every one must feel, with Professor Morris, that most of his examples could not be changed to the subjunctive form without violence to the thought. Why now is this so? Even if it is said that the subjunctives just mentioned are due to "rhetorical effect" (which has long been a *deus ex machina* in Greek syntax), the question remains, why will not this potent agency transform Mr Morris's examples for me as well as my own? To begin with the strongest case, Aesch. Agam. 37: *οἶκος δ' αὐτὸς, εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι, σαφέσταθ' ἂν λέξειεν*, and the parallel passage in Plat. Protag. 361 A, where it is said of the issue of the argument: *εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἄν, κ.τ.λ.*,—I would remark that there is nothing intrinsically more impossible in a *house* or the *issue of an argument* speaking

than in *laws* speaking; and yet in Plat. Crit. 50 C we find τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι; The supposition of the laws addressing Socrates had first been made by εἰ ἔροιντο (50 A). Now why is there no absurdity in this sudden change to the more vivid form? Merely because the apodosis is a simple future τί (sc. ἐροῦμεν); so that the whole sentence means *what shall we reply if the laws (shall) say?* If, on the contrary, the sentence were *they* (the laws) *would astonish us by their eloquence if they should speak,* there would be the same objection to changing this to the subjunctive form which is felt in the other case of the house speaking. To say *the laws will astonish us by their eloquence if they shall speak to us* would be felt at once to be unnatural; but there is, as we have seen, no valid objection to be made to the protasis. So also in the changed form of the passage from Æschylus the apodosis *the house will speak most plainly* is the only objectionable part; and this offends us because 'will speak' is too absolute and unqualified an assertion to make of a house, the more contingent and weaker form 'would speak' being the only one appropriate under ordinary circumstances. If now we substitute an apodosis here in which a simple future can stand, e.g. *dark deeds will come to light,* then grammatically (though not dramatically) all objection to ἢν φθογγὴν λάβῃ οἶκος is felt to be removed. Compare "Foul deeds *will* rise, though all the earth o'erwhelm them."

In Aristoph. Nub. 754, εἰ μηκέτ' ἀνατέλλοι σελήνη μηδαμοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοίην τοὺς τόκους, the optative is perhaps necessary, as Mr Morris intimates, to account for the patience of Socrates with the stupidity of his pupil, which would (he thinks) have been intolerable in the subjunctive form; nevertheless, whatever grammatical or logical objection there may be to the subjunctive will be at once removed if we substitute in the apodosis οὔ με δεήσει ἀποδοῦναι τοὺς τόκους. If a similar change is made in all the examples in the next fifty lines, to which Mr Morris refers, no one can object to stating the conditions in the subjunctive except on the excellent ground that their impudence would be thereby greatly enhanced.

In Æsch. Pers. 431 the same principle holds; and if the apodosis be made future, e.g. *half my tale will not be told,* the

subjunctive can stand in the protasis. I may add that, in my own judgment, the changed form which Professor Morris gives as erroneous is not only correct, but elegant.

Of the next example (Plat. Repub. II. 359 C) I have already spoken; and I think it will be evident that this could have been stated *ἔσται δ' ἐξουσία...ἣν αὐτοῖς γένηται.*

As to the striking example from Plat. Euthyd. 299 E, already mentioned: *εἴη ἂν εὐδαιμονέστατος, εἰ ἔχοι χρυσίου μὲν τρία τάλαντα ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ, τάλαντον ἐν τῷ κρανίῳ, στατῆρα δὲ χρυσοῦ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶφθαλμῷ*;—I am encouraged to think that I am right in saying that it might be written *ἔσται...ἐὰν ἔχῃ*; by two conditions which precede (299 B and C): *καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἕξει, ἐάν τις αὐτῷ τρίψας ἐγκεράσῃ ἑλλεβόρου ἅμαξαν*; to which Ctesippus adds: *πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ἐὰν ᾖ γε ὁ πίνων ὅσος ὁ ἀνδριὰς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς.* Surely whoever can swallow this "cart-load of hellebore" will not be troubled even by "three talents of gold in his stomach!" I may add here, as a proof that no amount of absurdity or impossibility can make the subjunctive incorrect in protasis, Dem. Phil. III. § 68 (p. 128): *ὥστε, μηδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν ᾖ, δεινὸν πείσεσθαι*, where *ὁτιοῦν* is a sort of *x* for which we are at liberty to substitute anything imaginable. The more common formula would undoubtedly be *οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ὁτιοῦν γένοιτο*, but here the irregular future infinitive after *ὥστε* makes the subjunctive in the dependent clause more natural.

In the argument cited from Plat. Phæd. 72 B, C, we cannot, it is true, suppose the conditions to be changed to the subjunctive form without injury to the argument, because the apodoses are not of a kind to be stated absolutely in the future indicative; but I can see nothing in the conditions themselves which would be repugnant to the other form. In Phædr. 245 D, however, I cannot doubt that either form could be used in the sentence *εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο.* For in the corresponding sentence just below, which on every ground should be parallel in construction, we have *ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης, οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ἔκ του οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται*, where the participle is clearly equivalent to *ἐὰν ἀπόληται.*

In the quotation from Pericles in Arist. Rhet. III. 10, 7 (where three of Bekker's four MSS. read ἐξέλῃ), the optative seems clearly the more natural form, not only from the nature of the supposition, but from the implied apodosis, which would be in the optative with ἄν. With an appropriate apodosis, I think even this condition could have the other form.

In Xen. Anab. III. 2. 24, the last of Mr Morris's examples, I cannot see anything in the protasis, *καὶ εἰ σὺν τεθρίπποις βούλοιντο ἀπιέναι*, to exclude the subjunctive form; but the apodoses are all better expressed by the optative with ἂν than they would be by the future indicative. Indeed, it may be safely said that the implied protasis which conditions the first two optatives is also understood with the third, so that the expressed protasis states only part of the condition.

I fear that the doctrine of the effect of the apodosis upon the protasis may be considered even more heretical than the main proposition which I am defending. I must therefore give a few examples to illustrate this effect. It is especially evident in conditional relative sentences when the apodosis precedes the protasis and consists of an optative in a wish: in such cases the force of the optative in assimilating the dependent verb will be generally admitted. As examples may serve Odyss. I. 47: *ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅ τις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι may and other man likewise perish who shall do the like of this;* and Mimnermus Fr. 1: *τεθναίην ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλοι, may I die when I shall no longer care for these.* Here few will deny that if the wish had been expressed by any other form than the optative—even by a weaker expression, like *βούλομαι* with an infinitive—the dependent verbs would have naturally been in the subjunctive, without any essential change in meaning. In Il. V. 212–15 we have one protasis in the subjunctive preceding the apodosis (an optative in a wish), and another in the optative following it: the assimilation is here very marked.

εἰ δέ κε νοστήσω καὶ ἐσόψομαι ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
πατρίδ' ἐμὴν ἄλοχόν τε καὶ ὑψερεφὲς μέγα δῶμα,
αὐτίκ' ἔπειτ' ἀπ' ἐμεῖο κάρη τάμοι ἀλλότριος φώς,
εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ τάδε τόξα φαεινῷ ἐν πυρὶ θείην.

But in Il. II. 258–261, a passage otherwise parallel, the assimilation is not effected. In Æsch. Prom. 979: *εἴης φορητὸς οὐκ ἂν, εἰ πράσσοις καλῶς, you would not be endurable if you should ever be in prosperity,* who can doubt that a change of *εἴης ἄν* to *ἔσται* would have caused a change of *εἰ πράσσοις* to *ἦν πράσσῃς, if you shall ever be in prosperity?* In Dem. Aph. II. § 18 (p. 841), quoted above (p. 27): *ποῖ δ' ἂν τραποίμεθα, εἴ τι ἄλλο ψηφίσαισθε*; what possible reason can be given for the optative in a condition which is twice expressed by the subjunctive and once by the future indicative, except the assimilating force of the apodosis? The same effect is quite as striking in English as in Greek. We should say 'Turkey will beg for mercy, if Russia shall take (takes) Constantinople'; but we should also say, with no change in our view of the contingency, 'England would be in danger of war, if Russia should take Constantinople.' The form which the apodosis takes (which may be determined by various considerations not affecting our view of the realization of the condition which is to follow) in such cases naturally determines the form of the dependent protasis. That is, the greater or less absoluteness with which we state the apodosis often (though not always) affects the "distinctness and vividness" with which we state the same condition at different times.

Though this assimilating effect is more apparent and probably more powerful upon a protasis which follows its apodosis, it is by no means confined to such cases. I cannot see any other ground than assimilation for the distinction in the two conditions in Odyss. VIII. 352, 353, and 355, 356:—

πῶς ἂν ἐγώ σε δέοιμι μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν,
εἴ κεν Ἄρης οἴχοιτο χρέος καὶ δεσμὸν ἀλύξας;

Ἥφαιστ', εἴ περ γάρ κεν Ἄρης χρείως ὑπαλύξας
οἴχηται φεύγων, αὐτός τοι ἐγὼ τάδε τίσω.

Here Poseidon, the last speaker, who proposes to be surety for Ares, would naturally be expected to state his supposition in the weakest form; but the apodosis *τίσω, I will pay,* is an absolute statement compared with *δέοιμι ἄν,* and this decides the form of the protasis by an influence as strong and as unfelt

(by the speaker) as that which would cause every schoolboy to translate one protasis by *if Ares shall depart* (or *departs*), and the other by *if Ares should depart*, without dreaming of one expressing more probability or implying more expectation than the other. I am sorry that I cannot see the ground for the distinction between the two suppositions of Philip's death, *ἂν οὗτός τι πάθῃ* and *εἴ τι πάθοι*, in Dem. Phil. I. §§ 11, 12 (p. 43), for which Professor Morris argues so persuasively; but I cannot be convinced that an orator could use *within a single minute* and with reference to the same future contingency two forms of expression which differed essentially and fundamentally in the manner in which the supposed event was conceived, with regard to its probability or to the expectation or anticipation of its realization. I believe, on the contrary, that here too the protasis was assimilated in each case to the apodosis: in the former case this was *ταχέως ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε*; in the latter it was a complicated sentence consisting of two distinct apodoses in the optative with *ἄν*, each conditioned specially by a participle. If the former apodosis had been *ποιήσαιτ' ἄν* (as it might easily have been), and the latter had been simply *οὐδὲ Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι δυνήσεσθε*, I feel confident we should have had the two forms of protasis reversed.

The strong evidence I have given of the effect of the apodosis on the form of the protasis will, I trust, strengthen the position already taken (p. 21), that the subjunctive differs from the optative in common future conditions very much as it does in oratio obliqua after past tenses in conditions which in direct discourse have the subjunctive, and in the indirect form allow either subjunctive or optative. This is also an effect of the leading verb on the dependent mood, which is as plain in English as in Greek. Thus we say 'he says he will tell her *if she comes;*' but 'he said he would tell her *if she came*' (i.e. '*should come*'); corresponding to the Greek *ἐὰν ἔλθῃ* and *εἰ ἔλθοι*. The distinction of the Greek is that its greater freedom allows both *εἰ ἔλθοι* and *ἐὰν ἔλθῃ* in the latter case, while the English allows only the weaker form; that is, in Greek the assimilation is optional, in English it is compulsory. Perhaps the most striking cases of this principle in Greek are those in

which the apodosis and the leading sentence on which the oratio obliqua depends are united in one sentence; as in Dem. Cor. § 145 (p. 275): *οὐκ ἦν τοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολέμου πέρας οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγὴ Φιλίππῳ, εἰ μὴ Θηβαίους καὶ Θετταλοὺς ἐχθροὺς ποιήσειε τῇ πόλει*, i.e. *Philip saw no way of ending or escaping the war, unless he should make*, etc. Here *ἐὰν μὴ ποιήσῃ* would have been equally proper, as is plain from sentences like Thuc. II. 24: *ἢν δέ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ κινεῖν τὰ χρήματα..., θάνατον ζημίαν ἐπέθεντο.* I am very skeptical of any theory which assumes a more fundamental distinction between *ἢν ποιήσῃ* and *εἰ ποιήσειε* in ordinary cases than is universally admitted to exist here.

The same principle is illustrated by the double form of protasis allowed after final clauses which depend on past tenses; but this is really another form of protasis in oratio obliqua. See Dem. Aph. I. § 53 (p. 830); Thuc. I. 58, 91.

I must leave many points of detail both in Professor Sewall's and in Professor Morris's paper unnoticed. I will briefly allude in conclusion to what seems to me a fatal objection to the system of classification advocated in both those papers. The fundamental idea assigned to the subjunctive, that of "contingency" or that of "anticipation" or "expectation" of realization, in my opinion, fails utterly to explain the nature of the "present general suppositions" expressed by *ἐάν* and the subjunctive. Professor Morris does not allude to these, and he has perhaps little occasion to do so in his argument; Professor Sewall mentions them as suppositions of "uncertain fact," and quotes two in illustration of this explanation. I cannot see, after carefully considering his interpretations of these passages, how his doctrine would enable us to distinguish between the cases which require the subjunctive and those which require the present or perfect indicative. Why is *if ever they have fought a battle* any more a "supposition of uncertain fact" than *if these men have fought a battle to-day* (the fact supposed being uncertain)? I fear, however, I have failed to understand this part of Mr Sewall's paper, for he speaks of *ἢν προσμίξωσι* (Thuc. II. 39) as "in the *past*, not future." It certainly is not future; but it seems to me

impossible to conceive of it as past, or even as strictly present. It rather refers indefinitely to any one of a series or class of acts; and the Greek is perhaps the only language which ever undertook systematically to distinguish this indefinite "general" supposition by construction from the simple present supposition. Now I hold it to be impossible to bring these conditions under one head with the future suppositions which take the subjunctive by any such sweeping definitions as the one just mentioned. The subjunctive in the latter case is generally interchangeable with the future indicative, and can be translated by this tense in both English and Latin; the other is regularly expressed in both English and Latin by the present indicative, and sometimes takes this form even in Greek. I have already described the quasi-present general condition as a "variation (so to speak) of the ordinary present condition," while the corresponding past general condition is a variation of the ordinary past condition expressed by the past tenses of the indicative[1]. This important relation, with its consequences, must be apprehended, as it seems to me, before the true force of the subjunctive in protasis can be understood. It will be borne in mind that I refer here to the distinction between the use of the subjunctive in *future* conditions (where it may be either particular or general) and its use in *present general* conditions, and not to the 'general' character which may be given to any class of conditions without essentially changing their nature. A distinction based upon this latter character has been recognized in the subjunctive in protasis by Bäumlein, as I have already stated[2]; but it led him to no important result, as it is the basis of no

[1] See *Journal*, v. 10, p. 192.

[2] See Bäumlein, *Untersuchungen über die griech. Modi*, p. 211. For remarks on his views of this subject, see *Journal*, v. 10, p. 193. It is there said: "Bäumlein leaves the subjunctive in general conditions, as well as in other kinds of protasis, to be explained on his single principle as denoting a 'Tendenz zur Wirklichkeit'; and he seems to have no suspicion that the two subjunctives stand in different relations to the present indicative." It is no wonder, therefore, that he found his distinction "unessential" (unwesentlich) and "without effect in changing the meaning of the construction" (die Bedeutung dieser Construction *nicht ändert*). *Modi*, p. 221; cf. p. 224.

distinction in construction. Bäumlein shows in his first statement of the subject that he has no such distinction in mind as that which I have used in my classification; for his very first example is ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὅν κεν ἵκωμαι (Il. I. 139), and of eighteen other Homeric examples cited to illustrate the general use of the subjunctive with ὅς κε, "wonach eine Gattung von Fällen als eintretend gesetzt wird," no less than sixteen contain subjunctives referring to the future. It is absolutely necessary to recognize distinctly the element of *time* in order to appreciate the relations of the subjunctive in its two uses, first, to the future and the present indicative, secondly, to the two corresponding uses of the optative. I cannot feel, therefore, that the two systems of classifications which I have discussed in this paper, as they are based on other considerations and exclude wholly or in great part the element of time, can possibly give just prominence to these important relations.

W. W. GOODWIN.

LUCRETIUS' PROŒMIUM AND EPICUREAN THEOLOGY.

MATTER is utterly dead, Lucretius has told us over and over again. The world and all that is on it, from the inert mass to the wonderful human form, instinct with life and thought, everything, look as fine as it may, is made but of scraps of this dead matter in which no slightest admixture of life dwells or works. Of this Lucretius is most firmly convinced. What then are we to think, when, having mastered his whole system, we return to his opening lines? There, at the portal of the poem, as it were, stands an apparition and a lovely one—the figure of Venus joyous and full of life. We are utterly startled at the sight, and almost expect it to vanish, for how comes this beautiful presence here, where the realm of death is, and none but dead things should be seen? It is an apparition indeed.

All lovers of Lucretius have been perplexed and puzzled by the apparent inconsistency of this opening of a poem, one chief feature of which is to prove that "all things are done without the hand of the gods," that they have no possible control over the world or men. All have been puzzled here—we might assume it to be a mere imitation of ancient poets who invoked the Muse to their aid—but something in the tone and matter has forbidden nearly all to view it as such. And yet, if it be an actual prayer for Divine aid, how can that be reconciled with Lucretius' system? One recent writer, Mr Robert Buchanan[1], has solved the question very simply. According to him, this Invocation is merely "in the highest sense a parody, because it

[1] *New Quarterly Magazine*, April, 1876, p. 5, also p. 3.

is the mere imitative conjuration of a divine entity in whom the singer has no faith." Thus the knot is loosed in a very easy way. But could we feel nothing too earnest for a parody in the passage, apart from this entirely, Mr Buchanan's verdict that Lucretius has no faith in any Divine existence is in entire contradiction to those who have studied both Lucretius and Epicureanism most thoroughly. There is, as we shall shortly see, unquestionable evidence that both Epicurus and Lucretius firmly believed that Gods of a kind did exist. Another opinion, partly similar to Mr Buchanan's, is expressed by Lange in his justly well-known "History of Materialism." "Lucretius invokes the Gods, and at the same time combats religion," says Lange, "while yet it is impossible for us to discover in his system even a shadow of doubt or contradiction in respect of this." The meaning of these words it is impossible to understand till we turn to his chapter on Epicurus[1], where we find the following explanation: "There can be no doubt that Epicurus in reality reverenced the conception of the Gods as being an element of a noble human origin, and did not reverence the Gods themselves as externally existing Beings." "He worshipped the Gods on account of their perfection: he could do this no matter whether this perfection manifests itself in their external actings, *or whether it unfolds itself solely as an ideal in our thoughts:* and it is the latter which appears to have been his standpoint." "Epicurus never came into conflict with religion, for he worshipped the Gods sedulously (*fleissig*) in the customary way, yet without on this account pretending a view of them which was not his."

We must not think that his worship of the Gods was a "mere pretence in order to keep himself safe with the mass of the people and with the dangerous priesthood, it came truly from the heart, since in fact his Deities who live without care or suffering represented the ideal of his philosophy as it were embodied. It was at the utmost a concession to the existing order of things,"—from a moral point of view we must say a most dangerous concession—"if Epicurus thus complied with

[1] *Geschichte des Materialismus.* Erster Abschnitt. Cap. 4. 1873.

forms of worship which he must have thought at the least arbitrary or indifferent." The peculiar 'consistency' and honesty which lay in being entirely a disbeliever in the Gods' existence, for such Lange declares him to have been, and at the same time 'sedulously' going through the ordinary forms of pagan worship, seems to us very hard to understand. Indeed the morality of this passage appears to us absolutely incomprehensible. According to Lange, Lucretius does not believe in the existence of Venus. She is no reality, she is but the merest picture—yet he can pray to her "without even a shadow of inconsistency," for is she not an "embodied ideal of his philosophy"? Such mock worship of a popular deity,—under the reservation that all the time it implied the worship of something else, namely, of an 'ideal' which did not objectively exist,—seems to us the most contemptible insincerity possible. The notion of a parody is repulsive enough, but such a 'concession' as this is positively hideous. (Moreover Lange's emphatic assertion, for which he offers no word of proof, that Epicurus did not hold the actual existence of the Gods, is entirely contradictory to historical evidence[1].) A different explanation, which does not reduce the Invocation either to a parody or to a concession, is offered by a French writer, M. Martha[2]. According to him we have here an allegory:—the goddess Venus is a personification of the great law of life and reproduction in Nature—the sovereign law which rules the world. "These beautiful images, borrowed from the national religion, enclose a profession of faith and a fundamental doctrine of Epicureanism." As the poet proceeds and prays to Venus[3] to beg from Mars, her lover, peace for the Romans, in this Lucretius more and more confounds Venus with the mythic ancestress of the Roman race—but this is a

[1] See Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen*, Theil III. p. 395.

[2] *Le Poème de Lucrèce*, 1873, pp. 100—106.

[3] In the Appendix (p. 358) Martha makes the suggestion—a very natural one—that in this beautiful picture Lucretius has reproduced some statuary group of Venus soothing Mars. It is probable that the two were frequently represented in the attitude here described. Certain phrases, such as 'tereti cervice reflexa,' suggest this, he says.

simple play of imagination[1]. The Venus of the opening lines is only a law of Nature personified[2].

Before we can decide what Lucretius meant here, it is plain that we must first answer a question which it is not easy at once to settle, namely, Did Epicurus and Lucretius really believe that their assumed Deities existed, or did they not? Historical evidence asserts that Epicurus did, but the Epicurean Gods are such meaningless, impotent shadow-deities, and so superfluous are they in particular for his atomic explanation of the world, that some have thought Epicurus simply professed a belief in them for appearance' sake, and really believed in no Divine existence whatever. But as the profession of Atheism would have made his system too unpopular (would have been 'dangerous' as Lange asserts), he nominally retained the ancient deities while depriving them of all their power. But for the entire superfluousness and impotency of these deities, the question whether Lucretius and his master were atheists could never have been raised at all. Lucretius asserts repeatedly his belief that the Gods exist, and promises[3] more than once to prove "at full length" what their nature is. Their bodies, he says, are material, being formed of the smallest kind of atoms, but of supersensual—almost inconceivable—fineness, and they dwell far, far away from earth, in their *sedes quietæ*, a stormless, cloudless, Epicurean heaven,

[1] Probably it is not even this. No mythological tone need *necessarily* be seen in the address *Æneadum genetrix*. It is probably here but a title of Venus, and of all her names the one dearest to Roman ears. Lucretius did not believe that she was ancestress of the Romans, and had he been a modern author would not have used the phrase.

[2] Bockemüller in his recent edition of Lucretius (Part I. p. 10, 1874) also holds Venus to be a mere personification of natural law, but offers a different and somewhat novel explanation of the passage. According to him Lucretius' petition for peace is directed in reality and under cover of the figures, Venus and Mars, to the recently wedded pair, Julia and Pompey, who were for Romans of that period the "universally acknowledged representatives of supersensual power." "Julia (Julus, Æneas, Venus) = Venus and Pompeius M. = Mars."—It was, we believe, Martha who first called attention to the fact, as bearing on this passage, that the Roman emperor and his consort were often represented in statuary under the guise of Mars and Venus.

[3] See v. 155, and I. 57 too.

"Where falls not hail, or rain, or any snow,
Nor ever wind blows loudly."

Munro says, "it is certain that Epicurus and Lucretius firmly believed in the existence of these Gods[1]," and Zeller[2] emphatically asserts the same. There is but one passage in the poem which does indeed seem to imply the opposite. Lucretius proves at length that Cybele is but the Earth personified. If any one thinks fit to be so foolish, he may call the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, but he must remember all the time that these are but names of things without life. Yet in this passage Lucretius by no means rejects an actual Neptune, or Ceres, or Bacchus. It is merely the connection of these deities with the sea, corn, or wine which he denies. The Epicurean shadow-deities—the new Pantheon—do in verity exist, but their counter-parts, which a former theology supposed to have power over nature, have no existence whatever. It is apparently on a misunderstanding of this passage that Lange has based his opinion.

According to the facts of the case, grossly and absurdly inconsistent as it may appear to us, Lucretius did firmly believe in the existence of Gods of a kind. It is inconsistent because his Gods are utter nonentities, and because his system leaves them no part to play. But how frequent, even now, especially in matters of belief and practice, some similar inconsistency is! It is plain that while Lucretius invokes Venus in the proœmium, he has before his mind a principle, the existence and constant transmission of life in Nature. This is a Law of Nature. But is it impossible that the thought should occur to the poet, "May not this Law be a person too? a Deity?" Who can say that in some moment this thought may not have seized him? Is it not true that Lucretius' ardent recognition of Law (and thereby of Unity) in Nature in defiance of Polytheistic caprice prepared the way for Theism? and if so, is it impossible that he himself should have had a glimpse of the truth towards which he had, though unwittingly, been working? It seems bold to deny the possibility of this.

[1] See his note on II. 646.

[2] *Philosophie der Griechen.* Theil III. p. 395.

To recognise one Life in Nature would, it is true, utterly contradict Epicurus, whom Lucretius has almost always followed so closely, yet he need not have so followed him everywhere: and here, *for once,* he may have taken a long stride in advance of his master. Doubtless, even Lucretius felt occasionally, in presence of the beautiful world, that there was somewhere a contradiction between Nature and *his* darling *De Rerum Natura*—that the first contained something which was wanting in the other.

It is not fair to say that the supposition of an allegory can entirely explain this invocation—for the address to Venus contains something in its tone more like a prayer for Rome and his countrymen, if we are not mistaken, than like a make-believe address to a mere conscious and intended allegory. A Roman worshipper in a temple raising his eyes to some marble statue of a god might form such mental pictures of Deity and use some such phrases as here suggest to us mere pictorial description. Fatal again to the notion of a parody are the words

"Quæ quoniam rerum naturam *sola* gubernas,"

"Since thou *alone* governest nature." The word 'alone' makes the passage no parody, but a distinct expression of Lucretius' protest against the belief in many deities who all alike interfere with nature. Lucretius, it seems to us, here distinctly avows *one* ruling power in the world, and, whether this be taken for a Law or a person, in either case it is not an "imitation" of the popular creed, but an expression of his own. (Lucretius attributes no control over Nature to Mars.)

Possibly too the passage may be more fairly viewed as the expression of some mood, earlier or later, than as spoken from Lucretius' habitual stand-point. His earliest inspiration—and evidently a very strong one—was derived not from Epicurus but from Empedocles, a thinker of a very different order. Lucretius speaks of him with the most fervent admiration, as almost more than a mortal. The divinity named Love or Aphrodite[1], a most prominent figure in Empedocles' poem,

[1] Zeller insists on this name *not* representing a mere personification. *Philosophie der Griechen*, Vol. I. p. 697. (Vierte Auflage, 1876.)

who produces life and brings all things into being, is very like the Venus of the Invocation. Another Greek poet who strongly influenced Lucretius was Euripides; and he too repeatedly extols the power of Aphrodite; for him she is almost omnipotent; she is, he sometimes says, the all-ruling power both in nature and in the heart of man[1]. And in this prooemion we seem to have a wild reconciliation between Epicureanism and the religious nature-speculations of Empedocles (influenced possibly by Euripides also)—an Epicurean Venus who is yet at the same time the Life of the whole world. At any rate the whole introduction of the poem bears a most unfinished character: the paragraphs composing it, though in strict sequence of thought, come in severally with a jerk as it were, and it seems as if it had been written not all at once, but in parts and at different times[2]. Thus the address to Venus may possibly have been composed at a different time and stage of thought from the rest of the poem.

(The notion that Venus and Mars are merely two allegorical figures, Love and Strife, or the motions of destruction and renewal ever at work in nature, in spite of Professor Sellar's eloquent vindication, appears to us artificial, or at least without sufficient evidence. At the same time we must beware of attributing to Lucretius ideas which are foreign to him, for instance, Mr Symonds says that Lucretius "dropping the phraseology of atoms, void, motion or chance, spoke at times of Nature as endowed with reason and a will," but no one of the passages which he quotes (v. 186, 811, 846) appears to have this meaning. 'Nature,' as Lucretius uses the word, means

[1] See Reisacker's pamphlet, *Der Todesgedanke...bei den Römern*, pp. xx. and xxi.

[2] So Munro in his second edition (see Vol. I. pp. 346—7) thought it possible that the poem originally opened with the passage now beginning at v. 62 (Humana ante oculos, &c.), but that Lucretius subsequently composed another opening passage, that with which the poem at present begins. (He has since retracted this opinion.)—We express here the indebtedness to Mr Munro's edition felt by all who have endeavoured to grasp the thought of Lucretius, which is often a difficult matter. It required some qualities of mind which are rarely united, to produce so *trustworthy* a work. Much as Lachmann performed for the text, it must be remembered that he left almost all undone for the explanation of the poem, a task of excessive difficulty.

but the laws of Nature, the habits of the world; that is all. Yet it is true that having discarded the old Divine agencies, the notion of Nature as a new self-working power might easily come.)

In conclusion, we can only mention that it is not certain whether Epicurus did not allow of prayers to the Gods—how to be answered, we can barely conceive—possibly merely in keeping the mind open to the influence of the Divine 'images[1]'. Epicurus' relation to religion seems to have been, as Martha says, a kind of 'obscure mysticism' of which we know but little. After all the question is one that it seems not possible to solve entirely. Lucretius did believe in Divine existences, of however strange a kind, and perhaps we may view the picture of Venus and Mars (vv. 31—39) as a single scene out of his promised description of the new Pantheon and the Epicurean heaven. The promise remains unfulfilled, but as the sixth (which he intended for the concluding) book is manifestly incomplete[2], stopping abruptly in the course of a description of the plague, and as in its beginning he again refers to the Gods at some length, it seems fair to infer that, had he lived, he would have concluded the poem with a description of the Epicurean deities and their abode. Doubtless a wonderful piece of painting that would have been (for Lucretius has gorgeous colours at command) and not entirely uninfluenced by the old mythology. Would it have resembled the picture of the Epicurean Gods by our great English poet in the 'Lotos-Eaters'? Yet what contemptible Deities for any man to worship! with neither heart nor hand to help, lower far than the Heroes worshipped of old with all their sins, for they, if suffering men called to them, would labour or die to help and deliver them. But with these no man's soul could ever

[1] See Book vi. 75—78.

[2] Lange (page 120) says that "perhaps intentionally" Lucretius concludes his work with a description of the power of death as he began it with an Invocation of the Goddess of Life. But we have absolutely no reason to suppose that Lucretius intended this for the conclusion. It seems plain (from vi. 92 f.) that he intended the sixth book for the last, and as his express promise to describe the Gods and their seats is nowhere fulfilled, he must apparently have reserved this subject for the conclusion of this book and of the poem.

have been satisfied, and who can say that Lucretius, dogmatic Epicurean as he was, would have used no bitter tone, such as marks Tennyson's vivid picture:

> "*Careless of mankind;*
> For they lie beside their nectar and their bolts are hurled
> Far below them in the valleys, and the clouds are lightly curled
> Round their golden houses girdled with the gleaming world.
> *There they smile in secret, looking over wasted lands,*
> *Blight and famine, plague and earthquake, roaring deeps and fiery sands,*
> *Clanging fights, and flaming towns and sinking ships and praying hands,*
> *But they smile;* they find a music centred in a doleful song,
> Steaming up a lamentation, and an ancient tale of wrong,
> Like a tale of little meaning, though the words are strong."

Before concluding, we wish to touch on one central but little understood dogma of Epicurean physics. Thoroughgoing in his Materialism as Lucretius is, there is one particular where he comes into most striking agreement with recent speculations, starting from an utterly different stand-point. In the course of the recent controversy between Tyndall and Martineau, the latter has discussed the nature of Force[1]. Science, he tells us, cannot answer the question, What is Force? To find an answer to this we must look within ourselves. We are conscious that we ourselves exercise Power. This is the one thing we immediately know, and our whole idea of Power is identical with that of Will or reduced from it. Any causal Power other than Will is "absolutely out of the sphere of thought." Lucretius strikingly illustrates this conception according to which Will is the source of Energy. When on a former occasion we gave an account of Lucretius' Atomic Theory, we did so with especial reference[2] to the Declination of the Atoms and its philosophical consequences—a subject before hardly touched on. In Epicurean theory, the motion of the atoms is the source from which the whole Energy of the Universe is originally derived. The atoms which are conceived to fall straight downwards, in parallel lines, like drops of

[1] *Contemporary Review*, March, 1876.

[2] "The Atomic Theory of Lucretius, contrasted with modern Theories of Atoms and the Origin of Life." *British Quarterly Review*, October, 1875, pp. 335—377. See here pp. 355—363 and p. 371.

rain, would never meet, but that occasionally they swerve a very little from their proper path and so come into collision. The slightest declension is quite sufficient, as we pointed out, to bring the atoms into universal collision and so render them a source of Power. This swerving—'Declination' Lucretius calls it—comes entirely from their own volition, which is governed by no laws, but impels them to move of their own accord, "at no fixed place or time." Thus, according to Lucretius as well as according to that living thinker, to whom Lucretius appears so completely antagonistic, Will is most closely connected with the original source of all the Energy, or Power, or Forces acting in the world. It is Will, even though it be the will of the atoms. True, Lucretius, as we have said, most emphatically insists that Matter is "utterly dead[1]." After having reduced the whole universe to atoms, he makes merry with somewhat ghastly laughter over the notion of these little particles having life. If so, you may think of them "laughing and weeping and learnedly discussing Epicurean doctrines." To do this and conceive them living is "raving madness," he says. Yet surely that is not more absurd than his own conception of atoms that have wills of their own and can move to the right or left, "as they wish," *sponte suâ*, but which are at the same time "utterly dead." It is for this reason, because his atoms act as if they were alive, and because a dead Will is an absurdity, that we formerly said that Lucretius *virtually* conceives Matter as living, and that really his theory of Matter involves—certainly in a very low form, perhaps in the very lowest form possible—Pantheism.

This statement may seem somewhat startling, especially when we consider what Lucretius' creed was, how thoroughgoing in many ways his materialism is. We may call to mind that he has most emphatically asserted the existence of Free Will, which he supposes to be rendered possible only through Declination. This power in the atoms he supposes to be the cause of Free Will action in men. Now, the question strikes one, Is his theory of Volition as a source of Energy connected with his strong belief in individual Free Will? and, if so, may

[1] Seminibus carentibus undique sensu.

not the connection be strictly logical? Is it not entirely in harmony with the thought expressed by Martineau, that all phenomena are the expression of living Energy? that our whole idea of Power is derived from that of living Will? It is true, the volition of the atoms is not, nominally, what one calls a living Will. A dead Will is indeed an absurdity, but Will without life was one of the Epicurean dogmas which Lucretius, as a convert, had felt himself bound to swallow. He will not even admit to himself that there is anything unnatural in it. Yet, putting this aside, Lucretius does indeed furnish an assent from an unexpected quarter to the conception of recent thinkers that Will is the only source of Energy.

When we examine the subject we see that the part played by Declination in his system is most subtle;—especially we refer to his notion of an Increase of moving force[1], starting from the infinitely slight swerving of the tiny atoms of the fourth principle of the soul, and growing gradually stronger and stronger till the whole body moves. Space does not permit us to show how curiously this notion is adapted to Epicurean psychology. Thus, however, and in a most subtle way, does his system link the mightiest efforts of the moving body with the Declination of the atoms, a motion so inexpressibly slight.

If then it be true that he too assigns Will as the source of the world's Energy, does not this to some extent alter Lucretius' position among the philosophic systems? Though at the cost of utter inconsistency, has not even he been *compelled* to admit within his scheme of evolution something besides dead matter? for it must not be forgotten that the Matter which, he says, is so potent to evolve Life, is Matter + Free Will.

JOHN MASSON.

[1] Lange has referred to this, but with some misconception of its force. (*Geschichte des Materialismus*, note, p. 141.) It is strange that Lange and even Zeller should both entirely fail to indicate the philosophical consequences of Declination.

NOTES ON THE AENEID.

I.

36. COMPARE Lucr. 2. 639, "aeternumque daret matri sub pectore volnus."

63. With *laxas dare, vasta dare* and the like, comp. Sall. Jug. 59, *dare victos = vincere.*

104. *averto* intrans. Plaut. Mil. 202, 1065 (Lorenz.).

122—3. For the language generally, comp. Lucr. 6. 1071, quam *laxare* queant *compages* taurea vincla: for *accipiunt* Liv. 35. 26. 8, "omnibus compagibus aquam *acciperet*," and Aen. 6. 414, "multam *accepit* rimosa paludem."

148. See Cic. Cluent. § 138, from which it appears that the converse of this simile was a common one.

168. Lucr. 5. 948, "silvestria templa tenebant Nympharum, quibus e scibant umore fluenta Lubrica proluvie larga lavere umida saxa."

190, 191. Lucr. 2. 921, "praeter *volgus turbamque* animantum." The use of *turba* may perhaps be illustrated by Plaut. Aul. 338, 340, where the word is used of a number of slaves.

195. *Cadis onerarat vina*, I incline to take not as an inversion for *cados onerarat vinis*, but as = "had put (on the ships) in casks:" *onus* appears to have been the technical word for *a cargo* (Cic. Inv. 2, § 153, Verr. 5, § 145), and Petronius 76 says, "quinque naves aedificavi, *oneravi vinum*," i.e. "I put wine into them as their cargo."

203. The passage in the Odyssey (12. 211—12), from which the words "forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit" are apparently translated, is susceptible of a very different interpretation. Odysseus says:

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔνθεν (from the Cyclops) ἐμῇ ἀρετῇ βουλῇ τε νόῳ

τε Ἐκφύγομεν, καί που τῶνδε μνήσεσθαι οἴω. May not this mean "and I think that in this case too we shall remember (i. e. know how to put to good use) *these, viz.* my manhood and counsel and wit"? Comp. μνήσασθε δὲ θουρίδος ἀλκῆς.

214. For *implentur*, which seems to have been a colloquial expression, comp. Petron. 16, "*nos implevimus* cena," and Juv. 5. 75, "vin tu consuetis audax conviva canistris *Impleri*."

262. *Volvens:* comp. Livy 34. 5. 7, "tuas adversus te Origines *revolvam*."

293. The meaning of *iura* in such phrases as *iura dare* does not seem to have been sufficiently examined and illustrated. There seems no question that the word is often used in the sense of *ordinances, decrees in particular cases, provisions of law to meet particular cases, rules of law.* Cic., Inv. 2, § 67, distinguishes *iura naturae, iura consuetudinis* and *iura legitima*, provisions or ordinances of nature, of custom, and of *leges* or written formulae: comp. Rosc. Com. § 24, "sunt *iura*, sunt formulae de omnibus rebus constitutae" (*rules, ordinances*): Top. § 23, "aequitas, quae paribus in causis paria *iura* desiderat:" Quint. § 45, "quis tandem nobis ista *iura* tam aequa describit?" *ib.* § 48, "ad haec extrema et inimicissima *iura* tam cupide decurrebas:" Top. 23, "valeat aequitas, quae paribus in causis paria *iura* desiderat:" Verr. 5, § 27, "pretio, non aequitate *iura* descripserat:" *ib.* § 34, "*iura* omnia praetoris urbani nutu... Chelidonis...gubernari:" Prop. 4. 12 (13). 49, "auro venalia *iura*, Aurum lex sequitur:" Liv. 34. 3. 1, "muliebria *iura* quibus alligaverint licentiam eorum maiores vestri:" Gaius 1. 47, "cetera vero *iura* eius legis ad peregrinos non pertinere."

Iura condere seems to have thus originally meant "to put together isolated decisions," and so "to establish precedents" or "found rules of law" (which must be based on precedents): Plaut. Epid. 3. 4. 90, "omnium legum atque *iurium* fictor, *conditor* cluet:" Liv. 34. 6. 8, "decemviris ad *condenda iura* creatis:" Sen. Ep. 14. 14, "ad *iura condenda* humano generi sapientes recesserunt." Gaius 1. 2. 9, "responsa prudentum sunt sententiae et opiniones eorum quibus permissum est *iura condere:* nam antiquitus institutum erat ut essent qui *iura* publice

interpretarentur." Vergil's *condere fata* (Aen. 10. 35) seems a phrase formed on the analogy of *condere iura.* Lucr. 5. 1144, *iuraque* constituere ut possent legibus uti might be taken to mean "they established single precedents or provisions, that they might be able to use written formulae."

From meaning "binding ordinances" "*iura*" comes to be used for "authority" in general: Prop. 4. 10 (11). 2, "trahit addictum sub sua *iura* virum:" and *iura dare,* so common in verse and later prose, or *iura reddere* (Liv. 7. 1. 6, "praetorem *iura* reddentem:" 31. 29. 9, "praetorem excelso ex suggestu *iura superba reddentem*"), = "to give decisions" so "to administer justice," and lastly, "to govern." The correlative of *iura dare* is *iura petere,* which, from meaning "to ask for decisions," comes to mean "to submit oneself to." Catull. 66. 83, (if the true reading be not rather *colitis,*) "casto *petitis* quae *iura* cubili," (i. e. submit yourselves): comp. Liv. 23. 5. 13, 10. 2: ("*iura petere* a Roma, a Carthagine"). Statius Silv. 1. 4. 12, "quae tua longinquis *implorant iura querellis.*" In Pliny 3. 141—2, "*petere iura* in aliquam urbem," is used as = to be under the iurisdiction of a city; literally, to go there for the decision of cases. Thus "iura dare" here, as elsewhere in Vergil, will simply mean "to govern."

297. "Demittit—ut terrae *pateant,* ne Dido finibus *arceret.*" Precisely the same sequence of tenses is found in Cic. Cluent. § 71, "capit hoc consilii ut pecuniam *polliceatur... supprimat;* ut...hos...destitutione iratos Oppianico *redderet:*" the immediate object being expressed by the present, the remoter object by the imperfect, subjunctive.

407. Lucr. 4. 571, "interdum *frustratur imagine* verbi."

426. Lucr. 5. 1144, quoted above.

439. "Infert *se...miscetque:*" Ov. Am. 3. 5. 29, "illic *se* rapuit, gregibusque *immiscuit* illis."

441. Sall. (Hist. 3. 91), quoted here by Serv., said "*laetus frugum:*" for *laetus* = "abundant:" comp., among other passages, Lucr. 1. 255, "hinc *laetas* urbes pueris florere videmus."

450. Caes. B. C. 2. 12, "qua *nova re oblata.*"

465. Aristotle, Poet. p. 1455 a 2, ἐν τοῖς Κυπρίοις τοῖς Δι-

καιογένους· ἰδὼν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν ἔκλαυσε: a further hint of Vergil's obligations to the Cyclic or tragic tradition.

639. Cic. Quint. § 10, "ut multis iniuriis *iactatam* atque agitatam aequitatem *in hoc tandem loco consistere* et confirmari patiamini."

660. Lucr. 3. 250, "postremis datur *ossibus* atque medullis sive voluptas est sive est contrarius *ardor*."

II.

99. Cato ap. Front. ad M. Aur. 2. 6, p. 32 (Naber), "dum *se intempesta nox...praecipitat*."

103. For *iamdudum* with imper. comp. Sen. Ep. 84. 14, "*iamdudum relinque* ista:" with the future indic. *ib.* Ep. 17. 9, "iamdudum exibit."

169. Lucr. 2. 69, "et quasi longinquo *fluere* omnia cernimus aevo, ex oculisque vetustatem *subducere* nostris."

176. Livy 7. 6. 2, "id enim illi loco *dicandum* vates *canebant*."

201. Cic. Rep. 1. § 51, "si e vectoribus *sorte ductus* ad gubernacula accesserit:" the phrase is also found in legal documents, and cannot therefore be taken as a poetical inversion.

283. Sall. Hist. 1. 48. 15, "*Ut te* neque hominum neque deorum pudet quos per fidem aut periurio violasti!"

377. Cic. Att. 4. 5. 1, "*senseram, noram, inductus*, relictus, proiectus ab iis."

425. Accius 127, "Minervae *armipotenti*."

516. Eur. H. F. 97, ἄλλος δὲ βωμὸν, ὄρνις ὡς, ἔπτηξ' ὕπο.

572. Lucr. 3. 1018, "at mens sibi conscia facti *Praemetuens* adhibet stimulos."

622. Lucr. 3. 18, "*Apparet divum numen*."

638. Plaut. Merc. 550 (Ritschl), "tum quom est *sanguis integer*."

746. Catull. 62. 24, "quid faciunt hostes *capta crudelius urbe?*"

III.

43. Lucr. 1. 885, "*manare cruorem.*"

68. Lucr. 4. 575—6, "palantis comites cum montes inter opacos Quaerimus et *magna* dispersos *voce ciemus.*"

196. Varro, Sat. Men. p. 211 (Riese), "quodsi pergunt diutius *mare volvere.*"

208. "*Verro,*" properly "to pull about," so "to tear up:" Lucr. 6. 624, "validi *verrentes* aequora venti:" Ov. Am. 3. 8. 43, "non freta demisso *verrebant eruta* vento."

223. "Partem," a share of the food, "portion:" comp. Sueton. Calig. 18.

228. Lucr. 3. 581, "*taetro odore.*"

284. Lucr. 5. 644, "quae *volvunt magnos* in magnis orbibus *annos.*"

331. Cic. Verr. 2. 1, § 6, "quorum *scelerum* Poenis *agitatur:*" 5. § 113 (from the letter of Furius), "Poenas *scelerumque Furias.*"

372. Lucr. 2. 869, "*ipsa manu ducunt.*"

408. Lucr. 2. 610, "antiquo *more sacrorum.*"

658. Lucr. 3. 1033, "*lumine adempto* animam moribundo corpore fudit."

IV.

1. "Cura" of love, Plaut. Epid. 1. 2. 32.

22. Ter. And. 266, "dum in dubio est *animus impellitur.*"

71. Lucr. 4. 1137, "verbum iaculata *reliquit* Quod cupido adfixum cordi vivescit ut ignis."

158. Lucr. 5. 985, "*spumigeri suis* adventu validique *leonis.*"

250. Soph. Trach. 13, ἐκ δὲ δασκίου γενειάδος Κρουνοὶ διερραίνοντο κρηναίου ποτοῦ.

427. The *manes* appear to have been conceived as the material part of what survived after death: comp. Liv. 31. 30, "omnium *nudatos manes:*" Prop. 5. 53, "nec sedeant *cineri manes:*" 3. 5. 30, "inde ubi suppositus *cinerem* me fecerit ardor,

Accipiat *manes* parvula testa meos:" and other passages in which *cinis* and *manes* are connected.

450—1. Lucr. 2. 1038, "quam tibi iam nemo, fessus satiate videndi, Suspicere in caeli dignatur lucida templa: Desine quapropter novitate *exterritus* ipsa, &c."

V.

5. Cic. Phil. 11, § 29, "*polluere* deorum hominumque iura."

15. Plaut. Merc. 192, R. "*armamentis complicandis componendis* studuimus:" Caes. B. G. 5. 1, and elsewhere has "*armare naves.*"

80. As "sanctus" is almost technically applied to the dead (see Aen. 12. 648 and elsewhere), so "sanctitas" seems to have been the name of the feeling with which the dead were to be regarded: Cic. Top. § 90, "aequitas tripartita dicitur esse: una ad superos deos, altera ad manes, altera ad homines pertinere. Prima pietas, *secunda sanctitas*, tertia iustitia aut aequitas nominatur."

137. Lucr. 3. 141, "hic *exultat* enim *pavor* ac metus."

212. Catull. 64. 6, "ausi sunt vada salsa cita *decurrere* puppi:" for the construction, comp. "quorum aequora curro," 235 below.

317. Plaut. Cist. 4. 2. 27, "certe eum *signat* locum ubi ea (cistella) excidit" = "has her eyes on the place:" confirming Serv.'s interpretation of this passage.

426. Lucilius 8 fr. 13 Müller: "gallus (se) *sustulit in digitos.*"

537. "In magno munere:" comp. Cic. Verr. 2. 3, § 115, "hoc vix ab Apronio *in summo beneficio* pro iis...impetratum est;" i. e. "as, or by way of, the greatest kindness."

VI.

165. "*Ciere viros,*" Catull. 68. 90.

179. Catull. 63. 53, "*ferarum* gelida *stabula.*"

302. With "velis ministrat," comp. Liv. 34. 6. 6, "*administratio* navis."

304. "Viridis:" comp. Cic. Lael. § 11, Tusc. 3. § 75: Hor. C. 1. 9. 17, Epod. 13. 4, Sen. Ep. 66.

423. "Fusus," Lucr. 4. 757, "cum somnus membra *profudit*."

481. "Caducus," probably transferred from the usage common in Cato's Res Rustica, "*caducae* oleae" = fallen olives, "*caduca* folia," and the like. *Ad superos esse = vivere,* Inscr. Lat. 6. 2968.

533. "Fatigat ut...adires:" Catull. 102. 1, 2, "*advenio* ut ...*adloquerer*."

622. Cic. Att. 14. 12. 1, "ecce autem Antonius *accepta grandi pecunia fixit legem*."

640. Lucr. 5. 281, "*Largus*...fons luminis, aetherius Sol:" Cic. N. D. 2. 149, "cum (Sol) terras *larga* luce compleverit."

646. Varro Atacinus, "et *septem* aeternis sonitum dare *vocibus* orbes."

729. "Marmoreo," evidently "of dazzling whiteness:" Lucr. 2. 767, "vertitur in canos *candenti marmore* fluctus:" 772, "quod si caeruleis constarent aequora ponti Seminibus, nullo possent albescere pacto: Nam quocumque modo perturbes caerula quae sint, Nunquam in *marmoreum* possunt migrare colorem."

746. "Concretam labem," perhaps "the taint *of matter*:" Cic. Tim. § 8, "quod erit *concretum* atque corporeum" (= "material").

803. Monum. Ancyr. 5. 1, "mare *pacavi* a praedonibus."

VII.

37. *Tempora rerum*, the times at which events happen, Lucr. 5. 1276, "sic volvenda aetas commutat tempora rerum." Hor. Sat. 1. 3. 112, "tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi."

66. The construction of *per mutua* has naturally puzzled commentators. Is it possible that we have here the neut. pl. of a lost adjective *permutuus*, which stood to *permutare* as *mutuus* to *mutare?* The construction of *permutua* would then be the same as that of *mutua* in Lucr. 5. 1100 (quoted by Conington). So possibly *adprima*, not *ad prima*, should be read Georg. 2. 134.

111. "Augent," comp. Lucr. 5. 1417, "cubilia...herbis et frondibus *aucta*."

235. Cic. Deiot. § 8, "per dexteram istam te oro...non tam in bellis neque in proeliis quam in promissis et fide firmiorem." Comp. Caes. B. C. 1. 32, "se vero (Caesarem) ut operibus anteire studuerit, sic iustitia et aequitate et prudentia."

307. I should be disposed to explain the difficult phrase "scelus merentem" on the analogy of "merere," "*commerere noxiam*" found several times in Plautus: Most. 5. 2. 56, "commeream aliam noxiam:" Trin. 1, "amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam:" so Epid. 1. 1. 60, "commeruisse in te aliquid mali:" Merc. 816 (Ritschl), "quae in se culpam commerent."

345. For *coquebant* comp. Plaut. Trin. 225, "egomet me *coquo* et macero et defetigo."

372. Cic. Deiot. § 10, "nos *in media republica* nati semperque versati."

407. *Vertisse* as Lucr. 1. 105, "somnia quae vitae rationes *vertere* possint."

436. For *invectas* with acc. comp. Liv. 35. 8. 9, "ut triumphanti sibi *urbem invehi* liceret."

470. Plaut. Pers. 26, 27 (Ritschl), "advorserne deis quasi Titani, *quibus sat esse* non queam?"

588. Plaut. Trin. 835, "ita iam *quasi canes*, haud secus, circumstant navem turbine venti."

596. *Triste* supplicium: Livy 7. 28. 9, "iudicia eo anno populi *tristia* in feneratores facta."

722. Lucr. 2. 251, "pars terrai nonnulla, perusta Solibus adsiduis, multa *pulsata pedum vi*."

772. Varro Res Rustica 1. 2. 19, "Libero patri *repertori* vitis."

VIII.

1. Livy 7. 32. 5, "Valerius *signum pugnae* proposuit."

23. If "radiantis imagine Lunae" can mean the moon, a parallel to the expression may be found in the Ibis 73, "sideraque, et radiis circumdata *solis imago*, Lunaque quae nunquam quo prius orbe micas," where "solis imago" apparently stands for "Sol."

215. "Discessu:" comp. Caes. B. C. 1. 18, "quorum adventu (= qui cum advenissent) castra ponit:" so *ib.* 1. 27, and elsewhere.

227. For *fultos* comp. Ov. Am. 1. 6. 27, "roboribus duris ianua *fulta* riget."

239. "*Impulit, impulsu quo,*" &c. Lucr. 6. 289, "nam tota fere tum Tempestas *concussa* tremit—*Quo de concussu* sequitur gravis imber et uber."

318. "Asper victu venatus:" comp. Plaut. Capt. 188, "*asper* meus *victus* sane est."

343. No satisfactory explanation has been given of "Asylum rettulit." I am inclined to suspect that a verse has dropped out between vv. 342 and 343, and that *rettulit* refers to something in the lost verse: the story, perhaps, of the founding of the Asylum.

353. "Cum saepe concuteret, cieret," can be simply taken as = "saepe concutientem, cientem," as in the common idiom "audivi eum cum diceret" = "dicentem:" comp. Cic. Verr. 5, § 165, "se vidisse...cum is...in crucem ageretur." So Verg. A. 3. 623, "Vidi egomet...cum...corpora...frangeret ad saxum." The *cum saepe* of this passage would then be different from that of 1. 148.

429. With "imbris torti" comp. Varro Sat. Men. p. 211 (Riese), "*aquam* e nubibus *tortam* Indicat fore."

610. "Gelido flumine," apparently a local abl. as 5. 38, "Crimiso flumine:" Prop. 1. 14. 1, "abiectus Tiberina molliter unda."

IX.

22. Livy 7. 26. 4, "si divus, si diva esset quo sibi praepetem misisset, volens propitius adesset."

30. *Sedatis amnibus:* Cic. Orat. § 39, "quasi *sedatus amnis* fluit Herodotus."

56. Livy 32. 33. 11, "in bello non congredi *aequo campo.*"

112. "Idaei chori." Prop. 4. 17. 36.

255. "Mores dabunt vestri:" Cic. Att. 9. 12. 2, "illum *ulciscentur mores sui.*"

348. "Multa morte recepit," if it means "welcomed with

abundance of death," may be compared with Lucr. 6. 146, "haec (nubes) *multo* si forte *umore recepit* Ignem."

502. "Inter manus:" Plaut. Most. 2. 1. 38, "abripite hunc intro actutum *inter manus:*" Cic. Verr. 5. § 28, "ut alius *inter manus* e convivio tamquam e proelio auferretur."

601. Catull. 40. 1. 3, "quaenam te *mala mens...quis deus* tibi non bene advocatus?"

630. Lucr. 6. 99, "*caeli de parte serena.*"

736. *Ira* with gen. of cause: so *dolor* Sall. Cat. 28, Cic. Phil. 14, § 5, Caes. B. C. 1. 4.

775. "Musarum comitem:" Lucr. 3. 1037, "Heliconiadum comites."

X.

9. Suet. Iul. 43, "qui obsonia *contra vetitum* retinerent:" so Cod. 11. 11. 1.

160. With "quaerit sidera" = "quaerit de sideribus," comp. Caes. B. C. 1. 74, "imperatoris fidem quaerunt" = "de fide."

212. "Semiferus," Lucr. 2. 702.

289. "Inoffensus:" so Varro Marcopolis 9 (Riese) "currum a carcere intimo missum labi *inoffensum* per *aequor:*" Ov. Am. 1. 6. 8, "*inoffensos* derigit ille pedes."

306. Lucr. 2. 553, "disiectare solet magnum mare *transtra* guberna...per terrarum omnis oras *fluitantia* aplustra."

361. Eur. Heracl. 836, Τὸ δεύτερον δὲ ποὺς ἐπαλλαχθεὶς ποδί· Ἀνὴρ δ' ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ στὰς, ἐκαρτέρει μάχῃ.

446. "Stupet in Turno:" Ter. Hec. prol. 5, "populus studio stupidus in funambulo Animum occuparat:" comp. Cic. Fin. 1, § 4, "hoc primum est *in quo admiror.*"

488. Liv. 2. 46. 4, "praeceps Fabius *in vulnus* abiit."

509. "Acervos:" Varro Mysteria 7 (Riese), "una pestilentia aut hostica acies puncto temporis immanis *acervos* facit."

652. Catull. 30. 12, "dicta omnia factaque *Ventos* inrita *ferre.*"

809. "Caelum" in its old sense of "aer:" see Lucr. 4. 133, Plin. 2, § 102.

832. Eur. H. F. 233, "λαβὼν ἂν ἔγχος τοῦδε τοὺς ξανθοὺς πλόκους Καθῃμάτωσ' ἄν."

XI.

18. Plaut. Bacch. 942, "*armati* atque *animati* probe:" Acc. 308, "cum *animatus* iero, satis *armatus* sum." The Romans seem to have liked the combination; Livy 7. 13. 6, "exercitum tuum sine animis, sine armis, sine manibus iudicas esse."

152. Catullus 64. 139, "at non haec quondam nobis promissa dedisti."

277. "Violavi volnere:" Cic. Sest. § 140, "invulnerati inviolatique vixerunt."

282. "Vertite ad Aeneam:" Tac. H. 1. 74, "imperium ad Othonem *vertissent*."

407. With "artificis scelus" comp. Plaut. Curc. 614, "scelus viri!" Ter. Ph. 978, "hoc scelus," (=this villain).

495. "Perfundi" of cattle, Varro, R. R. 1. 13. 3.

548. "Se ruperat:" so Varro, Sat. Men. pp. 162, 197 (Riese), "se erumpo, irrumpo."

620. "Turmas inducit:" Plaut. Amph. 239, Ussing (*si lectio certa*) "equites iubet dextera *inducere:*" Sall. Cat. 60. 5, "cohortem praetoriam in medios hostes *inducit*:" Liv. 30. 18. 4, "ego *inducam* in pugnam equites."

634. Lucr. 5. 1313, "*permixta caede* calentes Turbabant saevi nullo discrimine turmas."

791. Liv. 33. 40. 4, "non *spolia ulla* se *petisse*."

829. "Exsolvit se corpore:" comp. besides the passages quoted in Conington's note Lucr. 1. 810, "vita quoque omnis Omnibus e nervis atque ossibus *exsoluatur:*" 3. 577, "videtur Ire anima ac toto *solvi de corpore* velle."

833. "Crudescit:" Liv. 10. 19. 20, "interventu Gellii *recruduit pugna*."

896. "Implet," Liv. 34. 12. 8, "hostes fama Romani auxilii adventantis *impleverat*."

XII.

23. "Animus" in the sense of "generosity," "will to give," Cic. Agr. 2, § 22, "*animorum* ac magnificentiae:" Q. F. 1. 1. 3.

"*animo* ac benevolentia:" Sen. Ep. 16. 7: "non est quod mireris *animum* meum: adhuc de alieno liberalis sum."

39. "Proelia tollo:" Ov. Am. 1. 8. 96, "non bene, si *tollas proelia*, durat amor."

72. Eur. Erechtheus Gr. 62. 28 (Nauck), *τὰ μητέρων δὲ δακρυ' ὅταν πέμπῃ τέκνα, Πολλοὺς ἐθήλυν' ἐς μάχην ὁρμωμένους.*

171. "Admoveo:" so Livy 10. 38. 9, 35. 19. 3.

181. Cic. N. D. 3, § 52, "itaque et Fontis delubrum Maso ex Corsica dedicavit, et *in augurum precatione Tiberinum, Spinonem, Almonem, Nodinum, alia propinquorum fluminum nomina videmus.*"

258. Petron. 108, "illinc Tryphaenae familia nudas *expedit manus.*"

559. Ov. Am. 2. 14. 1, "quid iuvat *immunes belli* cessare puellas:" so *immunis* without gen. Georg. 4. 244.

568. "Parere fatentur:" Ov. Am. 1. 2. 18, "qui servitium *ferre fatentur.*"

591. Can *ater* be a mere mistake for *acer?* Lucr. 1. 153, "*acrem* odorem," so 6. 1217, 6. 747, "*acri* sulpure," 791, "*acri* nidore offendit nares."

603. For "nodum leti," comp. Cic. Cluent. § 31, "iam exhausto illo *poculo mortis.*"

669. For the metaphor comp. Plaut. Cist. 2. 1. 7, "ita nubilam mentem animi habeo:" Epid. 5. 1. 36, "animo liquido et tranquillo es."

685. Lucr. 5. 313, "non *ruere avolsos* silices a montibus altis, Nec validas aevi vires perferre patique Finiti."

793. Livy 7. 8. 2, "quid deinde restaret, quaerentibus."

801. "*Edit:*" Catull. 91. 6, "cuius me magnus *edebat* amor."

817. "Reddita," "assigned:" so often in Lucr. (see Munro on 2. 96): Cic. N. D. 1, § 103, "ut.....ignibus altissima ora *reddatur.*"

894. Plaut. Merc. 600. R. "tristis cedit, pectus ardet, haeret pes, *quassat caput.*"

H. NETTLESHIP.

AN INTERPRETATION OF יזה גוים.

The Jewish interpretations of the prophecy,

הנה ישכיל עבדי כו׳

have lately been published in Hebrew and English by Dr Neubauer and Mr Driver, and analysed in an *Introduction* by Dr Pusey. One of the most difficult expressions in the prophecy is יַזֶּה גוים (Isaiah lii. 15), of which I have never seen a satisfactory explanation, except perhaps that of the LXX.:

> *οὕτω θαυμάσονται ἔθνη πολλὰ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ,*
> *καὶ συνέξουσι βασιλεῖς τὸ στόμα αὐτῶν·*
> *ὅτι οἷς οὐκ ἀνηγγέλη περὶ αὐτοῦ ὄψονται,*
> *καὶ οἳ οὐκ ἀκηκόασι συνήσουσι.*

Aquila and Theodotion render יזה by *ῥαντίσει*. Symmachus by *ἀποβαλεῖ*, and the Targum by יבדר, 'he shall *scatter* (= *sprinkle* like drops of water)'. These and the later interpreters refer the word to the root נזה—hiphil, הִזָּה, to *sprinkle* (blood, water, &c. *upon* a person or thing)—but the LXX. perhaps refer it to some other root, or may even have had a different reading before them, since they render נזה itself, in the Pentateuch and 2 Kings ix. 3, by *ῥαντίζειν, ἐπιῤῥαντίζειν, ῥαίνειν, περιῤῥαίνειν, προσραίνειν*, and in Isaiah lxiii. 3 (cf. ver. 6) by *κατάγειν*.

The Constructions of נזה.

1. The root נזה, according to Fuerst's *Concordance*, occurs twenty-four times, viz.,

(i) *Once* in the disputed passage, Isaiah lii. 15, and

(ii) *Twenty-three times*, in the following verses: Exodus xxix. 21; Leviticus iv. 6, 17; v. 9; vi. 20; viii. 11, 30; xiv. 7, 16, 27, 51; xvi. 14, 15, 19; Numbers viii. 7; xix. 4, 18, 19, 21; 2 Kings ix. 33; Isaiah lxiii. 3.

It is found most frequently in the *hiphil*, the normal construction being: והזה אותו על הכפרת (Lev. xvi. 15), with an accusative of the liquid sprinkled, and with על, or some corresponding preposition, of that upon, or towards, which it is sprinkled. Sometimes, instead of אותו, we have מן הדם (iv. 6). Or the thing sprinkled may be understood from the immediate context, as in Lev. iv. 17: "And the priest shall dip his finger in some of the blood, והזה שבע פעמים." But in no case does הִזָּה occur absolutely, without mention of the liquid sprinkled.

The constructions of the root in the *kal* are similar:

Lev. vi. 20. ואשר יִזֶּה מדמה על הבגד

2 Kings ix. 33. וַיִּז מדמה אל הקיר

Is. lxiii. 3. וְיֻז נצחם על בגדי וכל מלבושי אגאלתי

We see then that there is nothing in the Biblical uses of נזה to justify the rendering of יזה גוים, "he shall besprinkle nations." The construction ought rather to be על גוים. Dr Kay indeed replies (*Speaker's Commentary*) that in Is. lii. 15: "the verb refers, not to a literal process of sprinkling, but to an act of *purification* analogous to that which was effected by ceremonial sprinkling." But there is nothing to shew that נזה of itself implies anything more than "the literal process of sprinkling." It is used in the Pentateuch of a sprinkling which purifies: it is used in 2 Kings ix. 33 of a sprinkling (of the blood of Jezebel) which defiles. In the latter sense it occurs in the book of Isaiah itself, within a few chapters of the passage under consideration:

"And their blood shall be sprinkled upon my garments, and I will stain all my raiment" (Is. lxiii. 3).

2. These objections to the rendering BESPRINKLE might be waived if the context obviously required that meaning. But the context is so far from suggesting it that it is rather an additional argument against it. If it were required to supply from conjecture the missing word in the passage:

"As many were astonied at thee; his visage was so marred more than any man, and his form more than the sons of men: So shall he...many nations; the kings shall shut their mouths at him: for that which had not been told them they shall see; and that which they had not heard they shall consider."

who would think of proposing to insert "besprinkle"?

3. The word required is one which describes an act producing a PASSIVE condition of wonderment, on account of the final clause, "kings shall shut their mouths at him." If it had been said of them that they should *break forth into singing*, or the like, we might accept the interpretation of יזה, "he shall cause to *spring*," (for joy, or amazement). But since it is said that they shall be reduced to silence, the proposed meaning is inappropriate. In support of the meaning "spring"—especially for *joy*—reference is made to the Arabic root نزا, which, according to the lexicons, may mean, "Exultavit præ hilaritate"—not however, so far as I am aware, unless "præ hilaritate" is actually expressed in the context. It is thus used of asses which bound "præ alacritate," in a passage quoted in the *Muḥit el Muḥit* of el Bustani (Beyrout), and other lexicons:

والحمّر وثبت من المَرَاح اى مرحت فوثبت

but it does not appear that there is any adequate support for the absolute use of יָזֶּה, in the sense, "cause to spring" (for joy, &c.), or "startle."

On the root הָוָה.

4. "His watchmen are BLIND: they are all ignorant, they are all DUMB dogs, they cannot bark; הוֹזִים שֹׁכְבִים אֹהֲבִים לָנוּם" Isaiah lvi. 10.

This is Targumised : נימין שכבין רחמין למדמך ...*dozing, lying-down, loving to sleep.*

The Greek versions have for הֹזִים, *ἐνυπνιαζόμενοι, φανταζόμενοι, ὁραματισταί.* The meaning of the word is doubtful within certain limits, but, as I suggested some years ago, it may be explained in such a way as to suit the two passages, Isaiah lii. 15, and lvi. 10. We may conjecture that יַזֶּה is for יהזה, as מַזֶּה (Ex. iv. 2) for מה זה, and perhaps לַבַּת (Ex. iii. 2) for להבת. As in Ex. iv. 2 there are different views about the relation of the כתיב (מזה) to the קרי (מה זה), so in Is. lii. 15 there is room for the two opinions

(i) that יַזֶּה, for יהזה, is the original reading :

(ii) that יהזה, the original reading, was phonetically corrupted into יַזֶּה.

The latter hypothesis would go far to account for the *θαυμάσονται* of the LXX., which has been supposed to imply a reading יחזה, from חזה, *to gaze* (with admiration).

There are now two ways of explaining הזה.

a. We may suppose that in Is. lvi. 10 there is a play upon חזה, and that הזה refers to the vacant *stare* of stupefaction, as opposed to true vision. "His watchmen are BLIND :" they are not חֹזִים but הֹזִים : they do but stare drowsily, lie down, and love to sleep. The *hiphil* of הזה might be rendered, *to agast* (or *aghast*)—in the sense *set a gaze* (on which see Richardson's *English Dictionary*) thus :

> So shall he AGAST many nations ;
> Kings shall shut their mouth at him ;
> For that which had not been told them they shall SEE ;
> And that which they had not heard they shall consider.

Here we have a perfect parallelism, יה(ה)זה denoting (i) a *passive* display of wonderment, corresponding to the *speechlessness* described in the clause immediately following ; and (ii) a *visual* impression, answering to the ראו of the third clause, and

following naturally upon the מַרְאֵהוּ כִּי of the preceding verse. Observe that in Is. lvi. 10 the watchmen are described as BLIND and DUMB. So here the nations and the kings stand *agazed* and *speechless* with admiring awe.

b. Or we may suppose הוה to imply a condition of *trance* or stupefaction. The meaning *entrance* is very suitable in Is. lii. 15:

So shall he ENTRANCE many nations, &c.

As a connecting link between the renderings *a* and *b* compare the very natural combination,

"AGHAST IN SPEECHLESS TRANCE,"

in one of the lines cited by Richardson *s.v.* AGAST.

C. TAYLOR.

A WORD ON LUCILIUS.

Mr Munro's remarks in the preceding number of this Journal p. 302 might lead an incautious reader to suppose that I had maintained the monstrous position that *nomen hŏc nobis* was admissible in Lucilius. I of course said and meant no such thing: I tried to show—proof is almost impossible—that the use of *hŏc* in Plautus and Terence as a virtually short syllable in such positions as *sed hoc mihi molestumst* and *sed quid hoc clamoris* is comparatively of more frequent occurrence than the use of *hic* in similar situations; and that this may have corresponded with a similar feeling in these writers as to the comparative weight of the syllables *hoc, hic:* that there are, besides, cases such as *hoc hoc est* where, without a predetermination to treat *hoc* as inherently long, the metrical bias is in favour of its being short: that *hoc* and *hic* are actually regarded as standing on an equal footing as *communes syllabae* by Probus and Diomedes; that they certainly could not have arrived at this conclusion from Catullus and Lucretius on the one hand, or from Virgil and his followers on the other, that therefore they arrived at it from the earlier poetry, including Lucilius: hence that it was justifiable to retain any instance of short *hŏc* before a vowel, which the Mss in which Lucilius' fragments are preserved seem to make probable. Whether in the passage quoted by Velius it *is* probable, is doubtful, and more doubtful since Mr Munro's most ingenious emendation. But in the longer passage from Nonius I still prefer my own reading to either Munro's Ἔτος or Lachmann's Ἔπος, if for no other reason than that the words of the Mss then need no change at all. But I would not deny that if the quantity of *hŏc* rested on this alone, the support is certainly a very slender one. I am not disposed to make the same

concession as to Probus and Diomedes. Mr Munro indeed asserts that Probus and Diomedes 'knew no authority but Virgil; and that *hŏc* is a mere blind assumption, taken probably from an older authority.' Putting aside the fact that this is itself an assumption of a startling kind, it seems to do little but shift the statement to an older source. Even if we knew—which we do not—that Probus and Diomedes would *of course* have quoted other authority for their statement if they had known it, and that as they only quote Virgil, Virgil was their only authority—would this be enough to prove that the older writer from whom Mr Munro supposes them to draw had no authority but Virgil for *his* statement? Surely it is more reasonable to believe that the same wide range of reading which we find for instance in Charisius or Priscian was the *ultimate* basis of the statement in Probus and Diomedes. And if so, my inference is to say the least a natural one.

Again my assertion that *tamĕtsi* was used by Lucilius, *may* no doubt be explained away by supposing *tam* elided or by writing *tam etsi*. But the question is not settled by these obvious remarks. We cannot be sure that the comic writers elided *tam* and made *etsi* long: on the contrary it would seem probable, that the same syllable which was heard in *tamen etsi* would be heard in *tam etsi*, and that the *e* would be slurred before *ts*, as in *magĭstratus miniŏsteriis miniŏstremus vetŭstate fenĕstras scelĕstus* &c. If this was the scansion of comedy, may it not have been retained by Lucilius in the doubtful region of satire? An occasional exception in the case of a common word would not materially affect the generally careful laws by which his prosody was bound.

That the sound of *hoc* was short may I think be inferred from the Greek mode of writing it, as seen in Plutarch's ὃκ ἄγε (Numa 14, Coriol. 25) compared with his transliteration of other words, ὀπίμια ὄπεμ ὄπους for *opima opem opus* (Romul. 16). There seems to be no reason why if the sound had been definitely long it should not have been expressed by a long ω. *As a rule* the instances of Greek spelling of Latin words given by C. F. Weber prove that Greek ο cor-

responded to Latin *ŏ*, Greek ω to *ō*. Thus *βήλωξ πραίτωρος κυαίστωρες χόρωνον ἀκτιώνιβυς ὀπορτέβιτ νοβάλις βόνα οὐρκίολαρ νότα νοτάριος στολάτους τογάτους*. There are no doubt exceptions, such as the recurring use of short *o* under the later Roman empire in the genitive plural *φιδεικομμισσόρουμ, βονόρουμ ραπτόρουμ*, and again *δόνουμ* for *donum*. But these do not materially shake the general truth of the position; and so far as anything can be made out from this source, the sound which Plutarch expressed by ὂκ was not *in itself* long, and *may* therefore have been used short in metre even by a writer of hexameters, in the earlier period of literature before the Augustan poets had determined the quantity long.

I take the occasion to reexamine some passages of Lucilius.

Non. 546. *Vrceus aut longe gemino mixtarius paulo.* Read *haut* and *palo:* the mixing-jar was supported on two stakes. *Palo* is sufficiently obvious and has already been conjectured by Quicherat, as I find now for the first time. Quicherat has also anticipated Munro in his explanation of XXVI. 46 M.

Non. 398. *Samium rursus acutum; unde et samiare dicimus acuere, quod in Samo hoc genus artis polleat. Lucilius Satyrarum lib.* VII. *hanc ubi uult male habere, ulcisci pro cele* (*Scelere* Junius) *eius Testam sumit homo Samiam ibi* (*sibi* Gifanius) *an uno telo inquit Praecidit caulem testisque una amputat ambo.*

For the corrupt *an uno telo* Munro (Journal of Philology VII. 295) reads *anu noceo*, quoting Gell. IV. 16. 6. I venture to differ from him on three grounds: (1) The improbability of so common a word as *noceo* being corrupted into *no telo;* (2) the frequency with which Gellius adds *inquit* after the first or first two words of a quotation, cf. V. 14. 5, VI. 12. 6, VII. 6. 6, IX. 12. 17, XI. 11. 2, 3, XII. 2. 5; (3) the weakness of the expression. Several years ago I conjectured what I still prefer to any of the proposed emendations, *anūnetero*, i. e. *anumne tero?* The indignant question and the instant action following as in emphatic protest seem not unworthy of that lively and incisive style which made Lucilius so popular with his countrymen.

Non. 260 and 308, VIII. 2 M.

Lachmann Müller and Munro all correct the Ms. *fictrices* as if it must contain some part of *fingere,* the word under consideration. It is at least as probable that Nonius did here what he often does elsewhere, introduced a word *derived* from *fingere.* If so, *fictricis* may be right, especially as from Nonius' explanation '*Fingere est lingere*' the word in this sense would be likely to be rare.

Non. 533, VIII. 15 M. *Cercurus nauis est Asiana pergrandis....Lucilius Satyrarum lib.* VIII. *Verum flumen uti atque ipso diuortio igneis pedibus cyrcerum concurret equis.*

diuortio aquarum Iligneis is an old emendation, universally accepted: for *concurret* perhaps *contuere: uti* seems to be an error for *ubi,* as Lachmann, whose *roboret* for *concurret* is improbable.

Non. 165, Festus p. 270. It is clear from Nonius' citation of the last half of the line *ut uulgus redandruet inde* that he did not follow the same version as Festus, who gives the whole verse *Praesul ut ampiruet inde uulgus redamplauit at,* i. e. as seems most probable *Praesul ut amptruet inde, et uulgus redamptruet ei.* In such a case, the version of Festus is obviously the preferable.

Non. 227, XI. 1 M.

> *Conuentus pulcher braces saga fulgere torquem*
> †*Datis magni.*

For *torquem Datis* perhaps *torques Phremdatis* (*Pherendatis*). The breeches would be quite in keeping with an assembly dressed in the style of Persia.

Non. 344, *meret militat. Lucilius Satyrarum lib.* XV. *dum miles Hibera terras ac meret ter sex aetate quasi annos.*

Munro emends *terra fractus.* May not a proper name lurk in *s ac,* possibly Sacsa or Seica?

Cic. Fin. II. 8. 23. After all the discussion on this obscure passage, it still remains unsettled. Can Lucilius have written

> Diffusum e pleno siet, hir-siphon cui nildum
> [Demp]sit uis et [nil] sacculus abstulerit?

'whose wine is drawn from a full cask, from which the hând-pipe or the strainer has as yet taken no part of its strength.' Lucian Müller's version of this seems to me deplorable.

Non. 351. *Mutare transferre. Lucilius Lib.* XXVI. *doctior quam ceteris is asa mittis mutes aliquo tecum sacra facta uitia.*

It is wonderful that after Scaliger had conjectured *symmistis* for the corrupt *asamittis,* the rest of the line should have suggested anything so far from probability as Düntzer's *sartas tectas di(ui)tias.* Can there be any reasonable doubt that *sacra facta uitia* is simply *sacra facticia?* The whole passage then may have run thus,

doctior quam caeteri
Sis symmistae, mutes aliquo tecum sacra facticia,

'be cleverer than the rest of the confraternity of initiated, transfer yourself and your false rites somewhere else.'

Non. 38, XLIX. 10 M.

ut si eluuiem facere per uentrem uelis
Curare omnibus distento corpore expiret uis.

uiis is obvious and long accepted: for *Curare* read *Aura de* (*Sudor de,* L. Mueller, *Cura ne,* Lachmann).

Paulus 335 M. *Schedia genus nauigii inconditum, id est trabibus tantum inter se nexis factum, unde mala poemata schedia appellantur.* A XIIth century glossary in Sir Thos. Phillipps' collection gives this passage thus, *Sechedia genus nauigii inconditum trabibus tantum inter se iunctis unde et uiciosa atque incomposita carmina schedia appellantur.* Now Festus, in whom the passage is imperfect, has preserved the beginning of a line, probably by Lucilius, *Qui schedium fa.* The Phillipps glossary seems to have been copied, not from Paulus, but either from Festus directly, or, as is perhaps more likely, from another abridgment containing more of the original than that of Paulus. At any rate the verse suggested by the words of the glossary would be thoroughly Lucilian *Qui schedium fa-ciunt incompositum ac uitiosum.*

R. ELLIS.

9. *Trinacriae sterilescant gaudia uobis*
Nec fecunda senis nostri felicia rura
Semina parturiant segetes, non pascua colles.

For *senis nostri* read *seni, nostris,* 'the farm fruitful to our labourers, unfertile to the old man' now become its new occupant.

40. *Quom tua cyaneo resplendens aethere silua*
Non iterum dicens herebo tua lydia dixti.

The reading of 41 is from a Ms in the Bodleian Auct. F. 1. 17, interesting as containing at intervals the same capital letters at the commencement of the verse which Ribbeck found in his Bembinus, and which he considers to mark the metrical divisions of the poem. I would read

Non iterum dicetur, heri 'tua,' Lydia, dixti.

'when your forest, Lydia, wrapt in flames shall no longer be called yours,' the title you gave it yesterday. This is Scaliger's interpretation, but he read *Non iterum dicent, crebro.*

50. *migret Neptunus in arua*
Fluctibus et spissa campos perfundat harena.
Qua Vulcanus agros pastus Iouis ignibus arcet
Barbara dicatur Libycae soror altera Syrtis,

So the Bodleian Ms, I believe rightly. The poet contrasts the *marshy bog* into which the sea is to change part of his farm with the *sandy waste* into which the other part, which the fire keeps apart from the waters (*arcet*), is to be converted.

74. *Coculet arguti grylli caua garrula rana.*

One of Ribbeck's Mss reads *Cogulet.* Surely this is right = *coagulet,* cf. *coperio colesco* in Lucretius and Lachmann on II. 1061. The picture is a very defined one; land is to become water, and where the cricket chirped the frog is to *spawn.* The *c* for *g* I have found in a Bodleian Glossary, Auct. T. II. 24, *coaculum · agogendo · (cogendo) et colligendo,* and again *coaculauit. constringit, coaculatus · constrictus.* Possibly a trace of the same corruption *coaculare coculare* then *conclare* (as some of Ribbeck's Mss read here) may be found in the fact that the Balliol Glossary places the gloss *coagulat, conserit, coniungit* between *conclusio* and *conglutinat,* as if the word had in the earlier codex from which the glossary is copied been written *congulat.*

146, 7.

Phoebe gerens in te laurus celebrauit amorem.
Et quem pompa deum, non siluis fama, locuta est?
Omnia uos estis: secum sua gaudia gestat
Aut insparsa uidet mundo, quae dicere longum est.

By making 147 a question, much of the difficulty is removed. I think the poet both in 146 and 147 has *a procession* in his mind. 'Phoebus, thy bearer has made thee famous as feeling love for a bay; and where is the god whom his procession has spoken of and rumour has not also declared (as a stealthy lover) to the forests?' i. e. Phoebus is declared the lover of Daphne by the bay borne in his processions; and most of the gods we see carried through our streets have pursued some scandalous amour in the woods.' The two following lines I would explain (partly with Wernsdorf) thus: 'Ye (the gods) are everywhere (all nature is identified with your presence and your amours); each of you carries with him the reminiscence of his love (a flower, a pipe, &c.), or else sees them sprinkled over the heavens as constellations (e. g. the Corona Ariadnes). Ribbeck's *nisi siluis fama locuta est Somnia pro ueris* is very clever, but, with deference to so great a man, has little verisimilitude.

156. *Ausus ego primus castos uiolare pudores*
Sacratamque meae uittam temptare puellae?
Inmatura meae quoque nece soluere facta.

For *nece facta* (both in the Bodleian Ms) other Mss give *nexe, noxe, necis* and *fata*. Ribbeck emended

Inmatura meaeque est noxae soluere uota?

in which the position of *que*, as well as of *est*, appears to me exceptional and strange. I suspect a far deeper corruption. The first point which strikes one in the line as given by the Mss is the meaninglessness of *quoque*. If we suppose the original to have been

INMATVRAMEAEVENERISDISSOLVERE

it is not difficult to conjecture how it may have assumed its present shape: *ue* became dissevered from *neris*, then *neris* was changed to *necis* or *nece*, and *ue* enlarged to *quoque*. But Ribbeck seems right in his view that *facta* (*fata*) at the end of the line changed places with *uota* at the end of 164. Reading therefore *uota*, I would translate 'was I the first who ventured to pay before their time the vows of my love?' i. e. to forestal the maturity of Lydia's womanhood by cohabiting with her whilst still only a girl. The lover pays his mistress's vows by fulfilling the condition on which they were made, viz. union. For *dissoluere* in this sense cf. Catullus' *Pristina uota nouo munere dissoluo*, LXVI. 38.

R. ELLIS.

ON SOME PASSAGES IN THE MEDEA OF EURIPIDES.

While lately reading the Medea with the advantage of Paley's school edition, I found myself differing from him in my view of some few passages. Hence these notes. On a play so well known one cannot hope to say much that is both new and true: my explanations may be the same as others already in print. But former editors seem to me rather to fail in pointing out the plain bearing, argument, and connexion of passages. In this respect Paley is excellent; how I agree with him almost always may be inferred from these few instances where I venture to differ.

(1) *πότερον ὑφάψω δῶμα νυμφικὸν πυρὶ,*
ἢ θηκτὸν ὥσω φάσγανον δι' ἤπατος
σιγῇ δόμους ἐσβᾶσ' ἵν' ἔστρωται λέχος.
vv. 378—80.

If the two last lines be genuine here (and I see no strong objection to their repetition from v. 40), Paley would prefer to transpose them: surely without reason. Medea says 'Shall I set the house on fire and burn it, bride, bridegroom and all; or steal into their bed-chamber and stab them?' *δῶμα νυμφικὸν* may be 'the whole house' not only the 'chamber.' And 'to enter the room stealthily and set it on fire' (Paley's rendering), is a curious procedure. It would be more conveniently fired from without.

(2) *ἦν μέν τις ἡμῖν πύργος ἀσφαλὴς φανῇ*
δόλῳ μέτειμι τόνδε καὶ σιγῇ φόνον.
vv. 389—90.

Paley thinks that this does not refer to such a refuge as she

found with Aegeus, but to the prospect of some Corinthian offering her a home. Of this however there is no trace. The connexion of thought in Medea's speech seems this: 'I will kill them by poison as the best way. But what refuge can I find when they are dead?' None at present. Well I will wait a while [less than a day, for she must go within that time]: and if I can find any refuge [which she does find in Aegeus], I will poison them and depart: if not, I will use the sword even though I die for it.'

(3) *ἐπειδὴ καὶ λίαν πυργοῖς χάριν.*
v. 526.

Paley first renders 'since you build too much on the gratitude due to you.' But *πυργοῦν τι* is rather 'to build a thing up, to exaggerate, extol.' Perhaps the metaphor may include the idea of raising the *χάρις* into a tower of defence, fortifying and entrenching oneself behind favours conferred.

(4) *Ἑλλάδ' ἀντὶ βαρβάρου χθονὸς*
γαῖαν κατοικεῖς, καὶ δίκην ἐπίστασαι
νόμοις τε χρῆσθαι, μὴ πρὸς ἰσχύος χάριν.
vv. 536—8.

The two halves of this last line must be in contrast. Medea is able, by being in Greece and not in a barbarian land, *νόμῳ χρῆσθαι μὴ βίᾳ*, to live by law not by force, to enjoy laws not to live according to the capricious pleasure of might or brute force. Were it necessary to define a word to be supplied in the second clause, it should be an infinitive, *οἰκεῖν* for instance or some similar word.

(5) *χρὴν γὰρ ἄλλοθέν ποθεν βροτοὺς*
παῖδας τεκνοῦσθαι.
vv. 573—4.

I cannot in the least approve of Nauck's *ἄρ'* for *γάρ*. In numberless passages *γὰρ* is used where it is useless to speculate on the exact ellipse necessary in order that we may render *γὰρ* by 'for.' Rather suppose (with Shilleto on Thuc. I. 25) that *γὰρ* bears, as its original meaning, the sense 'truly, verily, indeed.' In this passage 'you women are most obstinate and

perverse. Why (In fact, Truly) children should have been supplied in some other way.'

(6) *μή μοι γένοιτο λυπρὸς εὐδαίμων βίος,*
μηδ' ὄλβος ὅστις τὴν ἐμὴν κνίζοι φρένα.
vv. 598—9.

'Be it far from me, the painful prosperous life, the wealth that would ever be chafing my soul!' Medea means 'I do not want the prosperity you speak of (gained by the royal alliance) purchased by the vexation of having a rival in my husband's affections.' Jason had said that Medea would acknowledge his wisdom *εἰ μὴ κνίζοι λέχος*. Paley explains *λυπρὸς* 'attended with remorse': Medea would not have external prosperity purchased by injustice, wealth that would reproach her conscience. This does not seem to suit so well the sense of *κνίζοι* as determined by v. 568 *οὐδ' ἂν σὺ φαίης εἴ σε μὴ κνίζοι λέχος*. Nor is it so suitable to Medea's character.

(7) M. *τί δρῶσα; μῶν γαμοῦσα καὶ προδοῦσά σε;*
I. *ἀρᾶς τυράννοις ἀνοσίους ἀρωμένη.*
M. *καὶ σοῖς ἀραία γ' οὖσα τυγχάνω δόμοις.*
vv. 606—8.

Without doubt *ἀραία* is active in sense here. But the connexion and argument need explanation. Paley's view does not satisfy me. He says "*γε* shows this is ironically said 'I suppose I am cursing *your* family,' *i.e.* it is just as right to charge me with that as with cursing Creon's." Medea would thus be made to deny that she had cursed Creon's family. But this she could not and would not do: nor is it the usual force of *καὶ...γε*, which expresses assent and adds something more. Rather Medea sneering at Jason's selfishness allows that she did curse the royal house, adding that it was of course tantamount to cursing his house, as he was now marrying the king's daughter. 'Did I betray you?' she asks: 'you curse the royal family,' he rejoins: 'yes, and yours too no doubt you think', she replies. As in fact she did in v. 163.

(8) *ἐμοί τε γὰρ τάδ' ἐστιν ἀσφαλέστατα,*
σκῆψίν τιν' ἐχθροῖς σοῖς ἔχοντα δεικνύναι,
τὸ σόν τ' ἄραρε μᾶλλον.
vv. 743—5.

Aegeus says 'It is safest for me that I should swear an oath, and so have a justification for my conduct in receiving you, if your enemies question me; while at the same time you will feel more secure.' Paley thinks that Medea also takes an oath and that *τὸ σόν τ' ἄραρε μᾶλλον* means 'and your part of the compact (to procure me children) is better secured, if you too swear.' But nothing is said of Medea's swearing. Aegeus is nervously anxious not to involve Athens in a quarrel: he wishes to befriend Medea, and when once sworn, will have colourable grounds to allege for doing so.

(9) *ὡς ἀρτίδακρύς εἰμι καὶ φόβου πλέα.*
v. 903.

Paley explains this in connexion with the following line, 'How late it is to weep, when I think how long our dispute has existed.' This is a new interpretation of *ἀρτίδακρυς*. Hesychius explains it *εὐχερὴς πρὸς δάκρυον*. The Scholiast by *προσφάτως δακρύουσα*. Medea seems to be excusing herself for her tears, either because she is naturally 'quick to shed tears, having tears ever close at hand and ready to well up,' or because she has been 'lately bathed in tears' when remembering her long quarrel which she is now laying aside.

(10) *ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης*
τὸ καὶ προέσθαι μαλθακοὺς λόγους φρενί.
v. 1051—2.

'Nay it is of my weakness (it argues weakness in me) even to propose in my mind words of softness.' So I prefer to take it. The genitive of indignation etc. is of course common enough, but it does not seem to come well after *ἀλλά*. 'The very thought of relenting argues weakness' is a better sense than the two exclamations 'Alas! my cowardice, to think that I should etc.'

W. C. GREEN.

ON SOME PECULIARITIES IN THE USE OF THE FUTURE PARTICIPLES OF GREEK VERBS.

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, 19th April, 1877.)

It is a rather curious fact, and one that has not been sufficiently observed, that, as a general rule, the Greeks use the future participle only in the sense of the Latin supine in *-um*, and not in that of the future in *-rus*.

In other words, it is used only with verbs implying motion, in the nominative with passive or neuter verbs, as the subject, in the accusative with transitive verbs, as the object.

Thus *ἐπεμπόμην σοι φράσων, ᾤχετο θεασόμενος, ἔπεμψέ με ἀγγελοῦντα*, as the Romans said *exibat spectatum, lusum it Mœcenas, misit eos exploratum, &c.*

But the Romans did not say *abiit spectaturus*, or *misit me venditurum*, and the Greeks did not say *ἦξων ὁ πατὴρ, venturus pater*, or *πωλήσων ἵππον ἐζήτει τὸν θέλοντα ὠνεῖσθαι, equum venditurus quaerebat emptorem.* Such a phrase as *non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo* they had no very direct way of expressing; they would have said *οὐκ ἂν ἀφιεῖσα*, perhaps.

Hence *δράσων* is by no means the same as *facturus*.

Nevertheless, it is often so used with the addition of *ὡς*, as *περιέμενεν ὡς ἥξοιτος τοῦ πατρὸς*, 'he waited under the hope his father would return,' *ταῦτα ἐποίει ὡς τἄλλα ἀποδώσων*, 'he did this with the intention of paying the rest'; and it is used with verbs of *knowing*, &c., as *ᾔδει σε ταῦτα δράσοντα*, 'he knew you would do this.' In the latter instance, it is merely an idiomatic way of saying *ᾔδει ὅτι δράσοις*. Thus Antigone says *θανουμένη γὰρ ἐξήδη, sciebam mihi moriendum esse*, Soph. Ant. 460. But no Greek would say *θανούμενος ὁ*

πατὴρ τοὺς παῖδας ξυνεκάλεσε. The idiom would require ἀποθνήσκων.

Assuming that the above rule is generally true, what are we to say of a passage in the Agamemnon (60—67), where I have pointed out the difficulty in a brief note?—

οὕτω δ' Ἀτρέως παῖδας ὁ κρείσσων
ἐπ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πέμπει Ξένιος
Ζεὺς πολυάνορος ἀμφὶ γυναικὸς
πολλὰ πάλαίσματα καὶ γυιοβαρῆ
θήσων Δαναοῖσιν
Τρωσί θ' ὁμοίως.

Here, clearly, if θήσων is right, it is precisely the Latin *Danais impositurus labores.* But the Greek usage requires πέμπει παῖδας θήσοντας, and when we consider how very awkwardly, and I believe unprecedentedly, the *ictus* falls on the mere suffix of the dative Δαναοῖσιν, we shall be disposed to entertain the question if Δαναοῖς ἐπιθήσοντας is not the right reading, especially if we compare Iliad II. 39, θήσειν γὰρ ἔτ' ἔμελλεν ἐπ' ἄλγεά τε στοναχάς τε Τρωσί τε καὶ Δαναοῖσι διὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας.

For some time I could find no example to justify the reading θήσων in the above passage. But some few instances do occur, which are sufficiently anomalous to deserve some discussion.

In the Hecuba, 517, the captive queen says to Talthybius, who is about to relate the sacrifice of Polyxena,

εἰπὲ, καίπερ οὐ λέξων φίλα.

Now here, though *dicturus* would render the sense, the participle is in fact influenced by καίπερ, which does not take the finite verb. It is but another way of saying εἰπὲ, εἰ καὶ μὴ φίλα ἐστὶν ἃ λέξεις. In v. 633 of the same play we read

Ἰδαίαν ὅτε πρῶτον ὕλαν
Ἀλέξανδρος εἰλατίναν
ἐτάμεθ', ἅλιον ἐπ' οἶδμα ναυστολήσων.

Here ναυστολήσων is ἵνα ναυστολήσειε, or ὅπως ναυστολήσει, by the use of the *præsens historicum.* I should say

this is an instance of the omission of ὡς from metrical necessity; for *with* ὡς, as I have already remarked, the future participle is common enough, even without a verb of motion, to express intention. Thus in 1146 of the same play, Hecuba brought Polymestor to the ladies' tent, ὡς κεκρυμμένας θήκας φράσουσα. Nothing is commoner than such a phrase as εἰπὲ, ὡς ἐμοῦ λέξοντος οὐδὲν, &c.

One other example occurs in this play, very similar to the last. It is in v. 1202, where Hecuba asks the Thracian king why he was so eager to kill her son Polydorus. Was it, she asks, to make an alliance with some family? πότερα κηδεύσων τινά; Here it would be equally easy to read κηδεύων, and to supply ὡς κηδεύσων.

In Eurip. Electra 1025, Clytemnestra says that if Agamemnon had killed her daughter to cure some evil in the state, or to benefit the family, some allowance might have been made for him;

> κεἰ μὲν πόλεως ἄλωσιν ἐξιώμενος,
> ἢ δῶμ' ὀνήσων, τἄλλα τ' ἐκσάζων τέκνα
> ἔκτεινε πολλῶν μίαν ὕπερ, συγγνώστ' ἂν ἦν.

Here we observe,

(1) That ὀνίνημι has no present participle in use.

(2) That ὀνήσων, thus used by a kind of necessity, stands between two *present* participles. It was natural for a critic who may not have considered the rarity of the usage, to propose ἐκσώσων, as Nauck has done. I have little doubt the poet wrote ἐκσώζων, and that ὀνήσων again stands for ἵνα ὀνήσειε, which a prose writer would have used.

I am not aware of any other instance in Aeschylus, Sophocles, or Aristophanes, and the result of my investigation so far is, that the identity of the Greek future participle and the Latin participle in *-rus* is altogether rare and exceptional.

The future participle not unfrequently represents the finite verb with εἰ or ὅστις. Thus in Soph. El. 317,

> τοῦ κασιγνήτου τί φῇς,
> ἥξοντος, ἢ μέλλοντος;

i.e. πότερον ἥξει, ἢ ἔτι μέλλει;

And in Antig. 260,

κἂν ἐγίγνετο
πληγὴ τελευτῶσ', οὐδ' ὁ κωλύσων παρήν,

nec aderat qui prohiberet.

So οὐκ εἶχε τὸν ὠφελήσοντα, &c., 'he had no one to help him.' But these uses are entirely distinct from a meaning equivalent to the Latin future in *-rus*.

Hence great doubt is thrown on such emendations as τύχη δὲ σωτὴρ ναῦν στελοῦσ' ἐφέζετο, *navim servatura*, for θέλουσ', in Agam. 647, as suggested by Dr Oberdick. I see no objection to θέλουσα in the sense of *libens* or *sponte insidebat*.

F. A. PALEY.

ON CHOEPHOROE 472—3 (481—2 DIND.).

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, 8th February, 1877.)

One of the most perplexing iambic passages in Aeschylus is the couplet referred to: it is spoken by Electra in a dialogue with her brother, who has just invoked the spirit of his murdered father to give him the possession of his rightful home. She then says,

κἀγώ, πάτερ, τοιάδε· σοῦ χρείαν ἔχω
φυγεῖν μέγαν προσθεῖσαν Αἰγίσθῳ [μόρον].

The last word, wanting in the Medicean MS., has been introduced into the editions from the conjecture of Turnèbe, who also first gave *τοιάνδε* for *τοιάδε*. It now appears to me that *τοιάδε* is quite defensible, and ought to be retained. Thus in Agam. 1331 (1360 Dind.) one of the elders in deliberation at the murder of the king says *κἀγὼ τοιοῖτός εἰμι*, i.e. *τοιοῦτος τὴν γνώμην*. This formula, *κἀγὼ τοιοῦτος*, 'I too am so-minded,' occurs also in Eur. Heracl. 266 and Orest. 1680 (both quoted in my note), and *τοιάδε τὴν γνώμην* in Soph. El. 1022. This is one of many examples of a plausible alteration which, when carefully examined, appears to be unsound.

The difficulty however which I propose to discuss lies in the second verse, which is usually understood thus: 'I too, my father, have this request to make to you, that I may escape when I have inflicted an awful fate on Aegisthus.' Here *μέγαν* is supposed to represent *δεινὸν*, a sense which is certainly defensible. Miss A. Swanwick accordingly translates,

"I too, my father, need thy gracious aid,
When wrought is base Aegisthus' heavy doom."

Still, the reading seemed to me so unsatisfactory, that in the last edition I marked the verse as corrupt. Nor is any correction of it hitherto made either satisfactory in itself, or consistent with the explanation of the Scholiast, *ὥστε φυγεῖν τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς Αἰγίσθου, τιμωρησαμένην αὐτόν.*

Hermann reads,

κἀγὼ, πάτερ, τοιῶνδέ σου χρείαν ἔχω
τυχεῖν, μέγαν προσθεῖσαν Αἰγίσθῳ φθόρον.

Franz,

τυχεῖν με λαμπρὰς θεῖσαν Αἰγίσθῳ παγάς.

Weil,

μέγαν πως θεῖσαν Αἰγίσθῳ δόλον.

But none of these seem at all probable, though *παγὰς* and *δόλον* have a certain resemblance to *τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς* in the Scholium.

It is important to bear in mind that the Scholia of Aeschylus undoubtedly belong to a different recension of the text from that given in the Medicean MS., into which they were copied by another hand, probably from another source. On a careful consideration of the above words, which were evidently a comment on the verse in its integrity, and from an examination of the tragic use of *προσθεῖναι*, I have come to the conclusion that we must read,

φυγεῖν με γῆν, προσθεῖσαν Αἴγισθον δίκῃ.

'That I may get safe out of the land, after punishing Aegisthus as he deserves.'

The last words are correctly explained by *τιμωρησαμένην αὐτόν.* By *φυγεῖν γῆν* he also rightly saw that Electra prayed for an immediate escape from a country in which her life was in constant danger from the plots of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. And he added *τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς* because in itself *φυγεῖν γῆν* might have been taken to signify 'to be banished from the land,' which could not be really a part of her prayer.

It remains to show that the tragic usage is *προσθεῖναί τινα δίκῃ*, &c., not *προσθεῖναι δίκην τινι*, and therefore that *Αἴγισθον* and not *Αἰγίσθῳ* must be read.

(1) Eur. Bacch. 675,

> *τοσῷδε μᾶλλον τὸν ὑποθέντα τὰς τέχνας*
> *γυναιξὶ τόνδε τῇ δίκῃ προσθήσομεν.*

Here we have the exact expression, *προσθεῖναί τινα δίκῃ*, 'to put a man on his trial,' 'to bring him to justice.' And as the correlative of the transitive *θεῖναι* or *θέσθαι νόμον* is *κεῖσθαι* and *κείμενοι νόμοι*, so in Soph. Ant. 94 we have *προσκεῖσθαι δίκῃ*, 'to be given up to punishment.' Antigone there says to her suitor,

> *εἰ ταῦτα λέξεις, ἐχθαρεῖ μὲν ἐξ ἐμοῦ,*
> *ἐχθρὰ δὲ τῷ θανόντι προσκείσει δίκῃ.*

'If you persist in talking so, you will incur hatred from me, and when you have to undergo the punishment of your disobedience, you will be hated (instead of being loved and pitied) by your brother also.'

Commonly, but I think erroneously, this is rendered, 'You will justly be hated besides.'

(2) Phoenissae 963,

> *ἐγὼ γὰρ οὔποτ' εἰς τόδ' εἶμι συμφορᾶς,*
> *ὥστε σφαγέντα παῖδα προσθεῖναι πόλει,*

'to devote a murdered child to the service of the city.'

(3) Andromache 1014,

τίνος εἵνεκα—ἄτιμον ὀργάναν χέρα τεκτοσύνας Ἐνναλίῳ δορι-μήστορι προσθέντες τάλαιναν μεθεῖτε Τροίαν;

These words are addressed to Phoebus and Poseidon, 'Why did ye make over to the war-god your own handy-work, and give up Troy to destruction?'

It is true that in this passage the thing is devoted or given up to the person, and not the person to the thing. Yet it is the same logical idea, 'to give up Troy to the war-god,' as 'to give up a person to justice.' So also in

(4) Hecuba 368, where Polyxena says,

> *Ἄιδῃ προστιθεῖσ' ἐμὸν δέμας,*

i.e. *ἐμαυτὴν θανάτῳ.*

(5) Troad. 492,

ἃ δ' ἔστι γήρᾳ τῷδ' ἀσυμφορώτατα,
τούτοις με προσθήσουσιν,

exclaims the aged captive Hecuba. 'They will set me to perform duties most unsuited to my old age.'

(6) Eur. Suppl. 948,

ὅταν δὲ τούσδε προσθῶμεν πυρὶ,

'when we have consigned these captives to the pyre.'

(7) Iph. Aul. 540,

πρὶν Ἄιδῃ παῖδ' ἐμὸν προσθῶ λαβών,

'till I have devoted my daughter to the sacrifice,' Agamemnon says.

(8) Ion 1545,

ὁ δ' ὠφελῶν σε προστίθησ' ἄλλῳ πατρί.

'Apollo to benefit you assigns you to another father.'

I find nothing to justify *προστιθέναι δίκην τινι*, though a few passages occur, as may be seen in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, where the imputing a charge, the doing harm or giving pleasure, is expressed by *προστιθέναι τί τινι*. Hence I conclude that in the verse of Aeschylus under discussion we must read *Αἴγισθον* and not *Αἰγίσθῳ*. And I think it is easy to explain the cause of this corruption. When *με γῆν* (written, perhaps, from the scribe's familiarity with the Doric accusative, *με γᾶν*) had been mistaken for *μέγαν*, and the necessity of construing *μέγαν Αἴγισθον*, 'the mighty Aegisthus,' had perplexed some grammarian or some reviser of the text, he tampered with the passage, and got over the difficulty by writing *Αἰγίσθῳ*. But, as neither *δίκῃ* nor *δίκην* could be reconciled with such a reading, with *μέγαν* in the first part of the verse, the last word was assumed to be corrupt, and omitted altogether. The Scholium however, *τιμωρησαμένην αὐτὸν*, could only have been founded on the reading which I now propose to restore, *προσθεῖσαν Αἴγισθον δίκῃ*. If the Schol. had found *μέγαν*, he would not so entirely have ignored it.

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University of London,
Jan. 8th, 1877.

ON THE MS. OF SOPHOCLES IN THE LIBRARY OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

The Codex of Sophocles in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, R. 3. 31, is a composite MS., of which the greater part is of the 14th century. It contains (roughly speaking) the complete text of the Ajax, Electra, and Œdipus Tyrannus.

1. Of this Aj. 811—1125, El. 914—O. T. 1355, belong apparently to a 14th century MS., of which the rest has perished.

2. Aj. 1396—El. 913, belonged originally to a different and perhaps somewhat older MS. The three quires on which this part is written are marked ϵ', ς', ζ'.

3. Aj. 1126—1395, were written by a hand of the 14th or early 15th century evidently for the purpose of connecting the two fragments. This is proved by the fact that ll. 1360—95 are crowded together in double columns. Line 1395 has been partly cut off in binding.

4. O. T. 1356—1520, are again taken from a different MS., written in various hands, and possibly older than the main part of the volume. The first page began with line 1330, but as this and the following lines were also on the last page of the preceding MS., they are cancelled with strokes of the pen, and the pieces are thus roughly joined.

That the two MSS. whose fragments are thus pieced together were of different classes, appears from the fact that while in the passage as it stands, ἄχθος is read in l. 1355, in the passage as cancelled the same line has ἄχος.[1]

[1] In the following collation the readings of this part of the MS. are enclosed in square brackets.

This part contains one remarkable reading, 1463, ἡμῶν pr. ἡμὴ corr.

5. The MS. thus completed seems to have once more suffered, for a late 15th century hand has supplied the initial portion as far as Aj. 810, and has also re-written Aj. 1360—95 on a separate leaf.

The portion first spoken of (1) is well furnished with scholia and glosses, interlinear and marginal.

The Œdipus is also ornamented or rather disfigured with quaint illustrations, in which Dodona and Corinth are oddly substituted for Delphi and Thebes.

On the margin of O. T. there is some cryptographic writing.

Having had occasion to consult this MS. with a view to an edition of the O. T., and being enabled to do so through the kindness of the authorities of Trinity College, I observed the following readings not mentioned by Burton in his Pentalogia, ed. 1779. I have also transcribed some glosses that drew my attention. The text used for comparison was that published by the Oxford Clarendon Press in 1876. I add L to readings agreeing with L and differing from A, and A to those agreeing with A but differing from L. Where a reading differing from both agrees with some other MS. I add the indication of this.

Oed. Tyr.

line 10. gloss on *καθέστατε*, *ἐπεστήκατε* (sic pr.).
„ 22. om. in text, ins. in mg.
„ 29. *καδμείων* pr. A.
„ 42. *τιν' ἡμῖν εὑρεῖν* L.
„ 77. *ὅσα δηλοῖ* L.
„ 89. *ἔστι δὲ ποῖον*
„ 118. *θνήσκουσι γὰρ πάντες πλὴν*
„ 124. om. in text, ins. in mg.
„ 134. *ἔθεθ' ἐπιστροφήν*
„ 158. *κέκλομαι* (?) pr. M (Ambros. G 56 sup.).
„ 179. *θαναταφόρα* pr. L 31, 10, Pal. *θαναταφόρω* corr.
„ 182. *παραβώμιον* LA.
„ 198. gl. *εἴ τι γὰρ ἡ νὺξ ἀφῇ τοῦτο διὰ τέλους ἡ ἡμέρα ἐπέρχεται.*

line 200. πυρφόρων ἀστραπῶν (ἀστραπὰν Vat. 40).
„ 201. κρατεῖ (?) pr. κράτει corr. κράτη corr. 2. (κράτει A^c).
„ 211. νίὸν (?) pr.
„ 212. gl. τὸν συνόμιλον.
„ 221. αὐτὸ (?) pr. L. αὐτὸς corr. A: ib. ἔχοντι pr.
„ 222. ἀστὸς om. pr. sed ins. eadem m.
„ 227. gl. on ὑπεξελὼν, ἐκβαλὼν τὸν φόβον.
„ 245. 2nd τῷ om.
„ 261. κοινῶν δὲ
„ 281. δύναθ'
„ 287. ἀλλ' οὖν pr.
„ 294. δείματός τ'
„ 296. δρῶντι om. pr.
„ 297. ὁ ἐξελέγχων pr.: οὐξελέγχων corr. L.
„ 300. πάντα νωμῶν (*a*, *ν* in erasure).
„ 315. πόνω (?) pr. πόνος corr.
„ 322. ἔννομον L.
„ 326. ἀποστραφεῖς pr.
„ 328. τἄμ' ὡς ἂν, εἴπω, μὴ τά σ' ἐκφήνω: κακά. gl. οὐ μήποτε εἴπω τὰ ἐμὰ, ἡγοῦν τὴν ἐμὴν μαντείαν, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἐκφωνήσω, ἡγοῦν φανερὰ ποιήσω, τὰ σὰ κακά.
„ 342. ἃ γ' (*γ* in erasure).
„ 345. παρήισω pr.: ib. ὡς ὀργῆς (ὀρ in erasure of 3 letters).
„ 360. gl. on ἐκπειρᾷ λέγειν, εἰς πεῖραν λόγων προτρέπῃ. ἐκπειρῶμαι.
„ 372. σύγ' ἄθλιός τε
„ 375. βλάψαι (but *a* in erasure).
„ 380. τέχνη τέχνης· (sic interpunct.)
„ 382. ἦμιν: γρ. παρ' ὑμῖν.
„ 396. θεῶν τοῦ
„ 397. εἰδὼς (εἰ in erasure).
„ 400. παραστατήσειν (ή in erasure).
„ 407. λύσωμεν
„ 413. ἦ (not *η*).
„ 441. εὑρίσεις

line 445. (gl. on *συθείς*) *ἐκποδὼν δὲ καὶ μακράν.*
„ 446. *ἀλγύνοις*: *γρ. ἀλγύναις.*
„ 448. *ὅπου* in erasure.
„ 464. *ὄντινά* pr. *ὅντινά ἡ* corr.: ib. *εἰ πέτρα* pr.
„ 478. (gl. on *ὡς*) *ὡς* Vat. 140. *καθὰ*
„ 483. *οἰωνοθέτης* *α*
„ 484. *ἀποφάσκωνθ'*
„ 494. *ὅτου* om. pr.
„ 516. *πρός τ' ἐμοῦ* Ven. 472. *τι*
„ 525. **πρὸς τοῦ** in erasure.
„ 528. *ἐξ ὀμμάτων δ' ὀρθῶν δὲ*
„ 530. *δρῶσιν*
„ 532. *οὗτος· σὺ πῶς* pr. L., *οὗτος σὺ· πῶς* corr. Vat. 40.
„ 537. *ἐν* om. Γ.
„ 543. *ποιήσω* pr. *ποιήσων* corr. A.: gl. *οἶσθ' ὡς ποιήσεις. ἔστιν δὲ ἀττικισμός.*
„ 557. *ἔτ' αὐτὸς*
„ 558. *πόσον οὖν* pr. *πόσον νῦν* corr.
„ 571. *οἶδά γ'* (*γ'* in erasure). (*οἶδας* A.)
„ 583. *εἰ διδοίης* in erasure (sic interpunct.).
„ 586. *ἕξει* (*ι* in erasure).
„ 598. *αὐτοῖς ἅπαν*
„ 609. *χρηστοὺς* pr., *κακοὺς* corr.
„ 616. *εὐλαβουμένῳ σοι πε* (*σοι πε* in erasure). *σεῖν*
„ 630. *μέτεστι τῆσδ' οὐχὶ σοὶ.* *μόνον*
„ 631. *κυρίαν* pr. *καιρίαν* corr.: ib. *ἡμῖν* Ven. 468.
„ 656. *λόγων* pr. Laur. 31, 10. *λόγω* corr. Par. E.
„ 658. *χρήζης*: *γρ. ζήτης.* (*χρήζεις* Γ.)
„ 660. *θεὸν* pr. *θεῶν* corr. (for *θεῶν θεόν*).
„ 670. *ἀπωσθῆναι*: *σ* om. pr.
„ 673. *στυγνὸς* (*ος* in erasure).
„ 690. *φρόνημα* pr. L.
„ 695. *οὔρασας* *η*
„ 699. *ἔχεις στήσας* *β* *α*

line 709. ἔχων pr.
„ 712. γ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ corr.
„ 724. ἂν om.
„ 730. τριπλαῖς A.: γρ. διπλαῖς (by 2nd hand) L.
„ 740. τὰν δὲ pr.
„ 748. ἐξείποις pr.
„ 753. ἀπήνη γ' ἦγε
„ 755. ἡμῖν
„ 763. ἄξιος γὰρ ὅδ' ἀνὴρ Ven. 468.
„ 766. gl. on πάρεστιν, ὡς παρόντα νόμιζε αὐτόν.
„ 774. omitted by 1st hand.: ins. 2nd, omitting μέν.
„ 775. ἡγόμην (?)
„ 786. τοῦδ' (τ)
„ 791. μὲν om. p. m.: ib. χρεῖ' ἦ
„ 793. φονεύσαντος pr. φυτεύσαντος corr. (cp. Amb. G. 56 sup.)
„ 796. ὀψοίμην: οι in erasure.
„ 799. ὄλυσθαι
„ 800. καὶ σὺ pr. καὶ σοὶ σὺ corr.
„ 816. ἐχθροδαίμων ἂν γένοιτο μᾶλλον ἀνήρ (ο μᾶλλ in erasure of ἀνήρ)
„ 817. μηδὲ ξένων
„ 818. μήτε προσφωνεῖν
„ 827. ἐξέθρεψε κἀξέφυσέ με. Amb. G. 56 sup.
„ 829. τῷδε κἀν ὀρθοίη
„ 836. (πρὸς τοῦτον): γρ. τοσοῦτον.
„ 845. πολοῖς ἶσος
„ 846. οἰάζωνον (?)
„ 866, 7. οὐρανίαν δι' αἰθέρα (s) corr. A. (os)
„ 890. ἕξεται (not εξεται).
„ 891. ἕρξεται pr. ἕξεται corr.
„ 892—5. τίς—τίμιαι om. but add. in mg. (θυμῶ) (οῦ)
„ 896. gl. on τί δεῖ με χορεύειν, ἀντὶ τοῦ τί πρέπει πανηγυρίζειν τοῖς θεοῖς (the letters have nearly faded). Cp. Dind. Schol. in Soph. II. p. 168.

line 906. παλαιὰ λαΐου θέσφατα ἐξαίρουσιν (last ἀ of παλαιὰ added by 2nd hand).
„ 926. κάτοισθ' pr. L. κάτισθ' corr. A.
„ 941. οὐχὶ πρέσβυς (ὁ om.)
„ 943, 4. εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγω 'γὼ (not λέγω γ' ἐγώ) Ven. 468.
„ 957. ὦ ξέν' : ib. σημάντωρ (μηνυτής by 2nd hand.)
„ 968. δὴ om.
„ 985. κύρει
„ 991. φέρων pr.
„ 998. ἀπόκειτ' pr.
„ 999. ὅμαθ'
„ 1001. γέρον pr. γέρων corr.
„ 1002. ἔγωγ' οὐχὶ
„ 1011. ταρβῶ : γε om.
„ 1014. δῆτα πρὸς om. pr.
„ 1029. οἶσθα pr.: ἦσθα corr.
„ 1037. ὦ om.
„ 1044. οὗτος om.

The notes of persons in this scene have been confused and then corrected.

„ 1050. σημήνασθ'
„ 1063. ματρὸς corr.
„ 1072. οὔποτθ'
„ 1084. τοιόσδ' ἐκφύς
„ 1085. μὴ om. pr.
„ 1100. ὀρεσιβάτα
„ 1111. gloss on πρέσβυν, τὸν γηραιὸν.
„ 1130. ἦ ξυναλλάξαντί πω pr.
„ 1137. ἐκμήνους corr. (μ by 2nd hand) Ven. 617: gl. μηνιαίους.
„ 1156. ἔδοκας
„ 1157. ὤφειλον τῇ δ' ἐν ἡμέρᾳ.
„ 1167. τοίνυν om.
„ 1173. ἦ γὰρ δὴ δίδωσιν
„ 1177. πῶς δ' ἀφῆκας τῷ γέροντι σὺ pr.

line 1193. *τοσόντοι*
„ 1214. *ὃς δικάζει* (*ὃς* extra versum in margine).
„ 1218. *ἰδοίμην* (*εἶδον* by 2nd hand).
„ 1220. *ἰαχαίων* (but *αί* in erasure of *ε* ?).
„ 1231. **αἰ 'ν φανῶσ'** in erasure.
„ 1245. *κάλει*: ib. a letter erased before *ον* of *λάϊ-ον*.
„ 1252. *εἰσέπεσεν* L.
„ 1264. gl. rec. *ἑώρα διὰ τοῦ ε̄ ψιλοῦ ὅθεν καὶ μετεωρός*.
„ 1270. *ἔπεσεν* pr.
„ 1288. *καδμείοις*
„ 1311. Χο. *ἰὼ δαῖμον*
„ 1337. [*τί δήποτ'*] L.
„ 1339. [*ἔτ'* om. ...]
„ 1340. *ἐπάγετ'*: [...*ἀπάγετ'*...]
„ 1345. *καταρώτατον* pr.: [...*καταρότατον*...]
„ 1347. [*δείλεε*]
„ 1348. *ὡς ἠθέλησσα...πότ' ἂν* L: [*ὥς σ' ἠθέλησα... ποτε*] A.
„ 1350. *ἔλυσέ μ'* E [...*ἔλυσεν*...] A: *φόβου* [...*φόνου*...]
„ 1355. *ἄχθος* L: [...*ἄχος*...] A.
„ 1359, 60. [*ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν*]
„ 1365. [*ἔφυν κακοῦ*]
„ 1373. [*μητέρα*]
„ 1380. [*εἷς ὤνγε* pr.]
„ 1395. [*ἄρα*]
„ 1401. [*ὅτι* pr. *ἔτι* corr.]
„ 1412. [*ἐκρίψατε ἔνθα*]
„ 1413. [*ἵτε ἀξιωσατ'*]
„ 1426. [*τιόνδ'*]
„ 1432. [*μ'* om.]
„ 1436. [*ἐκ* om.]
„ 1441. [*ἀπολύναι*]
„ 1442. [*ταῦτα· ὅμως*]
„ 1454. [*ἀπολλύντων*: *γρ. ἀπωλλύτην* corr.]
„ 1456. [*μήτ' ἄλλον*]
„ 1459. [*τῶν ἐμῶν ἀρρένων*]

line 1460. [πρόσθη]
„ 1461. [ὦσιν]
„ 1463. [ἡμῶν pr. ἡμὴ corr. : gl. τὸ χωρὶς τὸ ἄνευ παραλλήλου τροφῆς.]
„ 1469. [θιγῶν]
„ 1472. [τοῖν ἐμοῖν φιλοῖν]
„ 1477. [ἦν εἶχες] A.
„ 1492. [ἥκετ']
„ 1493. [παρρίψει : γρ. παραρρίψει.]
„ 1498. [κἀκ τῶνδ' ἴσων]
„ 1505. [μή φθε παρίδης pr. (σφε corr.)]
„ 1510. [ξύνευσον]
„ 1513. [τοῦ βίου]
„ 1517. [οἶσθ' οὖν ἐφ' οἷς εἰμὶ]
„ 1518. [πέμψης ἀπ' οἴκων γρ. ἄποικον.]
„ 1519. [αἴσχιστος μισητός]
„ 1520. [φρονῶν pr.]

The greater part of these readings are of no value, and Burton is not to be blamed for ignoring them; although in a few instances he has neglected the 1st hand, and he has for the most part not cared to notice alternative readings, whether given by the first hand or inserted subsequently. Yet even the worst readings are of some interest, as showing the naïf character of the MS. or MSS. There are few important divergences from L: yet this MS. has ἀβλαβὴς in l. 229, and has l. 800 in its place (with σὺ for σοὶ):—indeed, which of the so-called 'apographa' has not? In l. 1137, ἐκμήνους, it has preserved the true reading (with a change of the breathing) in common with the first hand of Ven. 617. The loss of the aspirate and the subsequent alteration to ἐμμήνους in both MSS., together with the gloss μηνιαίους, show that ἐκμήνους is not a 14th century emendation. Another trace of independence is the gloss on l. 896, πανηγυρίζειν τοῖς θεοῖς, a corruption of which, πονεῖν ἢ τοῖς θεοῖς, has found its way into the text of L. (*i.e.* παν η.....has been read as πον ἢ.) In comparing Burton with my notes of the Trin. MS. I see it mentioned by him that the

Laud and Selden MSS. in the Bodleian (alone so far as known to me) have in the text the curious reading *τήνδε θεσπίζει γραφὴν*, given as a marginal alternative for *τήνδ' ἔθεσθ' ἐπιστροφὴν* in O. T. 134 by the diorthotes of L. Can any scribe have deliberately preferred the margin in this case, or are these late MSS. from a pre-Laurentian source?

The Ajax and Electra are not in Burton's Pentalogia, and I am not aware that the readings of the Trinity MS. in these plays have anywhere been recorded.

L. CAMPBELL.

THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. TWO CRITICISMS.

I.

In his 'Social Life in Greece,' p. 173 (ed. 1), Professor Mahaffy thus describes the character of Antigone in Sophocles. 'There is something masculine in all her actions, and hard in her words. The way in which she repels the sympathy of the gentle, but common-place, Ismene is very unpleasing, and shows a heroism vastly inferior to that of Euripides' Alcestis, or Macaria, where, as we shall presently see, equal heroism was not sustained by the excitement of a violent conflict, or by that *αὐθαδία* which is anything but feminine. So, again, the coldness of her relations to Haemon must strike every modern critic—a defect which Euripides very naturally avoided when he wrote his own Antigone. She is in Sophocles, at least in this play, little else than a man in female dress, undertaking female duties, but with no trace of female tenderness, or weakness, in any of her actions.' And Professor Mahaffy draws the conclusion that in the time of Sophocles 'the ideal of female character had degenerated, the notion of a true heroine was no longer natural, but was supplanted by a hard and masculine type,' etc. (p. 174).

There is no better way of gaining an insight into the character of Antigone, as Sophocles has made it for us, than to take this criticism and examine it by the light of the evidence to be obtained from the drama. And, first: 'There is something masculine in all her actions, and hard in her words.'

In the opening scene of the drama Antigone comes before us, leading out her sister beyond the gate in order to be alone with her, and have her sympathy and help in the plan now

agitating her breast. She addresses her by the closest appellation 'my own, my very sister, my Ismene.' She dwells on the lonely situation of herself and her sister as the last remaining descendants of a doomed race, and on the woes which they have seen and suffered together. She tells her of the new sorrow, the unjust proclamation of Creon, and enquires whether her sister also is aware that evil is coming on their friends. Throughout she speaks in a tone of gentle sadness, and looks forward with undoubting confidence to her sister's sympathy. Ismene may not have heard the news; when she has heard it, she will join Antigone in her action.

But on revealing her plan, which is to bury Polynices in spite of the proclamation, Antigone meets with no response to her own deep feeling. Ismene has heard nothing for good or evil; the intelligence that her brother is to lie unburied on the battle-field awakes in her no sense of indignation. She does not, like her sister, picture to herself the mangled corpse torn by dogs and birds of prey; she does not think of the spirit dishonoured by the loss of burial rites. She dwells rather on the misery of past days, and the woe of the house of her father Oedipus; on the necessity of cautious conduct under present circumstances. Could it be done with impunity, she would indeed tell her mind to her enemies, but she is a woman and not framed to contend with men; she may not transgress the law, or search after the impossible, which is at all times a foolish errand. Thus for Antigone, the hope of her sister's help and sympathy is dashed to the ground: the pious affection which will not be restrained by conventionalities or unjust edicts is met by selfish timidity and proverbial wisdom. Antigone must stand alone: she has no sister nor kindred among the living. The dead are still hers and will answer her affection. Rather than betray these she will die, and join them in the under-world. Such devotion is irresistible. Even Ismene, while she condemns her sister's action as foolish, confesses that she is a true friend to her friends.

This opening scene is of itself sufficient to prove the tenderness which underlies the passionate vehemence of Antigone, and is indeed the cause of that vehemence; but other passages,

stronger still, may be quoted. When Creon is forced by Antigone into a defence of his edict, he entrenches himself behind the ordinary moral feeling of the Greek. 'An enemy is never a friend, not even in death.' With the Greeks the feuds of life are not extinguished in death on either side. In the *Ajax* Odysseus is the enemy of Ajax when alive, and therefore Teucer fears to let him join in the burial of Ajax when dead, 'lest perchance in this I do what is displeasing to the dead;' while the Atridae, from motives of enmity, are anxious to prevent the burial of Ajax altogether. This commonplace Antigone answers by a sentiment which very possibly startled the audience in the Athenian theatre—a sentiment widely different from the practice of Greek women. 'My nature is not to join in hating but in loving.' As a woman, Antigone has no part in the feuds of the state, but only in the love of the family. This is precisely the feeling which governs the Antigone of the *Oedipus Coloneus* when she attempts, so far as is possible, to heal the feud between Oedipus and Polynices. How does Creon meet this strange declaration? 'If loving be a necessity of your nature, go down to that other world and be loving there; in this life such woman's laws shall never govern me.' The statesman has no sense of the deeper truth so plain to Antigone. He is full of 'wise saws and modern instances,' but ignorant of the truths which come to us through the heart. How could the contrast of masculine and feminine be marked more strongly?

Secondly, we are told that: The way in which Antigone repels Ismene is 'very unpleasing, and shows a heroism vastly inferior to that of Euripides' Alcestis, or Macaria, where equal heroism was not sustained by the excitement of a violent conflict, or by that *αὐθαδία* which is anything but feminine.'

We have seen how deeply injured Antigone is by her sister's behaviour; how it left her alone in the world, and how she took it to be a renunciation of love and duty on the part of one nearest and dearest to her. The reasons given for that renunciation are timidity, worldly prudence, and the desire to live a comfortable life. In a later scene Ismene changes; she wishes now to die with her sister, who has been detected and con-

demned to death; she cannot live without her; she is, she pleads, equally guilty—had not prudence held her back. She even casts aside her natural timidity, and at the risk of rousing an angry tyrant pleads with Creon for her sister's life. But Antigone is unmoved by the heroism of an exalted moment. When the question was the burial of a dead brother at the risk of life, Ismene held back and would have no part in the deed. With such weakness Antigone has no sympathy: the sacrifice of such a life is little worth. Ismene may live; she has betrayed her kindred on earth, what service can she do them in the under-world? It is no matter for compromise or concession. The false decisions of life are not to be rectified at the last moment, and Ismene will not gain a share in the action of Antigone by sharing in her death. Nor is it Antigone only who pronounces this stern refusal of her repentant sister's wish: it is justice. 'Justice will not suffer this: you would not, and I had no partner in the deed.'

The way in which Antigone repels her sister, however 'unpleasing' it may be, is not a mere mistake or misconception on the part of Sophocles. It has a deep meaning, altogether worthy of a place in the great tragedy. If it is sad that death should remove from Antigone what is near and dear to her, it is sadder still that weakness and selfishness—and, till roused, Ismene is both weak and selfish, in spite of her amiability—should place an everlasting bar of separation between the sisters. Thus there is deep pain mingled with the contempt with which Antigone turns aside from her sister's course of action. She also has something to renounce.

Professor Mahaffy contrasts the Antigone of Sophocles unfavourably with the Alcestis of Euripides. The characters are indeed widely different, perhaps so different that no real comparison can be made between them. The pathos of a domestic scene, in which the death is self-chosen, is not to be compared with the tragic situation of the *Antigone*. The mild gentleness of Alcestis, a wife and mother, submitting quietly to her self-chosen doom, has nothing in common with the maiden spirit of Antigone, with her daring, her freshness, her fulness of life. The objects also for which these two persons are supposed to

die are widely different. The death of Alcestis serves absolutely no purpose but to keep in life a coward who goes the round of his relations beseeching each in turn to take his place at the fatal moment; the death of Antigone is a sacrifice on the 'altar of men's highest hopes,' winning recognition for the laws of affection and eternal justice. There is therefore nothing similar in the characters or in the situations in which they are placed. We must not quarrel with white because it is not black.

Macaria is a less well-known person than Alcestis. She is the daughter of Heracles, who in the *Heracleidae* of Euripides (l. 474 ff.) dies in order to save her race from destruction. Here again the situation is not like that in the *Antigone*. Macaria dies to gain a certain good, she gives one life for many. Antigone perishes because she has performed a solemn duty. She goes to her death 'because of her reverence for piety,' the victim of a tyrannical edict. Antigone does not fight against her doom, but she speaks very plainly of the injustice of it. Macaria parts with her life so readily that she hardly seems to know the value of it. Moreover in her case, as in that of Alcestis, the divine power has ordained that the sacrifice is needed. Antigone, on the other hand, acts with perfect freedom. Only her own love and sense of justice prompt the burial of her brother. Creon's law and Ismene's prudence forbid it.

Even if we go beyond the instances given by Professor Mahaffy and quote the Iphigeneia of Euripides, we shall find differences which make a comparison of the character with Antigone impossible. When, on her arrival at Aulis, Iphigeneia learns that she has been brought not, as was said, to be the bride of Achilles, but to be sacrificed in order to secure a fair voyage, she entreats her father Agamemnon to spare her. The speech is touchingly pathetic, but not by any means heroic. She reminds her father of the past days in which she first called him father, and was called his daughter; when as a child she sat upon his knee, and together they planned the future. 'Shall I, my child, behold thee happy in a husband's halls, full of life and joy, in state worthy of me?' And she replied, looking on to her father's old age; 'Shall I welcome thee, my father, with loving reception in my halls, repaying thy toil with care and

tendance?' But these memories of childhood are forgotten now, Iphigeneia says; and she concludes her appeal thus: 'This light of day is very pleasant to behold, the under-world is nothing worth; it is madness to pray for death; better a life of misery than a glorious death.' Later on in the poem, when the princess finds that her death is a necessity, and that the chieftains of the army are resolved on it, even though Achilles should resist them, she abandons with some inconsistency her love of life, and reasons in favour of death, as she had before pleaded for life. 'It is not meet,' she says to her mother, 'that I should love my life too dearly; not for thyself only, but for all the Hellenes, did'st thou bear me. Warriors without number, shield and oar in hand, will venture daring deeds and die for Hellas. Shall my one life hold them in check? What just answer can be made to a plea like this?' This deserves the praise of heroism and devotion, but it is out of harmony with the love of life set forth in the preceding speech. So sudden a change is more in the manner of Ismene than Antigone. It shows a somewhat weak and impulsive nature, widely different from the steady resolution which marks Antigone's action from first to last. Moreover, it is the act of Antigone when alive which is of the first importance in her character; her death is to her of secondary importance. In Iphigeneia, as in all the cases quoted from Euripides, the death is a necessity; a sacrifice made to avoid a great calamity. The heroism of these characters is in a measure passive; the princesses suffer nobly, as becomes a royal nature, when the suffering is a necessity. Antigone's heroism is of a more active kind; it brings a new and higher law into the world.

If then Antigone perishes in performing a sacred duty and by reason of her persistent clinging to justice, what becomes of her 'wilfulness' (*αὐθαδία*), 'which is anything but feminine?' To be obstinate in the observance of right, to love at the risk of death, are not qualities wholly masculine. 'Wilfulness' in the Greek sense of the word is the sin of Creon; it is only a false judgment which ascribes it to Antigone. She is not 'wilful,' she is absolute in her obedience to a higher law.

Thirdly, Professor Mahaffy tells us that: 'the coldness of

Antigone's relations to Haemon must strike every modern critic, a defect which Euripides very naturally avoided when he wrote his own Antigone.'

We do not know very much about the *Antigone* of Euripides. Aristophanes, the grammarian, in his argument to the play of Sophocles, says: 'The story will also be found in the *Antigone* of Euripides, only there Antigone is detected with Haemon, and given in marriage, and she has a son Macon.' At the end of the *Antigone* also the Scholiast informs us that 'this play differs from the *Antigone* of Euripides, because in that play Antigone was detected, and, owing to the love of Haemon, given in marriage.' Welcker has attempted to give a sketch of the plan of the Euripidean tragedy in his 'Griechische Tragoedie' 2, 563 ff. He believes that the events of the play of Sophocles were contained in the prologue of the drama of Euripides, and that the latter is taken, in point of time, from a period when the son of Haemon and Antigone was grown up. The plot may be guessed from the story in Hyginus (Fab. 72). 'Creon, the son of Menoeceus, published an edict that no one should bury Polynices or those who came with him, inasmuch as they had come to besiege their country. But Antigone, his sister, and Argia, his wife, secretly by night take up the body of Polynices and place it on the same pyre on which Eteocles was burnt. They were detected by the watchmen: Argia escaped, Antigone was brought before the king. He puts her in the hands of Haemon, to whom she was betrothed, to be put to death. Haemon was induced by his affection to disregard his father's commands; he placed Antigone among the shepherds, and falsely gave out that he had put her to death. Antigone bore a son who on coming to full age repaired to Thebes, to the games. Creon recognized him by the mark which is on the bodies of all who are sprung of the serpent's seed. Hercules entreated for Haemon, but in vain; Haemon put himself and his wife Antigone to death. But Creon gave his daughter Megara to Hercules to wife, and from her was born Therimachus and Ophites.' If Welcker is right in the theory that this extract from Hyginus gives the plot of the drama of Euripides, we may assume that this *Antigone* stood to the *Antigone* of

Sophocles in much the same relation that the *Electra* of Euripides stands to the *Electra* of Sophocles. Antigone is here placed among the shepherds, as Electra is married to a man of low rank: Haemon and Antigone become in secret the parents of a son Maeon or Maemon, who is subsequently discovered by Creon, through bearing on his body 'the spear which the earth-born carry.' So that though Euripides has undoubtedly made more of the love of Haemon and Antigone than Sophocles, he has not, by so doing, contributed to the nobility of either character, and he has made Creon a monster of cruelty, not merely a wrong-headed and self-willed statesman. But, in truth, we do not know enough of the drama of Euripides to pass any sentence upon it. One thing is clear; the account given by Aristophanes and the Scholiast is confused and incomplete. If Antigone is detected in burying Polynices, and then given to Haemon to wife, the tragedy disappears altogether, and we have nothing left but a comedy.

Sophocles knew well the power of Eros; he had felt it, if report speaks true, in his own life, and he has described it in many passages of his dramas. If, therefore, there is a coldness in Antigone's relations towards Haemon, it is not because Sophocles is ignorant of the power of love, but because he has not chosen to give that passion authority over Antigone in the situation in which he places her. Or rather, he has not chosen to allow Antigone to speak of her love, for of the depth of affection existing between her and Haemon he has left us in no doubt. This 'masculine' woman has such reserve and modesty that even in the last moments of life she will not speak of her lover. She thinks rather of her father, her mother, and her brother; these she hopes to join in another world, and reap the reward of her piety by unbroken intercourse with them; but of her lover personally she says nothing. This is, no doubt, strange to a modern reader; but it would not be equally strange to a Greek; nor in any degree inconsistent with the fact that the love of Haemon and Antigone is of the utmost importance in the drama. The Greeks, as is well known, did not look on the love of the sexes even in married life, in the same light that we do. They placed the relationship of blood above the

relationship formed by marriage, and filial or sisterly affection took with them the higher place. Thus it may be that in the mind of Sophocles love, *i.e.* love of the kind which leads to marriage, was not calculated to become the motive and spring of the highest moral action. In modern society a great deal is made of this passion, and almost everything else in life is regarded as giving way to it; yet no one will deny that there are other motives more exalted. Sophocles then wishing to raise his heroine into a spiritual world has raised her above this motive, and supplied her with another. It is justice which penetrates every thought and action of Antigone—justice asserting the claims of affection. In all the great writers of antiquity we find this sense of an ideal justice; this striving after a perfect judgment which shall reward a man according to his deserts. Justice, so Antigone thinks, though Creon declares otherwise, demands the burial of Polynices. Justice will not allow Ismene to share in an action which is not really hers. If Antigone has done wrong she is willing to suffer, for suffering justly imposed is better than a life of impunity: if her enemies are wrong, may they suffer to the full measure which ideal justice demands. In other characters of Sophocles we find the same feeling: in Electra justice has wholly triumphed over affection for a mother; Ajax feels that nothing but his death will satisfy the claims of justice; Oedipus is resigned in the same feeling; and the native force of justice compels Neoptolemus to restore the bow to Philoctetes.

There is also another consideration. The characters of Greek tragedy are for the most part one-sided, as Arnold Passow has shown. They display one trait; they are filled with one emotion. This the poet brings into prominence, and leaves the rest out of sight; he does not wish, any more than the sculptor of a relief, to give a rounded and perfect whole. Antigone is filled with the thought of what is due to her dead brother; and she regards nothing else. Creon has declared that the body shall not be buried, but he has no right to keep her from her own. His laws are not to be set against the divine laws which enjoin burial. So absorbed is she in this feeling that, when carried away to her tomb, she speaks of herself as the sole remaining

princess of the royal house, entirely ignoring the existence of her sister Ismene. It is the same intensity in one direction which makes it impossible for her to dwell in any manner on Haemon and his affection.

Once more let us hear Professor Mahaffy: Antigone 'is in Sophocles, at least in this play, little else than a man in female dress, undertaking female duties, but with no trace of female tenderness or weakness in any of her actions.'

Weakness, no doubt, will not be found in Antigone; if this quality is necessary to a heroine, we must give up the case. Of tenderness we have already spoken; it is the depth of her tenderness which makes Antigone what she is. But we have still to ask—'Are there grounds for separating the Antigone of this play from the Antigone of the *Oedipus Coloneus?*' Professor Mahaffy, in the words 'at least in this play,' implies such a separation, and indeed it is absolutely necessary for his point. No one could say of the foot-sore sun-burnt girl, who never left her father in his wanderings, who laments that he has not died in her arms, and weeps that she may not see his grave—that she is 'little else than a man in female dress.'

The *Antigone* was brought out in the poet's middle life; and, if tradition can be trusted, it won such applause that Sophocles was in consequence chosen to be one of the generals in the expedition to Samos. Whatever be the value of such a tradition it supports us in assuming that the *Antigone* was regarded as a masterpiece, even in the author's life-time, as it certainly was after his death. Another legend—that Sophocles, an old man, perished under too sustained an effort in reading his *Antigone*—points in the same direction. But the *Oedipus Coloneus* belongs to quite the latest period of the poet's life, and was not brought out till after his death. It is then improbable that in the later play he should have drawn an Antigone inconsistent with the great creation which won such renown. His effort would rather be to delineate a character which should have the force and fire of his earlier Antigone, and at the same time display greater gentleness in so far as she is not, in the later play, called upon to act in such trying circumstances as in the earlier one. And this is, in fact, what we find in the Antigone

of the *Oedipus Coloneus*, where she is, of course, but a little younger than in the *Antigone*. She has abandoned everything at Thebes for her father, she is regardless of the conventionalities of life, and wanders with her father, resting how and where she can. She speaks with courage to the elders of Colonus in her father's behalf, appearing before them as one of their own blood. She entreats her angry father for Polynices. She shews throughout a vigorous independent spirit; she is 'no woman when help is needed.' As if to connect the plays closely together and shew under what pressure Antigone lies in burying her brother, Sophocles has chosen in the *Oedipus Coloneus* to represent Polynices as especially laying this charge of burial upon her. And in such a nature a last request is not lightly forgotten. There is therefore no reason to speak of the Antigone in the play of the same name as different from the Antigone of the *Oedipus Coloneus*. The character is the same, but in different circumstances. If the separation is necessary for Professor Mahaffy's argument, so much the worse for the argument.

Such an one as Antigone, if we met her in daily life, might not be an attractive woman. She might have fancies, crotchets, and prejudices. She might not be soft or gentle; she certainly would not gain the praise due to the woman of whom least is said for good or bad among the men. But we must not on that account condemn the character or the age in which it was created. We cannot measure the heroines of great poets by standards such as these. No one would say of a sculptor's creations that they are 'cold' because of marble, or lifeless because immovable. The standard of ordinary life is not applicable here, or all ideals will be equally unreal and unsatisfactory. The women of Sophocles are not the women of his own time or of any time. They are ideal creatures such as might be in an ideal world, such as are not and cannot be in the circumstances of ordinary life. A poet who has delineated for us a heart filled to overflowing with the purest earthly affection, with the love of a sister for a brother, of the living for the dead, a nature passionate and unyielding in the sense of right and duty, can hardly be said to have joined in the degraded ideas of the female sex current in his day, whatever these may have been.

II.

Another critic, on widely different grounds, arrives at a conception of the character of Antigone, not indeed so low as that formed by Professor Mahaffy, but still to some degree unfavourable. In the papers reprinted in his edition of the *Antigone*, A. Boeckh endeavours to shew that the poet did not intend Antigone's action to be regarded as wholly blameless, and that such a view is necessary to the unity of the drama.

As the thought which underlies the whole and gives unity to the piece, Boeckh gives us the following (p. 160): 'Immoderate and passionate effort, when rebellious, leads to destruction; let a man measure his capacity (Befugniss) with sobriety so as not to overstep human and divine rights in his rash self-will, and suffer severe blows in punishment; reason is the best element in happiness.' The thought that want of moderation brings men to their ruin is to be found, no doubt, in the *Antigone;* indeed, it will be found to a greater or less degree in almost any Greek play, at least, any play of Sophocles, for on it is founded the Greek idea of a virtuous life. It is the leading thought of the *Ajax*, expressed plainly by Athena at the end of the prologue (l. 127 ff). 'Look then on this, and let thy lips utter no high words against heaven: be not puffed up, if so be that thou art more than another in strength of hand, and abundance of wealth. All that is human a day may bring down or a day may set up: but the gods cherish the prudent, and hate the evil.' In this drama the self-restraint of Odysseus is contrasted with the proud and rebellious spirit of Ajax. And when Ajax has perished, the moderation of Odysseus is needed to bring about his burial, so that here, beyond a doubt, the unity of the play may be sought in the idea expressed by Boeckh.

But is it so in the *Antigone?* If it is, we must find the spirit of rebellion and rashness in Antigone no less than in Creon, for both are involved in ruin; indeed, if death is the worst of evils, Antigone suffers more than Creon. Boeckh does

find it. He allows that Creon's edict with regard to the burial of Polynices is harsh and tyrannical, an infringement on the rights of Antigone, and an offence against the gods and the dead; yet Antigone is also guilty in transgressing the law of the state. To support this view of Antigone's action he quotes the words of Ismene, which point out to her sister her duty as a woman. 'The poet,' he says, 'wished to delineate Antigone as grand and noble, not commonplace or poor; but she was intended to be ignorant of moderation.' 'The harshness of both sides shews itself towards Ismene, whom Creon will involve in destruction though she is guiltless, while Antigone rejects her sympathy.' And again, p. 167, 'The poet is far removed from any wish to glorify Antigone absolutely; the grandeur and firmness of her resolve are justly brought into prominence, but hints of reproach are not wanting.'

Undoubtedly Ismene regards her sister's action in the first instance with disapprobation. It is, in her eyes, a breach of law (ll. 44, 46, 60). It goes beyond the reserve natural to, and proper for, women (l. 61). It is impossible in the present helpless and subject condition of the sisters (l. 63). Yet she admits that it is prompted by genuine affection (l. 99). She has, in fact, only motives of a lower order, and maxims of worldly or proverbial wisdom to oppose to the lofty resolution of her sister. And in a later scene she owns that these prudential maxims are false. So far from regarding her sister's action as wrong, she wishes to join in the results of it. To die as Antigone dies is better than life. The character of Ismene is gentle and amiable, but too weak to give us the measure of right and wrong. In this respect, as in many others, it may be compared with the Chrysothemis of the *Electra*, who, also, while dissuading her sister from her course of action confesses that justice is on the other side (ll. 338, 466, 7). The language of Ismene, therefore, even if we admit it to imply reproach on Antigone, cannot be regarded as the utterance of the poet's own thoughts. It is intended to point out, and does point out with perfect truth, the fact that the action of Antigone is above the level of the ordinary Greek woman, not that it is blameable in itself.

But the chorus, who are often taken to be the *alter ego* of the poet, speak in more than one passage with severity of Antigone—severity in spite of a certain sympathy. 'Having caught thee in foolishness' (l. 383). 'Truly the child is stern after the sternness of her sire; she knows not how to bend to misfortune' (l. 471). 'Thou hast advanced to the edge of daring, and dashed heavily against the lofty throne of justice' (l. 853 f.) 'A self-decided temper has been thy undoing' (l. 875). It is not a little remarkable that the *Antigone* should be the only extant play of Sophocles in which the chorus is not of the same sex as the principal character. In the *Electra* the chorus are women, and have the strongest sympathy with the heroine: 'in all things they answer love for love' (l. 134). To Antigone such sympathy is denied. Are we to interpret this singular fact as meaning that the poet's sympathy also was not with Antigone in her action?

The chorus are old men, and as such are naturally opposed to any expression of feeling which disturbs the existing order of things. They are also absolutely under the control of Creon. 'You, I suppose, have the power to put in force any law, both in regard to the dead and to us who live' (ll. 213, 14). 'They too see this, but they pay lip-service to thee' (l. 509). Yet even they do not approve the action of Creon; they give, from time to time, a little timid advice; and when at length Creon has insulted Teiresias and drawn from him menaces of evil, they venture on open and serious remonstrance (l. 1092—11), urging the king to obey his better feelings, or rather the feelings of dread which the prophet's words have aroused in his mind. Finally, when the punishment of his self-will has come upon Creon, they take quite a different view of Antigone's act and Creon's conduct, 'methinks, thou art too late in perceiving justice' (l. 1270, cf. 1349—50).

Can the judgment of such wavering and time-serving men be regarded as the judgment of the poet? If so, we must suppose that the poet is inconsistent in his view of the action of his heroine, condemning her so long as it is possible to do so, and relenting only when the gods have declared on her side. Or could the hand which has sketched this grand character write

down as the rule of action, 'There is a kind of piety in paying due reverence; but power is not to be transgressed'? (l. 872). No! we must look elsewhere for the mind of Sophocles. The free people of Thebes, speaking their thoughts without fear of Creon and uninfluenced by motives of worldly prudence, declare in her favour, 'she who would not suffer her brother to lie unburied on the field of carnage for dogs and birds to feed upon, is she not worthy of a golden meed of honour?' (ll. 696—9). Antigone herself has no doubt about it. She does indeed allow her action to be called in question in the passage ll. 905 ff., if that passage is genuine, but only to justify it more completely and shew how absolutely necessary it was for her to act as she did. She is carried away from the stage declaring to the last that she perishes by a tyrannical act 'because of her reverence for piety.' On the other hand, Creon's action is from first to last thoroughly unjustifiable, and is so spoken of by the poet. Antigone declares when speaking of the proclamation that Creon has no right to keep her from her own, *i.e.* he has no right to interfere with the duties of affection. When informed by Creon of his intention, the chorus do not approve of it, but merely remark that life and death are in his hand. Teiresias speaks of the death of Antigone as an impious act no less than the refusal to permit burial to Polynices. Creon, even, confesses his error when too late, and hastens to retrieve it: 'I too, now that my determination is so set, will in presence set her free as with my own lips I entombed her; for I am sore afraid that it may perchance be best to go to the end of life observant of established laws' (ll. 1111 ff.).

Creon's act, then, is a distinct outrage. Antigone opposes it. There is no doubt vehemence on both sides; but Creon is vehement in the cause of wrong, Antigone in the cause of right. When compelled to defend himself by Haemon, Creon is forced back upon maxims of absolute tyranny: 'Am I to rule this land for another than myself?' Antigone, in her defence, appeals to the everlasting laws of Zeus.

There is a certain peremptoriness in the character of Antigone; without it the drama would be impossible. But it cannot be maintained that Sophocles wished to imply that her action in

burying Polynices against the decree of Creon is at all blameable. Nor is such a conception of her character necessary to the unity of the play. The leading idea round which all the parts are gathered, and from which they all spring, is that the ordinances of the state are not to be at variance with human nature and religion. An absolute king may lay down laws with a certain air of wisdom and statescraft, but if those laws are at variance with higher ordinances they will come to nothing and involve their author in ruin. Throughout the *Antigone* the pedantic statescraft of Creon is in contrast with the natural humanity which governs the actions of Antigone, of Haemon, of Eurydice. That statescraft has to give way: it is founded on selfishness and ignorant obstinacy. It consumes all who come within its reach. It is a principle of death, not of life. It ends in utter desolation.

Professor Lehrs (*Populäre Aufsätze*, ed. 2, p. 69) thus criticizes—in his somewhat peculiar manner—those who regard Antigone as to blame. "'The law of the state,' say the modern philologists and aestheticists, in dealing with the *Antigone*, 'comes into conflict with the divine and moral law; both sides, equally justified in themselves, equally fall into error through obstinate persistence.' This conception of the *Antigone* is, with permission, a piece of Philistinism for which Sophocles is not to blame, for he speaks plainly enough to an unprejudiced mind, and in a higher key. The law of the state dashing against the divine and moral law cannot be justified more than any other immorality, and though passion and prejudice may be blinded to this, the pure heart of a maiden perceives it, suddenly, with direct certainty and divination[1]."

[1] When this criticism was written, I was not aware that the subject had been treated by Mr Dyer in the *Classical Museum*, Vol. 2.

EVELYN ABBOTT.

NOTE ON ODYSSEY V. 368.

ὡς δ' ἄνεμος ξαὴς ἠΐων θημῶνα τινάξῃ
καρφαλέων, τὰ μὲν ἄρ τε διεσκέδασ' ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ.
Od. v. 368, 369.

THE word ἠΐων occurs only in this passage, for it is manifestly a different word from ἦϊα, ἤϊα, or ᾖα, which occurs elsewhere in all these forms in the sense of "provisions", or "food". The old commentators interpret it as ἄχυρα, and modern lexicons translate it by "chaff"; but I believe that this interpretation is derived only from the context and adopted because it suits the sense of the passage. Now I conceive, from the addition of the epithet μακρὰ to δούρατα in v. 370:

ὣς τῆς δούρατα μακρὰ διεσκέδασε,
"so he scattered the long beams of the raft,"

that the simile will appear much more graphic if we understand by ἤϊα not merely minute particles like chaff, but something long and resembling the beams in shape, and yet light enough to be blown away by a violent gust of wind. Upon this internal evidence I would translate the word by "straw", "stubble", or "reeds". But there is another word in another passage, likewise a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, but one which has attracted greater notice, which determines me to adopt the last meaning. In the fifth book of the Iliad, v. 36, Athene withdraws Ares from the battle and seats him ἐπ' ἠϊόεντι Σκαμάνδρῳ. This epithet has sorely puzzled the commentators. Buttmann, in his Lexilogus, has shewn, what indeed scarcely wanted shewing, that the vulgar derivation from ἠϊών, "sea shore", is good

for nothing; and chiefly from the internal evidence of the passage itself he suggests "grassy" as the meaning. I submit that the adjective *ἠϊόεις* is regularly formed from the substantive *ἤϊον*; that *ἤϊον* is "a reed," and *ἠϊόεις* "reedy"; that *ἠΐων θημῶνα* is "a heap of reeds," and *ἐπ' ἠϊόεντι Σκαμάνδρῳ*, "on the bank of the reedy Scamander." This interpretation suits perfectly the passage in which Quintus Smyrnaeus has used the word, better even than Buttmann's: B. v. v. 299,

> *χήνεσιν ἢ γεράνοισιν ἐοικότες, οἷς ἐπορούσῃ*
> *αἰετὸς ἠϊόεν πεδίον καταβοσκομένοισιν,*

"a reedy or rushy plain."

HENRY MALDEN.

NOTE ON XENOPHON'S HELLENICS. I. c. VII. § 2.

In the beginning of the account of the prosecution of the six admirals the clause τῆς Δεκελείας ἐπιμελούμενος (according to the common text) has caused great trouble to commentators; and it is so inexplicable that there is good reason to suspect that it is corrupt. We want a better collation of MSS. than we have in order to lay a foundation for a sound text. But if Δεκελείας be the reading best supported by MSS., then I conjecture the true reading is δεκατείας, and that the office of Archidemus is to be explained by reference to what we are told in c. I. § 22: ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἀφικόμενοι τῆς Χαλκηδονίας ἐς Χρυσόπολιν, ἐτείχισαν αὐτὴν, καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ· καὶ τὴν δεκάτην ἐξελέγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων, καὶ φυλακὴν ἐγκαταλιπόντες ναῦς τριάκοντα καὶ στρατηγὼ δύο. The Athenians stationed a force at Chrysopolis, and exacted a toll of one-tenth of the value of the cargo from all merchant ships which passed out of the Pontus. Of this δεκατεία, or exaction of tithe, I conceive Archidemus to have had the charge; and if this were his office we see at once that it was in the discharge of his ordinary duties that he accused Erasinides of embezzling monies from the Hellespont which were the property of the state; and we can understand how he had the power by his own summary jurisdiction to impose a fine upon him (ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβαλών) to a certain amount.

I observe, however, that Schneider reports as the reading of two MSS., and as a marginal reading in Stephen's edition Διωκελείας. This would lead me to conjecture τῆς διωβελείας ἐπιμελούμενος. According to this conjecture Archidemus would

have the management of a most important part of the Theorica, a very fitting office for a demagogue, and one which would give him a good excuse for looking sharp after any peculation. I find from Dindorf's edition, that among the various readings noted by Victorius, on the margin of a copy of the Aldine edition and taken from some MS., is Διωκελίας in this passage. This confirms me in my opinion that Διωβελίας is the true reading.

Professor Dobree (Adversaria, I. p. 125) conjectured τῆς δεκάτης or τῆς λείας or τῆς δεκάτης τῆς λείας. The addition of τῆς λείας to τῆς δεκάτης makes me conclude that his notion was not the same as mine.

HENRY MALDEN.

ON THE WORD ΒΟΥΓΑΙΟΣ AND THE PREFIX ΒΟΥ-.

Some new light has been thrown on this word by Mr Nettleship in the Journal of Philology, Vol. v. p. 18. To some of his statements, however, exception may be taken. In examining them I shall for brevity's sake assume an acquaintance with the substance of his paper.

Now, in the first place, Mr Nettleship rejects the usual explanation of *βουγάιος* as "great boaster", on two grounds, one valid, but the other questionable. First, no doubt, *γαίω* and its root GAV (*γαF*) do not mean "to boast", but originally "to rejoice" (cf. Latin gaudeo), and then "to exult". Even in the later use of the connected words *γαῦρος*, &c., in a *bad* sense the idea is still that of proud consciousness, not that of boastful expression. His second ground is that "there is nothing to shew that *βου-* is ever used as a prefix in Homer as it is in later Greek." Now waiving *βούβρωστις* and *βοῶπις* as capable of other explanations, and supposing that *βουγάιος* is the only instance of the prefix in Homer, we may regard that fact from two different sides. On the one hand, when we consider how small is the bulk of the Homeric poems compared with that of the rest of Greek literature, and again how very few words there are altogether containing the prefix, and that of these few (v. infr.) a considerable part like *βούνεβρος*, *βουμελία* are names of particular animals and plants, while others, like *βούπαις*, "bouncing boy", seem to belong to familiar talk, we shall conceive that so far from the fact of there being only one instance of it in Homer casting any doubt upon his use of it, that one instance is more than we can expect. Indeed, one might fairly claim from those who press an *ex silentio*

argument in such a case, that they should shew that the poems comprise either the whole or the greatest part of the current vocabulary of their times; which we may safely say they will never do. On the other hand, the character of the prefix itself furnishes some anterior probability that it would occur in Homer. It indicates size by a reference to a concrete example or typical individual of sense, viz. the ox—a mode of indication characteristic of the simplicity of early thought. To take one illustration from Homer himself, *κοτυλήρυτον αἷμα* (Il. 23. 24), "blood which can be *drawn in cups*," is "copiously flowing blood." So that I think that we may without violence say that these two contending probabilities are fairly represented in the fact of our finding one instance of the prefix in Homer, but not more than one.

Still this prefix does furnish an argument against the common explanation. *Βου-* and the other similar prefixes are almost exclusively used of material size only: their application to objects out of the sphere of sense is very late and very rare, and therefore on *à priori* grounds unlikely to be found in Homer.

The following are the words in which *βου-*, *ἱππο-*, *horse-*, *pferde-*, *ross-* seem to denote absolute size.

βου- in

βούβαλος (*βούβαλον· μέγα καὶ πολύ*, Hesych.)

βουβάρας (*μεγαλοναύτης*, id.), cf. *βούβαρα· μέγαλα*, *βούβαραι· μέγαλαι*, id.

βούβοσις, Hesych., Etym. Magn., ravenous hunger, = *βούβρωστις*, which is also the name of a bird, Nic. Ther. 409[1].

βουγέρων (Writer in Boisson's Anecd.)

βουκόρυζα, a severe cold, Hesych.

βουκόρυζος, adj. Suid.

βούλιμος, ravenous hunger, *βουλιμιᾶν -ώττειν -ία*, κ.τ.λ.

βούμαστος, large kind of grape.

βουμελία, large ash.

[1] This use and the other words *βούβοσις*, *βούλιμος*, *βούπεινα*, make it hard to resist the conclusion that in *βούβρωστις* the prefix is the *βου-* of size.

βούνεβρος, large fawn.
βούπαις, big boy.
βούπαλις, hard-struggling.
βούπαλος· μέγας, Hesych.
βούπεινα, ravenous hunger.
βουπρήονες· κρημνοὶ μέγαλοι καὶ λόφοι, Hesych.
?*βούρυγχος*, with a large snout, an *ἰχθὺς κητώδης*, Hesych.
βούρυτος· ποταμὸς μέγα ῥέων, id.
βούσυκα, large kind of figs: and add
βόεια ῥήματα, Ar.[1]

ἱππο- in

ἱππόκρημνος, very precipitous.
ἱππολάπαθον, large kind of sorrel.
ἱππομάραθρον, large kind of fennel.
ἱππόπαρῃος, with large cheeks.
ἱππόσελινον, large kind of parsley.
ἱππότιγρις, a large tiger.
ἱππότυφία (Lucian, Diog. Laert.), excessive conceit.
ἱππόφλομος, a large kind of mullein.
Compare *κρόνιππος*, an utter dotard, Ar., and perhaps *ἱππόπορνος*, an utter prostitute.

Horse- in

Horse-bean,
horse-chestnut,
horse-cucumber,
horse-emmet,
horse-laugh,
horse-leech,
horse-marten,
horse-mint,
horse-mushroom,
horse-mussel,
horse-play ("great rough" play).

[1] The idea of size might come in various ways as in the following: *βουτόρος*, *βουπόρος*, "fit to pierce an ox;" *βουχανδής*, "able to hold an ox;" *βουφάγος*, "eating oxen;" *βούτιμος*, *βοώνητος*, "the price of an ox;" and perhaps *βοῶπις*, "ox-eyed."

Pferde- in

Pferde-ameise,
Pferde-arbeit (cf. Eng. "work like a horse"),
Pferde-bohne,
Pferde-glück,
Pferde-kastanie,
Pferde-münze,
Pferde-nuss,
Pferfe-raupe,

Ross- in

Ross-dill,
Ross-egel,
Ross-fern,
Ross-kümmel,
Ross-pflaume.

In Sanskrit *hasti*, elephant, is used in the same way; *e.g.* in *hasti-karaṅja* = *mahā-karaṅja*, large kind of tree: *hasti-ghoshā* (or *hasti-ghoshātakī*) for *mahā-kos'ātakī*, large kind of creeper[1].

These considerations lead us to reject the ordinary interpretation of *βουγάιος* as "great boaster": and the context of the two passages in which it occurs offers at least no impediment. In Il. 13. 824 it is certainly more in keeping with the context that Hector should deride Ajax as "great blundering fool", than as "great boaster": the other epithet which he addresses to him, *ἁμαρτόεπες*, and the clumsy incoherent character of Ajax's speech, esp. 810—813, which is no doubt intended, point in this direction. So too does the Homeric conception of Ajax as the slow giant, the *νωθὴς ὄνος* of the simile in Il. 11. 559 (comp. the "*beef-witted* lord" of Shakspere, Tro. and Cress. II. i. 15). In Od. 18. 79, too, the reference may well be to Irus' vast but weak and ungainly frame: *οὐδέ*

[1] I owe these two instances to the kindness of Professor Cowell. They seem certain: which perhaps cannot be said of all the others that I have given of the other prefixes, as it is often very difficult to decide whether the prefix originally denoted size or some other connexion with the particular animal.

οἱ ἦν ἴς οὐδὲ βίη· εἶδος δὲ μάλα μέγας ἦεν ὁρᾶσθαι. We may, therefore, put the old derivation finally aside and seek for something more satisfactory.

Mr Nettleship suggests that the βου- is the vocative of βοῦς, and γάιος an adjective agreeing with it. I have already replied to his argument against βου- being the prefix: that it should not be so, I think improbable on other grounds. All our authorities take βουγάιος as one word, and not as two: and in the case of the Cretan nickname βουγάιοι it must be so taken. The force of the epithets and the rhythm of the line are considerably impaired by its being split up into two words ἁμαρτόεπες | βοῦ | γάιε. That this can be done is, I think, an accident, the two phrases βουγάιος and βοῦς γάιος happening to agree in the vocative, that being the case in which, as epithets of abuse, we expect to find them most frequently used. With regard to the second part of the word, I do not think that we can do better than accept Mr Nettleship's suggestion, that it is related to the Sanskr. *gavaya, bovis species* and *gavyas, bubulus bovinus*, Gr. γαιὸς, βοῦς ἐργατής, Hesych. Eustath. and Lat. *Gaius* (*Gavius* which preserves the *v* should be added), and, of course, ultimately with the Sanskr. *gaûs* βοῦς, cow: and consequently reject the alternative he offers of connecting it with γαῖα and making it = "belonging to the *field*," a sense of γάιος or γήιος without example. The next question is whether -γάιος is a subst. or adj. The evidence which may be gathered from Mr Nettleship's paper is indecisive. Still the balance seems to me in favour of taking it as a substantive. Mr Nettleship however says, "If γάϊος then = γαϜιος it must mean properly 'belonging to an ox':" I cannot see the necessity, unless the "properly" refers to primitive times which our analysis cannot reach. It is certainly not at all uncommon for a suffix to be used without any specific meaning; *e.g. er* and *er-in-aceu-s* both mean "hedgehog", and κάπριος = κάπρος. This adjective he would take to mean either (1) "loud" (comparing Av. Ran. 678, βόεια ῥήματα, where however βόεια is *not* "*loud*", but "*big, monstrous* words"), which is an unexampled change of meaning, or (2) "hulking" or "stupid" (both notions should be com-

bined), which gives a satisfactory sense to the adjective, or (3) as "two words to express one thing, like *σῦς κάπριος*": in this case, apparently, taking *γάιος* to be a substantive, and = *βοῦς*. His example however is quite inconclusive, because in it the *σῦς* is generic and the *κάπριος* specific, "the *wild* swine": and it is hard to belive that such a tautology is possible.

This suggests the last point that I need touch upon, the recurring of the same element [*βου*, *γα*(F)] twice in the same word. This may happen if the meanings and forms of the two parts are, as in the present instance, so altered or obscured that they are no longer felt to be the same. Unfortunately, I cannot offer any parallels from the classical languages: but the following from modern ones may be interesting. Fr. *cormoran* (cormorant) = Fr. *corb* (crow) + Bret. *môr-vran* (*mor* sea, *bran* crow): *loup-garou* = *loup* + *garou* (L. L. gerulphus = G. währ-wolf): so Bret. *bleiz-garô* (bleiz = loup): so in Ital. *Mongibello gibello* Ar. = *mon* It. (Diez, Romance Dict. s. v. *loup-garou*): so Eng. *saltcellar* is said to = *salt-salière*, and *court-yard* is another example.

To sum up then, *βουγάιος* is *one* word, a *compound*, of which the first part is the *prefix βου-*, used to denote *material size*, and the second the *substantive γάιος*, an ox, so that the whole means a "*great ox*", a "*lumbering brute*".

J. P. POSTGATE.

SOME NEW LATIN FRAGMENTS.

In the course of this summer I found whilst examining some of Sir Thos. Phillipps' MSS. at Cheltenham a Latin glossary of the XIIth century (No. 4626) containing a large number of the words in Paulus, most of those in Fulgentius, and much matter, more or less valuable, drawn from Priscian, from other grammatical writers, or glossaries of an early period. My extracts, which were tolerably copious, I hope to publish at some future time: meanwhile the following fragments of verse, some of which wider reading than mine may perhaps identify, will be interesting to readers of the Anthologia Latina.

Admirabilis per d non per duo m m scribi debet. Vnde lisorius in ortographia dicit quod d ante omnes consonantes mutari potest praeter m et q ut adquiro admitto admodum quemadmodum. Adbreuio quoque dicendum non abbreuio.

This *Orthographia* must have been a prose treatise, it would seem by the same Luxorius to whom the verse-fragments below are ascribed.

Basterna. Basterne etiam dicuntur quaedam matronarum in itinere uehicula quae desuper cooperta et mollioribus stramentis composita a duobus equis trahuntur.

This explains an epigram in the A. L. 101 Riese.

Berillinus...Possidonius hic specular renitens fert et cristallina mira. et alibi has inter species operum smaragdina tota Prata uirent.

The last quotation seems to be from Prudentius Psychom. 862.

Candaces olim uocabantur regine ethiopum vnde lisorius Candacis ethiopum ditant eraria paruos.

Duum aliquando ponitur pro duorum sed in metro tantum. in quo tamen metro auctores magis in usu habent duorum dicere quam duum. Ouidius... (M. II. 197, V. 165) *liuius quoque aspice monstrorum praeeuntia signa duorum.*

Lauacrum...sic a tenere tenebras corripitur. Meque sub his tenebris nimium uidisse quereris (Ouid. M. III. 525) *faustus quoque in epylogo de lauacro redeunt numerantur et inde uidentes.*

Molossi sunt rustici canes. vnde quidam poeta ait et raucos timuit discernere damma molossos.

Obrizum dicitur aurum optimum rubrum uel ut alii dicunt rude. hoc obrizum i uel haec obriza e. lisorius prompserat obrizum dum licida (? lycidas dum) *sterteret aurum.*

Osculum fit inter amicos basium inter coniuges suauium autem inter eos qui se turpiter amant. Vnde quidam ait, Basia coniugibus sed et oscula dantur amicis Suauia lasciuis miscentur grata labellis.

Anth. Lat. 681 Riese.

Peritus a uerbo pereo ris corripit penultimam peritus i doctus ab eo quod est perior iris producit quod utrumque ostendit lisorius uno breui uersiculo dicens non peritum tendis si uis audire peritum.

Recens aliquando ponitur pro recenter nomen pro aduerbio Virgilius (!) *sole recens orto numerus ruit omnis in urbem Pastorum reboant saltus siluaeque cicadis.*

Reditus i. pensio unde lisorius Annuus ut reditus quo pascar uestiar ungar.

Siliqua tunica leguminum i. folliculus Virgilius unde prius letum siliqua quassante legumen Item Grandior haud fetus siliquarum follibus esset.

Is this variant found elsewhere ?

Sirma dicitur caudum mulierum praediuitum unde quidam ait terramque īpresso sirmate uerrat.

Sorex mus unde Sofocles (cl altered in darker ink from first hand) *Catus in obscuris cepit pro sorice picam.*

Anth. L. 181. 3 where *in obscuro.*

Supina...frondui tum...florui tum Lisorius nec fronditura pinus nec floritura ficus.

Tribula flagellum quo frumenta excutiuntur cuius penultima aliquando producta aliquando correpta inuenitur Affranius exuitur peplis celerans agitatque tribulas.

Ysopus est herba pectori mundatiua unde lisorius pectus ysopo mundatur cerebrumque sinapi.

There can be little doubt that the Lisorius of the glossary is the Luxorius of the Anthologia (18, 203, 287—375 Riese). Luxorius is believed, but hardly on sufficient evidence, to have lived in the reign of the Vandal king Thrasamund (A.D. 496—523). Teuffel 468, Riese A. L. p. xxvi.

R. ELLIS.

JUDGES AND LITIGANTS.

(A Paper read before the Philological Society, Nov. 9, 1877.)

> Τοῖσιν ἔπειτ' ἦϋσσον, ἀμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον.
> κεῖτο δ' ἄρ' ἐν μέσσοισι δύο χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,
> τῷ δόμεν ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι.
> *Il.* XVIII. 506—508.

I SHOULD not have ventured to occupy the time of the Society with any remarks on this passage, had it not been that its right interpretation appears to have an important bearing on our appreciation of ancient legal procedure, while the view of its meaning which I desire to support has not been formed in reliance on my own judgment alone. I have the satisfaction of being able to substantiate it by what will I feel sure be here regarded as the very highest authority. It was communicated to me not many months before his lamented death by one of the most gifted scholars that this society has ever numbered among its members—Mr Shilleto. He took occasion in doing so to point out what he believed to be a grave error on the part of Sir Henry Maine; and he added that it was the only mistake in point of scholarship which he had been able to detect in Sir Henry's most admirable work on "Ancient Law." I need hardly say that Mr Shilleto was one of the very few philologists whose commendations, bestowed on so brilliant a scholar as Sir Henry Maine, would be other than absurd.

The first line in the passage quoted above is not free from difficulty. The most probable translation appears to be "with these"—or "leaning on these"—"they rose to speak"—or "hastened forwards"—"and each after other pronounced judgment." It has however been suggested that the mean-

ing is "to these," *i.e.* the judges; "they"—*sc.* the litigants—"hurried forwards and pleaded each his cause in turn." So Doederlein, *causam suam agebant,* and Heyne, *alter post alterum causam egerunt.* The abrupt change of subject which this interpretation involves would perhaps present a sufficient objection to its being accepted; but a far graver difficulty lies in the assumption that δίκαζον is here equivalent to δικάζοντο, an hypothesis which, as I shall subsequently endeavour to shew, is unwarrantable, and is not really supported by a passage in Thucydides which has been explained by several editors and commentators in that sense. I therefore adhere to the translation which I first gave, and which is adopted by Mr Paley in his edition of the Iliad.

"And in the midst of them were set two talents of gold, to give to him who before the elders should plead his cause with most justice." This is also substantially the view taken by Mr Paley of the following lines; although he does not appear to speak with complete confidence. Similarly Doederlein:—*qui causam suam optime orasset;* while the Schol. Ven. furnishes a similar interpretation:—δύο δὲ τάλαντα χρυσίου κατέθεντο ὥστε τὸν ἀποδείξαντα τὸ ἀληθὲς λαβεῖν ἀμφότερα. This explanation, though itself not free from ambiguity, is I believe undoubtedly correct; and I think this will appear from a somewhat detailed examination of the other view, which is certainly supported by the weight of several eminent authorities.

Liddell and Scott for instance *s.v.* δίκη give the following note on this passage: δίκην ἰθύντατα εἰπεῖν "to give the most upright *judgment.*" Similarly Spitzner. Again, I find that a recent translator—Mr E. W. Simcox—in lines which I must say do not strike me as remarkable either for excellence of English, for fidelity to the original or for metrical beauty—renders as follows:—

> Two golden talents lay in the mid senate awaiting
> Him who the best among them all should utter his judgment.

I now come to two other exponents of the same opinion.

The view which they take of the passage is especially important, because from their—I believe mistaken—interpretation they proceed to deduce some rather striking consequences. Mr Gladstone in describing the scene writes as follows:—

> Quite apart from this fine there lies in the midst duly 'paid into court' two talents of gold to be given at the close to him of all the judges who should deliver the most upright, that is the most approved, judgment. However righteous the original intention of a payment in this form, it is easy to estimate its practical tendencies and curious to remark how early in the course of time they were realised. (*Homeric Studies*, Vol. III. pp. 60, 61).

I regret to find that Mr Gladstone, who appears to have had in his mind a well-known passage in a much later poem—the *Works and Days* of Hesiod—considers that bribery and corruption played their part in the judicial proceedings of his favourite Homeric age. The inferences which Sir Henry Maine draws from the words of the author of the Iliad are of a somewhat different kind. It may perhaps be convenient for me to quote the passage in which he refers to the line in question:—

> The point of detail, however, which stamps the picture as the counterpart of the archaic Roman practice is the reward designed for the judges. Two talents of gold lie in the middle, to be given to him who shall explain the grounds of the decision most to the satisfaction of the audience. The magnitude of this sum, as compared with the trifling amount of the Sacramentum, seems to me indicative of the difference between fluctuating usage and usage consolidated into law. The scene introduced by the poet as a striking and characteristic, but still only occasional, feature of city life in the heroic age has stiffened, at the opening of the history of civil process, into the regular, ordinary formalities of a lawsuit. It is natural, therefore, that in the Legis Actio the remuneration of the Judge should be reduced to a reasonable sum, and that, instead of being adjudged to one of a number of arbitrators by popular acclamation, it should be paid as a matter of course to the State which the Prætor represents. But that the incidents described so vividly by Homer, and by Gaius with even more than the usual crudity of technical language, have substantially the same meaning, I cannot doubt; and, in confirmation of this view, it may be added, that many observers of the earliest judicial usages of modern Europe have remarked that the fines inflicted by Court on offenders were originally *sacramenta*. The State did not take from the defendant a composition for any wrong supposed to be done to itself, but claimed a share in the com-

pensation awarded to the plaintiff simply as the fair price of its time and trouble. (A. L. p. 377, 378).

It will be seen that the whole of this argument depends on what Sir Henry rightly describes as a "point of detail," and, as it seems to me, a point of detail as to which he labours under a grave misapprehension. In the first place I need scarcely say that the ordinary usage of *δίκην εἰπεῖν* is not "to pronounce judgment," but "to plead a cause." Mr Shilleto indeed confidently assured me that there was no instance of the phrase being used in any other sense. *δίκη* in Homer is doubtless a very complex word, used in many different ways. As Sir Henry Maine elsewhere points out, the word *νόμος* was unknown to the poet, and belongs to a subsequent stage of social life. When the isolated *θέμις*, the result of the law-giver's momentary inspiration, began to be developed, through frequent repetition under more or less analogous circumstances, into a kind of customary law, *δίκη* was the word used to signify the new state of things, as an equivalent for just decision, or judgment according to the custom which prevailed. Hence I am not prepared to affirm that *δίκην εἰπεῖν* could not possibly be used with the sense of "to pronounce what is just"; but it may at least be asserted that in order to justify us in departing from the ordinary rendering of the phrase, the necessity of doing so ought to be abundantly, nay conclusively, proved by the context in which it is used. Now it certainly seems to me that if we examine the context with any care, the probabilities will be found to be all the other way.

Among other reasons, if Sir Henry Maine and Mr Gladstone are right, there must have been not one trial but two. The merits of the suit had first to be adjudged and then the merits of the respective judgments. The talents were to be given "to him who shall explain the grounds of the decision most to the satisfaction of the audience." Further on Sir Henry Maine speaks of "the remuneration of the judge .. being adjudged to one of a number of arbitrators by popular acclamation." We do not learn whether the judges were to be rewarded in proportion to their knowledge of precedent,

the skill which they displayed in mastering and grouping the facts of the case, or the elegance of the Greek in which their decisions were respectively pronounced. Whichever point was selected for determining the award, it is at least possible that the spectators would not be invariably unanimous in their preference; and there certainly appears to be no little incongruity in assigning to the ignorant bystanders of the agora the duty of rewarding the elders and the functions of a kind of ultimate Court of Criminal Appeal. If for instance there were four judges, two of whom pronounced in favour of the plaintiff, and two in favour of the defendant, the ultimate decision would clearly have depended on the suffrage of the mob.

Moreover, the amount of the reward certainly seems altogether disproportionate to the services rendered by the judge; for one judge alone, we are told, was to receive the whole sum, while his less fortunate fellows, who had confused the merits of the case, or pronounced their decision in an inelegant style, were to go home empty-handed, and console themselves with the conviction that they had gratuitously performed an eminent public service. Two talents of gold—whether we regard the talent as a weight or a coin, a point which does not appear to be altogether certain—would, I should fancy, form a very suitable compensation for an accidental homicide, though I am myself inclined to believe that the injured relative of the deceased did not receive more than a single talent in compensation for his bereavement; but as a fee for a judicial decision the amount would seem to be most preposterous. It is clear from the passage which I have read that Sir Henry Maine himself felt this difficulty. He speaks of the remuneration of the judges being reduced in the *Legis Actio* "to a reasonable sum"; it is surely on the whole more likely that in early days the judges received no pecuniary remuneration at all. In his interesting account of the *legis actio sacramenti* Sir Henry, speaking of the dramatization of ancient justice, shews that, in his own words, "the magistrate carefully simulated the demeanour of a private arbitrator casually called in". The "dispassionate bystander", "casually called in" to appease and adjust an angry dispute, would

scarcely expect a couple of talents for his trouble. It is, I imagine, pretty certain that in the Homeric period the kings and elders considered it part of their duty at stated times to sit in the judgment-seat and judge the people; they had not yet relegated this vocation to paid functionaries, acting in their name.

I may in conclusion briefly mention my own view of the conditions under which the judicial procedure mentioned in the Iliad was probably carried on. *A.*, a relative of the deceased, sued *B.* for the price of homicide; *B.* alleged in reply that he had already paid the proper sum—a talent. *A.* averred that he had not received it, and in order to obtain a judicial decision of his claim himself deposited another talent as a *sacramentum* or proof of *bona fides*. If he proved his case, he of course received the amount claimed, while his own deposit was returned to him. If on the other hand the judges came to the conclusion that the amount had been already paid, the defendant *B.* would not only receive back the talent he had deposited but *A.*'s talent as well; the object of thus fining the plaintiff being of course the discouragement of frivolous and unjustifiable litigation. It is also quite possible that the amount of the *sacramentum* was half a talent and that it was paid by both parties alike. In this case, if *A.*, the plaintiff, won the suit he would receive a talent and a half from *B.*, the latter being thus punished for his perversity in refusing to pay the talent due at first; while if *B.* were successful the result would be the same as before; only that the amount he would receive in compensation for the annoyance to which he had been unwarrantably subjected would be only half a talent. Whichever of these plans may have been adopted is really immaterial. The point which I have endeavoured, I trust successfully, to establish is that the two talents went not to the most learned or most eloquent among the judges, but to the successful litigant.

The expression in Thucydides to which I referred at the beginning of this paper occurs in the 49th chapter of the 5th Book, in the passage where the historian commemorates the

exclusion of the Spartans from the Olympic festival by its presidents, the Eleians. *καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦ ἱεροῦ ὑπὸ Ἠλείων εἴρχθησαν...οὐκ ἐκτίνοντες τὴν δίκην αὐτοῖς ἣν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιακῷ νόμῳ Ἠλεῖοι κατεδικάσαντο αὐτῶν.* "And the Spartans were excluded from the festival by the Eleians on refusing to pay them the fine for which the Eleians had *sued* them"—or "*procured judgment against them*"—"according to the Olympic law." I think it will here be generally agreed that there is no objection to either of the two translations I have mentioned, and that they are the only possible translations. Owing to the use of the preposition, the latter is perhaps more strictly correct. Among other passages where the compound verb is used, there is a sentence in Demosthenes against Meidias, § 223:—*δίκην ἐμπορικὴν καταδικασάμενος τοῦ Μενίππου,* "having obtained a verdict against Menippus in a mercantile suit"; and again in the speech against Euergus and Mnesibulus for perjury, § 22:—*ἐμοῦ ἀδίκως κατεδικάσατο, ἐξαπατήσας τοὺς δικαστάς,* "he obtained a verdict against me by unjust means and by deceiving the judges", where the force of the middle is well illustrated. There is not the slightest particle of evidence that *καταδικάζεσθαι* was ever used in the sense of *καταδικάζειν,* "to pronounce a verdict against any one"; and yet it has been very generally taken in the present passage in that sense. Goeller and Arnold do not notice any difficulty there may be; but Poppo in the Prolegomena to his larger edition, in the course of some observations on peculiar usages in Thucydides of the middle voice, gives the following rendering:—*multam quam Elei* (*in suum commodum*) *iis irrogaverant,* which I suppose can only mean "the fine which the Eleians—to their own profit—had imposed on them." Even as a mere statement of fact, this would seem to be incorrect: for it appears from a subsequent paragraph that only one moiety of the fines so levied went to the Eleian revenues, the other moiety being appropriated to the treasury of the Olympic Zeus. The Eleians in fact afterwards offered, in return for some territorial concessions, to remit their own portion of the fine and pay the portion which belonged to the god out of their own pocket. In a word, the Eleians, as plaintiffs, had

no power to rescind the sentence which the Eleians, as judges, had imposed. In the smaller Poppo, I find that an alternative translation—*iis irrogandam curaverant*—is suggested, which is practically free from objection.

That the Eleians *had* as judges pronounced the sentence is perfectly clear both from the context and from what we know from other sources of their position as arbiters of the Olympic law and proclaimers of the Olympic truce. It is perhaps precisely because this is otherwise so clear that Thucydides did not mention it in the present passage and preferred to call attention to the fact that in such trials the men of Elis stood in the somewhat anomalous position of being plaintiffs as well as judges. The misunderstanding of the verb has possibly arisen from the circumstance that in the next section we read of the Spartans complaining of the *judgment* pronounced against them by the Eleians as unjust:—*πρέσβεις πέμψαντες ἀντέλεγον μὴ δικαίως σφῶν καταδεδικάσθαι*, § 2. It is perhaps just worth while to observe that the double part which the Eleians played in this matter is singularly well illustrated in their rejoinder to this contention. *Ἠλεῖοι δὲ τὴν παρ' αὑτοῖς ἐκεχειρίαν ἤδη ἔφασαν εἶναι—πρώτοις γὰρ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγγέλλουσιν.* "The Eleians rejoined that the truce was already in force among themselves—for they always proclaimed it to themselves first." Just as certain Eleians proclaimed the truce, while the rest listened to the proclamation, so certain Eleians constituted a judicial tribunal before which citizens of Elis might implead another nationality, and from whose decision, as it would seem, there was no appeal. The position was in fact much the same as that of the respective parties before a modern Prize Court. A belligerent man-of-war seizes a hostile vessel, or a neutral vessel engaged on "un-neutral service", and claims it as "good prize" before a tribunal in the *captor's* country; and from the wrongful decision of such tribunal, if confirmed on appeal to the superior courts, there is no judicial but only a diplomatic remedy.

PERCEVAL M. LAURENCE.

ON EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE.

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, 7th March, 1878.)

THE question at what period Greek authors began to commit their works to writing has the greatest interest for literature generally. It may be settled with a reasonable amount of probability. The oldest allusion to any subject connected with writing is, I believe, the *ἀχνυμένη σκυτάλη* of Archilochus, fragm. 89, Bergk. The expression has no meaning, save on the condition of written scrolls, as being familiar, and in connection with the appellative *κηρυκίδη* points to a despatch sent by hand. I take the *σήματα λυγρὰ, θυμοφθόρα* of *Il.* VI. to refer to picture writing rather than alphabetic characters. I have shown (see Pref. to *Odyssey*, Vol. II. p. cxxiv.), that the poet probably regarded such transmission of intelligence as a magic mystery and had no familiarity with its methods. The age of Erinna is so far dubious, that I refrain from citing the references to letters in her remains.

But the general argument is strong. Of Archilochus, the early Iambographi and Lyrists we have many fragments surviving from a large assortment of pieces. They appear to have been nearly all of a personal and fugitive character. There was no general interest, no central occasions, no fixed institutions, connected with them, such as gave to Epos and drama a permanent hold on the popular mind. How could they have floated over the precarious stage of their unwritten existence if it had lasted more than one or two generations? When once written, they certainly lived in considerable bulk through many generations of transcription. All that now survive are quoted

fragments embedded in the writings of others, or short pieces received into miscellaneous collections. In their first stage of unwritten existence these resources, *ex hypothesi*, would not exist. It is reasonable to infer that that first stage was a very short one. If with the aid of those resources so little has reached us, how can we account for the prolonged life of so large a bulk in an unwritten age? True, they were the popular songs of their own period. But popularity would follow novelty. All would be new in turn, none for long. Unless fixed at once by ms. they must have died an early death. No doubt they accumulated in copy by driblets and without design. But if Polycrates, or any man of wealth and taste, desired to possess such ware, he might easily send his γραμματιστὴς about to collect them in Paros, Lesbos and Ionia. If we take the age of Archilochus somewhere in the 8th century B.C., it will follow that so much of him as reached Alexandria, must have been written down soon, certainly in the first half of the 7th century. The wonderful polish and refined points which his mutilated remains exhibit, rivalling Euripides in their terseness and smartness, are wholly astounding for an age that knew not of writing. But whatever we may deem of the conditions of their origin—and it is undoubtedly difficult to measure the sudden degree of refinement which the Greek mind in the spring time of its poetry might have reached—the long preservation without ms. can scarcely be believed in even by the most credulous. I hope to develope a similar argument more fully in the case of Pindar.

To come to prose, Pherecydes of Syros and Cadmus of Miletus, both probably 550—540 B.C., divide the credit of the earliest efforts in it. See Pliny, *N. H.* v. 31, VII. 56. The former was philosophical, the latter historical, writing on "the founding of Miletus and the whole of Ionia." The former is classed by Aristotle, *Metaphys.* XIII. 4, among the "ancient poets[1]." Strabo ranks him with Cadmus and Hecataeus who dropped metre, but retained other characteristics of poetical style (Strabo, I. 18). Pliny is positive, "Prosam orationem

[1] In a rather qualified way, however, by the curious term οἱ μεμιγμένοι, meaning apparently something "betwixt and between" (prose and verse).

condere Pherecydes Syrius instituit." He says the same thing of Cadmus.

It has been supposed that Pherecydes was the first prose philosopher[1] and Cadmus the first prose historian. But then in Themistius' Oration XXVI., a somewhat late authority, we have a positive and circumstantial statement that the first Greek who wrote *περὶ φύσεως* was Anaximander of the same Ionian school and period. Pherecydes' principal work, called *ἑπτάμυχος*, is believed to have been extant in the Alexandrian period, and to have been a digest of his philosophical views. It is probably this to which Cicero refers, in *Tusc. Quaest.* I. 16, whose language might be understood equally of a prose or a verse writer. I think it likely on the whole that he wrote prose, but that his mythological bias (see the last note for a specimen) and poetic style, which indeed the title *ἑπτάμυχος* suggests, may account for Aristotle's classing him with the poets. Of course Aristotle's authority would on such a question have great influence, and those who deferred to it, would put Anaximander in the place thus vacated by Pherecydes,—that of the first prose philosophic Greek writer. The fact of Anaximander's writing is more specifically attested than that of some of his contemporaries. His book was a summary exposition of his views, and Apollonius seems to have picked it up by chance[2]. Anaximenes, supposed his pupil (but probably this rests on some false general assumption as well as particular ignorance), is said to have written a book in which he used the simple unsophisticated Ionic dialect[3].

Aristotle cites the opinions of Anaximander and Anaximenes as though he had no more doubt about them than about those of Empedocles or Anaxagoras (*Metaph.* I. 3, XI. 2; *de phys. auscult.* I. 4, III. 4; *de Coelo.* III. 3). Ritter and Preller *Histor. Phil. Gr. et Rom.* p. 8, 9, cite from Simplicius, *Phys.*

[1] *τοῦτόν φησι Θεόπομπος πρῶτον περὶ φύσεως καὶ θεῶν Ἕλλησι γράψαι*, Diog. Laert. *in Pherec.* I. 11, who adds *σώζεται δὲ τοῦ Συρίου τότε βιβλίον ὃ συνέγραψεν οὗ ἡ ἀρχή, "Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος ἐσαεὶ καὶ χθὼν ἦν· χθονὶ δὲ οὔνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γέρας διδοῖ."* The *Συρίου* is distinctive, as there was an Athenian writer named Pherecydes.

[2] Diogen. Laërt. II. 1.

[3] *κέχρηταί τε γλώσσῃ Ἰάδι ἁπλῇ καὶ ἀπερίττῳ.* Ibid. II. 2.

fol. 6 *a*, a passage on the nature of Anaximander's *ἄπειρον*, *γένεσις* and *φθορὰ*, containing what they believe to be an actual fragment[1] of his. It speaks of physical agencies under terms borrowed from the then infancy of ethics. This gives a presumption of its genuineness. Philosophy had not till long after a vocabulary of its own, and was obliged to make shift with a language in which poets had as yet been the only masters. The obscurity which this caused, was perhaps the reason of a difference in the exposition of his views on the *ἄπειρον* between later writers on philosophy: see Simplicius, *Phys.* I. p. 34, Hardouin. But this only shows more clearly that those views existed in a tangible form. Anaximenes, it seems, taught that air, rarefied, becomes fire, but, gradually condensed, becomes successively wind, cloud, water, earth, and even stone. Had it not been for the determination of system-mongers of later times to know more than could be known about these early forerunners of methodical investigation, and arrange them all in sequences of schools, the suspicions, which prevail in some quarters as to all details about them, would perhaps never have arisen. It makes hardly any difference for my purpose, whether Anaximander wrote or his pupils took notes of his discourse. Of course all early teaching was oral; and the accumulation of brief notes, embodying results rather than processes, would be the first step. But with mechanical facilities at hand in the *βύβλοι* and the earlier *διφθέραι* mentioned by Herodotus—of which more anon—that first step would be very short. The statement therefore is perfectly credible that a summary exposition of his *ἀρέσκοντα* = *placita* was put forth by Anaximander. And, unless the chronologists are all wrong, this takes us back to the middle of the 6th century, B.C. I will venture a word on the absurdity of discrediting evidence, *in toto*, because we cannot reconcile it in detail. It is no reason for doubting that Pherecydes, Cadmus and Anaximander *all* wrote early Greek Prose, that each is claimed by some writer as *the* earliest. As if there had been no modern rival

[1] "Vides excerpta quaedam ex opere Anaximandri exstare quae deprehenduntur etiam in sequentibus...voces *τίσις*, *δίκη*, *ἀδικία*, quamquam ad mores pertineant ad rerum naturam referendas esse patet."

claims to the invention of gunpowder, or the discovery of a planet! Josephus, I know, disparages Pherecydes' remains. His object in writing was to disparage the genuineness of all early Greek remains. He is to be viewed as an advocate who holds a brief.

Anaximenes lived to teach Anaxagoras, the earliest philosophic name at Athens, the teacher of Pericles and Euripides. It is mentioned of Pythagoras that he left nothing in writing, which would be a perfectly otiose statement, unless the custom of so embodying their views had been common amongst contemporary philosophers. Cadmus and Hecatæus, both of Miletus, certainly left written works, the latter of considerable bulk. They were contemporaries of Anaximenes of the same place. It is against all probability that they used writing and that he refrained. Indeed this large and bright array of intellectual names clustering round Miletus is its own evidence of such mental culture as bespeaks fixed literary habits, and may alone convince us that we have reached an age of manuscript. It seems to me that we have to choose between the extreme scepticism of rejecting the whole tradition that such a school flourished, and the extreme credulity of supposing that they could have so flourished without the aid and use of writing.

The testimony of Strabo and Pliny to Cadmus the histotorian, as having written as aforesaid, seems to me decisive, as there is nothing to set against it. From him downwards we have a *catena* of prose history writers of the Ionian school in Hecatæus, Hellanicus, Dionysius of Miletus, Charon, Xanthus, the first being the most remarkable in the influence which he exercised on contemporaries and successors.

Before quitting the subject of early prose, I may remark on the ambiguity of the word λόγοι and its kindred *οἱ λόγιοι*. Pindar[1] uses thrice one or other of these, coupled in two places with *ἀοιδοὶ*, as equivalent to "In story and in song[2]." It means tales, first as told orally, then as written

[1] *Pyth.* I. 183, *Nem.* VI. 51 and 75.

[2] The words *ἀοίδιμος*, *περιλεσχήνευτος*, Herod. II. 136, support the view of those above cited from Pindar. They seem to refer to a habit of cheering leisure with song and gossiping anecdote, the demand for which doubtless called forth a supply of professionals

down. Thus λογοποιὸς may mean either story teller or prose writer, as collateral evidence may determine. Herodotus more than once so designates Hecatæus[1], and prose writer is undoubtedly the sense in which he so applies it. With regard to Æsop, who belongs to an earlier generation, I hesitate so to interpret it, although applied to him too by Herodotus.

Æschylus' plays show the art of writing familiar to him and to his audience. Papyrus, with the Egyptian trade open now for over a century and a half, must have been cheap and plentiful in Greece and Sicily. If any one pleases to think that, with this resource open to abridge his toils, the poet preferred composing a trilogy of between 3000 and 4000 lines, together with the lyric music and choral movements, *memoriter*, it is hardly worth while arguing with him. Before noticing in detail such passages as are noteworthy, I may remark that, of Phrynichus, his earlier contemporary, there is a respectable handful of fragments, enabling us to trace, *inter alia*, his influence on the *Persæ*, although no long piece, much less entire drama, has been preserved. Of Thespis, the earliest known master, there survives not a single line. The easiest way of explaining this difference in the fortune of two poets so nearly contemporary is, that Phrynichus wrote his plays and that Thespis did not, which opinion as regards Thespis was expressed by Bentley in *Phalaris* I. 289. This gave occasion to the earliest wholesale forgery on record by Heraclides Ponticus; but again, we hear of no such fraud attempted in the name of Phrynichus. From Bentley's saying this so pointedly of Thespis I should suppose that he held the contrary view of Phrynichus, as above stated.

Phrynichus was familiar with Ionia, as his "Capture of Miletus" shows. Assuming the fact then to be that he wrote, this familiarity would readily account for it through the intimacy of Ionia with Asiatic sources of literary culture.

who sung and told tales. They doubtless both survived—the ἀοιδοί we know did—into the age of manuscript. Herodotus seems to embody many such tales orally told. But it would be most rash to infer that he did not also embody much from written authorities.

[1] Herod. II. 143, V. 36, 125, VI. 137, II. 134.

The words *γράφω* and *γραφή*, with compounds of the latter, occur in Æschylus in the familiar sense of painting, tracery or embroidery, as well as in that of writing: *Agam.* 1329, *Choëph.* 205—7, 232, *Eumen.* 50 are the passages. I will cite only the third. The two words *θηρίων* (*θήρειον*) *γραφὴν* seem to show that the technical term *ζωγραφία* was not yet current. It was in fact the infancy of art in Greece. The use of writing-tablets, however, to assist the memory was so well established that they furnish a rather trite metaphor in *Prom. V.* 789 *ἦν ἐγγράφου σὺ μνήμοσιν δέλτοις φρενῶν*, *Choëph.* 451—2 *τοιαῦτ' ἀκούων ἐν φρεσὶν γράφου*, *Eumen.* 275 *δελτογράφῳ φρενί.* In *Suppl.* 179, 991, *φυλάξαι τἄμ' ἔπη δελτουμένας*, and *ταῦτα μὲν γράψασθε πρὸς γεγραμμένοις κ.τ.λ.*, it seems likely that no metaphor but literal record is intended[1]. To our notions it seems strange for the heroines to be bidden by their father to keep a record of his wise maxims, and "add these to the many recorded already." But this seeming oddity is our key to one of the literary habits of the age. Such books were doubtless made and became family treasures. The saws and shrewd sayings of Thales collected in an early chapter of Diogenes Laërtius are a sample of the sort of thing intended[2]. Notice also, of written laws, *τὸ γὰρ τεκόντων σέβας τρίτον τόδ' ἐν θεσμίοις δίκας γέγραπται*, *Suppl.* 707—9, thought by Mr Paley *ad locum* to refer to Draco's code, and similarly the bronze tablet nailed in the temple or public place, embodying the decree of the *βουλὴ* or of the people. The earliest extant example is that of the treaty between the Eleians and Heræans. Further, Æschylus in the passage last referred to puts this side by side with another mode of permanent record—"not inscribed on tablets nor sealed up in scrolls of papyrus[3]." In two other passages

[1] The somewhat startling metaphor involved in *Suppl.* 463, *νέοις πίναξι βρέτεα κοσμῆσαι τάδε*, may refer merely to *painted* votive tablets, although these too may probably have been inscribed, as commonly were *ἀναθήματα*.

[2] It seems that Danaüs, the father, is meant to be such an impersonation of wisdom; see *Suppl.* 969 *Δαναὸν πρόνοον καὶ βούλαρχον*, and for some of his gnomes 190, 203, 230—1, 760—1, 769—70, especially the phrases *ὡς λόγος*, 230, *ἀλλ' ἔστι φήμη*, 760.

[3] *Suppl.* 943 foll. Doubts have been expressed as to the genuineness of this line, if I remember right, by Mr Paley, in some of his writings on the Homeric question since his edition of Æschylus,

this plant is mentioned. Against papyrus diet the poet contemptuously holds up the bread-stalk of his nation (*Suppl.* 761). But in the epithet *βυβλίνων ὀρῶν* of *Prom. V.* 811 he shows us the Egyptian landscape of his fancy clothed with this vegetation. In short it was to him the typical plant of Egypt, as tea is to us of China at this day. How came it thus to possess his mind? If he and Athens knew and used it the answer is easy. We may compare the *χρυσῶν ὀρῶν* of Aristoph. *Acharn.* 82. Gold was to the Greek mind the characteristic yield of Persia (as shown abundantly in that passage), just as the papyrus was the special product of Egypt. I suppose that the difference between *βύβλος* and *βίβλος* will not be deemed serious enough to call for remark here. I pass on to the passage *Prom. V.* 460, in which Prometheus claims to have given mankind the discoveries of calculation and letters[1]. This is a patriotic attempt to repudiate indebtedness to Phoenician sources. I take the phrase *πάντων μουσομήτορ' ἐργάνην* as in one construction, opposed to the previous one, *γραμμάτων τε συνθέσεις μνήμην θ'*, which I view as in hendiadys, meaning "written record," or memory as resting on documents. He cannot mean that he taught men to remember.

Thus "written record" is the "busy mother of all intellectual (*μοῦσο-*) effort." These are weighty words, and the poet, we may conclude, made Prometheus utter them because he believed them himself, and believed them, because he had found their truth. If it be asked, what evidence was within his reach? The rapid growth of Ionia and the adjacent islands in culture and mental development under the influence of literature, for more than a century, is the ready answer; above all, perhaps, the influences, literary and political, summed up in the name of Hecatæus of Miletus.

This leads me on to a kindred phrase *ἀπομούσως γεγραμμένος Agam.* 801, which Mr Paley renders, "painted very unskil-

when no such doubts seem to have troubled him. The absence of caesura is a fact in favour of its genuineness. An interpolator would probably not have given a lame line.

[1] Compare Erinna, *ἐξ ἀταλᾶν χειρῶν τάδε γράμματα· λῷστε Προμαθεῦ, ἔντι καὶ ἄνθρωποι τὶν ὁμαλοὶ σοφίαν*, Epigramm. 4, Bergk, p. 927.

fully." Of course Æschylus, who does not shrink from such a startling image as *κτύπον δέδορκα*[1], might as readily have combined painting with a word which relates to sound. But I wish to point out that, to a Greek, it *would be* a startling combination, and that "written down uncongenially," i.e. censoriously, would not. Æschylus and Euripides use *ἀπόμουσος*, *παράμουσος* and their adverbs, so far as they have any definite use of them, in reference to *sound*[2]—"discordant;" thence generalizing the notion of "repulsive, uncongenial." Now any word of sound is less remote from writing than from painting, because letters stand for sounds. Further, as written record is called *μουσομήτορα* above, it seems to me more agreeable to analogy to unite the sense of writing than of painting with *ἀπομούσως* here. In fact the poet seems in this expression to borrow a metaphor from his own trade. Written poetry was for the voice to utter; inharmonious verse would be *ἀπομούσως γεγραμμένος*. To what indeed could the terms be more fitly applied? It yields then a presumption in favour of written poetry as then existing.

The phrase obscure through the corruption of a single word —the emphatic word—*παροῦσαν ἐγγράφει* (*Choëph.* 699), need not detain us long. The verb *ἐγγράφει* is as in Shakespeare's "*write me down* an ass;" and the notion seems that of classifying rateable values of persons or chattels.

In the *Septem c. Thebas* 434, 468, 647—8, we have the remarkable shield mottoes, merely reproducing the word *γράμματα* several times, with nearly two lines of writing in one instance, supposed written on the shield's metallic surface. These stand quite by themselves; and when we turn to fact, the inscribed helmets found, which are all votive, are obviously no parallel. Whencesoever the notion reached the poet (possibly from the inscribed Hermæ, &c., of the Pisistratid period[3]), it shows that to him and to contemporary Athens the conveying a sentiment to the general public by the use of written words

[1] *Sept. c. Theb.* 104.

[2] See Eurip. *Med.* 1085, *κοὐκ ἀπόμουσον τὸ γυναικῶν*, *Phoen.* 797, *Βρομίου παράμουσος ἑορταῖς*, Æsch. *Choëph.* 467, *παράμουσος Ἄτας αἱματόεσσα πλαγά*.

[3] *Μνῆμα τόδ' Ἱππάρχου· μὴ ξένον ἐξαπάτα* is a pentameter from one of their pedestals.

was a perfectly familiar idea. Indeed the written *θεσμοὶ* of Solon had been before their eyes for a century.

I come next to the fragments of Æschylus. Among those *incertae sedis* 359, Dindorf, are two worth noting. The first is *ὡς λέγει γέρον γράμμα*, "as an old record says." Of course the captious here might argue that the poet appealed to some saw or maxim as ancient, not necessarily implying the antiquity of the writing. This, however, is not the simple sense of the words. When the poet speaks of the venerable character of the *saying*, he has the expression, *τριγέρων μῦθος*, *Choëph.* 314. I think that he uses it as Catullus, whom Nauck aptly compares, uses *charta loquatur anus*. But the second fragment, 359 Dindorf, adds weight to the first. It is corrupt, perhaps hopelessly, but the meaning is made plain by the introductory remark of Plutarch who quotes it, *Moral.* p. 625 D, *οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτεροι πόῤῥω τὰ γράμματα τῶν ὀμμάτων ἀπάγοντες ἀναγινώσκουσιν, ἐγγύθεν δ' οὐ δύνανται· καὶ τοῦτο παραδηλῶν ὁ Αἴσχυλος φησίν.* Then follows the fragment[1]. This shows either that reading and writing were no recent acquisitions, since an old man might be expected to possess them; or that they had become so strongly popular that an old man might be supposed to acquire them. The previous fragment, *γέρον γράμμα*, shows that the first alternative is the right one.

But besides all these direct lines of converging evidence, the poet gives us an itinerary of geographical terms supposed detailed to Iô by Prometheus. A large part of this is real geography, including the coasts of the Euxine and Caucasian region. The rest is mythical, but was no doubt accepted as real at the period of the poet. It gives the haunts of the Gorgons, Arimaspians, &c., which latter we find in great detail in Herodotus. The presumption is that the poet and the historian both were led by the same authority which was perfectly accessible to both, in their mention of the Arimaspians. Similarly the fragments Dind. 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184 are from the

[1] Given as *οὐδὲ ἀπὸ αὐτὸν οὐ γὰρ ἐγγύθεν γέρων δὲ γραμματεὺς γενοῦ σαφής*. For which Dind. edits, *ἄπωθεν εἶδες αὐτὸν οὐ γὰρ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾷς γέρων δὲ κ.τ.λ.* but the last two or three words are corrupt also. However, for my purpose the sense is plain enough.

Λυόμενος, and presumably related to the wanderings of Herakles (cf. *uagus Hercules* Hor.). Whence did the poet derive this geographical knowledge? It can hardly have been generally current in Athenian society. There was only one source from which it could have reached him—the γῆς περίοδος of Hecatæus or one of his school. That περίοδος was doubtless the greatest literary stimulant of its age. A mind like that of Æschylus, soldier-poet, μαραθωνομάχης, who, in celebrating Xerxes' defeat, celebrated his own victory, would not be likely to miss the work which magnified the *éclat* of that victory by exhibiting the wide scene affected by the struggle from the banks of the Indus to the pillars of Hercules. The ethnical characteristics of the two rival races which led their two continents come out broadly in the *Persæ*. In the *Prom. V.* the Bosporus appears as their limit, in fragm. 177 the Phasis; and the catalogues of local names on the Asiatic mainland give a strongly geographical flavour to the drama. I question whether there is any one poem ancient or modern which could in this respect match the *Persæ*. This information is exactly what the περίοδος of Hecatæus would furnish him with. Herodotus has been understood to have Hecatæus in view in one passage, IV. 36, in which he censures the incorrectness of a statement about the relative size of Europe and Asia. Thus the poet would be likely to find in Hecatæus' περίοδος a geographical interpretation of his own line of thought. Of the details in which it was clothed I will presently speak. A wonderful book it must have seemed to the young world in that fresh age. Is it not certain to have instantly found congenial readers at Athens? We know how deep the feeling for Ionia and her sufferings was there from the story of Phrynicus' fine; and even earlier still Peisistratus may be believed on mere grounds of literary tradition to have hastened the means of culture at Athens by forming a circle of readers for the Ionian geographers and philosophers.

So far is mere general probability. But the fragments of or references to Hecatæus in later writers, of which Müller has collected several hundred[1], give a strong confirmation in detail.

[1] In his *Bibliotheca Graecorum Scriptorum*, Vol. I, II, *Fragmenta Historiarum*. See especially *Fragm.* 195, 170, 278, 350, 352, 78, 11, 33, 212.

We find mention there of the Chalybes, the Araxes, Themiscyra, Thermodon, Caucasus, a "Cimmerian" city, the Dodoneans, and several places recalling the memory of the Amazons. All these occur in the *Prom. V.* As regards the wanderings of Herakles, which seem as prominent in the Λυόμενος as those of Iô in the *Prom. V.*, Müller's judgment is (on Fragm. 298), "Hecatæum tractavisse res Herculis et commemoravisse locos singulos ubi ille labores suos perfecerit ex iis constat quae de Erythia disseruit." The last phrase refers to fragm. 349 where Hecatæus (ap. Arrian. *Alex. Exped.* II. 16) is cited as holding that "Geryon's realm was near Ambracia, that Herakles drove his cattle from there, and did not go to any island Erytheia outside the great sea." Compare Strabo VIII. 524 (ap. Müller), Ἑκαταῖος δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ἑτέρους λέγει τῶν Ἠλείων τοὺς Ἐπείους· τῷ γοῦν Ἡρακλεῖ συστρατεῦσαι τοὺς Ἐπείους ἐπὶ Αὐγείαν κ.τ.λ. We know moreover[1] that local mythology formed one staple of the older geographers; and that Iô and Herakles and the voyage of the Argô would be duly traced by them is highly probable. If any one prefers to believe that Æschylus picked up his geography in the slave-market at Athens, or among the Carthaginian harbour-masters in Sicily, of course I cannot prove that he is wrong. I infer that Æschylus was a diligent student of Hecatæus; and that he was not likely to neglect in his own compositions that aid to memory on which he so strongly dwells.

Thus there are reasonable grounds for thinking that the Ionic school of geographers—and why not of philosophers?—found congenial relish at Athens at the time, and that the encouragement of literature and formation of a library by the Pisistratidæ is no fiction. As regards Homer[2] I have already given my reasons for thinking that at Solon's period or earlier, a Homeric text under the influence, unacknowledged at first, of written copies in aid of recitation had silently sprung up, and will not repeat them here.

[1] Diod. I. 37 οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν Ἑλλάνικον καὶ Κάδμον ἔτι δ' Ἑκαταῖον καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, παλαιοὶ παντάπασιν ὄντες, εἰς τὰς μυθώδεις ἀποφάσεις ἀπέκλιναν (ap. Müller *ad Fragm.* 278). The Mæotæ (Μαιῶται Σκύθαι) of the Palus Mæotis were mentioned by Hellanicus, also the Amazons, as entering Attica over the frozen Bosporus (*Fragm.* 92, 146, 84, Müller).

[2] Preface to *Odyssey*, Vol. I. p. xiii—xv.

Herodotus says (v. 58) that the Phœnicians "who came with Cadmus" introduced letters to the Hellenes who had none before, as he believes. These letters were first such as all Phœnicians use, but as time progressed *ἅμα τῇ φωνῇ μετέβαλον καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν τῶν γραμμάτων.* I think *ἅμα τῇ φωνῇ* must mean "together with the language," meaning that the Phœnicians adopted Greek speech, and together with that change altered the *ῥυθμός*. What is this? Not the alphabetical *order*, for this was unchanged save that the *υ* derived from the vocalized Semitic *bau*, took its place at the end after *τ*. Not the phonetic value, for the writer probably knew not Phœnician, and without that knowledge could have no notion of the original phonetic value of a Semitic alphabet. It is not likely he refers to so slight a matter as saying "alpha" for "aleph," etc. It might possibly refer to the direction in which they were read, but we could not then understand the qualification *ὀλίγα* in the next sentence, of the Ionians, *μεταρρυθμίσαντές σφεων ὀλίγα ἐχρέωντο.* It refers then to the form of the character, the proportions of which, and special features, underwent some slight alterations. Thus the Semitic 𐤀 *aleph*, became the early Hellenic 𐌀 or 𐌐, the Semitic 𐤁 *beth*, became the Hellenic 𐌁 or 𐌑, or, reversed, B. He says that the Ionians, their neighbours, learned the letters of these Phœnicians, and then adds the statement (the Greek is given *paul. supr.*) that, "after making some changes in the *ῥυθμὸς*, of a few of them, they continued to use the Phœnician letters." Now the evidence of inscriptions shows that the changes—those just given in the *aleph* and *beth* are nearly the most extreme—were nearly all slight. There seems no room then (the result or outcome leaving them still so far similar) for two stages of change, first by the naturalized Phœnicians, then by their Ionian neighbours. I take him to mean that substantially the same changes which were made by the former were made by the latter—accepted, one might rather say in such a case—but that, since with the Ionians there could be no change of the *φωνή*, the careful historian restates the particular in which there *was* a change, under the form of *μεταρρυθμίσαντες*, adding the word *ὀλίγα*,

to guard against the notion of any sweeping or transforming change. He adds that they continued still to call them *φοινικήϊα*, "as was but just," which remark again confirms the slightness of the change, and the fact that they took over the alphabet, substantially as it was. The calling them *φοινικήϊα* is confirmed very remarkably by an early Ionian inscription, in which the clause occurs, denouncing "whoever shall break this stone or deface the *lettering;*" the word for this last is *φοινικήϊα*[1].

As regards the small extent of the change, any one without any knowledge of Greek or Phœnician may, from a comparison of early alphabets, verify the words as literally true. I have looked carefully through Gesenius' earliest extant Phœnician alphabet, through the characters given as recorded on the Moabite stone, the earliest, but latest found and greatest of Semitic monuments, and through the letters and alphabets of and from inscriptions figured in Boeckh and Franz. But I should add that I have included with the first a *teth* and a *jod* from coins[2] given by Gesenius, Table 3. Not only are the variations small on the whole as between Greek and Semitic, but where two diverse types of Phœnician were extant, as in the *pe*, corresponding diversities are found in the type of the Greek *πῖ*[3]. The only important diversity which I have *not* found Greek to match is in the *lamedh*. It has two types, a round and an angular one. The latter only is represented in the Greek records. Probably the scantiness of sufficiently early monuments is the reason of the deficiency. But it seems likely that the ox-goad, regarded as the natural type of this letter, was itself of variable shape, including a

[1] The monument, Franz, *Elementa Epigraph. Graecae*, p. 107, is known as "The Imprecation of the Teians."

[2] A coin indeed here is our very earliest authority, dated 394 B.C. by Gesenius, *Monum. Phoenic.* § 5, p. 10.

[3] On a coin a *pe* is found of the square type. ⊓ is the common Greek form to a late period. The Phœnician is ⊓ having the converse leg (as should be in reading the opposite way, from right to left) a little longer. So a coin gives ⊟ for *hheth*, which in Gesenius' alphabet is ⊞; the former is exactly reproduced in the name 'Hiero' on a Doric inscription, Franz No. 27. The latter by reducing the two joining strokes to one becomes the normal H, *eta*.

round and an angular handle. Further, in Gesenius' Table 1, a form of the Hebrew *teth* is found to be coincident with a form of the *'ain*, just as the Greek *θ* and *o* which spring from these respectively have a coincident form Θ. With regard to the *vau* or *bau* Gesenius gives his opinion that, although no certain example of it in the shape of the Greek digamma and Roman F, occurs on Phœnician monuments, "nullus tamen dubito quin primaria huius litterae figura ea fuerit quam Bau digamma habet apud Graecos antiquiores" (p. 27, § 17). He adds that this form is a key to the discrepancies of type which this letter shows in Hebrew and Samaritan. However this may be, no form approaching the F is found on the Moabite stone. The nearest approach to it is on some Hebrew coins, Gesen. Table 3, where the *bau* is like a three-pronged stick. Gesen. developes from it the digamma[1] thus, 𐤅𐤅𐤅; but he gives no actual specimen of the intermediate form. I incline to view the F as the most decided instance of the change of *ῥυθμὸς* admitted by Herodotus.

The differences of type, as far as inscriptions now extant show them, are more and more serious between those of the Moabite stone and the Phœnician earliest as given by Gesenius, than between the Moabite and the earliest alphabets which Greek inscriptions show. I should tabulate the results of the various comparisons thus:—

		serious differences	slight differences
Date of Moabite, circ. 890 B.C.	Between Phœnician and Greek	10	7
Date of Greek, circ. 600 B.C.	Between Moabite and Phœnician	8	6

[1] The F gives the consonantal force of the *bau*, the *υ* its vowel force. In a singularly interesting Ionic No. 44 inscription, referred by Franz to *Ol.* 58, both appear in *αϝυτο = αὐτοῦ*. Both types of *υ*, V and Y, are found on highly ancient inscriptions and come clearly from the form of *bau* on the Moabite Stone Y by removing the stem of which we get the ordinary *υ*, just as the V came from the Y. The quiescence of the "Ehevi" letters is said to be perfect on the stone, i.e. the *bau* appears with vowel force

		serious differences	slight differences
	Between Moabite and Greek	4	6
Date of Phœnician, circ. 400 B.C.	Between Phœnician with Moabite, taken together, and Greek	3	6

Now, as the Moabite and Phœnician must have been practically identical at some time, it is remarkable that they offer greater divergency than do the Moabite and the Greek. This offers a strong presumption that the further we went back the closer would the oldest Ionian be to the oldest Semitic type, and that the *φοινικήϊα* and *ἰωνικὰ* of 700 B.C. would be all but absolutely identical. The oldest extant Greek is probably 100 years later. But take for instance the "Nanian Column[1]" as a probably very early sample. All the letter forms on it can be found approximately in the alphabets of Gesenius and of the Moabite stone, unless any one were to take exception at the Υ, which, however, see previous note, is plainly deducible from the Moabite *bau*. This is Dorian. Take the probably oldest Ionian, the "Burgon" vase[2], the only difference which could arrest the eye is the Θ = *θ*, which in Franz's and Gesenius' earliest Phœnician is ⊖, an oblique oval with a bar across, for a circle with a dot in the centre. There is therefore a reasonable probability that higher antiquity instead of causing difficulty would reconcile even these slight diversities of later forms, and that if we could find an inscription as early as those seen by Herodotus they would well-nigh vanish. It is worth noticing that, judged by the Moabite stone, the tradition of the early Greek 16-lettered alphabet is a patriotic delusion intended to minimize the debt due to the Phœnicians. The Semitic alphabet of 890 B.C. had its twenty-two letters, and except the *tsaddi*, the Greeks took

there. Thus the Greeks found in it their *υ*, and perhaps developed from it also their F.

[1] Franz, No. 21, p. 57—9.

[2] *ib.* No. 42, p. 101.

them all. They soon dropped the *koph* and adopted a somewhat similar sign for *phi*[1], which appears on some of the very earliest inscriptions, *e.g.* the Theræan epitaphs (Franz, p. 51), as does also the H for long ē, *e.g.* in the name προκλῆς (ib. 1 a). They split up the *bau* into the Ϝ and the ϒ, and they confused the *samech* and *shin*, and eventually reduced them to one, retaining, however, two forms of the *samech* for ξῖ and χῖ respectively, and adding later ψ and ω. The η and ω did not come in together. In the Theræan epitaphs η appears repeatedly for long e, but the o long or short is always ⊙ as in ῥηξάνορ.

Thus, when Herodotus says, "I saw Phœnician (Cadmeian) letters on certain tripods in a certain temple, the most of them like the Ionian letters," we need feel no doubt that he could judge for himself and verify the lettering. This confirms his authority when in the same passage he proceeds to speak of the writing materials used. "The Ionians from of old call βύβλοι, διφθέραι, because once in default of the former they used to employ the latter." Many barbarians, he adds, used such διφθέραι down to his own time. Material fit for literary purposes is what he notices first, and the tripods only, I think, because they were accessible evidence, and therefore he appeals to them as such. But he speaks of these βύβλοι and διφθέραι, not to prove the fact of their having been in use of old—*ça va sans dire* with him, but only to explain an obscure point of language, how one word got into the place of the other. This reads as though the Ionian use of papyrus from an early period, and of skins from one still earlier, was so notorious as to need no proof. He probably had found what he deemed adequate evidence of the retention of the earlier name under the later usage; and if I am right in supposing that the Iambic and Lyric poetry from Archilochus downwards was early reduced to writing, such evidence might easily have been contained in its literary form.

But Herodotus goes on to give the Inscriptions which he

[1] Both φ and χ occur on the Eliac bronze, the former square. Indeed all the letters of this inscription are angular, the o being a small button-form chipped out, the rest looking as if the graver had had the letter forms set up for him in wooden skewers pegged together.

says he saw. He mentions the names of Amphitryon, Skaios, and Laodamas, as the three dedicators of as many tripods inscribed with their names and mementoes. The "Phœnician" letters in these names, if executed with moderate clearness, would be perfectly legible. That myths had grown up round the names of Labdacus, Œdipus[1], and Eteocles, with which he associates, and by reference to which he attempts to date the dedications, is no argument at all against the verity of the readings and the identity of the persons. How could we reasonably impugn the reference of any archaic remain to the period of Charlemagne on the ground that Charlemagne has been made a hero of romance, and a crusading warrior with a whole career of anachronisms?

I think, then, there is no reasonable doubt that in the sixth century B.C., by about the middle of it, Greek Prose began to be written by Pherecydes or Anaximander, or both; that Æschylus composed his plays by the aid of writing, and, as well as other more highly educated Athenians, had access to the works of Hecatæus and Hellanicus in writing. It is, I think, highly probable that the Iambic and Lyric poetry of from 710 B.C. began to be written down even earlier, viz. in the prior half of the seventh century B.C., and that the plays of Phrynicus were written. It is probable from Herodotus' criticisms on the "Cyprian Epic," and the *Iliad* (II. 116), that standard epic texts were by his time (450 B.C.) established, which implies that writing had been for some time of use

[1] I have shown in the preface to Vol. II. of the *Odyssey*, p. cxii, that the early tale of Œdipus in particular was simple, and had no Sphinx in it. That came later;—nay, very probably the Sphinx, a female monster and her riddle, originated in some Egyptian figure of a woman-headed lion, with a hieroglyphic insciption on the base of the statue which no Greek could read. In the same way, *ib.* p. xc—xci. I have shown that the omission of Thebes, which should have been first among the thirty Bœotian towns, from the Homeric catalogue in which Bœotia takes the lead, points to the obliteration of Thebes temporarily as a historical fact; and, coupled with the foreign surroundings of the Κάδμειοι of the *Iliad*, harmonizes with the truth of their having been expelled by the Argives, and suggests for the legendary war of the Epigoni a nucleus of historical truth. Thus the *Iliad* tends to confirm Herodotus, and his "Laodamas son of Eteocles" may probably be a real person.

in fixing them. And all this gives a probability to the statements which rest on later authority, that literature flourished in Athens under the patronage of the Peisistratids, and in Samos under that of Polycrates, and that the attention of competent men was directed to the constitution of the *Corpus Homericum*, although a great deal besides the Iliad and the Odyssey were probably included in it.

HENRY HAYMAN.

P.S. Since the above was read, I observe in the report of the meeting of this Society on March 21, 1878 (*Cambridge University Reporter*, pp. 403—404) some remarks by Mr Fennell on some few points of my argument. He is reported as saying "It seems strange that papyrus was not used *in Italy* before the time of Alexander the Great, as Varro stated according to Pliny *N. H.* XIII. 21." I italicize "in Italy" because, on referring to Pliny, I cannot find that in the text. The words are "ante ea (*i.e.* ante conditam Alexandriam) non fuisse chartarum usum: in palmarum foliis primo scriptitatum, dein, etc." Of course Mr F. may have explained that the statement of Varro must in his opinion have referred to Italy, and the report may have omitted, for brevity, his explanation. If Varro meant that, his statement can have very little to do with the question of the use of papyrus in Greece. If Varro meant to deny the use of papyrus *generally* before the age of Alexander, his statement is worthless, as being contradicted by abundant evidence. Mr F. also says that I "take no notice of arguments against the notion that Herodotus consulted written authorities." The *locus Classicus* of Herod. v. 58 I have noticed at some length, vindicating the identity of *φοινικήϊα* with *ἰωνικὰ γράμματα* which Herodotus claims for them. Beyond this there is hardly any argument to notice. Mr Fennell had himself previously recognized the *Περσέων οἱ λόγιοι* (I. 1), *λογιώτατοι*, as applied to the "corn-growing Egyptians" (II. 77), the roll of papyrus giving 330 names of kings (II. 100), and the probable quotation

from Hecatæus. To these might be added the statement, that the Heliopolites were said to be Αἰγυπτίων λογιώτατοι (II. 3), given as a reason why Herodotus specially sought conference with them. The mention that the "corn-growing Egyptians" were λογιώτατοι πάντων, as μνήμην ἀνθρώπων πάντων ἐπασκέοντες μάλιστα, may be probably interpreted of the exercise of memory on written records, in a country notoriously at the time so rich in them, no less than on oral tradition. To exclude the former would indeed be highly arbitrary. As regards the written records themselves, alike in Egypt and in Persia, the probability is that Herodotus could not have understood them, and was obliged to trust to the oral statements of their custodians. Hence his perpetually recurring ὥς φασι, ὡς λέγουσι, but we need not therefore exclude the fact of written records having been, through that medium, the basis of his statements. I am not sure that I apprehend the ground of the criticism of Mr F. on the word μουναρχέων in one of the inscriptions as recorded by Herodotus, whether on the score of the word itself, or of his spelling of it. The γραμματιστὴς of Polycrates presumably had to do with whatever γράμματα that monarch cared for. But nothing turns on the question of whether he was personally employed on the errand of searching for MSS. Further, I have merely inferred it as probable from the arguments which I have deduced from Æschylus himself, that that poet did not "compose his trilogies memoriter." To speak of my "denial" as "begging the question" is therefore incorrect. As regards "taking γεγραμμένος in *Agam.* 801 in an impossible sense," that statement seems to me to be "a begging of the question." As, however, no reason is given why the "sense" should be "impossible," it is not easy to carry the question further. The reading of μνήμηνδ' or μνήμης in *Prom. V.* 461 does not seem to me to affect in any way the result arrived at. Finally the ascribing Æschylus' geographical knowledge to "*hearing* Aristeas' *Arimaspeia*, instead of to his *reading* Hecatæus," carries us into a field of which we know very little, while what little we glean about the *Arismaspeia* does not lead to the inference that they could have supplied more than a very small portion of the Æschylean geography.

The legend of the Arimaspians and Gryphes might no doubt have been so derived. But the wide area which the poet traverses was covered, so far as our knowledge serves us, by Hecatæus alone. There are the fragments of Hecatæus before us, and they are manifestly adequate. Where can we similarly verify the supposed connexion with the *Arismaspeia?*

H. H.

Aldingham, *Dec.* 10, 1878.

SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION.

In a paper in the seventh volume of this Journal, which was brought to a conclusion somewhat abruptly, I endeavoured to shew that Mill and Grote had mistaken the meaning of *τὸ αὐτόματον* and *ἡ τύχη* used as technical words in Aristotle: that they were not "agencies" at all, or "influences," but names for results resembling those produced by design or special organization, when produced accidentally—that is, without such design or organization: *freaks* of chance, as we may call them, without being set down as holding any particular opinion about causation[1].

But I did not proceed to examine the more general question, whether not only Aristotle but Plato also did, as Grote and Mill assert, recognize lawless self-determined agencies in Nature, by whatever other name. I propose now to examine this question; so far, at least, as to shew that the grounds of Grote's opinion are fallacious.

The opinion, however derived, seems to have become a fixed dogma in his mind. I see no evidence that he had begun any special study of the *Physics* up to the time of his death; but he repeats the main substance of the passage I extracted in several places in the existing text of his *Aristotle* (e.g. I. 192, 296: II. 322); so that there is no reason to suppose he was changing

[1] I might have remarked that *τὸ αὐτόματον* is so far from being an "agency frustrating nature" that *τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου*, by the very definition, copy and emulate nature: indeed, in the opinion of Democritus and of Grote himself, constitute nature: *αἴτια ὧν ἂν ἡ νοῦς γένοιτο αἴτιος ἢ φύσις.*

his view. And in his matured *Plato* he seems to lose no opportunity of enforcing it. I extract some passages and references.

The principal is the one referred to in my former paper (*Plato*, Vol. III. p. 497). "Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle," he says, "all maintained that regular sequence of antecedent and consequent was not universal, but partial only"—and here he gives references, as below—"that there were some agencies essentially regular, in which observation of the past afforded ground for predicting the future—other agencies (or the same agencies on different occasions) essentially irregular, in which the observation of the past afforded no such ground." And then he gives a sketch of Aristotle's scheme almost identical with that which I extracted, followed by further references. And he continues "This Chance of Aristotle—with one of two contraries sure to turn up, though you could never tell beforehand which of the two—was a conception analogous to what logicians sometimes call an Indefinite Proposition, or to what some Grammarians have reckoned as a special variety of genders called the *doubtful gender*. There were thus *positive* causes of regularity and *positive* causes of irregularity"—the italics are here mine—"the co-operation or conflict of which gave the total manifestations of the actual universe. The principle of irregularity, or the Indeterminate, is sometimes described under the name of Matter"—here another reference—"as distinguished from, yet cooperating with, the three determinate causes, Formal, Efficient, Final. The Potential—the Indeterminate—the *May or May not be*—is characterized by Aristotle as one of the inherent principles operative in the Kosmos."

The references are for Socrates Xenoph. *Memor.* I. 1: for Plato *Timaeus*, p. 48, ἡ πλανωμένη αἰτία, &c. As regards Aristotle, he enlarges thus (note *s*): "ἡ τύχη—τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε—τὸ αὐτόματον are independent ἀρχαί, attached to and blending with ἀνάγκη and τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. See *Phys.* II. 196 b. 11; *Metaph.* V. 1026, 1027. Sometimes τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε is spoken of as an ἀρχή, but not as an αἴτιον, or belonging to ὕλη as the ἀρχή, 1027, b. 11, δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι μέχρι τινος βαδίζει ἀρχῆς, αὐτὴ δὲ οὔκετ' ἐς ἄλλο· ἔσται οὖν ἡ τοῦ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν αὐτὴ καὶ αἴτιον

τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ[1] οὐδέν." And in note *t* he cites from the preceding chapter (p. 1027 a. 10) ὥστε ἔσται ἡ ὕλη αἰτία, ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως, τοῦ συμβεβηκότος: and adds, I presume by way of interpretation, "matter is represented as *the principle of irregularity*, of τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε—as the δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων."

He in like manner connects Aristotle and Plato as holding this doctrine and "neither of them including even the idea of regularity as an essential part of the meaning of Cause" (*Phaedo*, Vol. II. p. 184). And he has further remarks on Plato's doctrine in the *Timaeus* (Vol. III. 249). After observing that "Plato's Demiurgus is not conceived as a Creator, but as a Constructor or Artist...contending with a force superior and irresistible, so as to improve it as far as it will allow itself to be improved," he proceeds: "We ought here to note the sense in which Plato uses the word Necessity" (ἀνάγκη). "The word is now usually understood as denoting what is fixed, permanent, unalterable, knowable beforehand. In the Platonic *Timaeus* it means the very reverse—the indeterminate, the inconstant, the anomalous, that which can neither be understood nor predicted. It is Force, Movement or Change, with the negative attribute of not being regular or intelligible, or determined by any knowable antecedent or condition—*Vis consili expers*. It coincides in fact with that which is meant by Free Will in the modern metaphysical argument between Free Will and Necessity. It is the undetermined or the self-determining as contrasted with that which depends upon some given determining conditions known or knowable."

Although Aristotle is not named here, and his understanding of ἀνάγκη is elsewhere described as the reverse of this (*Arist.* I. 167), yet I think it clear that Grote would apply all this description of Plato's ἀνάγκη to Aristotle's indeterminate agency, however named. I believe him to be entirely mistaken as to the thought and meaning of both philosophers.

[1] There is apparently no authority for αὐτοῦ, which I suppose he means to refer to τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε. αὐτῆς is the only reading in the Berlin Edition, and is adopted by Bonitz. The Berlin Edition inserts ἄλλο after it, on the authority of one MS.

But Plato's real doctrine seems to me clearer than Aristotle's, and Grote's mistake about it simpler. So I will begin with it.

Vis consili expers, taken by itself, may be used to express very well what I understand Plato to mean:—a blind force, not directed to a purpose by an independent intelligence, nor controlled by an organization of materials and other forces conspiring to a definite, orderly, result.

Neither Socrates, Plato, nor Aristotle conceived it possible that the Kosmos, the fair order of Nature, could be explained by any such laws of movement and interaction of material substances as any contemporary or earlier speculators had presented to philosophers. For Socrates' opinion I may refer to the *Memorabilia* I. c. 4. I have cited that of Aristotle in my former paper (p. 106) from the *Metaphysics;* and I may further refer to the 2nd Book of *Physics*, chap. 8, for a most interesting exposition of his view of the opposite doctrine. For Plato's the whole scope of the *Timaeus* is a voucher.

But this does not imply any belief that, when you mentally abstract the notion of Design or Control from Nature, you leave "self-determined" or "undetermined" agencies: but only that there would in such a case be no Kosmos, no visible harmony of parts, nor orderly cycles of phenomena. Let me take some examples.

The very type of unvarying law is the Law of Gravitation. And, as matters are in fact arranged, the result in our Solar System is a very close approximation to a visible uniformity of cyclically recurring positions and motions, securing to us a similar, though less perfect, recurrence of heat and cold, rain and sunshine, and stages of vegetable and even animal life. Not such an uniformity as would have satisfied Plato and Aristotle—rather would Heraclitus have rejoiced to find that one cannot twice sweep a telescope over the same celestial orbit —but sufficient for a working science of Astronomy.

But it does not appear that this is the necessary result of the Law considered in itself: it requires some special adaptations of the proportions and collocations of the bodies subjected to it. Even if the system were simplified by reduction to but three bodies, yet if these were of about the same order of mag-

nitude, and were at any time at about equal distances apart, I am not aware that any mathematician has ever attempted to calculate what these paths would be[1]. And if they are ever calculated, I know no reason for anticipating that there would be any approximation to a cyclic, orderly, recurrence of relative positions and consequent seasons in each of them. Here, then, primeval collocation is all-important.

Take another case in another department, not so far removed from the ken of the age of Plato and Aristotle:—the Laws of Organic Life, and their results.

According to the latest and, I suppose, most generally accepted theory, Life began in the existing Kosmos, in an undifferentiated mass of "protoplasm;" that is in a chemically and physically homogeneous body, endowed, no one knows from what source or by what mechanism, with powers and capacities of assimilation and excretion, growth and decay, from and back to the surrounding medium, and also of motion and of division into separate similar masses. To get anything out of such a body, we require some determinate shape, and some determinate variation in the medium—that is, some determinate Collocation —and, of course, some specific law or laws of interaction both between the protoplasm and the medium, and also between the particles of the protoplasm itself when once disturbed by the former influence[2]. Now can any reason be assigned *à priori* for expecting from such an origin anything more than a continuing chaos of living organisms, vegetable and animal, or of some intermediate nature, becoming, it may be, more and more rich in specialized forms, but incapable of scientific classification, and rapidly changing the character of such semblances of species as might from time to time occur: *ἴχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὑτῶν ἄττα, παντάπασι μὴν διακείμενα ὥς περ εἰκὸς ἔχειν ἅπαν*

[1] Since this was written Mr Spottiswoode has told us that a machine has been invented by which "the problem of finding the free motion of any number of mutually attracting particles is reduced to the simple process of turning a handle." But he does not tell us what kind of orbits they describe in any such case as I have put.

[2] Perhaps the nearest analogon in Greek Philosophy is the Anaxagorean *ὁμοιομέρεια*, as described by Aristotle, or by Grote, developing its latent capacities under the influence of *νοῦς*.

ὅταν ἀπῇ τινὸς θεός (*Timaeus*, p. 53)? Mr Darwin thinks that the control of two guiding principles—an internal law of *Inheritance* or *Atavism* (itself not shewn to be necessarily connected with the laws of growth, motion, and decay,) and the scarcity of a fit surrounding medium (described as the Law of the Survival of the Fittest) have sufficed to bring about the present approximately permanent order. Professor Huxley more cautiously leaves the question open whether the original capacity for variation was not "definite, and determined in certain directions rather than in others by *inherent conditions*" —that is, by some further controlling law of internal change (Encyc. Brit. *Evolution*). Take either view, my point is that the conception of a continuing chaos, of Elements or of organisms, does not necessarily involve that of the absence of definite laws of action.

Plato had no such examples to refer to; but I think they illustrate his line of thought. Ἀνάγκη is the sum of the laws of interaction primevally imposed on the materials with which the Demiurge is to work out his "constructive" or "artistic" purpose: laws which he cannot alter, but must bend and guide skilfully to work his Will as far as possible. Left to itself it is a πλανωμένη αἰτία, producing only shifting scenes as of a dream, incapable of fixing them in any permanent form. I can find no trace of any fancied "self-determining" power in it; but on the contrary, both in the *Timaeus*, the *Phaedrus*, and the later *Laws*, the only power in Nature to originate motion is attributed to Life (ψυχή), which he certainly does not class with ἀνάγκη and the πλανωμένη αἰτία.

To prove my point, it may perhaps be best to begin with the plain prose of the *Laws*. Grote may be right in asserting (*Plato* III. 416) that the Theology of the two works is not identical, and perhaps the supremacy assigned to Life in the latter Work is more absolute than in the former[1]; but I cannot admit

[1] Grote attributes to the Socrates of the *Phaedo* the belief that the Kosmos was a living Being (*Plato* II. p. 176 *note*). I cannot see it: but only the craving for explanations by Final Causes—the Design of a Creator or Disposer.

that there is any real discrepance in the views taken of the primordial chaotic movements.

In the 10th Book of the *Laws* (p. 889, &c.), the Athenian tells his companions that the common opinion of the *σοφοί* seems to be that *φύσις καὶ τύχη* are the great powers in the universe, and that *τέχνη* is but subordinate and imitative of them: that the primary elements exist *φύσει καὶ τύχῃ*; and that each being borne as it may chance by its proper power—*τύχῃ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων*—whenever the natural opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry, &c., happened to meet in fitting state and proportions—*ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως*—and so *κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη*, they there and thus produced the universe and all its contents—without Intelligence (they say) or Divine Power, or Art, but (to repeat it) *φύσει καὶ τύχῃ*.

This coupling of *τύχη* and *φύσις* seems to me clearly to shew Plato's meaning. *φύσις* is the natural law of interaction among material bodies, which must produce its effect, according to their relative conditions and proportions, whenever they come in contact: and this is properly *ἀνάγκη*, the fixed law of Nature. But the motions in space by which they are brought into contact is an arbitrary *datum*, *τὸ τυχόν*; Mill's "Casual Primeval Collocations," dimly referred in this place to the previous action of something living (*ψυχή*); which again in the *Timaeus* is represented as the natural vehicle of *νοῦς*.

The Athenian proceeds (pp. 895, 896, 897) to refute this opinion of the *sufficiency* of these natural powers for the construction of the universe, by shewing that these interactions presuppose motion, and that the only original source of motion known to us is *ψυχή*, of which the proper definition, according to him, is "that which can give itself motion" (p. 896 line 1); that therefore *ψυχή* was prior to any of these actions of *φύσις*, and that therefore the operations of *ψυχή*, Counsel, Reason, Emotion, and so forth, are also prior to these physical actions, and are the *πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις* (p. 897) which lay hold of the secondary material agencies and guide them to all the physical operations of growth, decay, &c., wisely or unwisely according to the quality of the originating *ψυχή*. He is so far from questioning the

reality of the tendencies of matter to unite in definite ways, as alleged by those he is opposing (Empedocles and Democritus I suppose), that in a long continuous passage (pp. 893, 4) he expounds their mode of working according to his own theory of *γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις*, &c., very much after the fashion of *Timaeus*, p. 56.

I turn now to the *Timaeus*, the meaning of which seems to me equally clear if we do but follow the course of the text, and make fair allowance for its professedly fanciful imagery. Only Grote, as is his wont, has selected one particular poetic passage and taken it literally, without connecting it with the plainer passages (*Plato* III. 249 *note*, quoting *Timaeus* pp. 47, 8).

Having laid down that "all that comes into existence must do so by the action of some cause" Plato proceeds (at the end of p. 29) to say that the design of the Demiurge to make an Universe as nearly as possible in his own likeness must be taken by all wise men as in the most proper sense the originating cause —*ἀρχήν*. When he undertook this work, he is represented as having to take in hand a natural chaos in motion—*πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως*—and bringing it into order.

Timæus does not at once make any use of these motions, but takes up the establishment and development of Life, as the necessary vehicle of Intelligence, in the Kosmos as a whole, and in the Mundane Gods, Mankind, &c. But at p. 46, having expounded his theory of the mechanism of vision, he finds himself again in the region of Physics and observes: *ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἔστι τῶν ξυναιτίων, οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσι χρῆται τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἰδέαν ἀποτελῶν· δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ ξυναίτια ἀλλ' αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων ψύχοντα καὶ θερμαίνοντα*, &c. And what precedes clearly shews that these are fixed laws, not capricious motions.

Timaeus, however, as before, maintains the supremacy of Final Causes (to use the scholastic term) over these secondary physical or mechanical causes *ἴσαι ὑπ' ἄλλων μὲν κινουμένων ἕτερα δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης κινούντων γίγνονται*: which same physical causes are again, a few lines below, described as *ὅσαι μονωθεῖσαι φρονήσεως τὸ τυχὸν ἄτακτον ἑκάστοτε ἐξεργάζονται*—"perform

in no orderly course the work which happens to fall to them." And again, in the following section, having, as he says, concluded his account of the work of Intelligence in the production of the Kosmos, he addresses himself to expounding the part which *ἀνάγκη* has in it, "for the birth of this Kosmos was from the combination of *ἀνάγκη* and *νοῦς*;" which sentence is followed by that about Intelligence *persuading* Necessity which Grote cites; and then comes in the *πλανωμένη αἰτία* as a synonym for *ἀνάγκη*:—*εἴ τις οὖν ᾗ γέγονε κατὰ ταῦτα ὄντως ἐρεῖ, μικτέον καὶ τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας, ᾗ φέρειν πέφυκεν.*

The description of the work of *ἀνάγκη* which follows contains much matter for interesting comparison with other physical speculations ancient and modern. The point I am here concerned with is, that the explanations are all geometrical or mechanical, whatever "self-determined" or otherwise inscrutable First Cause may lie in the back ground. Thus we have at the close of p. 52 a picture of the chaotic stage before *ἀνάγκη* had come under the sway of *νοῦς*. Space, or the something in space —*ἡ γενέσεως τιθήνη*—is kept in a state of irregular motion *because no equilibrium is possible in the forces or masses*—*διὰ τὸ μήθ' ὁμοίων δυνάμεων μήτ' ἰσορρόπων ἐμπίπλασθαι*: and the motion reacts on the contents and keeps them continually running into a kind of inchoate order, as the heavy corn and light chaff in a winnowing machine[1]; but only in an unstable way, much needing the intervention of a Divine Power to establish it *εἴδεσί τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς.*

This machinery still continues to work in the Kosmos and is the cause that gives to each element its *proper Place*—*διέστηκε τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου τὰ πλήθη κατὰ τόπον ἴδιον διὰ τὴν τῆς δεχομένης* (space) *κίνησιν.* And the sustained, never-ceasing, processes of motion and change are kept on foot by the very ingenious conception of a surface tension at the boundary of the universe compressing the mass of elements chemically as well as mechanically unstable (pp. 57, 58); so that what would,

[1] The image seems to be borrowed from Democritus. Frag. Phys. 2. *Mullach.* But it is remarkable that Plato sees the dynamical reason of the thing; while Democritus draws the fanciful and false inference that "like seeks its like."

acting alone, produce equilibrium in one sense, disturbs equilibrium in the other—not unlike Sir Charles Lyell's theory of the maintenance of heat in the Earth (*Principles of Geology*, 1847).

I think, then, that I have sufficiently proved that Plato recognized no self-determining force in Matter, nor called Free Will by the name of Necessity. And the way in which Grote associates the two philosophers in this supposed tenet seems enough to suggest that he may be mistaken as to Aristotle also[1]. I proceed to examine the grounds on which he founds his statements, so far as he has furnished us with them.

Aristotle does certainly recognize the existence of contingency—of the uncertainty of future events, or some of them. But Grote asserts that this belief is "founded" on the ontological or physical doctrines of which he gives the summary I extracted in my former paper. Whereas it will be found that in all the passages which Grote cites or refers to where this uncertainty is spoken of, it is assumed as a notorious fact, and is itself made the foundation on which some logical, physical, or ontological doctrine is raised by an argument *ex absurdo*.

Thus in the passage in the *De Interp.* c. 9 (pp. 18, 19), Aristotle's thesis is that the Rule of Logic which asserts that "with certain exceptions, in every Antiphasis one proposition must be true and the other false" is only true in regard to matters past or present; that it is not true in regard to events particular and future. *For* "to admit it in regard to these latter would be to affirm that the sequences of events are all necessary, and none of them casual or contingent."

I am obliged here to abandon Grote's analysis, though it is in the middle of a sentence. The bias under which he wrote (howsoever derived) begins here to work, and imports a meaning which is not in the text. He makes Aristotle single out the consequences of deliberation and voluntary action as

[1] Aristotle criticizes this theory of primeval movement, *De Caelo* III. c. 2, p. 300, entirely from his own point of view;—the first feature in which is that the primary *motion* of the elements must be determinate and single—φύσει, and μία. The source of any capriciousness, therefore, did not, in his opinion, lie here.

"known" to be contingent, and thence to argue and infer a "class of sequences which are not uniform." The text runs simply (p. 19 a. 7): *εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα—ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρᾶξαι τι, καὶ ὅτι ὅλως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι* (not in classes of sequences, but in Things) *τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι· (καὶ πολλὰ ἡμῖν δῆλά ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον ὅτι τουτὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον δυνατόν ἐστι διατμηθῆναι καὶ οὐ διατμηθήσεται, ἀλλ' ἔμπροσθεν κατατριβήσεται . . . .)... φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀληθής, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μὲν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ θάτερον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι καὶ θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.*

This passage is the only one in the chapter which can be said to contain any physical or ontological doctrine. The rest, as I read it, is addressed to proving the logical inference;—to maintaining that, if the facts are so, it must be incorrect to say, before the event, that one member of the antiphasis is already true and the other false. If Aristotle had, or imagined an opponent who asserted the doctrine of necessity (as Grote thinks), the only argument he uses is *ὁρῶμεν γάρ*, and an example.

I am not asserting the force of the argument, only pointing out what it is. Aristotle himself would seem never to have become conscious of how far it would carry him: though he had the knowledge necessary for seeing it[1]. But for the unlucky blunder of the Ancients in taking Fire to be an Element—a Body, instead of an action, I cannot bring to mind any Thing in Nature of which, according to Aristotle's own conception of Nature, it can be said that in respect of all its capacities for action under various circumstances, *ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ*. If, therefore, the dependence of action on surrounding circumstances, not

[1] See the amusing surprise with which Grote discovered that Aristotle is quite orthodox as to the power of the agent being conditional for its exercise on the presence and suitable state of the patient, &c. and, on the other hand, that it *must* act when these conditions are fulfilled, *Plato* III. p. 495, 6, *note* (n.). He did not, however, cancel or defend what he had first said to the contrary; and seems to have forgotten it in his later work.

merely on the development of the agent, makes the future uncertain, pretty well every event is uncertain.

I shall examine the other passages in which contingency is referred to presently. But I have extracted this one almost at full length, because it is a very plain one, and shews what meaning Aristotle, sometimes at least, attached to the phrases *τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε* and *τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*, which, as we have seen, Grote takes for natural agents.

"It is clear then that not all things are, or come to exist of necessity; but some *as it may happen* (*ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε*), so that the asserting proposition is no nearer to truth than the denial; some with more approach to certainty and *for the most part* (*ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*) one way, yet with a possibility that the other event may occur." The fate of the coat is an example of the first case; the general course of the seasons, which leads us to expect heat in July, though we may experience wintry weather, is an example of the second. Aristotle is not thinking of the causes which bring about the events, either way, but of their observed course—*ὁρῶμεν γάρ*. And the part which he saw wrong was not the imperfection of the cycles of weather, or of vegetable or animal life, but the imaginary perfection of the cycles of the Heavenly bodies.

The only other passage, among Grote's references, which speaks of the uncertainty of the future, is *Metaph.* v. c. 2 and 3, pp. 1026—27. It is strictly parallel with Book x. c. 8, p. 1064, 5, which Bonitz takes to be a first sketch of the subject. It is somewhat simpler, and I take it first. It reproduces (1064 b. 32) the division of events into necessary, usual, and casual successions—*ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ὅπως ἔτυχε*—which we had in the *De Interp.*, and also in the 2nd Book of the *Physics* (p. 196, &c.), on which I commented in my paper. And it confines the name of *τὸ συμβεβηκός* to the last class: and, having thus defined it, he says *ὅτι δὲ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται οἱαίπερ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ὄντος δῆλον· ἔσται γὰρ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης.*

Here again, the absence of necessary connection is assumed, and the physical or ontological doctrine inferred. And so the parallel passage (1027 a. 30) *εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης*

πάντ' ἔσται, and again (b. 8) ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα πάντα ἔσται τὰ ἐσόμενα.

But Grote, as cited above, uses this passage to prove that τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε is, sometimes at least, "spoken of as an ἀρχή but not an αἴτιον, or as belonging to ὕλη as the ἀρχή." The words cited as authority for the first part of this description form part of chapter 3. I must leave it to the reader to discover how Grote got this sense out of them, even with the silent alteration of the text from αὐτῆς to αὐτοῦ; and also to settle what distinction is here meant to be drawn between αἴτιον and ἀρχή. But the sense of the chapter is more difficult to determine.

I must confess that it appears to me more like a marginal note by Aristotle, meant to be worked into a revised text, than intended to stand as it does. Chap. 2 closes a discussion with the usual formula—τί μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς εἴρηται; and chap. 4, also in the usual way, proceeds from it to a fresh one—περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀφείσθω· διώρισται γὰρ ἱκανῶς. But this interposed chapter—cognate no doubt in subject—begins abruptly with proposing to prove that there are such things as ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἴτια γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι[1], taking it for granted, apparently, that this must be the proper description of whatever causes are not οἷαίπερ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ὄντος (p. 1065)—and the sentences seem to me rather dislocated—and it ends with starting a discussion which it does not follow up—ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρχὴν ποίαν καὶ αἴτιον ποῖον ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, πότερον ὡς εἰς ὕλην ἢ ὡς εἰς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἢ ὡς εἰς τὸ κινῆσαν, μάλιστα σκεπτέον.

I must plead with Bonitz "difficile est ea interpretari quae philosophus ipse non satis distincte et perspicue explicuerit:" and I must add that, while attempting to give Aristotle's meaning, I do not mean to say it is altogether sound. My own conception of its purport is something of this kind.

"Events and collocations are causes of change and action as well as Matter, Form, and Purpose, or the nature and specific

[1] For the phrase, meaning changes or movements not involving any modification of ὕλη, see *Phys.* VIII. p. 258, a. 16, *De Caelo* p. 280, b. 27, *Metaph.* VII. c. 4, 5.

qualities and capacities of the things acted on. Otherwise, if there were no Moving cause but these latter, all changes would be determined by the present or some past state of things, and there would be no such uncertainty in the future *as we know there is.* But the truth is that the natural capacities of Things are called into action, and directed one way or the other (for each natural capacity is a capacity for movement in reversed directions, hot to cold and cold to hot, &c.), by circumstances favourable or unfavourable; and so these circumstances are causes in one sense; but the nature and capacities of the Thing are the ultimate cause of *whichever turn the thing takes*, τοῦ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε. Thus 'Man is Mortal'—must die somehow—because he has ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι—'Composita solvuntur.' But whether he will die to-day, or by this particular kind of death, depends, perhaps, upon whether he leaves home; and this on whether he is thirsty; and this on what he may eat, or have eaten. These circumstances are in one sense causes of the future event, *if it does happen:* but there is nothing in the nature of them to make them causes in *themselves;* they are 'causes by accident:' the nature of Man is the *essential* cause, whatever the kind and time of his death. This is the ultimate *datum*, beyond which our investigation cannot ascend: μέχρι τινὸς βαδίζει ἀρχῆς, αὕτη δ' οὐκέτι ἐς ἄλλο. ἔσται οὖν ἡ τοῦ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν αὕτη, καὶ αἴτιον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς [ἄλλο] οὐθέν. As regards the other description of τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε, as "belonging to ὕλη," I do not see where Grote found the two connected. But in the preceding chapter the sentence does occur ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία, ἡ ἐνδεχόμενη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως, τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, which, and the similar one p. 1071 (also cited by Grote), appear to have troubled Bonitz as well. To me the meaning of chap. 2 seems much the same, on this point, as of chap. 3. Accidents are, in the one as in the other, described as caused, in the sense of moving or occasioning cause, by some circumstance unconnected with the essential character of the agent or patient: but that which makes the occasion efficient as a cause, is the composition of all things subject to change—their ὕλη. By its definition, this is "that which is susceptible of change." The Form tends to permanence, to

keeping all the proximate material principles in due harmony, to regulate the growth and changes. But the Matter retaining its capacity for change, what is hot *can* become cold, what is healthy *can* become diseased, if disturbing circumstances are in sufficient force to interrupt the usual course—*τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*. Therefore 'the Matter, as susceptible of other phases of change besides the usual course of Nature, is the ultimate cause of accidents.' "

I think this review of the passages on which Grote relies shews that he has made the same mistake as to *τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε* and *τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ* which in my former paper I pointed out in regard of *τὸ αὐτόματον*:—that none of these phrases are names of any self-determining agency, or agency of any kind, but only of the character of the changes we see around us, some moving in approximately regular cycles, some with no tendency of the kind. And if one looks at the examples which he gives, one sees (what Bonitz complains of) that nowhere does Aristotle point out this capricious moving cause, so as to shew what there is in the universe having this supposed character: " nimirum quales *non* sunt causae rerum fortuitarum Aristoteles per exempla illustrat, quales *sint* in medio relinquit." Only, according to my view, though he is guilty of vagueness in explaining himself, and of inconsistency in his doctrine, his examples, of the destruction of the coat, the death of the man, the meeting with the debtor, suffice to shew what he was really thinking of.

What remains is, that Aristotle did recognize uncertainty in the future. And we may still inquire how he came to do so, and what place he found for this belief in his physical system. The answer to the first question I take to be that he received the belief and accepted it without question, as all the world did and does, except those who are trained and led to believe the contrary—*ὁρῶμεν γάρ*: it was part of the "common sense" of society. And the fundamental reason for his retaining the belief in spite of the tendency of his philosophy, I take to be the imperfection of his Physical System, which by no means answered to the modern requirement of being a "working" or workable hypothesis, from which you may draw inferences which can be brought to a practical test. But the explanation, or

argument, with which he satisfied himself was no more original than the belief itself. If we may trust Euripides, it was familiar in the days of Hercules. The hero was proud of his knowledge:

Δεῦρ' ἔλθ' ὅπως ἂν καὶ σοφώτερος γένῃ.
Τὰ θνητὰ πράγματ' οἶδας ἣν ἔχει φύσιν;
Οἶμαι μὲν οὖ· πόθεν γάρ; ἀλλ' ἄκουέ μου.
Βροτοῖς ἅπασι κατθανεῖν ὀφείλεται,
Κοὐκ ἔστι θνητῶν ὅστις ἐξεπίσταται
Τὴν αὔριον μέλλουσαν εἰ βιώσεται.
Τὸ τῆς τύχης γὰρ ἀφανὲς οἳ προβήσεται,
Κἄστ' οὐ διδακτὸν οὐδ' ἁλίσκεται τέχνῃ.

But it was no novelty to the slave

Ἐπιστάμεσθα ταῦτα[1].

The necessity that man should die, and the uncertainty whether it will be to-morrow, remind one of the chapter in Aristotle I have discussed at length. But this may be a mere accident. What I think cannot be so is the immediate connection, here and in Aristotle, of this truth with the impossibility of any science or art relating to accidental events: *πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεκτέον ὅτι οὐδεμία ἔστι περὶ αὐτοῦ θεωρία. σημεῖον δὲ, οὐδεμίᾳ γὰρ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιμελὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ οὔτε πρακτικῇ οὔτε ποιητικῇ οὔτε θεωρητικῇ* (*Metaph.* v. 1026 b. 3); and so below (1027 a. 19) *ὅτι δ' ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φανερὸν*, and in the parallel passage (1064, 5) the same assertion is made over and over again.

The step from the fact that we cannot follow out and classify the circumstances which bring about irregular series or casual events to the doctrine that they are beyond the reach of knowledge (or at least of human knowledge, as he sometimes seems inclined to limit it—*ἄδηλος ἀνθρώπῳ Phys.* II. 197 a. 10, and elsewhere,) is a wide step. But I think it quite in accordance with Aristotle's habits of mind. He does, however, now and

[1] If Professor Jebb's view of this scene be true—that it is "a distinctly satyric scene" (Encyc. Brit. *Euripides*) this exhibition of Hercules as a sophist may be part of the intentional fun: anyhow, it surely represents the talk of the wise men of the time.

then all but break out from these habits, and the places where he does so are among the most interesting in his Physical and Metaphysical Works;

> Blank misgivings of a creature
> Moving about in Worlds not realized.

In this very 2nd Chapter of *Metaph.* v. he starts, if I mistake not, on a road which might have led him to see that his *συμβεβηκότα*, in the sense we are here concerned with, are relative to our actual state of knowledge, and may diminish indefinitely, if not absolutely vanish, as it improves.

The reasoning of the chapter is fairly consecutive up to 1027 a. 15, at which point he seems to have sufficiently explained his theory of *τὸ συμβεβηκός*. But then he suddenly opens a wider question, as to the whole constitution of the universe, only to drop it again, and bring in a fresh illustration of the unteachableness of the accidental. Suchlike breaks, which are not uncommon, are, I think, very generally followed by obscure sentences, which puzzle scholiasts and modern commentators alike: and though it may seem too easy a way out of the difficulties, I confess I am often inclined to conjecture that we have here a marginal note to an unedited text—quite a likely thing, if Grote is right as to the history of Aristotle's Works. Be this as it may, neither the scholiasts in the Berlin Edition nor Bonitz (who proposes an emendation) make much of lines 24, 6; *τὸ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν, πότε οὐ, οἷον νουμηνίᾳ· ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῇ νουμηνίᾳ· τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα.*

I think what Aristotle meant to jot down was this train of thought: "All knowledge is of the constant or the usual. For can one either learn or teach anything which is not so? For the only distinct proposition that can be taught or received from teaching is, that this or that always, or at least usually, happens in such or such a state of things—for instance, that a mixture of honey is usually beneficial to a patient in a fever: the physician cannot go on to define all the circumstances under which the medicine will fail. Or suppose he can; that, for instance, this occurs at new moons; he will then only have established a new general rule, and relegated *τὸ συμβεβηκὸς* to

the cases, if any, of failure in this new rule: he will not be teaching a *law* of *accidents* as such; the *proposition* relating to the effect at new moon will be either constantly or usually true, and the *accidental* will be the exception." Which, had Aristotle but considered it, would have shewn him how loosely he was reasoning in favour of a preconceived notion.

I hope I have succeeded in shewing, in continuation of my former paper, that Aristotle, no more than Plato, taught that there is Free Will in Matter, or self-determined agencies in Nature. However different their principles in other respects, they both held that when natural bodies come together their interactions are necessarily determined by their specific characters and the particular conditions in which they find themselves. What they both invest with some degree of vague uncertainty —but Aristotle more than Plato, in the passages to which Grote calls attention—is *the circumstances that bring them together*. Had he been in the habit of following out his thoughts to their utmost consequences, or had Grote been there to press him, I think he would have been driven to see that these circumstances must be determined by the collocations of the Kosmos—*ἄλλου μὲν λέγοντος συνέφησεν ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, σαφῶς δὲ οὐκ εἴρηκεν.* But to shew this would require another paper. I will conclude with an observation on the "laxity in the use of the word *συμβεβηκός*" in respect of this question, which Grote notices in another connection.

The proper Aristotelian meaning of the word, as a term of art, I take to be, a predicate which happens, now, to belong to a particular subject, but is not connoted by its name. Taken in this sense, to deny that there is any science of accidents seems to mean no more than to say that, to reason about things, you must use such names as are appropriate to the particular enquiry on which you are engaged. "Something white is walking" may be perfectly true; but no science can give you rules for ascertaining whether it is probable. But if by something white you mean a man, some Science—Medicine or the like—may enable you to say under what circumstances such an event happens *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*. The logical rule is true; but it does not help physics or ontology much. But Aristotle uses this

same word, in the places I have been discussing, not for predicates but for sequence of events. And the proposition, in this sense, has quite a different bearing, and requires quite a different proof.

D. D. HEATH,

P. S. The last chapter of the treatise *De Generat.* &c. ought to throw more light than I think it does on Aristotle's doctrine about *τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ γενέσθαι.* The question proposed is whether in the whole course of change which constitutes nature, *anything whatever* is of necessity, or whether all things are not contingent. But, as so often happens, he rides off—so it appears to me—on a logical or verbal argument, deserting the question of physical fact. What I wish to call attention to is that, even here, where the larger question is at issue, he still appeals to common experience as proving that *some things* at least are contingent—*ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἔνια δῆλον, καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἕτερον διὰ τοῦτο· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔσται, δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναί ποτε ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἔστιν· ὃ δὲ νῦν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι μέλλει οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ γενέσθαι· μέλλων γὰρ ἂν βαδίζειν τις οὐκ ἂν βαδίσειεν.* St Hilaire, it is true, construes this sentence so as to make it mean that we know some things are *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*: but I do not suppose any one will agree with him.

WILLIAM GEORGE CLARK.

On the 6th of last November died W. G. Clark, one of the first editors of our Journal, at the age of fifty-seven. Many interesting details of his life, his character and his work will be found in two notices, written by intimate friends of his and published soon after his death in the Obituaries of the Athenaeum and the Academy.

Intimately acquainted with him almost from his boyhood, for a space of nearly 40 years, I am disposed to think that, taking him all in all, his was the most accomplished and versatile mind I ever encountered. Whatever he undertook to do, was always executed with a surprising tact and readiness. I cannot remember the time when he had not at his command a finished English style, wielded with consummate ease and mastery. The same ease and mastery were displayed, whenever he chose to exert them and however varied the occasion might be, in Greek and Latin composition, prose and verse alike; nor was he a mean proficient in French. For many years he was a conspicuous figure in the University and in Trinity, as Public Orator and as a Lecturer and Tutor of his College. During his vacations he was an untiring traveller in France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Poland, Ireland and elsewhere, and shewed his power of acute observation and the readiness of his pen in more than one complete book and in many shorter papers.

In the large circle of his friends and acquaintances the feeling I believe was quite universal that, as a charming companion and brilliant yet gentle talker, he had no superior.

The late Lord Clarendon, who knew him and liked him well, told a friend of mine that Clark was the most agreeable man in society he had ever met. And Lord Clarendon had spent his life in the very choicest social circles, not of London only, but of Paris, Madrid and other capitals as well.

And yet, unless I greatly err, Clark never was quite satisfied with his life in Cambridge, and during the greater portion of it at least refused to concentrate his energies and faculties on some single adequate object. Whether he knew the actual words of the famous Cynic I cannot say; but he had often I fancy in his thoughts the purport of that profound maxim of La Rochefoucauld: La souveraine habileté consiste à bien connoître le prix des choses. A few powerful intellects grasp at once the vast significance of this golden truth, and a prudent choice leads to successful performance. But for many a year it was not so with Clark: he contented himself with brief occasional efforts, and schemes were thought of only to be abandoned. Some such feeling perhaps induced him long to vacillate and finally to give up his promised edition and commentary of Aristophanes, for which his various gifts better qualified him I believe than any other living Englishman.

At length in 1860 he designed a work which was destined to be brought to a successful conclusion, the critical edition of Shakespeare. With the cooperation of his able colleague this edition was completed in 1866, and at once superseded all former critical editions of the poet. For a few years longer he was able to join the same colleague in editing single plays of Shakespeare for the Clarendon Press; and had health and strength not failed him, he might have done much in many ways to illustrate him whom he looked upon as the greatest of mankind. But, from what he told me himself more than once, I believe that the severe mechanical work involved in the collations for his critical edition had irritated his nervous system and brain. In February of 1871 he had a severe attack of pleurisy from which he never completely rallied. He passed the last years of his life in a state of great physical weakness and nervous depression; but his intellect retained its

vigour, at all events until he was struck down by paralysis some three months before his death.

I was with him in York for some days last April: his mind was clear; his conversation as interesting as in his best time. I sent him a small book of mine on Catullus, and at the end of April I received from him a letter of careful and acute criticism. Catullus turned his thoughts to hendecasyllables, and I got from him in May an elegant version of Carew's charming song, 'He that loves a rosy cheek,' the words of which his powerful memory had retained. He sent me too the following lines, a reminiscence of a visit to Farringford, where he saw the Laureate with an armful of laurels which he was carrying to plant in his new garden:

> Quod laurus geris hortulo inserendas,
> paulisper cithara, Catulle, omissa,
> laudo: nam citius virens poetae
> quavis arbore fama crescit; idem
> scis, vates, fore ut olim Apollinares
> rami deficiant tuis coronis.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

NOTICE.

After the appearance of seven volumes of the Journal of Philology, it became necessary, for financial reasons, to consider whether the publication should be continued. The question was discussed by the Philological Societies at Oxford and Cambridge, and a desire was expressed that some effort should be made to relieve the Journal from its immediate difficulties, and to maintain its existence in the future. The accession of many additional subscribers in Oxford and the promise of substantial assistance from the Cambridge Philological Society have encouraged the Editors to issue another number of the Journal, in the hope that among the many who are interested in the subjects discussed in its pages the circulation may be sufficiently increased to make it self-supporting.

In consequence of Mr Clark's withdrawal from Cambridge for several years before his death, and the many literary undertakings in which Professor Mayor was engaged, the editorship for some time was practically left in my hands. As my own occupations are sufficiently numerous, I was desirous of retiring from the office of Editor in favour of some one who could devote more leisure to the conduct of the Journal; but for the present I have consented to remain in charge, and with the able assistance of Mr Ingram Bywater and Mr Henry Jackson I hope that the character of the Journal may be maintained as a vehicle for the discussion of questions connected with all branches of Philology.

In the next number will appear the first portion of Mr Clark's notes on the Acharnians, in the form in which they were left by himself when he still contemplated an edition of Aristophanes.

WILLIAM ALDIS WRIGHT.

THE JOURNAL

OF

PHILOLOGY.

NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES ACHARNIANS 1—578.

[The following notes are printed just as they were left by Mr Clark in 1867, when he finally abandoned the work upon which he had been so long engaged. The numbering of the lines is that of Dindorf's text. To facilitate reference, I have made out the following table of abbreviations: Rav. = Ravenna MS; Amb. 1 = Bibl. Ambrosiana (Milan), L 41; Barb. 1 = Barberini 289 (in the Library of the Barberini Palace, Rome); Laur. 1 = Bibl. Laurentiana (Florence), Pluteus XXXI. Cod. XV; Laur. 2 = Cod. XVI (ibid.); Mod. 1 = Bibl. Palatina (Modena), iii D 8; Mod. 2 = iii D 14 (ibid.); Pal. 1 = Pal. 67 (Vatican); Pal. 2 = Pal. 128 (ibid.); Par. 1 = Bibl. Nat. (Paris) 2712; Par. 2 = 2715 (ibid.); Par. 3 = 2717 (ibid.); Ven. 1 = Bibl. di San Marco (Venice), Cod. 474.

Par. 1, 2, 3 are referred to by Dindorf as A, B, C, and Laur. 1, 2, as Γ, Δ. W. A. W.]

1. Hermogenes (*περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος*, c. XXXVI; Walz, Rhetores Græci, Vol. III. p. 443) refers to the beginning of the Acharnians for an illustration of the mixture of *πικρὰ* and *γελοῖα* in comedy, and Gregorius of Corinth (Walz, Vol. VII. p. 1345) in his commentary on Hermogenes quotes the first

four and portions of the next twelve lines, copying the scholia.

2. *ἥσθην*] *ἡίσθην* Rav. So also in lines 4 and 13.

ἥσθην δὲ] *ἥσθην μὲν* Amb. 1, Laur. 1 (*δὲ* written above m. r.), Mod. 1, and Barb. 1.

πάνυ δὲ] *πάνυ γε* Elmsley. An unnecessary change. For the repetition of *δὲ*, see Matthiæ, Greek Grammar § 622. 5.

βαιὰ, τέτταρα] There is a colon after *βαιὰ* in Rav., Mod. 1, Pal. 1, and Pal. 2 : no stop in Par. 1, Laur. 1, &c. Brunck (though he translates 'pauca, perpauca, quatuor omnino') has no stop. So Bekker and Dindorf, as if *βαιὰ* and *τέτταρα* were predicate and subject; which cannot be the case here. Porson (Advers. p. 130) refers to this line for an instance of repetition. As only two occasions of joy are mentioned afterwards, lines 6 and 13, *τέτταρα* must mean 'some four', an indefinitely small number. So *τρεῖς* is used line 598 of this play. So 'duo' in Latin: 'Vel duo vel nemo' (Persius, Sat. 1. 3). So 'quattro' or 'due' in modern Italian and 'due' in Spanish.

3. *ὠδυνήθην*] *ὠδυνήδην* Rav.

ψαμμακοσιογάργαρα] So Par. 1. All other MSS. have *ψαμμοκοσιογάργαρα*. The MSS. of Suidas and Hesychius vary similarly. As manuscript authority goes for very little on such a point I have followed Elmsley in writing *ψαμμακ.* as conformable to the analogy of *ἑξακόσιος*, &c. *ψαμμακόσιος*, or *ψαμμοκόσιος*, has been used, as the scholiast tells us, perhaps invented, by Eupolis.

4. *ἄξιον*] *ἄξον* Rav. Cf. line 205 *τῇ πόλει γὰρ ἄξιον*. The disgrace of Cleon leader of the war-party was a service rendered to all Greece. Cf. Pax 269, 270, *ἀπόλωλ' Ἀθηναίοισιν ἀλετρίβανος, ὁ βυρσοπώλης ὃς ἐκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα*.

χαιρηδόνος] *χερηδόνος* Laur. 1, Par. 1, Barb. 1.

5. *ἐγῷδ'*] *ἐγὼ δ'* Rav.

εὐφράνθην] *ηὐφράνθην* Aldine, Scholiast and Elmsley.

6. *ἐξήμεσεν*] *ἐξήμεσε* Pal. 2 and Ald.

The scholia give two inconsistent accounts of the incident here referred to; first that Cleon was fined for insulting the

'Knights': which like many other scholia is merely an absurd inference from the text; and secondly that the Knights had forced Cleon to restore five talents which he had received from the islanders (i.e. the subject allies of Athens) *ἵνα πείσῃ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους κουφίσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς εἰσφορᾶς*. For this Theopompus is cited as authority: *μέμνηται Θεόπομπος*. By this is probably meant the historian, not the comic poet. The former may have mentioned it incidentally in his continuation of Thucydides, and perhaps on the authority of our poet. The circumstance does not appear to have caused much scandal, else Thucydides would not have passed it over in silence. It may be that Cleon in consideration of a speech in the assembly had received a present, which, being threatened with prosecution by some of the equestrian order, he sent back. The word *ἐξεμεῖν* is used, line 1148 of the Equites, probably with especial reference to this transaction.

7. *ταῦθ' ὡς*] Elmsley suggests *τούτοις*. But the accusative is as admissible here as in lines 1, 2, 3, 9, &c. Meineke suggests *ταῦθ' ὥς μ' ἐγάνωσε*.

8. *ἄξιον γὰρ Ἑλλάδι*] Parodied, according to the scholiast, from the Telephus of Euripides, the complete verse being: *κακῶς ὄλοιτ' ἄν. ἄξιον γὰρ Ἑλλάδι*. Elmsley suggests *κακῶς ὀλοίτην*. Perhaps *καλῶς ὄλοιτ' ἄν*.

The dative, dativus commodi, with *ἄξιον* occurs again line 205; *τῇ πόλει γὰρ ἄξιον*.

10. *'κεχήνη*] Bentley. *κεχήνει* Rav. *κεχήνη* the other MSS. Brunck reads *ὅτε δῆτ' ἐκεχήνη* without authority.

τὸν Αἴσχυλον] "Scriptor vitæ Æschyli: *Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τοσοῦτον ἠγάπησαν Αἴσχυλον, ὡς ψηφίσασθαι μετὰ θάνατον αὐτοῦ τὸν βουλόμενον διδάσκειν τὰ Αἰσχύλου χορὸν λαμβάνειν*. Quinctilianus x. 1. 66, "Correctas ejus fabulas in certamen deferre posterioribus poetis Athenienses permisere, suntque eo modo multi coronati." Elmsley. Euphorion, Æschylus's son, is said by Suidas to have gained four victories by representing posthumous tragedies of his father's, but as Æschylus had been dead more than thirty years the list must have been by this time

exhausted, and there can scarcely be, as Elmsley suggests, a reference to Euphorion in this passage.

11. *ὁ δ' ἀνεῖπεν*] *ὁ κῆρυξ δηλονότι* Schol. Mod. 1, Laur. 1 (originally), Amb. 1, Pal. 2, Barb. 1, and Pal. 1 (by correction), and Suidas have *ἀνεῖπ'*. Rav. has *ἂν εἶπεν*. Par. 1 *ἀνεῖπεν*.

ὦ Θέογνι] Theognis, a tragic poet, mentioned again, line 140, and Thesm. 170, *ὁ δ' αὖ Θέογνις ψυχρὸς ὢν ψυχρῶς ποιεῖ*. According to the scholiast he was nicknamed *χιών*. The scholiast, Suidas and Harpocration state that he was one of 'the thirty tyrants', but the text of Xenophon, who is doubtless the sole authority for the statement, has *Θεογένης* (Hell. II. 3. 2).

12. *πῶς τοῦτ' ἔσεισε*] Brunck adopts Valcknaer's correction *πῶς τοῦτο σεῖσαι*. 'Non male' says Elmsley, retaining however the old reading. There is a mixture of constructions very natural in the colloquial language of comedy. 'Think what a heart-quake this gave me'.

μου] 'Elegantius esset *μοι* quam *μου*'. Brunck. Why?

13. *ἐπὶ μόσχῳ*] *Ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὸν Μόσχον. ἦν δὲ οὗτος φαῦλος κιθαρῳδὸς, πολλὰ ἀπνευστὶ ᾄδων*. So the ancient scholiast, copied by Suidas. A more recent scholion, neither found in the Ravenna MS. nor in Suidas, adds *ὁ Μόσχος κιθαρῳδὸς Ἀκραγαντῖνος, τινὲς οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ νικήσας ἆθλον ἐλάμβανε μόσχον*. The latter interpretation was adopted by Bentley in his 'Dissertation upon Phalaris' (Works, ed. Dyce, Vol. I. p. 348). This, he says, is 'the true meaning of the passage, as the language and the sense sufficiently shew', 'as the dithyrambic poets contended for a bull, so the harpers, *κιθαρῳδοὶ*, contended for a calf'. But his vast erudition has not supplied him with any other authority for the assertion. The existence of a harper called Moschus is only vouched for by our scholiast who perhaps invented him to explain the passage. He apparently supposes the name to have been given because his singing resembled the continuous lowing of a calf. That he was an Agrigentine may be a circumstance added to the original lie, suggested by the fact that the bucolic poet Moschus was a Syracusan. That *ἐπὶ* joined with

the dative case of a person can mean 'after' I do not believe.

Mitchell in his note ad loc. says: "An opinion of Welcker seems to be gaining ground that nothing more is intended here than a mere jest; the poet, in allusion to the derivation of the word Βοιώτιος, playfully combining a calf with the νόμος Βοιώτιος".

The meaning seems to me simply this: Dexitheus dressed as a rustic came upon the stage mounted on a young bull or heifer. The Bœotian νόμος, said by the scholiast to have been invented by Terpandros, was probably of a bucolic nature.

14. Δεξίθεος] Δοξίθεος Laur. 1. "An excellent harper and Pythian victor", Schol.

βοιώτιον] Meineke proposes τὸ βοιώτιον. But there may have been more than one βοιώτιον μέλος (if, as the scholiast says, μέλος, and not νόμος, be the word understood). In any case the article may be omitted as it constantly is with words in very familiar use.

18. After κονίας Pal. 1 and the first corrector of Laur. 1 insert γε, as do the Aldine and all subsequent editions to Brunck's inclusive. Porson in his review of Brunck (Maty's Review, IV. p. 65) shewed that it should be omitted, the ι in κονίας being long, as in Lysistr. 470. The best MSS. and Suidas omit it. The meaning is: 'Never since my washing days began have my eyelids so smarted with soap as they do now with vexation'. He is ready to cry.

19. ὅποτ'] ὅπποτ' Rav.

κυρίας ἐκκλησίας] κυρία ἐκκλησία was a meeting of the Athenian assembly competent to pass bills, elect officers and generally to transact business of state in contradistinction to other meetings at which, as is probable, only matters of local and municipal interest were dealt with. As to the number of such meetings at this period we have no information. The scholiasts and lexicographers of later times are only authentic so far as they preserve the statements of Aristotle in his lost work, the πολιτεῖαι, and these doubtless referred to the usages of his own time. The statement of Pollux (VIII. 95) that of

four meetings in each πρυτανεία the first alone was called κυρία, while the third was appropriated to the reception of envoys and ambassadors, is inconsistent with what we find in the Acharnians, where the Persian ambassadors are introduced in a κυρία ἐκκλησία. From a passage in the speech of Æschines against Timarchus, quoted in full at line 44, we may infer that envoys and ambassadors were received at any κυρία ἐκκλησία previously to the transaction of the other business. The scholiast on this passage is wrong in considering νόμιμος ἐκκλησία and κυρία ἐκκλησία to be equivalent, and equally erroneous is the distinction sometimes made between σύγκλητος and κυρία. The truth is that certain meetings held on fixed days were νόμιμοι, others summoned on emergencies σύγκλητοι. Of the νόμιμοι some were κυρίαι, some not. The σύγκλητοι, by the nature of the case, would generally be κυρίαι. It would rarely happen that an emergency would arise requiring a special meeting for the transaction of municipal business. From Thesmoph. 373 sqq. it would appear that the βουλὴ had the right of fixing the time of meeting.

20. ἑωθινῆς] The assembly of women in the Thesmophoriazusæ is held also at daybreak. Thesmoph. 376.

πνὺξ] πνὶξ Laur. 1. The site of the Pnyx is to my mind one of the most certain points of Athenian topography, and the arguments of Welcker and others entirely fail to shake my belief in the conclusions of Leake. The votive tablets to Zeus found on the spot, and formerly inserted in the face of the escarpment on either side of the 'bema', prove indeed that the place was sacred to Zeus but do not disprove its having been the place of assembly also. The fact that the Pnyx was sacred to Zeus gives a new significance to the exclamation of Agoracritus when he has triumphed over Cleon (Equites 1253), Ἑλλάνιε Ζεῦ, σὸν τὸ νικητήριον.

αὐτηί] Aldus. αὐτηί MSS., except Laur. 2, which has ἠδεῖ.

21. οἱ δ'] οἳ δ' Rav. and others. This is not to be taken as necessarily implying that the ἀγορὰ is visible from the Pnyx. I have no doubt that the ἀγορὰ was on the north side of the

Hill of Ares, which thus stood between it and the Pnyx. A street doubtless led from the Agora to the Pnyx below the western end of the Hill of Ares.

22. Compare Eccl. 378, 9, *καὶ δῆτα πολὺν ἡ μίλτος, ὦ Ζεῦ φίλτατε, γέλων πάρεσχεν ἣν προσέῤῥαινον κύκλῳ.* The *τοξόται* under the direction of the *λῃξίαρχοι* (Pollux VIII. 104) removed all wares exposed for sale; opened the gates leading to the Pnyx, closed all the other issues and with a rope rubbed over with red-lead swept the loiterers towards the place of assembly. Those marked with the red-lead were fined. Such is the account given by the scholiast, and copied in full by Suidas. There is a minute exactness in it which distinguishes it from the imbecile inventions which fill so large a space in the scholia. Very likely it is derived from Aristotle. Nor need it surprise us to find so primitive a method of effecting 'a call of the house' still practised in times of great refinement and civilization. The Athenian democracy was very tenacious of old forms. This line, *τὸ σχοινίον, κ.τ.λ.*, had become a proverb, according to Suidas.

23. *ἀωρίαν*] *ἀώριαν* Rav. *ὠρίαν* Par. 1. Corrected in other MSS. *ἀωρίᾳ* Suidas. The accusative is used as in the phrase *καιρὸν δ' ἐφήκεις* (Soph. Ajax, 34). Matthiæ Gr. Gr. 425. See also Æsch. Eum. 108, 109, *καὶ νυκτίσεμνα δεῖπν' ἐπ' ἐσχάρᾳ πυρὸς ἔθυον, ὥραν οὐδενὸς κοινὴν θεῶν*, and Paley's note.

24, 25. The redundancy in *ἥκοντες...ἐλθόντες* and the use of *δ'* as if a finite verb, not a participle, had preceded, have thrown suspicion on this passage. Dobree, referring to the scholiast's *διωθήσονται*, proposed to read *εἶτα διωστιοῦνται*, and Ribbeck thinks that something is wanting before or after *ἥκοντες*, or else that the word itself is corrupt. He says: "Man vermisst nach *ἀλλὰ* ein neues Praedicat zu *πρυτάνεις*, woraus zu ersehen wäre, *was* sie zur Unzeit thun. Denn dass sie auf dem Markte die Zeit todt schlagen und sich nachher drängen werden, ist unstatthaft, da *sie* sich unmöglich *περὶ πρώτου ξύλου* stossen können". But the Prytanes came not from the *ἀγορὰ* but from the *πρυτανεῖον*, where doubtless they met pre-

vious to each *ἐκκλησία*. Perhaps they were not unfrequently detained by preliminary business so long as to try the patience of such of the people as were punctual in their attendance in the Pnyx. The road from the Prytaneum to the Pnyx, supposing the former to have occupied the place assigned to it by Leake, would pass not through the market-place but between the Hill of Ares and the Acropolis. Meineke, Vindic. Arist., regrets that he had not admitted Dobree's emendation *διωστιοῦνται* into his text, as *εἶτα δὲ* cannot be used after a participle. Certainly not, according to strict rules of grammar, but we are not bound to correct every anacoluthon we find in ancient texts. In Æsch. Agam. 423 Hermann says, Plena oratio esset *εὖτ' ἂν ἐσθλά τις δοκῶν ὁρᾶν ὁρᾷ*. So we may say here 'plena oratio esset *ἀωρίαν ἥκοντες ἥξουσιν*'.

It may be remarked that Suidas read *ὠστιοῦνται* and so probably did the scholiast for he says: *διωθήσονται ἀπὸ ἐνεστῶτος τοῦ ὠστίζω* (not *διωστίζω*).

I read *διωστιοῦνται* not to avoid the anacoluthon but because the compound verb is almost necessary to the sense. The corruption is owing to the tendency transcribers had to change and accommodate the comic iambic to the tragic rhythm. So line 107 has been altered in modern times.

25. Meineke reads: *ἀλλήλοις περὶ τοῦ πρώτου ξύλου*· an unnecessary change. *πρῶτον ξύλον*, first place, no more requires the article than would *προεδρία*. Pollux in two places, IV. 121, and VIII. 133, has *πρῶτον ξύλον* without the article, having perhaps this passage in his mind.

While the people sate below on the bare rock (Equit. 783) *ἐπὶ ταῖσι πέτραις*, or on stone seats, of which the supporting wall may still be seen, the Prytanes and Secretaries probably had wooden benches along the ledge behind the *bema*, where there are no traces of seats cut in the rock.

26. *ἀθρόοι*] A late scholion tells us that the proper Attic form is *ἄθροοι*, which Elmsley adopts. Suidas recognizes another form *ἄθροι* as also in use. Meineke reads *ἄθροι*.

εἰρήνη δ'] *εἰρήνησ*, at first, in Rav., corrected by the same hand to *εἰρήνη δ'*.

29. *νοστῶν*] 'Returning on each occasion', 'coming regularly'. Compare the use of *νόστος* Soph. Philoc. 43, *ἀλλ' ἢ 'πὶ φορβῆς νόστον ἐξελήλυθεν.*

κἆτ' ἐπειδὰν ὦ] *κάτ' ἐπειδ' ἂν ὦι* Rav.

32. *εἰς*] *ἐς* Dindorf, who makes the same change whenever *εἰς* is followed by a consonant.

33. *στυγῶν...πoθῶν*] "Stobæus 54. recte, si legas in versu priore *ἀποβλέπων δ'.*" Porson.

35. *ᾔδειν*] *ᾔδει* Laur. 1 and Mod. 1 (a correction). *ηἰδ' εἰ* Rav., Par. 2. *ᾔδη* Laur. 2. *ᾔδει* the rest.

Suidas reads *ᾔδειν*, and interprets *οὐδὲ ἐγίνωσκον τὸ πρίω ῥῆμα.* The scholiast *οὐδὲ ἐγίνωσκε τ. π. ρ.* 'Stobæi libri partim *οὐχ ἡ δὴ* partim *οὐχὶ δεῖ*' Dindorf. *ᾔδην* Elmsley. Whatever the form adopted, the third person is required here. Had the subject been changed *ἐγὼ* must have been added for clearness. I have adopted the form which is found in the Ravenna MS. in the Pax, line 1182, *οὐ γὰρ ᾔδειν ἐξιάν·* where the metre shews that the form cannot be *ᾔδει*: and it is more probable that in other places where the final consonant was not required it was omitted by transcribers than that both forms were concurrently in use.

36. *χὡ πρίων ἀπῆν*] "Valde frigida et invenusta mihi videtur hæc serræ mentio: præsertim cum *πρίων* priorem syllabam producat *πρίω* corripiat...Propemodum adducerer ut suspicarer nostrum scripsisse, *ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἔφερε πάντα μὲν τὸ πρίω δ' ἀπῆν,* nisi receptæ scripturæ accederet Stobæi auctoritas". Elmsley. And he might also have added 'that of Suidas'. A difference of quantity would scarcely stand in the way of a pun, and the jest is not so bad if we suppose *πρίων* to mean the instrument of the *κυμινοπρίστης*: "there was no skinning of flints". Ribbeck supposes that the poet jocosely makes from *πρίω* a participle *πρίων* meaning "one who cries *πρίω*", also alluding to the saw. This I think would not have been intelligible to the audience.

39. *τις*] Omitted by Rav.

πλὴν] *πρὶν* Par. 1, Laur. 1 and Barb. 1.

λέγῃ] *λέγει* Amb. 1 and Pal. 1.

41. *οὐγὼ 'λεγον*] *οὐγὼ λέγων* Rav. (the syllable *γω* having both an acute and a grave accent). All other MSS. have *'λεγον* or *λεγον*, varying in the breathings and accents over *οὐγώ*. In Rav. there is no stop after *ἠγόρευον*.

43. *πάριτ'*] *πάριθ'* Pal. 1.

44. *πάριθ'*] *παριτ'* Rav., Pal. 1, Pal. 2.

τοῦ καθάρματος] A young pig, *χοιριδίον* Suid. *δέλφαξ* Schol., was sacrificed and the blood carried round and sprinkled on the outskirts of the place of assembly. The blood was called *κάθαρμα* or *καθάρσιον*, as was the victim. The ceremony was *τὰ περίστια*, the person who officiated *περιστίαρχος* (Eccles. 128). The passage of Æschines alluded to in the note on line 19, is so important to the understanding of what follows here that I quote it entire. (Æschines against Timarchus, p. 4, Steph. p. 406, ed. Zurich, 1839.) *καὶ πῶς δὲ κελεύει τοὺς προέδρους χρηματίζειν; ἐπειδὰν τὸ καθάρσιον περιενεχθῇ καὶ ὁ κῆρυξ τὰς πατρίους εὐχὰς εὔξηται, προχειροτονεῖν κελεύει τοὺς προέδρους περὶ ἱερῶν τῶν πατρίων καὶ κήρυξι καὶ πρεσβείαις καὶ ὁσίων, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπερωτᾷ ὁ κῆρυξ· "τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται τῶν ὑπὲρ πεντήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων;" ἐπειδὰν δὲ οὗτοι πάντες εἴπωσι, τότ' ἤδη κελεύει λέγειν τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων τὸν βουλόμενον.* Amphitheus' speech, lines 47—54, is not, I think, intended as a parody upon the genealogies of which Euripides is so fond, but is designed to shew that as he was a descendant of Gods and Demigods, his business came under the head of *τὰ πάτρια ἱερὰ* and therefore should take precedence of all other.

I have sometimes thought that there might have been an Attic 'hero' called Amphitheus, whose *ἡρῷον* had been spared by the Lacedæmonians, when they devastated the country round, but the meaning of the name 'God on both father's and mother's side' makes it more probable that it was invented by the poet, and the scene may have been suggested by some recent incident in the assembly, when some one tried to get a hearing for his own grievances on the ground that they related to the national rites. At any rate, from the question of the herald *οὐκ ἄνθρωπος*; line 46, we may infer that Amphitheus

appeared in archaic dress such as heroes and demigods were represented with, in fresco paintings.

A good idea of the preliminary proceedings of the assembly may be gained from Eccles. 128 sqq. and from Thesmoph. 295—382.

45. *εἶπε*] Pal. 1 and Pal. 2. The other MSS. have *εἶπεν*. The note of interrogation was first given in the Leyden edition of 1624. Amphitheus, who has just arrived, addresses the question to a neighbour. The herald's words render an answer unnecessary.

46. The line is given thus in Rav.—*ἐγώ*: *τίσ ὤν*: *ἀμφίθεος*: *οὐκ ἄνθρωποσ* ; *οὔ*. In Mod. 1 *ἀμ. ἐγώ*: *κη. τίς ὤν*: *ἀμ. οὐκ ἄνθρωπος*:, *κη. οὔ*. Laur. 1 originally made the same omission, reading *ἀμφι. οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὔ* (corrected above). Par. 1 omits the three last names of the speakers. The line is substantially right in Pal. 1, Pal. 2, and Amb. 1.

Dindorf, in his note ed. Oxon. 1837, says, 'Præconis partes prytani sunt tribuenda', though he has retained the old arrangement in the text in this and the edition of 1851. Here and elsewhere the *κῆρυξ* pronounces in a loud voice the orders given him by the presiding *πρυτάνεις*.

47. *ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμ.*] Dawes (? R. P.), Miscell. Crit. (p. 465, ed. 1827), laid down a rule that a tribrach could not precede an anapæst. Elmsley accordingly reads *ἀλλ' ἀθανάτός γ'· ὁ γὰρ* 'Αμ. Hermann proposed *ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος· ὅ δ'* 'Αμ. (Reisig, Conjectanea, p. 13). Reisig himself suggests *ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος, ὅ γ'* 'Αμ. The rule seems to me very doubtful as applicable to Aristophanic senarii. Even admitting it, the pause after *ἀθάνατος* would be sufficient to justify an exception. In the Aves 108, though a new speaker intervenes, *ποδαπὼ τὸ γένος*; has been changed for the same reason, to *ποδαπὼ τὸ γένος δ'* ; to the detriment of the sense.

48. *γίγνεται*] All the MSS. have *γίνεται*.

52. *ποιεῖσθαι*] So all MSS. Meineke, following a suggestion of Elmsley's, gives *ποιῆσαι* here, *ποιῆσαι* line 58, and *ποίησον* line 131. Elmsley says: "*σπονδὰς ποιούντων* de Diis induciarum auctoribus dicitur in Pac. 212 et

eodem sensu εἰρήνην ποιήσας de Trygæo v. 1199". But in the latter case ποιησάμενος might have been used, as Trygæus was himself included in the peace which he brought about. So in the case of Amphitheus, the middle voice seems equally appropriate. I therefore in lines 52, 58, 131 adopt the reading which has the highest authority. Compare the use of ἐπεποιήμεθα, line 145.

πρὸς Λ.] πρὸς τοὺς Λ. Pal. 1.

53. ἀθάνατος ὢν] Brunck, asserting that the first syllable of ἀθάνατος cannot be long in dramatic poetry, conjectures ὢν ἀθάνατος to avoid the concurrence of dactyl and anapæst, which by Dawes' rule is inadmissible. So he would read εἰμ' ἀθάνατος Aves 1224, and ὄντ' ἀθάνατον Ranæ 629.

ἄνδρες] ὦνγρες Pal. 2. ὦν'δρες Ald.

54. ΚΗΡΥΞ] Omitted in Rav. κηρ. or κη. in the rest, except that in Par. 2 it is corrected by the same hand to πρύτανις, in accordance with the scholium: τοῦτό φησιν εἷς τῶν πρυτάνεων.

Brunck recommends and Bekker reads ΠΡΥ. for ΚΗΡΥΞ. But see the note to line 46. Mod. 2 gives the whole line οὐ γὰρ...τοξόται to the Herald.

55—58. These lines have been erased and re-written by the same hand in Laur. 1.

ΑΜΦ.] Omitted in Rav.

58. ποιεῖσθαι] Rav. ποιῆσαι the rest. The authority of the Ravenna MS., in a case of doubt, outweighs that of all the others put together. The transcribers altered ποιεῖσθαι to the first aorist active because of κρεμάσαι.

59. σῖγα] Rav., Laur. 2, Pal. 1, and Pal. 2. σίγα Laur. 1, Amb. 1, Par. 1, and Mod. 1. Elmsley adopts σίγα, putting a colon after κάθησο.

ΔΙΚ.] Omitted in Rav.

οὔ] οὔκ Brunck and Elmsley.

60. γε] τε Barb. 1. In Laur. 1, it is doubtful, whether τε or γε. It is omitted by the scholiast: Dobree proposes τι.

πρυτανεύσητέ] Meineke gives, silently, *πρυτανείητέ*, perhaps a misprint.

61. *οἱ...βασιλέως*] *οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως πρέσβεις* Laur. 2, and Pal. 1.

62. ΔΙΚ.] Omitted in Rav.

'γὼ] Barb. 1. So corrected in Laur. 1 and Mod. 1. In Laur. 1 the original was, I think, *γὰρ ὡς*. *γὼ* Rav. *κὡς* (i. e. *καὶ ὡς*) in Par. 1. *γὰρ* Pal. 1 and Laur. 2. *γὰρ ὡς* Pal. 2.

63. *ταῶσι*] Athenæus (IX. 57, p. 397 e), on the authority of Tryphon, a grammarian of the Augustan time, says that the Athenians aspirated the second syllable of *ταῶς*, and he seems to imply that he himself had a MS. of the Aves of Aristophanes where the word was written *ταῶς*. Both he and the grammarian Seleucus thought them wrong.

On the authority of this passage Dindorf says we ought to write here *ταῶσι*, though he does not write it so either in his earlier or later text. Meineke however does. Considering that the pronunciation of a foreign word may well have changed in the four centuries which elapsed between Aristophanes and Trypho, that written accents were not in use for more than two centuries after Aristophanes, and that, if we write *ταῶσι*, we ought also to write *διέλκειν*, I have adhered to the reading of all MSS. Elmsley writes *ταῳσι*.

64. ΚΗΡ...] *—σῖγα βαβαιάξ·* Rav. In Par. 1, also, ΔΙΚ is omitted.

65. *μέγαν,*] *μέγα·* Rav.

66. *φέροντας*] Rav., Pal. 1, and Laur. 1 (as corrected). *φέροντα* Amb. 1, Mod. 1, Pal. 2, and Laur. 1 originally.

τῆς] *τὰς* Laur. 1, and Barb. 1.

67. Euthymenes was archon from Midsummer 437 to Midsummer 436; eleven years before, not twelve, as the scholiast says. This was an important date for comic poets, being that of the repeal of the law prohibiting comedy which had been passed three years previously, *ἐπὶ Μορυχίδου*. It is probable that some embassy, of which history has preserved

no record, had been sent from Athens to Persia, whose long absence was still fresh in the memory of men.

68, 69. *ἐτρυχόμεσθα παρὰ Καΰστριον ποταμὸν*] Blaydes. *ἐτρυχόμεσθα παρὰ τῶν καϋστρίων πεδίων*· Rav. *ἐτρυχόμεσθα διὰ τῶν καϋστρίων πεδίων* Laur. 1, Barb. 1. *ἐτρυχόμεθα διὰ τ. κ. π.* Par. 1, Amb. 1, Laur. 2, Pal. 1. *ἐτρυχόμεθα διὰ τ. καστρίων π.* Pal. 2. *ἐτρυχόμεσθα τῶν Καϋστρίων πεδίων* Elmsley. *ἐτρυχόμεσθα παρὰ Καΰστριον πεδίον* Dindorf. Meineke conjectures *ἐ. περὶ Καΰστριον πεδίον*. I had once thought of reading *πέρα καϊστρίων πεδίων*, but I now prefer Blaydes' conjecture. He refers to Herod. v. 100, *πορευόμενοι παρὰ ποταμὸν Καΰστριον*. An additional touch of caricature is given by the statement that the carriage-road skirted the banks of a river, and that a river celebrated by Homer, flowing through the 'Asian meadow' (Il. II. 460). The '*plain* of Cayster', a very different place, was probably unknown in Greece till Xenophon's Anabasis, 1. 2, § 11, made it famous.

69. *ὁδοιπλανοῦντες*] *ὁδοιπλανῶντες* Laur. 1, Barb. 1. *ὁδηπλανοῦντες* Par. 1. *ὁδοιποροῦντες* (corrected to *ὁδοιπλανοῦντες* by another hand) Amb. 1.

70. *ἁρμαμαξῶν*] *ἁρμαξῶν* Rav. and Amb. 1 (corrected).

μαλθακῶς] Kuster actually proposes to read *οὐ μαλακῶς*.

71. ΔΙΚ.] Here, as in line 67, and frequently elsewhere, the sign : is used to indicate a new speaker, the name not being given, in Rav.

γὰρ] *γ' ἄρ'* Brunck and Elmsley. *τἄρ'* Meineke (Mehler conj.). Ribbeck suggests *σφόδρ' ἄρα γ' ἐσ.* *γὰρ* seems to me quite right. Dicæopolis assents to the proposition, and illustrates it by his own case. 'Riding in a cushioned carriage is killing work' says the exquisite. 'Yes' says the other, 'for health and comfort there's no bed like a good heap of rubbish'. Dicæopolis is not here alluding to his duties as sentinel on the wall, for a sentinel would not be allowed to lie down—he, like the other fugitives from the country, was obliged to find a bed where he could. Compare Thucyd. II. 17. *κατεσκευάσαντο δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πύργοις τῶν τειχῶν πολλοὶ*

καὶ ὡς ἕκαστός που ἐδύνατο· οὐ γὰρ ἐχώρησε ξυνελθόντας αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ὕστερον δὴ τά τε μακρὰ τείχη ᾠκησαν κατανειμάμενοι καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ πολλά. Compare Eccles. 243, ἐν ταῖς φυγαῖς μετὰ τἀνδρὸς ᾤκησ' ἐν πυκνί.

73. πρὸς βίαν ἐπίνομεν] Ahasuerus seems to have done what was proverbially impossible; changed a law of the Persians. See Esther 1. 8, 'And the drinking was according to the law; none did compel: for so the king had appointed to all the officers of his house, that they should do according to every man's pleasure'.

74. ἐκπωμάτων] ἐκπομάτων Rav. 'And they gave them drink in vessels of gold'. Esther 1. 7.

75. ΔΙΚ.] Omitted in Rav.

76. αἰσθάνει] Pal. 2, Par. 2 and Ald. αἰσθάνηι Rav. αἰσθάνη the rest.

77, 78. Laur. 1, and Barb. 1, give these lines to the κῆρυξ.

78. δυναμένους φαγεῖν τε καὶ πιεῖν] This is Brunck's conjecture, to which Elmsley objects because the scholiast recognizes καταφαγεῖν. But the scholion is not found in Rav. and therefore probably is of more recent origin. The simple verb φαγεῖν seems more suitable here than the compound, and τε can ill be spared. δυναμένους καταφαγεῖν τε καὶ πιεῖν Rav., Par. 1, Mod. 1, Amb. 1, and Pal. 2. δυναμένους καταφυγεῖν τε καὶ πιεῖν Laur. 1 originally (corrected καταφαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν by a later hand). δυναμένους καταφαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν Laur. 2, Par. 2, Pal. 1. δυναμένους καταφυγεῖν τε καὶ ποιεῖν Barb. 1. Aldus and subsequent edd. follow Rav., &c. Elmsley reads δυνατοὺς κ. τε καὶ π. Bergk conjectures τοὺς πλεῖστ' ἐθέλοντας κ. τε καὶ π.

79. ἡμεῖς δὲ λαικ.] ὑμεῖς δὲ λαικ. Par. 1. ὑμεῖς λαικ. Amb. 1, corrected by another hand ὑμεῖς δὲ λευκ. Par. 1 has also καταπύγωνας. So also Mod. 2.

τε] Elmsley in his additional note says: 'Manifesto legendum γε'.

80. δ'] Omitted in Rav.

τὰ] Omitted in Pal. 1.

82. Ὀρῶν] ὀρῶν Brunck. ὄρρων Rav. (the first ρ being struck through with a pen). ὁρῶν Laur. 1, Par. 1, Barb. 1. ὅρων the other MSS., the Aldine and early edd. ὄρων ed. Leyden, 1624. I have written the words χρυσῶν ὀρῶν with capital letters. Bergler quotes Plautus, Stichus 24,

'Neque ille mereat Persarum sibi montes, qui esse perhibentur aurei'.

84. ΠΡΕΣΒΥΣ. τῇ πανσελήνῳ·] Elmsley reads τῇ πανσελήνῳ; continuing the words to Dicæopolis, as the ambassador nowhere else takes notice of the interruptions. The speakers in this and the previous line are indicated by dashes in Rav.

85. παρετίθει δ'] All MSS. except Rav., which has καὶ παρετίθετ'. Dindorf has given παρετίθει θ' from Athenæus IV. 6, p. 130 f., where this and the four following lines are quoted. But some of the MSS. of Athenæus have παρετίθει δ', which is more euphonious than -θει θ'.

ὅλους] Pal. 1, Laur. 2, Par. 2. ὀπτοὺς Rav., Par. 1, Pal. 2. ὀπτοὺς (γρ. καὶ ὅλους above) Laur. 1, Mod. 1, Amb. 1.

87. βοῦς] τοὺς Par. 1. 'Oven-baked oxen'. The Athenians knew ἄρτους κριβανίτας. Athenæus III. 74—83, pp. 109—116, enumerates the different kinds of ἄρτοι. Those named from the respective modes of baking are ἐπνίτης, ἐσχαρίτης, ἀταβυρίτης, ἀχαΐνας, κριβανίτης, ἐγκρυφίας, λάγανον (τὸ) and ἐπανθρακὶς (ἡ).

88. Κλεωνύμου] Cleonymus is one of Aristophanes' favourite butts. He is described as a giant Ach. 88, Av. 1474, as a coward who had thrown away his shield Nub. 353, Vesp. 19, &c., as a toady, κολακώνυμος, Vesp. 592, as a perjurer Nub. 400, as effeminate Nub. 673, 680, and a glutton Equit. 1292. He is mentioned in many other passages of the earlier plays. After the Thesmophoriazusæ, we hear no more of him.

89. ἦν] Omitted in Par. 1, and originally, I think, in Mod. 1. In Laur. 1, ἦν is added by a later hand.

φέναξ] The name is suggested by Phœnix.

90. The second syllable of ἐφενάκιζες is blotted in Laur. 1. It is converted into ἐφεστιάκιζες in Barb. 1.

91. ἄγοντες ἥκομεν] ἥκοντες ἄγομεν Rav.

92. τὸν βασιλέως ὀφθαλμόν] Herodotus I. 114 tells us that Cyrus when chosen king by his young playfellows distributed offices among them, τὸν δέ κου τινὰ αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλέος εἶναι. There were many so-called officers. Xenophon, Cyropæd. VIII. ii. 10, 11, εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ἕνα αἱρετὸν εἶναι ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖ οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται κ.τ.λ. Aristotle, Politica III. 16, ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν αὑτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. One King's Eye, Alpistus, is mentioned as having perished in the Persian war by Æschylus, Persæ 980 sqq. Milton borrows the image Par. Lost III. 651, 'the seven, Who in God's presence nearest to his throne Stand ready at command and are his eyes'.

93. πατάξας] Omitted at first, but added in margin by the same hand, in Rav.

τόν γε σὸν] Elmsley, to avoid the repetition of γε, reads τόν τε σὸν. But why should it not be repeated when two separate words require to be emphasized? See Aves 171, 584; Eccles. 189. The 'King's Eye' had given Dicæopolis no offence, not having even appeared as yet.

94. A late Scholion says: ἐσκευασμένος ἦν ὁ Πέρσης δέρμα ἔχων καθειμένον εἰς τόπον τοῦ τε πώγωνος καὶ τοῦ στόματος ... And another: ὀφθαλμὸν ἔχων ἕνα ἐπὶ παντὸς τοῦ προσώπου. This description probably rests on no authority other than the fancy of the scholiasts and seems scarcely reconcilable with Dicæopolis's comments. The mask worn by the King's Eye was a caricature of the type of face represented in Persian art, some samples of which on tapestries or 'painted cloths' had probably found their way to Athens. (See Vespæ 1143, ἐν Ἐκβατάνοισι ταῦθ' ὑφαίνεται.) The eyes would be enormously large and the beard would cover the whole cheek, as it nearly does in the Nineveh sculptures. The ships' eyes referred to by Dicæopolis were probably not the rowlocks but the holes one on each side of the prow through which the cables passed, and the ἀσκώματα are either leather pads to prevent the

cables wearing away the wood, or else 'fenders' to prevent the ship suffering damage by collision, or as a temporary means of repairing some damage already done. We must suppose the King's eye to enter 'attended', and to salute the assembly with profound bows to right and left. Hence D.'s question 'Does your aspect mean that you are prepared for action, or are you wearing round a headland and looking out for a dry-dock?'

95. *ναύφρακτον*] Dindorf following Photius writes *ναύφαρκτον* as the more Attic form.

βλέπεις,] Ribbeck puts a colon at *βλέπεις* and says that he cannot conceive how the line can be taken interrogatively. But *πρὸς τῶν θεῶν* is always prefixed to a question or a command, *νὴ τοὺς θεούς* to an affirmation.

96. *νεώσοικον*] All the MSS. read *νεὼς οἶκον* and Rav. has *νεὼς κάμπτων οἶκον* (originally *κάμπων*).

98, 101. ΠΡΕΣΒΥΣ] Rav. indicates the speaker by a dash. Par. 1, Pal. 2, and Pal. 1, by a recent hand, *κῆρυξ*. The rest *πρέσβυς ἢ κῆρυξ*. In line 102, the speaker is marked by a dash in Rav.; in some omitted, in others *κῆρυξ*.

98. *ἄττα σ' ἀπέπεμψεν*] Par. 2. *ἄττ' ἄν σ' ἀπέπεμψεν* Rav. *ἄττα σ' ἀπἔκπεμψε* Pal. 1. *ἄττα σ' ἔπεμψε* Pal. 2, Barb. 1. *ἄττα σ' ἀπέπεμψε* the rest. Barb. 1 omits *φράσον*, which is written above the line in Laur. 1.

100. I have given this line as it stands in Laur. 1[1]. In Rav. it is *ἰαρταμὰν ἐξαρξασπισόναστρα*. It is not worth while to record the variations of the other MSS., or the attempts which have been made to get sense out of it. Such attempts are sure to prove equally fruitless whether applied to the Phœnician in the Pœnulus of Plautus, the 'Raphel bai ameth' of the Giant in Dante (Inferno XXXI), the 'Boskos Thromuldo Boskos' which perplexed M. Parolles in All's Well that ends Well (IV. i. 73) or the Turkish in the Bourgeois Gentilhomme IV. 5 if any reader is not satisfied with the translation which contented M. Jourdain.

Aristophanes was doubtless as ignorant of Persian as his

[1] *ιαρταμαν εξαρξαν: απισσοναι σάτρα* is the reading of Laur. 1. Mr Clark adds in another note book, 'another hand (old) has accented the 4th and 7th syllable erased *αι* and inserted *α* before *σατρα*.' [W. A. W.]

audience. He wanted words conveying no continuous sense but sounding like words in Persian with which they were familiar, as 'Artabas, Xerxes, Pisuthnes, Satrap'.

102. *ὑμῖν*] Laur. 1, Par. 1, Amb. 1, Laur. 2, Pal. 2. *ἡμῖν* Rav., Pal. 1, Mod. 1.

104. *λῆψι*] *ληψι* Pal. 1. *λήψει* Rav. *λήψη* or *ληψη* the rest.

χρῦσο] *χρῦσα* Von Velsen, Rheinisches Museum, XVIII. 127.

105. ΠΡΕΣΒΥΣ] Omitted in Rav., Laur. 1. δ. Pal. 1. $^{\pi\lambda}$ *δικαι* . Pal. 2. *κῆ*. the rest. Some similar errors are made in the next line.

τί δαὶ] Elmsley. *τί δ' αὖ* all MSS. except Par. 1 and, originally, Laur. 1 *τί δ' ἰαῦ*. Brunck reads *τί οὖν*.

106. *ὅτι*;] So pointed by Brunck on Reiske's suggestion. There is no stop after *ὅτι* in the MSS. Pal. 2 has a curious mistake here, reading *τί δ' αὖ λέγει κῆρυξ ὅτι χ.*, and ending the lines *δ' αὖ* and *ἰάονας*.

107. *χρυσίον*] 'Numerosius esset *χρυσὸν ἐκ τ. β.*' Elmsley. Dindorf adopts the suggestion in his edition of 1835—7, rightly recurring to the old reading in the edition of 1851.

108. *ὅδε γε*] A correction of Bentley's. *ὁδί γε* MSS. Brunck taking the second syllable in *ἀχάνας* to be short alters *μὲν* in the next line to *μήν*. Fritzsche proposed *μέν γ'*. A more probable correction would have been *ποίας ὅδ'*, or *ποίας ποτ' ἀχάνας*; but the *χα* is probably long as *χαυ* is in line 104.

110. *ἄπιθ'*] *ἄπιτ'* Rav., Par. 1. *ἄπιθ'* or *ἄπιθι* the rest.

μόνος] Perhaps *μόνον*, 'by himself, unprompted'.

111. A dash is prefixed to this line in Rav., as if a new speaker began. So also to lines 114, 115.

πρὸς τουτονί] *προς τοῦτονι* Rav. 'In the face of the ambassador'. He confronts those whom he supposes to be accomplices in a fraud. Dindorf takes it otherwise: 'Post *ἐμοί* mutata constructione intulit *πρὸς τουτονί*, quod tantundem valet quantum simplex dativus *τουτωί*'. Reiske conjectured *πρὸς τουτονί* 'per hunc *ἰμάντα* quem simul ostendit'. Meineke

adopts *πρὸς τουτουί*, explaining 'by this staff'. But in that case we should have expected *πρὸς ταυτησί*, i. e. *τῆς βακτηρίας*.

112. *σαρδιανικόν*·] Rav., Laur. 1, Mod. 1, Barb. 1 and a corrector in Pal. 1. *σαρδανιακόν* Par. 1, Par. 2, Pal. 1, Pal. 2. *σανδανιακόν* Par. 3. *σαρψεινιακόν* Ald. Later edd. *σαρδινιακόν*. The scholiast copied by Suidas, who writes *σαρδωνικὸν*, interprets it wrongly 'Sardinian' instead of 'Sardian'. Hesychius writing *σαρδανικὸν* explains rightly. Scarlet was probably a predominant colour in the stuffs manufactured at Sardis. 'The form is *σαρδυνιακὸν* in Clemens Alex. Paed. II. p. 235'. Kuster.

113. *ὁ μέγας ἡμῖν*] *ἡμῖν ὁ μέγας* Rav.

ἀποπέμψει] *ἀποπέμπει* Pal. 1, Pal. 2. The MSS. have after line 113 *ἀνανεύει*, after 114 *ἐπινεύει*, rare examples of stage-directions.

114. *ἄλλως*] *ἀλλ' ὡς* Par. 1.

115. Laur. 1 has *ἐπένευσεν ἄνδρες οὑτοσί*. The copyist in Barb. 1 mistaking the contraction for *ες* in *ἄνδρες* writes *ἐπένευσεν ἄνδρα οὑτοισί*.

ἄνδρες] Elmsley. *ἄνδρες* MSS.

118. *ἐγῷδ' ὅσ ἐστι*, K.] Rav. has *ἐγὼδ' ὅστις ἐστὶ* K. whence Meineke *ἐγῷδ' ὅτι ἐστὶ* K.

Kleisthenes who is ridiculed by Aristophanes as effeminate (Nub. 355 and frequently elsewhere) is ironically called Son of Siburtius who was a famous trainer *παιδοτρίβης* and doubtless a great athlete himself. Antiphon charged Alcibiades with having killed one of his attendants in the palæstra of Siburtius, Plutarch Alc. c. 3. Kleisthenes had no more relationship to Siburtius than he had beard. See Equit. 1373, 4 *οὐδ' ἀγοράσει ἀγένειος οὐδεὶς ἐν ἀγορᾷ. ποῦ δῆτα Κλεισθένης ἀγοράσει καὶ Στράτων*; The scholiast and Suidas say that he shaved to appear young.

119. *ἐξυρημένε*] So Suidas in two places s. v. *Κλεισθένην εἶδον* and *Στράτων*. First put in the text of Aristophanes by Bisetus 1607. All MSS. have *ἐξευρημένε*. The scholiast

quotes *ὦ θερμόβουλον σπλάγχνον* from the Medea of Euripides. No such words are found there. Perhaps, as Elmsley suggests, they come from the Peliades. They would be fitly addressed to Medea.

120. *τοιόνδε γ', ὦ*] Rav., Par. 1, Mod. 1. *τοιόνδέ θ'* Laur. 1 and Barb. 1. *τοιόνδ' ὦ* Amb. 1. *τοιόνδε δ' ὦ* Pal. 1, Pal. 2, and Suidas s. v. Στράτων. *τοιόνδε δὴ* Suidas s. v. Κλεισθένην *ὁρῶ* and Elmsley. The scholiast says this line is parodied from Archilochus.

121. *ἦλθες*] *ἦλθεν* Laur. 1, Par. 1, Mod. 1, and Barb. 1.

123. *σίγα*] *σῖγα* Rav.

126. *στραγγγεύομαι*] Kuster's emendation. *στραγεύγομαι* Rav. *στρατεύομαι* all the rest. In Nubes 131 Rav. Ven. 1 and others read *στραγεύομαι*, but the great majority have *στραγγεύομαι*.

127. *οὐδέποτέ γ' ἴσχει θύρα*] This reading was first proposed by Elmsley in his Auctarium. In his text he took, as Brunck had done, *οὐδέποτ' ἴσχει γ' ἡ θύρα*, given by Suidas (s. v. *ἴσχειν*). *οὐδέποτ' ἴσχει θύρα* Rav. *οὐδέποτέ γ' ἴσχ' ἡ θύρα* Par. 1, Laur. 1, Mod. 1, Amb. 1, Par. 2, Laur. 2, Pal. 1. *οὐδέποτ' ἴσχ' ἡ θιρα* Par. 3, Pal. 2, which also has *ξενίζεον* for *ξενίζειν*.

The phrase was proverbial as the scholiast says. He quotes a line of Eupolis: *νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, οὐδέποτ' ἴσχει ἡ θύρα*, amended by Elmsley *κοὐδέποτέ γ' ἴσχει θύρα*. He quotes also in a very corrupt form Pindar, Nem. IX. 4, *ἔνθ' ἀναπεπταμέναι ξείνων νενίκανται θύραι*. 'The Prytanes keep open house as they do it at the state's expense'.

131. *ποίησαι*] Par. 1, Mod. 1. *πόησαι* Rav., Amb. 1, Pal. 2. *ποιήσαι* Pal. 1. *ποιῆσαι* Laur. 1, Laur. 2 and Barb. 1. In this and other MSS. the first syllable of *ποιεῖν* is frequently but not uniformly written *πο* when the metre requires it to be short. Some modern edd. adopt Elmsley's suggestion *ποίησον*.

133. *κεχήνετε*] Rav. Elmsl. *κεχήνατε* other MSS. Schol. Suidas. Chœroboscus, Bekker's Anecdota p. 1287, says that Herodian recognized the form *κεχήνετε* in this passage, quoting

it however as from the Aves. As Herodian lived in the second century A. D. his distinct testimony outweighs all MS. authority. Besides, the imperative is required here.

This line is given to πρ$^{\beta'}$ (i. e. *πρέσβυς*) in Pal. 2.

134. *παρὰ*] *πα* Par. 1. Omitted in Mod. 1, Amb. 1.

ΘΕΩΡΟΣ. *ὁδί.*] *Θέωρος* is omitted in Rav. Other MSS. have *ὁδὶ Θέωρος*, as part of the text, an error which doubtless arose from the speaker's name being omitted and inserted in the margin of the original. Attempts at correction have produced great confusion which reaches its climax in Pal. 2, *θέωρος ὁσὶ κῆξ θεωρ'*. The mission of Theorus is probably a fact, though not mentioned by Thucydides.

135. *εἰσκηρύτται*] *εἰσκεκήρυκται* Rav. Elmsley proposes *οὑτοσὶ κηρύττεται.*

136. *ἂν ἦμεν*] Elmsley proposes *ἂν ἔμενον* or *ἔμειν' ἄν.* Blaydes *ἀπῆν ἄν.* Meineke *ἂν ἦ μὰ Δί'*. I venture to suggest *ἂν ἦγον.* The objection to the original is that Theorus everywhere speaks of himself in the singular number, and Dicæopolis uses *ἔφερες* not *ἐφέρετε* in his interruption.

137. This line is omitted in Laur. 1, Par. 1 and Mod. 1.

138. *κατένιψε χιόνι*] *κατένιψε τῇ χιόνῃ* Par. 1. *κατένειψε τῇ χιόνῃ* Laur. 1, Mod. 1. *κατένειψε τῇ χιόνι* Amb. 1.

139. *ἔπηξ'*] *ἔπηξεν* Laur. 1, Par. 1, and originally Mod. 1.

139, 140. *ὑπ' αὐτὸν...ἠγωνίζετο*] Meineke, adopting Nauck's conjecture, gives these words to Dicæopolis. See Thesm. 170 *ὁ δ' αὖ Θέογνις ψυχρὸς ὢν ψυχρῶς ποιεῖ.* Theognis was so cold a poet that when he produced a play at Athens he froze even the rivers of Thrace. The absurdity seems more comical when gravely stated by the envoy himself. The same charge of coldness was made against Araros the son of Aristophanes by Alexis in the Parasite: *πρᾶγμα δ' ἐστί μοι μέγα | φρέατος ἔνδον ψυχρότερον Ἀραρότος.* Athenæus III. p. 123 e.

140. *ἦν*] *γ' ἦν* Rav. *γ' ἦν* Laur. 1, Pal. 2. Elmsley, offended by the repetition of *ἦν*, proposes *φιλαθήναιος ὁ μὲν ὑπερφυῶς.*

143. *ἀληθὴς*] Rav., Pal. 1, Pal. 2. The rest have *ἀληθῶς*.

144. *ἔγραφ'*] *ἔγραφον* Laur. 2, Pal. 1, Par. 2, and Suidas in *καλός*. He repeats the scholiast's note : *ἴδιον ἐραστῶν ἦν τὰ τῶν ἐρωμένων ὀνόματα γράφειν ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις* ·κ.τ.λ. Compare Vespæ 98—100.

145. *ἐπεποιήμεθα*] *πεποιήμεθα* Rav. *ἐπεπονήμεθα* Pal. 2. For the middle voice see Thucyd. II. 29 *Νυμφόδωρον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρόξενον ἐποιήσαντο*.

146. *φαγεῖν*] Blotted in Pal. 1. *φασὶν* Laur. 2.

ἀλλᾶντας] Amb. 1, Mod. 1, Pal. 1, Pal. 2, and, by correction, Laur. 1. So also Suidas in *ἀπατούρια*. *ἀλλάντας* Rav., Laur. 2. *ἀλλᾶντος* Laur. 1 originally, and Par. 1. Brunck adopts *ἀλλᾶντος* and Elmsley quotes a similar construction in Equites 1181, 1182 *τουτουὶ φαγεῖν ἐλατῆρος*.

The festival of *ἀπατούρια*, in which only citizens, duly enrolled as members of *φρατρίαι*, could take part, was held on the 11th and two following days of the month Pyanepsion. V. Smith's Dict. of Antiq. s. v. Sadocus, son of Sitalces, King of the Odrysæ, had been made an Athenian citizen in the summer of 429, but had not, it seems, come in person to Athens to enjoy the privileges to which he was entitled. It was in 429 that Nymphodorus of Abdera Sitalces' brother-in-law *τήν τε τοῦ Σιτάλκου ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησε καὶ Σάδοκον τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖον* Thuc. II. 29. In this passage the zeugma is remarkable: *ἐποίησε* would not have been used with the second clause had it stood alone. It is to be observed also that the genitive of *Σιτάλκης* is *Σιτάλκου* in Thucydides, *Σιτάλκους* in Aristophanes. For the extent of Sitalces' kingdom see Thucyd. II. 95—101. In the autumn of the year 424 Sitalces was defeated and slain by the Triballi (Thucyd. IV. 101). The reputation they thus gained probably suggested to Aristophanes to give their gods a voice in the councils of Olympus (Aves 1567 sqq.). Sitalces was succeeded by Seuthes, his nephew, who is mentioned by Thucydides, II. 101, as being next in favour to the king.

147. *ἠντιβόλει*] Meineke, after Cobet, reads *ἠντεβόλει*. All MSS., both here and in Equites 667, read *ἠντιβόλει*. The

Etymologicum Magnum quotes ἠντεβόλησε from the Amphiaraus of Aristophanes (Fragments 101), apparently noting it as exceptional. It is very doubtful whether an absolute rule ever obtained as to the use of the double augment. Being in doubt I follow the manuscripts.

148. ὤμοσε] ὤμοσεν Rav.

152. This line, which is found in all MSS., was omitted in the Aldine and all subsequent editions till Brunck's.

ἐνταυθί] Elmsley. ἐνταῦθα Rav. ἐνταυθοῖ the rest. The form ἐνταυθὶ is found in the Ravenna MS. Lysist. 570 and Thesmoph. 646.

153. ἔθνος] γένος Pal. 1, Pal. 2, Par. 2, Par. 3, and, originally, Mod. 1. So also Aldus and his followers.

154. τοῦτο...σαφές] Continued to Theorus in Rav. Rav. has μέντ' ἤδη, Pal. 1 μέντ' ἴδη corrected to μέντ' ἤδη, Barb. 1 μέν δ' ἠγη, the rest μέν γ' ἤδη. Par. 1, Par. 2, Laur. 2 read σαφῶς, the rest σαφές. Elmsley reads τοῦτο μέν γ' ἤδη σαφῶς, which does not yield a suitable sense. Translate: 'Well here's something definite at last'.

155. ἤγαγεν] ἤγαγε Pal. 2.

156. τουτὶ...κακόν;] τοῦτί τί εστιν τὸ κακόν: Rav. The words Ὀδομάντων στράτος are given to Theorus in Mod. 1, Par. 2, to the κῆρυξ in most MSS. and edd. The speaker's name is omitted in Rav. and Par. 1. Ὀδομάντων is written with an aspirate in Pal. 2. The Odomanti (called Odomantes by Suidas and Pliny), as Thucydides tells us II. 101, were an independent tribe inhabiting the plains beyond Strymon, northwards. This description can only be reconciled with Herodotus VII. 112, Livy XLIV. 46, XLV. 4, and other authorities by understanding Thucydides to mean the lower Strymon. According to Herodotus they occupied part of Mt. Pangæus. Whether in 425 they were still independent or had become subjects of Sitalces was a question which neither Aristophanes nor his audience cared to settle.

στρατός] στατός, originally, in Rav.

[*To be continued.*]

ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS.

I SEEM to see a smile stealing over the face of any scholar who may have read the points in dispute between Mr Ellis and myself; but, as he continues the controversy in the last number of the Journal, I think it worth while to endeavour once more to shew him how greatly he misapprehends the grounds on which the argument between us ought to rest. And here I cannot help thinking that I have some reasonable cause for complaint. In an article in the Academy I made a few remarks on the quantity of *hoc* which Mr Wordsworth in his very valuable work, 'Fragments of early Latin', had been induced by Mr Ellis, against all authority external and internal, no less than three times to shorten in two passages from Lucilius. Surely the Academy was the right place in which to question my remarks, if they were to be questioned. Instead of that, Mr Ellis occupied no less than nine pages of our Journal in replying to my few lines. As a sane controversy must not be carried on at a length so monstrously disproportioned to the subject-matter, I contented myself with giving what I believe was generally thought an adequate rejoinder in a note to my Lucilliana, in p. 302 of the last vol. of the Journal. It will really conduce to brevity if I here reprint the greater part of that note:

When I reviewed Mr Wordsworth in the Academy (July 3, 1875), I said that *hoc* (nom. and acc.) was as long as *hoc* abl. or *hinc* or *haec*; and in Plautus and Terence as well. That it was exceedingly common for the last two to treat such monosyllables, *when preceded by a short monosyllable or by a pyrrhic with the last syllable elided*, like the final syllables of iambi: Et id grátum, Sed hoc míhi molestumst, commencing two consecutive lines near the beginning of the Andria, where *id* and *hoc* are slurred over in the same way as the final syllables of iambi so often are when they immediately precede or follow the syll. on which the metrical ictus falls. Mr Ellis I presume would not think 'nomen hŏc nobis' admissible in Lucilius. However he has devoted nine

pages in the Journal of Philology (VI p. 263—272) to questioning this brief passing assertion of mine. The greater part of these pages is taken up with quoting from C. F. W. Mueller a number of passages from Plautus and Terence which exactly bear out what I said, that *hoc* is as long as *hunc* or *hanc*. Lucilius appears from L. Mueller's index to use *hoc* (nom. and acc.) 8 times before a vowel, and always long. In none of the three cases where Mr Ellis writes *hŏc*, is his reading found in the Mss...Mr Ellis observes (p. 269): 'Lucilius shortens *tamětsi* just as Plautus or Terence might; to Horace such a liberty would have seemed impossible'! as if *tametsi* were not a spondee as much as *teipso*, *am* being elided; as if *ětsi* were not as impossible to Lucilius as to Horace; as if it matters the least whether we write *tametsi* or *tam etsi*; as if *tam*, =*tamen*, does not occur again and again by itself in the old writers. It is hard to have to dispute on questions like this.

I did think that the modest form and proportions of this rejoinder would save further controversy. But no: in the last number Mr Ellis came out with a surrejoinder of more than two pages (67—69). 'Mr Munro's remarks' he begins by saying 'might lead an incautious reader to suppose that I had maintained the monstrous position that *nomen hŏc nobis* was admissible in Lucilius'. He must be an 'incautious reader' indeed to suppose I charged Mr Ellis with maintaining it, when my words are 'Mr Ellis I presume would not think *nomen hŏc nobis* admissible', and when the very gist of my remark was to shew how utterly irrelevant it was to argue from the peculiarities of the old scenic prosody as to what Lucilius might admit. It is perfectly true that if Terence's *sed hoc mihi molestum est* be made to support *hŏc illi* in Lucilius, it might just as well be made to support *hŏc nobis*. When Mr Ellis goes on to say that 'the use of *hoc* in Plautus and Terence as a virtually short syllable in such positions as *sed hoc mihi molestum est* is comparatively of more frequent occurrence than the use of *hic* in similar situations', can he not see that the simple and sole reason of this is the fact that *hoc* occurs much more frequently than *hic* in Plautus and Terence and other writers? what other explanation can be needed? For the same reason we have *hōc* 8 times, *hīc* only 4 times in Lucilius before a vowel, simply because *hoc* on the whole occurs more than twice as often as *hic*.

Well, and after all Mr Ellis surrenders two of his three Lucilian *hŏcs*. I feel a good confidence therefore that he will soon surrender his 'atque si hŏc ununst' as well; for I am sure that any scholar will tell him, that the words in their context have no meaning at all. When he says 'I still prefer my own

reading to either Munro's Ἔτος or Lachmann's Ἔπος, if for no other reason than that the words of the Mss. then need no change at all,' he is here I can assure him under a complete misapprehension: *stoc* is not *si hoc*, and the Harleian itself carefully expunges the *hoc* in the next verse which no other Ms. contains, and which Mr Ellis should not have therefore snatched at. If too he had observed how the Harleian a few words before writes θεcιc, he might have seen that my ετoc is nearer stoc (cτoc) and that my text generally is closer to the Mss. than his own unmetrical, ungrammatical and meaningless reading is. I do not hesitate to say that *hŏc* in Lucilius would be a greater portent than in Virgil or Horace. Virgil admits *hĭc*; Lucilius only *hīc*.

What has brought this endless controversy upon me was an observation, contained in a few lines, that all the evidence we possessed, especially that of his own fragments, as well as the unvarying usage of all subsequent classical poets, proved Lucilius to have known only *hōc*. Mr Ellis never attempted to disprove this, the real point at issue; but filled page after page with irrelevant quotations from C. F. W. Mueller, which simply demonstrated what I had myself said with regard to the usage of the old scenic poets. He has abandoned as untenable two of his three Lucilian *hŏcs*, and admits of the third that 'the support is certainly a very slender one'. He now seeks to change the venue to the grammarians Diomedes and Pseudo-Probus whose words have no more apparent bearing on Lucilius than on Shakespeare. One of them is utterly unknown; the other belongs to the latter half of the 4th century and is styled by Reifferscheid a 'miserrimus grammaticus'. My words, to which Mr Ellis now shifts the controversy, were meant for a mere contemptuous reference, not intended for argument at all. He is quite welcome to the pair, as well as to Plutarch's *ox αγε*, which I cited ages ago. Let *hoc* or *oc* be as short to them as Mr Ellis pleases; but 'ignoratio elenchi' is a terrible engine for prolonging controversy.

Again, when I turn to the next page, my hopes that he will soon entirely abandon his *hŏc* are sadly dashed. In his former

disputation he had, to support this comic prosody, made the singular assertion that Lucilius used the scansion *tamĕtsi*. The reader will see what I say of this in my note quoted above. Lucilius has for instance 'Quo me habeam pacto, tam etsi non quaeri' docebo'. How does Mr Ellis (p. 68) take my correction? 'My assertion that *tamĕtsi* was used by Lucilius *may* no doubt be explained away by supposing *tam* elided or by writing *tam etsi*. But the question is not settled by these obvious remarks. We cannot be sure that the comic writers elided *tam* and made *etsi* long'. 'Explained away'! 'obvious remarks'! Am I to understand from this that Mr Ellis was aware of this explaining away and 'these *obvious* remarks', when he made his curious statement, and chose to connect it with comic peculiarities, as alien to Lucilius as to Virgil? I am now disposed to withdraw what I said above and to think that even a *cautious* reader might suppose he would be ready to defend *nomen hŏc nobis* in Lucilius, if some other misapprehension rendered this a convenient hypothesis. Let us see: it is not unusual for metrists of a peculiar turn of mind to scan *tĕīpsum, sĕīpsum*. If one of these were to bring me an hexameter ending with *nosce teipsum*, I should say to him, My good friend, metrically, if not morally, you should lay this maxim to heart: don't you know *teipsum* is a spondee? Take for instance, out of 50 examples, Horace's 'Tutus et in seipso totus teres atque rotundus'. I should now expect to hear him reply, 'oh, it *may* no doubt be explained away by supposing *se* elided or by writing *se ipso*. But the question is not settled by these obvious remarks: I prefer to scan *sĕīpso* in Horace after the example of Plautus and Terence'. Lucilius' prosody was identical with Horace's; and his scansion of *tametsi* the same as Horace's scansion of *seipso*. I cannot help reiterating once more, 'it is hard to have to dispute on questions like this'.

In the same 'Luciliana' of mine I began (p. 294 foll.) my emendations by what I venture to say almost every scholar will look upon as a *certain* correction of a passage on which many fruitless conjectures have been made. All who choose to turn to what I say there will see why I speak thus confid-

ently: I ground the certainty of my correction solely on the fact that I have discovered it in Gellius: 'anu noceo, inquit' for the absurd 'anunotelo inquit' of Mss.' I repeat that my restoration is *certain.* But what thinks Mr Ellis? He says (p. 69) 'I venture to differ from him (Munro) on three grounds: (1) The improbability of so common a word as *noceo* being corrupted into *no telo*; (2) the frequency with which Gellius adds *inquit* after the first or first two words of a quotation, cf. v 14 etc.; (3) the weakness of the expression'. And he prefers his own *anumne tero, inquit.*

Let me say a few words on these three objections. I appeal to any one who knows anything of Nonius' Mss. or of any medieval Mss. whether they might not offer *noceo* or *noteo* with perfect indifference, the sounds being in those times identical, as *facies* or *faties, spatium* or *spacium* and ten thousand similar cases sufficiently attest. I would ask further whether the meaningless *anunoteo* might not readily pass into *an uno telo* to give the semblance of Latin words.

As for the second objection, it is perfectly true that Gellius often attaches *inquit* to a quotation; but it is *not* his custom to attach it in a case like the present. I will quote what he does say here: Sicuti Lucilius in eodem casu *victu* et *anu* dicit, non *victui* nec *anui,* in hisce versibus: 'Quod sumptum atque epulas victu praeponis honesto': et alio in loco 'anu noceo, inquit'. Let me add what immediately follows: Vergilius quoque in casu dandi *aspectu* dicit, non *aspectui*: 'teque aspectu ne substrahe nostro': et in georgicis: 'Quod nec concubitu indulgent'. C. etiam Caesar, gravis auctor linguae Latinae, in Anticatone: 'unius' inquit 'arrogantiae, superbiae dominatuque'. item in Dolabellam actionis I lib. I: 'isti quorum in aedibus fanisque posita et honori erant et ornatu'. And so in 50 other places it is seen not to be Gellius' rule, when he quotes two or more successive passages from an author to repeat the *dicit* or *inquit* after the first passage. And moreover, when he speaks as here of citing a *versus,* he never contents himself with quoting two words like *anu noceo,* which give no indication of metre. The least he would cite is *anu noceo inquit,* which shews itself to be at least part of a verse.

I unhesitatingly assert then that *inquit* is a portion of the quotation, and that Gellius is quoting from our passage.

As for Mr Ellis' third objection, I greatly prefer in itself *anu noceo* to his *anumne tero*; but, as I said before, every corrector thinks his own correction best; and now, as then, I appeal to Gellius alone in maintaining that my emendation is *certain*. Mr Ellis may refer it to any scholar he likes: I have no doubt of the verdict being on my side.

In my Luciliana no. 11, Journal VII p. 299, I proposed *ficta ices* (i. e. *icens*) for the unmeaning *fictrices* of Nonius' Mss. which is only the change of a single letter. Mr Ellis in p. 70 of our present volume observes: 'Lachmann, Mueller and Munro all correct the Ms. *fictrices* as if it must contain some part of *fingere*, the word under consideration'. On the contrary we all of us assert that Nonius blunders and that the word comes from *figo*. Mr Ellis then argues that *fictricis* 'may be right, especially as from Nonius' explanation Fingere est lingere'. But the question is what Lucilius, not what Nonius, thought; and I fancy Mr Ellis will get no one to believe that Lucilius could employ *fictrix* in such a sense. If I am not mistaken, I can disabuse him of such a notion.

On looking at what the editors of Nonius and Lucilius say, I am much surprised that none of them have observed what was clear to me when I first came across the passage in Nonius, p. 308, 17: Fingere est lingere. Vergilius lib. VIIII Cum poclo bibo eodem, amplector, labra labellis Fictrices conpono, cet. The VIIII is a mistake for VIII which is rightly given in another part of Nonius. Both Mueller and Lachmann change *lingere* to *iungere*. This is what Nonius probably wrote: Fingere est lingere. Vergilius [lib. VIII illam tereti cervice reflexa Mulcere alternos et corpora fingere lingua. Fingere, iungere. Lucilius] lib. VIII Cum poclo cet. And then he goes on to illustrate four other senses of *fingere*. The cause of the omission is obvious. Of course the words 'fingere, iungere' are not certain, as he may have perversely given the sense of *lingere* to Lucilius' *ficta*, which is really the archaic partic. of *figo*, tho' we need not gratuitously thrust such a blunder on him. The

fingere in Virgil has nearly the meaning which is assigned to it: Medic. p. m. has indeed *lingere* for *fingere*.

Ibid. no. 22 I proposed 'dum miles Hibera Terra fractu' meret ter sex, aetate quasi, annos' for the 'Terras ac meret cet.' of Mss. Mr Ellis observes on this: 'May not a proper name lurk in *s ac*, possibly *Sacsa* or *Seica?*' If anything in so short a fragment can be clear, it must be clear that Lucilius is here speaking of the long and hard service of the Roman soldiery in Spain, *miles* having its collective sense; and that *Sacsa* or *Seica*, whatever may be their meaning, can have no place here. Comp. the precise parallel in XI 8 Annos hic terra iam plures miles Hibera Nobiscum meret: which is surely decisive[1].

I will now bring together and discuss several passages of Lucilius, which may have a more general interest than this thrashing anew of grain which I had fancied was already safely housed:

Cic. de finibus I 7 Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius! Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis: quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia: sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicia elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris.

Cic. de orat. II 25 Nam ut C. Lucilius homo doctus et perurbanus dicere solebat neque se ab indoctissimis neque a doctissimis legi velle, quod alteri nihil intellegerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse; de quo etiam scripsit 'Persium non curo legere'—hic fuit enim, ut noramus, omnium fere nostrorum hominum doctissimus—'Laelium Decumum volo', quem cognovimus virum bonum et non illiteratum, sed nihil ad Persium;

[1] Ibid. no. 18, I showed that both Mueller and Lachmann had corrupted this fragment; and I explained with some care its probable meaning and relation to the context. Mr Ellis observes; 'Quicherat has anticipated Munro in his explanation of xxvi. 46 M.' On referring to Quicherat's Nonius I find that he retains the Ms. reading which is unquestionably right; but not one single word of comment does he give.

sic ego, si iam mihi disputandum sit de his nostris studiis, nolim equidem apud rusticos, sed multo minus apud vos. malo enim non intellegi orationem meam quam reprehendi.

Pliny Nat. Hist. Praef. 7 Praeterea est quaedam publica etiam eruditorum reiectio. utitur illa et M. Tullius extra omnem ingenii aleam positus, et (quod miremur) per advocatum defenditur: 'Nec doctissimis—Manium Persium haec legere nolo, Iulium Congum volo'. quod si hoc Lucilius, qui primus condidit stili nasum, dicendum sibi putavit, Cicero mutuandum, praesertim cum de republica scriberet, quanto nos causatius ab aliquo iudice defendimus?

Lachmann, and after him with more precision Lucian Mueller, have proved that the last five books of Lucilius were written and published before the first twenty-five. The latter has shewn that books 26—29 were the earliest; then after an interval came 30 which refers to books already published. In the 7th there is a plain reference to a passage in the 29th. Various notes of time, to which I will recur later, as well as the metres in which the different books were written point perhaps to like conclusions. We have copious fragments of the last five books, mostly from Nonius. 26 and 27 were wholly composed in the favourite old Latin septenarius or trochaic tetrameter catalectic: 28 and 29 were written chiefly in the old Latin trimeter iambic, but at the same time contained each of them both septenarii and hexameters. As all, or certainly most of the books, were made up, like Horace's, of several satires, this mixture of metres is natural enough. The 30th book was wholly composed of hexameters; and so were the first twenty. Of the other five books, we are certain that 22 was partly written in elegiacs; whether entirely, the very scanty fragments do not allow us to decide: in fact we have only three pentameters; at least I hope later on to expel one of its distichs, and Mueller has, wrongly I think, admitted another, which Lachmann forms into trimeters. Of the four remaining books, 21, 23, 24 and 25, we possess no known fragment, except a single hexameter quoted by Priscian from the 23rd; and it Mueller relegates to the 13th. For some reason or other Nonius, to whom we owe most of the fragments to which the number of

the book they belong to is attached, does not give us a single line from these four books. They were probably hexameter or elegiac, or both, as Lucilius is not likely in his latter years to have returned to his earlier metres; and doubtless a portion of the 200 hexameters, more or less, 'ex libris incertis' belonged to them.

We may assume then that the fragments quoted above from Cicero and Pliny belonged to one or other of the four books 26—29; and in my judgment Mueller is quite right in assigning the one from Pliny to 26, and to the earliest satire of that book, in which Lucilius would first come before the public and would naturally set forth the purpose he had in view and the style he designed to adopt. The passage of the De Finibus too Mueller makes to refer to this first satire. But the line quoted in the De Oratore he puts in the 29th book at the end of the septenarii there. My feeling certainly is that it too belongs to the first satire of 26 and formed part of the same passage to which the De Finibus and Pliny refer. Again there is a manifest blunder in the Pliny extract, whether the author or his copyists are in fault; for we know from Cicero that Persius' praenomen was Gaius, not Manius.

Mueller lays the blame on the Mss. and thus reforms the passage:

~⏑–⏑–⏑ nec doctissimis. nam Gaium | Persium haece legere nolo, Iulium Congum volo. This I cannot accept: we get an uncouth verse with no caesura, and an inadequate meaning. Pliny is pleading to Titus the example of Cicero, who at the opening of his Republic had declared he was writing for those who had neither too much nor too little learning, and had called in as his 'advocatus' Lucilius, from whom he had cited what Pliny cites and also what he himself refers to in the De Oratore II 25. Pliny therefore I feel sure gives the beginning and the end of Cicero's quotation in his De Republica: Nec doctissimis——Manium cet. In error too he has written down *Persium* instead of another name; and this is natural enough, if the name occurred in the same passage as *Persium*, and, like his, was that of a very learned man. What Cicero

quoted then, and what Pliny refers to, must I should think have run thus:

Nec doctissimis *scribuntur haec neque indoctissimis:*
Persium non curo legere, Laelium Decumum volo:
*
Manium
[Persium] haec *ego* legere nolo, Iulium Congum volo.

The name for which Pliny has wrongly put *Persium* had probably the same quantity. If it were like *Curionem* or *Caesoninum,* then *ego* is not wanted; but *ego* is I think more energetic than Mueller's *haece.* Pliny's mistake however in *Persium* may have involved one in *legere* as well, and Lucilius may have written something like 'Gellium aestumare' or 'haec censere'. *Manium* was probably added because there was more than one known person of the name, just as *Decumum* is added to *Laelium* to distinguish him from the more famous *Gaius.* The fact that Pliny quotes the passage in his Preface, and that Cicero doubtless did the same, is another argument in favour of placing it near the beginning of Lucilius' first written satire.

I now proceed to another fragment, which Mueller and Lachmann place in the 'libri incerti', but which I think belongs like the preceding to the first satire of 26. Festus p. 273 Redarguisse per e litteram Scipio Africanus Pauli filius dicitur enuntiasse, ut idem etiam pertisum, cuius meminit Lucilius, cum ait 'Quo facetior videare et scire plus quam ceteri, pertisum hominem, non pertaesum, dicere ferum nam genus'. For the three corrupt words at the end Lachmann reads 'erumnam est opus': the *erumnam* is a certain and brilliant correction, the *est opus* only a makeshift. Mueller adopts of course *erumnam,* but reads 'hominum—dices erumnam genus'; which I do not much like. I have thought of *negas?* for *genus,* which is not much more than transposing two letters:

Quo facetior videare et scire plus quam ceteri,
pertisum hominem, non pertaesum, dicere erumnam negas?

'Do you refuse to say 'pertisum, n. p., er.', so as to shew yourself thereby more witty and more knowing than your neigh-

bours?' The construction 'nego dicere' for 'nego me dicturum' or 'recuso dicere', tho' it is rare and tho' Forcellinus and his followers give no instance of it, is well enough attested: Plaut. Casina III 5 55 negat ponere alio modo ullo; Ter. Andr. 379 si tu negaris ducere; Virg. georg. III 207 negabunt Verbera lenta pati et duris parere lupatis; Ovid met. XIV 250 Ire negabamus et tecta ignota subire. In XXIX 83 Lucilius himself used 'negat reddere' or rather 'se reddere' in the same sense.

That this first satire of 26 was a dialogue between Lucilius and somebody with whom he discussed and to whom he explained his style of writing, is, as Mueller shews, clear from many of the fragments. Persius' first satire in fact is an imitation of the Lucilian method. The 'Quis leget haec?' of v. 2 the scholiast tells us was taken from Lucilius' first book; so that he must have opened it, as well as 26, with a dialogue. Is it possible that the interlocutor in this his earliest satire, the first of book 26, was Scipio himself, and that the verses which we have just discussed were addressed by him to Lucilius and have some reference to the passage cited above from Festus? But this we must leave for the present, and may revert to later on.

Meanwhile I go on to another and a very corrupt fragment which belongs to this 26th book and I believe to the first and introductory satire of the book, and which assumes very diverse shapes in the hands of different scholars. It has this form in the oldest and most genuine Mss. of Nonius, p. 351, 4, Mutare transferre. Lucilius lib. XXVI. doctior quam ceteris is asa mittis mutes aliquo tecum satrafa acutia. The very ancient Harleian Ms. in the British Museum very carefully alters 'satrafa acutia' to 'satra facta uitia', a change made by some others of the older MSS.; and the more interpolated ones further change 'satra' to 'sacra', thus giving the words a semblance of Latin, For 'is asa' the Harleian p. m. has 'issa', 'corrected by another hand into *is asa*' E. M. T. As Nonius cites the passage to illustrate *muto* in the sense of transferring from one place to another, it is pretty clear that 'mutes aliquo tecum' as well as 'doctior quam ceteri' and perhaps 'mittis' are uncorrupted; the other words have given rise to widely different conjectures.

To take as samples those of the two latest editors of Lucilius, of the latest editor of Nonius, and of Mr Ellis in the last number of the Journal, it is thus Mueller reforms it after Duentzer:

doctior quam ceteri
sis et mutes aliquo tecum sartas tectas ditias.

The 'mittis' he says is doubtless a dittography of 'mutes', with which I do not agree, any more than with the meaning he assigns to the whole fragment. This correction is founded on the first stage of interpolation 'satra facta vitia': the others all rest on the further palpable interpolation 'sacra facta vitia'. Lachmann presents us with

doctior quam ceteri,
siqua mittis, mutes aliquo tum sacra face a via:

which he illustrates from Ovid. Quicherat too finds his way into the Sacra via, but robs it instead of buying as Lachmann does:

doctior quam ceteri,
saxa mutes aliquo tecum, sacrâ furatâ viâ.

Mr Ellis, p. 71, holds that, after Scaliger had conjectured 'symmistis', there can be no reasonable doubt that 'sacra facta vitia' is simply 'sacra facticia', which he translates 'false rites'. 'The whole passage may have run thus,

doctior quam ceteri
sis symmistae, mutes aliquo tecum sacra facticia'.

I have my doubts on all these points: *συμμύστης* is a late patristic word which does not occur in classical writers and which it is not likely Lucilius would know: 'sacra facticia'—a conjecture founded on the worst form of the interpolation—does not mean 'false rites', but rites made by the hand, by the art of man, not by nature, and has nothing 'false' about it. It too is a late word, first occurring in Pliny, perhaps coined by him. These adjectives in *-īcius*, with long *ī*, formed from participles, 'novīcius' and Plautus' 'caesīcius' being the only ones I know which come from an adjective, are peculiar and entirely to be separated from adjectives in *-ĭcius*, such as 'tribunĭcius, praetorĭcius, pastorĭcius, natalĭcius'. Some of the former class are found in

the older writers, 'novīcius, caesīcius, commentīcius, suppositīcius, insitīcius, commendatīcius'. Others are late and technical formations, such as 'factīcius, fictīcius, pigneratīcius, missīcius': 'sacra ficticia' would give the meaning Mr Ellis wants, but then Lucilius would not have employed the word.

As soon as I observed the genuine Ms. reading, I felt that 'satrafa acutia' represented 'satirāfactuā', and was scarcely more than the transposition of an *i*. But when I had got 'doctior quam ceteri ..mutes aliquo tecum satiram fac tuam', it was by no means so easy to divine what 's is asa (*or*, s issa) mittis' might stand for. At least three or four conjectures presented themselves which for the moment struck their deviser as more or less plausible, a pretty sure sign that the right one had not been hit upon. It then struck me that the 'doctior quam ceteri' of this fragment, which we know to belong to the 26th book, formed part of the same discussion as the fragment which I have above transferred, 'mutavi', from the 'libri incerti' to the 26th: the 'doctior quam ceteri' is so like the 'Quo facetior videare et scire plus quam ceteri'. It would then come from the same interlocutor who there tries to force on Lucilius the modern and learned refinements of 'pertisum' and the like. If this be so, would not the following supply the sense at least of what is wanted?

doctior quam ceteri
si esse omittis, mutes aliquo tecum satiram fac tuam:

'If you neglect to be more learned than your neighbours, you had better take your satire and yourself off somewhere else'; you wont do here in Rome. It would then be connected probably with the passages which we have cited above from the De Finibus, the De Oratore, and Pliny's Preface[1].

There are two or three other passages belonging to the 26th book or to the 'libri incerti' which may have some connexion with those we have been discussing; but as they are vague, I

[1] The elision of a syllable at the beginning of a verse is common enough in Lucilius and the older poets, even Catullus and Horace in his satires. In Lucilius' trochaics and iambics alone I have noted 'Re in secunda, Ne hoc faciat, Cum ipsi, Tum illud, Qui et.' 'Esse si omittis' would not be quite so near the Mss.

will pass them over and go on to say a few words on the dates of Lucilius' life.

Jerome, whose additions to the Eusebian chronicle, copied from Suetonius, so often perplex us through some seeming carelessness or ignorance on his part, gives two very distinct and authentic-looking notices, one of the birth, the other of the death of Lucilius. Under the year which corresponds to U. C. 606, B.C. 148, (as the two best Mss. attest, the others assigning it to the following year) he tells us the poet Lucilius was born. Again in the year which answers to 651 (103), as all the Mss. give it except the Amandinus, which assigns it to the year following, he says 'C. Lucilius satyrarum scriptor Neapoli moritur ac publico funere effertur anno aetatis XLVI'. The date of his death seems to be correctly given. Tho' this was formerly questioned, scholars are now agreed that there is nothing in his fragments that need be assigned to a later date than several years before B.C. 103 or 102: see L. Mueller's edition, p. 288.

But could he have been born so late as B.C. 148, and have died at the age of 45 or 46? We know from Cicero, Horace and others that he was an intimate friend of the younger Scipio; we know that he went with him to Spain B.C. 134 and served as an 'eques' in the Numantine war. He would then have been a boy of 14, which seems almost an absurdity. Scipio is spoken of as serving very young; but he was 17 when he fought under his own father Paulus at Pydna. Then could Horace write 'quo fit ut omnis Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella Vita *senis*' of a man who died in his 46th year? It has been said that we are all disposed to think of men of the olden time as 'senes'. But Horace was born 37 or 38 years after the other's death, and his Satires were written less than 70 years after that time. I observe that the publishers of the Beaumont and Fletcher of 1679 promise, if it succeeds, 'to reprint old Shakespeare'; but these are rather words of homely endearment.

But argue as we may about Horace's 'senis', there is a passage of Cicero which in my judgment is decisive on the point in question, tho' I have never seen it taken sufficiently

into consideration. I refer to the De Finibus I 7, cited above. Cicero says there 'Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius! *Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis; quorum ille iudicium reformidans,* Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere'. The Rutilius here spoken of is P. Rutilius Rufus, the celebrated statesman and Stoic writer. At this time he was quite a young man and, together with Lucilius, accompanied Scipio to the Numantine war as military tribune. As Scipio was dead when Lucilius published book I of his Satires, the passage here referred to must have occurred in one of his earlier books, 26—30; probably, as I have argued above, in the earliest of all, the 26th, in more or less close connexion with the other passages I have so fully discussed, especially with the 'doctior quam ceteri —— *mutes aliquo* tecum satiram fac tuam', if I have at all hit the right meaning of those lines. Lucilius says, in jest of course, that he shrinks from the judgment of Scipio and intends to write for folks who could scarcely understand Latin. The first published book or books then of his Satires must have been written between the time of the Numantine war and B.C. 129, the year of Scipio's death. If therefore Jerome's chronology be correct, Lucilius, who earned such great renown by inventing a new style of satire, the peculiar glory of Rome, must have composed some of his works between the ages of fourteen and nineteen: a thing incredible surely.

I am disposed to adopt a simple conjecture which has been put forth, that Jerome in copying out Suetonius' precise account of the death and funeral of Lucilius, through his own negligence or a faulty Ms. for Suetonius' 'anno aetatis LXIV' or 'LXVI' wrote down 'XLVI' and then adapted the year of birth to the 'annus Abrahae' which would correspond to this false reading. Every thing would now run smooth. Lucilius, when he went with Scipio to Spain, would be in the prime of manhood, 32 or 34 years of age. Soon after that time he would be writing and publishing his earliest books, 26—29, and then 30. Some of these at all events would be published before the death of Scipio, when the poet would be 37 or 39. His ready pen, tho' engaged on a novel

style of writing, would not need 'much scratching of the head or biting of the nails' to set it in motion. Fragment 47 Muell. of our 26th book, 'Percrepa pugnam Popili, *facta Corneli* cane,' proves that it was not published till after the capture of Numantia. A comparison of the fragments I have discussed above makes it appear to me not improbable that Scipio may have been the poet's sportive opponent in the dialogue of the 1st Satire of 26.

We have next an excellent terminus ex quo for the date of book I: its 10th fragment speaks of Carneades as dead. He died B.C. 129, the year of Scipio's death. This book therefore was completed certainly after that date, as is pointed out by Fischer in his Roem. Zeitt. for that year. We may assume then that books 1—25 were composed during the 20 years or so, beginning a year or two after B.C. 129 and ending a very few years before the poet's death in 103 or 102. His whole career as a satirist would then occupy some 25 years. This would harmonise well with Horace's picture, 'ut omnis Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella Vita senis.'

Mueller, p. 289, prefers another hypothesis which has been started, that Jerome has confounded the consuls of U.C. 606 with those of U.C. 574 whose names were almost the same. Lucilius would thus be born B.C. 180, and would be 77 or 78 at the time of his death. This would involve the consequence that the poet would be nearly fifty when he began to write or publish; which is perhaps a little improbable in the case of so voluminous an author. Lucilius would then too be ten years older than the poet Accius who preceded him at all events as an author. Mueller gives two main reasons for adopting this view, neither of which I can accept. Lucilius in the 46th fragment of 26 mentions the Lusitanian chief Viriathus who after years of successful warfare with Rome was murdered B.C. 140. Mueller argues that the poet's mention of him must have been contemporary with the events spoken of. But that is quite impossible: in a single line of this same book he mentions the defeat of M. Popilius by the Numantines B.C. 138, and Scipio's capture of their city five years later; and it seems certain that he must likewise have

brought into the same satire the former exploits of that 'barbarian Hannibal' in order to enhance the glory of Scipio. We see from the four first fragments of 29, that he must there have spoken at length of the deeds of the real Hannibal and of the elder Scipio. Mueller next asserts that the Lupus, so bitterly assailed by Lucilius, was Lentulus Lupus, who was consul B.C. 156, censor in 147; and that the poet satirises his conduct when he was censor. But this cannot be the fact: Fischer, as we said, has pointed out that book I was published after the death of Carneades B.C. 129; and in that book the gods hold a council to effect the destruction of Lupus, who is also alive in the 4th book. Lentulus Lupus must have been an elderly man when he was censor B.C. 147; and Lucilius can hardly have been attacking him for other misdeeds as a judge 20 years or more after that time. Tho' others have also identified the two, they can scarcely be the same; and we must be content not to know who Lucilius' enemy was. The cognomen is not an uncommon one, and our knowledge of the times in question is exceedingly scanty.

Lucilius ap. Cic. de Finibus II 8 23.

No editor of Cicero or of Lucilius has treated this fragment with a satisfying result. Madvig himself, tho' as usual he has well comprehended and well explained the drift of Cicero's argument, has quite failed to correct Lucilius' own words which are very corrupt in the Mss. Cicero, in reply to the Epicurean Torquatus, is denying that in any sense merely 'iucunde vivere' can be 'bene aut beate vivere.' He will not deign to take into consideration those 'asoti' 'qui in mensam vomant' and so on. But he will not allow it even of those who may be said really 'iucunde vivere' in an Epicurean sense and who display the utmost refinement of luxury and self-indulgence: mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis, vitantis cruditatem, quibus vinum defusum e pleno sit, hrysizon, ut ait Lucilius, cui nihil dum sit vis et sacculus abstulerit, adhibentis ludos et quae secuntur, illa quibus detractis

clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum: adsint etiam formosi pueri qui ministrent, respondeat his vestis, argentum, Corinthium, locus ipse, aedificium :—hos ergo asotos bene quidem vivere aut beate numquam dixerim.' I take the 'hrysizon' of Madvig's best Ms. as the oldest and most genuine form of the corruption: then comes 'hirsizon.' Morelius in his commentary of 1546 cites from his Ms. a strange reading 'hirsyphon', which has greatly affected the criticism of the fragment, and in my opinion most mischievously.

Madvig has clearly shewn that the commentators before him, with their 'nil dempsit' and so on, had quite misunderstood the purport of the quotation, the 'sacculus' being intended to soften the harshness of the wine, and he suggests 'nil duri sit' for 'dum sit'. He proves too triumphantly that 'hir' can have no place here. This word, which is not found in the classical authors, is explained by the old grammarians to mean *θέναρ*, 'the flat or hollow of the hand, the palm without the fingers.' Mueller adopts Madvig's 'duri' and Lambinus' 'nix'; but will not accept the former's refutation of 'hir'; and gives us this distich: Defusum e pleno siet hir siphoneve, cui nil Durist, cum nix et sacculus abstulerit: the syntax calls I think for Madvig's 'sit', not 'est'[1].

Tho' it may be presumptuous to say so, when Madvig is of the number, I assert that none of the critics of Lucilius or of Cicero has taken a correct view of this citation. Cicero is adapting the poet's words to his own argument and to his own context, and turning them into the oratio obliqua. Lucilius must have praised what Cicero, playing the stoic, here condemns. He was commending no doubt some fine and well-kept wine. In the first part therefore 'quibus' and 'sit' are Cicero's own words, not Lucilius'; and the 2nd 'sit' and 'abstulerit' were 'est' and 'abstulit' in the original. Varro has similarly turned Lucilius' words into the 'oratio obliqua' in

[1] Mr Ellis, supra p. 70, calls Mueller's version 'deplorable': he returns to 'dempsit' and to the old interpretation, exploded by Madvig. I do not understand the Latin, the syntax or the sense of his own lines. How can 'hir-siphon', any more than 'manus-siphon', 'palma-siphon', or '*χείρ-σίφων*', mean 'a hand-siphon'? and what a rhythm!

the fragment which follows ours in Mueller. Cicero is not citing a whole elegiac couplet; but two fragmentary hexameters. Again and again, when he is quoting his favourite poets, an allusive imperfect sentence is enough for himself and his hearers, more emphatic often than a complete citation would be. Look at 'Licinius, *ferreum scriptorem*' and what follows in I § 5 of this very work; on which Madvig remarks 'illud non nego, Ciceronem alibi, ubi pauca huiusmodi verba, *non integram sententiam, a poeta sumat, suis verbis grammatice annectere solere*'. Observe too three lines lower the 'an *Utinam ne in nemore*—cet.' Look at II 106 'Desine, Roma, tuos hostes'—reliquaque praeclare—'Nam tibi moenimenta mei peperere labores': he felt sure every listener would at once complete the first imperfect clause, which gains in energy by being left incomplete both in sense and in metre. In our very chapter, just below in § 24, observe how he pulls to pieces a favourite passage of Lucilius; nay twists it, as Madvig shews, from its real meaning by attaching to 'cenare' the 'bene', which belongs to 'cocto', as Cicero himself proves when he cites the same words in a letter to Atticus.

But what is 'hrysizon' with its three Greek letters? 'hrysizon' is 'hrysizon', *χρυσίζον*; of which I will presently say something. In the next line 'vis et' represents 'vi set'; and I believe I give the poet's true meaning, and follow the manuscripts more closely than others, when I read as follows:

> Defusum e pleno, *χρυσίζον*,
> cui nihilum est *viri*, set sacculus abstulit [omne].

Tho' *omne* is not necessary, I think it very probable that Lucilius so ended the verse; for it will be granted I think that, when Cicero had adapted the language to his own syntax and so destroyed the metre, it would have produced an awkward halting effect to quote the verses in full: for instance thus

> Defusum e pleno sit *χρυσίζον μαλθακὸν ἡδύ*,
> cui nihilum sit viri, set sacculus abstulerit omne:

such at least is the effect on my ear. Our fragment must now be ousted from the 22nd and placed in the 'incerti libri'; and

so must the fragment which follows it in Mueller, if, as I believe, Lachmann's senarii are to be preferred to Mueller's elegiac couplet.

Varro loved Lucilius perhaps as much as Cicero did: in a former number a passage from him was referred to, which Nonius quotes in connexion with a like passage from Lucilius. Now in Keil's gram. Lat. v p. 590 we read: Saccus generis masculini ut Varro 'vinum cui nihil sacculus abstulit.' This is a manifest allusion to Lucilius: Varro appears to be contrasting some common wine kept and used by common folks with the poet's as it passed through the 'saccus' and appeared in the 'cratera', refined and softened, with a bright golden hue.

I must add some words of illustration: 'defusum e pleno' is well explained by Madvig and illustrated by him from Cicero pro Scauro. *def.* of course has nothing to do with *diffusum* which is said of wine racked off from the huge 'dolium' into the 'cadus' (or 'amphora, lagoena, seria, testa'), answering to our modern bottling. *defundere* is the decanting of the 'cadus' into the 'cratera'. Wealthy gourmets, like those here spoken of, would have their wine fresh from a full 'cadus', not vapid from a half-empty one; just as now-a-days wine is decanted from a full bottle. Madvig calls for a 'cado' or some other word to agree with 'pleno': as I have given the words, it, like *vinum*, may have been expressed in a preceding clause; possibly in the same verse; as 'e pleno' can hardly perhaps mean 'e pleno cado', as 'de plano, ex aequo' mean 'de plano loco', and the like. Clear as the meaning of *defusum* is, I believe there is only one other instance in Latin, in which it has the same sense, Horace Sat. II. 2 58 Ac, nisi mutatum, parcit defundere vinum: which, plain as it is, all the editors of Horace whom I have referred to boggle over, except Macleane who alone sees that this, and *this only*, is the meaning. Lucilius and Horace will therefore illustrate each other. (In his odes Horace uses 'defusus' in quite another sense, of pouring a libation out of a cup.) In Greek ὑποχεῖν has the same force: it too I believe is found only twice, in Sophilus ap. Meineke Com. Gr. III p. 381 and in

Menander ib. IV p. 72: see Meineke, and Cobet Var. lect. p. 123 and Nov. lect. p. 601. But Martial, whom I will cite presently, has 'Defluat' in the same sense.

For *χρυσίζον* comp. Athen. p. 27 b *ὁ Σπωλητῖνος δὲ οἶνος καὶ πινόμενος ἡδὺς καὶ τῷ χρώματι χρυσίζει.* Some of the best Italian wines, such as Orvieto, much drunk in Rome, have when clear a gold-like hue; and the *χρυσίζον* here is less pedantic than many other Greek words in Lucilius which have not the same excuse; for I do not know any single Latin word which expresses exactly the same thing, 'taking a golden hue'. Thus, lib. inc. 129 M., we meet with *ὠμοτριβὲς* oleum Casinas, there being no single Latin word with the same force. Pliny XIV 80 colores vini quattuor, albus, fulvus, sanguineus, niger: comp. 'fulvum aurum'. The Greeks and Varro use *κιρρός* of wine in the same sense. Mart. VIII 45 2 *Defluat* et lento *splendescat* turbida lino Amphora, centeno consule facta minor; XII 60 8 et, ut *liquidum* potet Alauda merum, Turbida sollicito transmittere Caecuba sacco.

viri: this word often expresses what is acrid, pungent in taste or smell: Lucr. II 476 taetri primordia viri, of the brine of sea-water; 852 he uses 'viro' of a strong odour. Pliny XIV 124 applies the word to wine: e diverso crapulae conpesci feritatem nimiam frangique virus, aut, ubi pigra lenitas torpeat, virus addi: so that 'virus' comes to be almost the same as 'vires': Plin. XIV 138 ut plus capiamus, sacco frangimus vires; XXIII 45 utilissimum omnibus [vinum] sacco viribus fractis; and XIX 53 (in his favourite tone of ascetic bitterness) inveterari vina *saccisque castrari*, nec cuiquam adeo longam esse vitam ut non ante se genita potet. What the natural Pliny and the Stoic-affecting Cicero flout, Lucilius would like,—and the world in general too.

nihilum may be objected to, because it seems soon to have become obsolete as a nominative. But Cicero pro Caecina 95 cites from a law of Sulla's time 'si quid ius non esset rogarier, eius ea lege nihilum rogatum', where 'nihilum' is followed by a genitive, as in my version of Lucilius; as well as in Corp. Inscr. Lat. I, 204, 2, 30 eius hac lege nihilum rogatur (about 71 B.C.). It would pass very readily into 'nihil dum', because

it was unusual: it is more emphatic than 'nihil'. I had thought of 'nil iam' which gives an excellent sense 'nothing more'; but I prefer 'nihilum'.

XXVI. fr. 49 M.

Nonius 38, 26 Expirare dictum est vel ab spiritu effuso, vel ab spiraminibus. Lucilius lib. III Expirans animam pulmonibus aeger agebat. idem XXVI ut si eluviem facere per ventrem velis Curare omnibus distento corpore expiret viis (viis *Dousa.* vis *cdd.*). In p. 103 he explains 'eluviem' to be 'purgationem.'

Nonius' words must be noted: he expressly states that in the second passage 'expirare' has its meaning, not 'ab spiritu effuso', but from what comes out of the pores or vent-holes of the body. Mueller, noting this, for 'curare—expiret' reads 'sudor se—expirat': but that is almost rewriting. Lachmann, v. 539, gives us 'cura ne': I hardly catch the sense of the imperative after 'ut'; or if it has any sense, that sense is very feeble. Ellis, p. 71, offers us 'aura de': I do not see the meaning of this 'aura': if it has any, it must run directly counter to what Nonius asserts.

Without the context we cannot perhaps be certain of Lucilius' drift; but he seems to be giving some rough coarse illustration by this 'purgatio ventris', which should be let to come out by its proper channel, not through the pores of the body. Such a meaning may I think be obtained by a different division of the words, without the change of a letter, thus:

ut, si eluviem facere per ventrem velis,
cur ab re omnibus distento corpore expiret viis?

'why, the body stretched to bursting, should the 'eluvies' mischievously escape through all its pores?' I say without the change of a letter, because, tho' Lucilius no doubt would write 'ab re', the best Mss., and probably Nonius himself, would use indifferently 'ab re' and 'a re'. This use of 'ab re,' the opposite of 'e re', occurs in Plautus again and again: see the lexicons of Pareus and Weise, who cite four instances: trin. 238 subdole ab re consulit.

XV. fr. 3 M.

In numero quorum nunc primu' Trebelliu' multost Luciu'; narcesibai febris, senium, vomitum, pus. Mueller praises with good reason Lachmann's fine emendation 'multost Lucius' for the 'multos Titos Lucios' of Mss. His 'nam (nā)' too is probable. But, as Mueller points out, 'nam sanat' for the monstrous 'narcesibai' has nothing to commend it, as Nonius explains 'senium' by 'taedium et odium'. Mueller reads 'nam arcesit': 'nempe fuerat antiquitus traditum hoc: arcebat.' It may be so; but I should be more inclined to accept this, if some Mss. read 'arcebat', others 'arcessit', the two words having exactly opposite meanings. I believe he is right in thinking that Lucilius is speaking of some tiresome fellow, orator or poet perhaps, like the Sestius of Catullus' 44th poem with his 'orationem...plenam veneni et pestilentiae,' to which Catullus gives so humorous a turn. For 'narcesibai' I suggest '*nam creat ĭbu*' febris, senium, vomitum, pus.' Pliny IX 155 ut in lepore, qui in Indico mari etiam tactu pestilens vomitum dissolutionemque stomachi protinus creat'[1].

I find an analogy between my 'satirāfactuā' above for 'satrafa acutia' and 'nācreatibu' for 'narcesibai': in both cases a letter is put in its wrong place; in the former an *i* which was marked to be put above 'satra' got, from the loss of the mark, to be placed above the last letter; in the other case an *a* which was marked to be placed above 'cret' got placed above the final *u* of 'ibu.' Both *ībus* and *ĭbus* were in use among the old writers, Plautus, cet.: in fact the *ī* is, if any thing, better attested than *ĭ*. In lib. inc. frag. 83 *ĭbus* is a very uncertain conjecture, the Mss. having 'Atque aliquos ibi ab rebus clepsere foro qui': I am not indisposed to think the sentence there imperfect and to read 'Atque aliquoius ibi

[1] It would be absurd to claim for the emendation of an isolated passage like this more than a certain amount of probability. If we had the context, we might find Trebellius occupying quite another position. Thus the corrections of two scholars like Lachmann and Mueller, *sanat* and *arcessit*, give diametrically opposite meanings. I once thought 'nanctus ibei' or 'nanctu' sibei febris cet.' specious. The lexicons give examples of 'nanctus est febrem' 'morbum'.

ab rebus clepsere, foro qui cet.', the 'qui' referring to 'aliquoius'.

XI. fr. 1 M.

Conventus pulcher, bracae, saga fulgere, torques datis magni.

Nonius quotes this twice: in one place his Mss. have *torquem;* in the other they omit the corrupt 'datis'. It is manifest that Lucilius is speaking of a provincial 'conventus', the governor and the Roman officials coming at stated times to the chief city of a district and there meeting deputies from the different towns of the district. It is no less manifest from the 'bracae' and 'torques' that the poet is speaking of a Gaulish people. Mueller reads 'Induti magni', Lachmann 'Sat magni': I suggest 'torques Donatis magni': comp. Pliny, speaking of ancient times, XXXIII 37 auxilia quippe et externos torquibus aureis donavere: at cives non nisi argenteis. The 'donati' would be likely to appear with their 'torques magni'. If the corruption 'torque*m*' means anything, 'torques Mandatis magni' might suggest itself, the 'mandati' being the deputies of the towns.

VIII. fr. 15 M.

Verum flumen uti, atque ipso divortio *aquarum*,
iligneis pedibus cercyrum conriget aequis.

aquarum *add. Iunius.* aquae sunt *Mueller.* Ilignis *Iunius.* Igneis *cdd.* conriget *scripsi.* concurret *cdd.* conferet *Mueller.* roboret *Lachmann.*

'But where it is river, ay and already at the division between the salt and the fresh water, he will keep the galley on its right course by the help of the oaken evenly adjusted pedes.' 'aquarum' and 'Iligneis' seem to be pretty certain conjectures. But I have seen no satisfactory explanation given of the whole, and some at least of the corrections of 'concurret' I do not comprehend. The 'cercurus' had been sailing in the open seas under canvas: Plaut. Stich. 367 conspicatus sum interim Cercurum...In portum vento secundo, velo passo pervenit. If the wind was favourable, then it would have

sailed before the wind, and the two 'pedes', 'sheets' or 'ropes', attached to each clew or lower corner of the square sail, would be 'aequi', i.e. 'braced to the same length': comp. Rich, s. v. 'pes veli': he cites Cic. ad Att. XVI 6 1 duo sinus fuerunt, quos tramitti oporteret...; utrumque aequis pedibus tramisimus. But when the vessel got into the river, and even at the junction between sea and river, it could no longer use its sails, and its 'stuppei pedes' so to say: it had to take to its 'iligni pedes', which had to perform the same office. The skipper therefore 'conriget', 'will keep it on its course' by these; and, as the expression is metaphorical and taken from the 'pedes veli', it may mean the oars, tho' 'pedes', literally taken, seems never to have that sense; or, as I am inclined to guess, it may refer to two long sweeps, one on each side of the vessel, such as those by which I have sometimes seen barges managed in a river. With 'conriget' comp. Livy XXIX 27 14 inde aegre correctum cursum exponit. The context leaves no doubt that 'div. aq.' means the separation between the salt and the fresh water, tho' in Cicero and Livy the words denote the ridge on which the streams part in opposite directions.

I do not with Lachmann change 'uti' to 'ubi', because in old Latin 'ut' oftener than many think means 'where', as twice in Catullus, and our passage at once recalls 17 10 Verum totius ut lacus putidaeque paludis Lividissima maximeque est profunda vorago. Perhaps 'est' is understood from a preceding clause; else I think we must read 'Verumst flumen uti'.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

ON THE AEGRITUDO PERDICAE.

THIS is the title of a poem of 290 Latin hexameters edited for the first time in 1877 by Dr Emil Bährens. It was transcribed for the editor by Mr E. M. Thompson of the British Museum, from a MS of the 15th cent. Harl. 3685. The author, whose name is unknown, is believed to have belonged to that school of African versifiers who within the last few years have become more widely known through the publication of the poems of Dracontius (see Journal of Philology, v p. 252).

The editor has discharged his task with some skill: but a good many passages appear to me to admit of simpler corrections than they have yet received. The subject of the poem is the incestuous passion of Perdica for his mother, a story alluded to by Dracontius (Hylas 36—44) and Claudian (p. 686 f. Gesner); and briefly told by Fulgentius (Mythologica II. 2. p. 105 Muncker).

31. *Fonsque regit medio nota per gramina lapsa.*

Perhaps

Fonsque rigat medio rorans per gramina lapsu.

52. *Nec mora nota deo est.*

Bährens *longa:* why not *nata?*

59. *Iam sole menso radiis librauerat orbē.*

Bährens reads *Iam sol emenso radios librauerat ortu.* May not *orbe* be right? 'By this the sun had *reached the top of his circuit* and poised his rays evenly' at mid-day (*sexta hora*).

64. *lymfasque regentes* followed in 66 by *lucos rigentes* is strange. Accepting the editor's *recentes* in 64, I would suggest *uirentes* in 66.

72—5. All is perfectly straightforward if the passage is read thus:

Heu, Perdica, grauis aestus radiosque micantes
Solis te fugisse putas lucosque petisse?
Ignoras! intus grauior tibi flamma paratur.

I need not say that *fugisse* and *lucos petisse* are a ὕστερον πρότερον.

80. *Complexusque dedit per somnia tristis imago. Tristis* is not to be altered to *tristia* in spite of *somnia tristia* in 96. There is no difficulty in supposing the sadness which in one line is ascribed to the dreams transferred in the other to the image presented by them. On the other hand the elision of *a* at this place in the verse, especially as a correction of a rhythm so faultless as *per somnia tristis imago*, is improbable.

97. *Sed ego quam uidi, quae somnia tristia demens?*
Mater erat? aut ista tibi paretur imago
Est, sed caeca..... The rest of the line is blank.

B. reads,

Heu ego quam uidi per somnia tristia demens,
Mater erat? haut ista tibi parentis imago
Est, sed caeca.

Accepting *Heu* I would keep the rest of 97 unchanged. In vv. 98, 99 the sudden apostrophe which Perdica makes to himself suggests that this name as a vocative may have fallen out: then *imago* may have stood at the end of the following line:

haut ista tibi, Perdica, parentis
Est, sed caeca [*rapit sensus absentis*] *imago.*

104. *Soli tibi dulci numquam Perdica quieti*
Tradidit ardentis ardentia lumina flammas.

Not *solum te* as B., but *sola tibi.* 'Thy eyes alone, Perdica, night never consigned to sweet repose, kindling them into a

glow to match thy own.' B. seems right in correcting *flammans*. The construction *tibi* followed by *ardentis* is unusual, but may be explained by the distance of the two words from each other, as well as the close connexion between *ardentis* and *ardentia lumina*.

107. *Suspirat numquam requiem †daturus amori.*

Obviously *laturus*.

109. *Fluminaq̊; tenet nec non maris imperat undis.*

For *quoque* which B. keeps (cf. 91 *oscula quoque dedit*) possibly *aquasque*. I believe *aquam* to be the right reading in Lucret. VI 954 *denique aquam circum caeli lorica coercet*, where the Mss give *qua*.

112. *Tunc quoque Perdica premit igne Cupido*
Vt possit nec ferre uocem.

E. Rohde rightly keeps *nec ferre*, altering *uocem* to *facem*. May not B.'s *uicem* be retained 'so that he cannot even bear his fortune,' i.e. so that his anguish became actually beyond endurance. V. 112 Bährens fills up thus *Tunc quoque Perdicam diro premit igne Cupido* perhaps rightly, *nec ferre* he alters to *refferre*, a quantitative licence which seems over-hazardous.

119. *Tu* (Nox) *nosti quid possit Amor: sine te nihil ille Cupido*
Seu Veneris pars est, seu Venus aut Venus in te est.

Cupido is rightly omitted by Bährens as a gloss. In 120 he adds a second *est* following *pars est*. But it is difficult to believe that any one would have written *est seu* when he might write the more simple and euphonious *siue est*, and the antithesis of *seu Venus in te est* is to the identification of Night, not of Love, with Venus. Hence I would propose to read

Seu Veneris pars est, seu tu Venus aut Venus in te est.

122. *At matri narrabo nefas? tamen ibo coactus?*
'Mater, aue' dicturus ero? quid deinde? tacebo.
Cedamus. Quid? tu hoc poteris componere uerbis?
Aut uox qualis erit? Adgressus namque parentem,

131. *Vt proprium miserando nefas inceste labores!*

So I would punctuate and read this obscure passage. *At* for *Et* in 122, *Cedamus* for *Credamus* in 124 (Rohde), *Vt* for *Et* in 131, *labores* for *laboris* are sufficiently obvious corrections. V. 131 which in the Ms follows *Talis Perdicam per noctem cura premebat,* and is there written thus *Et proprium miseranda nefas incesta laboris,* I believe to be out of its place.

Translate 'But suppose I tell my guilty passion to my mother: suppose I go to her despite my better judgment: am prepared to say 'Hail, mother.' What will ensue? My tongue will be mute. Well; let me yield after all. What, Perdica! will you bring yourself to frame the avowal in words? or what sort of voice will that be? So then you have solicited a mother, only that you may be agonized, guilty wretch that you are, in commiserating your own crime.'

138. *famulosque uocauit*
Ad sese iussitque artis medicinae requiri
Primores qui forte forent.

B. emends *quaeri medicinae,* a very improbable remedy in so careful a poem. I think the Goddess of Medicine is addressed (cf. 155) and would read *artis, Medicina, requiri:* see my note on Catull. LIV. 2, and cf. Manil. II. 440.

142. *Ingressique fores atque abdita tecta †caciantis.*

B. *iacentis* or *cubantis.* Considering the medical character of the passage it seems not impossible that this word was *cacantis,* which would certainly suit *abdita.* An examination of the excrement or urine might naturally precede that of the various organs which immediately follows.

147. *Sed iecor et splenis temtanda cobilia †patri*
Quae fellis metuenda domus.

Patri, which B. has ingeniously altered to *et atri,* is all that calls for change. The rest of his correction is violent and improbable. Transl. 'what seat of the dark gall gives ground for apprehension.'

161. *Non momenta suas per mollia uiscera sedes*
Non corda uagi pulmonis anhelant,
Intercepta se non nilia concita costis
Incuciunt seuos iaculata sepe doloris.

It is noticeable that each new phase of the diagnosis is *introduced* by *non:* hence it would seem probable that *Intercepta se* is to be connected with what precedes, not with what follows. I would read then

Non omenta suas per mollia uiscera sedes
Excedunt, non corda uagi pulmonis anhelant
Intersepta sero, non ilia concita costis
Incutiunt saeuos iaculantia saepe dolores.

Intersepta sero would refer to the serous surrounding of the heart which accompanies some phases of heart-disease, e.g. pericarditis.

166. *Sic fatus fessae scrutatur †conscia uenae*
Ingreditur mater. tum quae fuit† ille tenenti
Mitis et in lentos motus aequaliter acta
Improbiter digitis quatiens pulsatibus urguet.

For *conscia* perhaps *compita.* For *ille,* which B. alters to *ante,* there can be little doubt that *ile* should be read. Lachmann's restitution of the word to Catull. LXIII. 5 would then have the support of an actual instance, and a very respectable one.

174. *Hic animi labor est: hebeo. iam cetera dicant.*

So the Ms. May not the meaning be 'I have no power to deal with a disease of the mind. Now let them declare the other cases' which call for my attention. I must be off to visit other patients.

200. *Inde Cupido monet secreta referre furoris.*
Inde Pudor prohibet uocis exordia rumpi
Famamq; surgentē reuocit †neanillans
Ire iubet propriumque nefas exponere mentis.
Verbaque multa docent, quae uoces pectore †labi
A Perdice misera moriuntur in ore pudico.

The general meaning is clear; love and shame struggle for the mastery: shall he rise from his bed and declare his passion, or remain passively tortured by it? Hence perhaps *Famane surgentem mittat reuocetne uacillans?* a reminiscence of Lucr. IV 1124. For *quae uoces pectore labi* B. writes *q. u. p. clausae*, a rather violent change. Perhaps the corruption is traceable to a different cause. The last word was *labori*, written in some copy *labi*. The *or* was transferred to the word before it, and united with it to form *pectore*. Read then *quae mox expressa labori*, 'wrung from his distress.' In 205 B. is no doubt right in correcting *Perdicae miseri*, in 204 *docet*.

215. *totas in me consume sagittas*
Quotquot amoris habes, et si tibi tela furoris
Defuerint, et si de ioue fulmina sumas,
Vincere non poteris sanctum, scelerate, furorem.

So I read, following the Ms throughout, and adding *uel* before *de ioue*. B.'s change *et, si t. t. furoris Defuerint, summo dein de ioue f. s.* is gratuitous: the double *et si* is obviously genuine.

230. *Ditior haec Danae, fulgentior altera Glauce,*
Candidior † Coigne † peruenit altera † disce.

Bährens' *Chione* and *Dirce* are probably right: for *peruenit* Rohde suggests *procerior:* less remote from the Ms would be *potior uenit*, 'a better Dirce.'

249. *† Iussisti mandasti iam possum expromere musam.*

Probably *Tu si mandasti*, as he had said in the preceding line *Ni tu das animos uiresque in carmina fundis.*

254. *Longaque testantur ieiunia uiscera † famem.*

Probably *ramex.*

257. *Produnt, quidquid homo est uel quod celare sepulchris*
Mors secreta solet. sufficit tibi, saeue Cupido,
Materialam † nttu sit atrox ubi flamma moretur.

Perhaps *suffis tibi, s. C., Materiam; nullast a. u. f. moretur.* 'You are burning your own fuel, Love: none remains for your

flame to smoulder in.' The body of the lover is so emaciated that it can no longer support the functions of love, 'consumed with that which it was nourished by.' For *nullast* compare 271 where B. rightly edits *nullast* for the Ms reading *ntta sit.*

260. *Denique defessos artus ac membra calore*
Molitur gestare uictusque uirorum.

B.'s *mollitur* is no doubt right: after *gestare* he adds *nequit*, for which I would substitute *negat; uirorum*, which B. changes to *ciborum*, is, I think, right: 'the food of healthy men.' Perdica can only take the light food of a patient or a woman.

284. *Terruit et laqueum metuis? mihi redde tenebris.*

B. *me redde.* I should prefer *mihi redde tenebras.*

R. ELLIS.

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ON THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO.

I.

The motive of Cicero's professed change of opinion.

Cicero himself, according to Quintilian 2 17 21, said that in the defence of Cluentius he had thrown dust in the eyes of the judges; and as eight years before the delivery of the speech he had appeared as a strong advocate of the attack on the senatorial *iudicia* which followed the *iudicium Iunianum*, there can be no doubt that he really believed throughout that the agitation of 74 B.C. was justified by the facts of the case. I do not know whether any attempt has been made to explain his professed change of opinion. In the following remarks I hope to make it probable that political considerations had a great deal to do with the matter. Cicero has been too hastily charged with inconsistency in the earlier part of his career. A careful examination of the facts will shew, I think, that there was a method in his changes. His politics are those of the *ordo equester*, whose interests he, as himself belonging to it, naturally made his own. The death of Sulla in 78 B.C. gave to this important body the hope of recovering something of the position which they had held from the time of the Gracchan to that of the Sullan constitution; and in 74 B.C. an opening was given them (in the corruption of the senatorial *iudicia*) for an attack on the dominant position of the senate. The scandal of the *iudicium Iunianum* was turned to good account by the tribune Publius Quinctius, and although the tumult was laid for a time, only four years elapsed before the *iudicia* changed hands. The attack of Cicero on Verres was in reality the attack of the *equites* on the senate; the consulship of Pompeius

and Crassus in the year 70 sealed the triumph of the *equites*. Their interests were now and for some years afterwards represented by Pompeius, with whose cause we find accordingly that Cicero for some time identifies himself.

But the *equites* with their champion Pompeius were by no means safe either against the jealousy of the nobility or the attacks of the democratic party. The bad case of Fonteius, defended by Cicero so soon after the attack upon Verres, may merely shew that the orator was willing to defend any Roman official against the complaints of barbarous provincials; but it must not be forgotten that the accused was a friend of Pompeius, and that to have deserted him would very probably have been to Cicero a desertion of his own political colours. Moreover it would appear that Fonteius was supported by Roman merchants and men of business, who presumably belonged to the equestrian order. Of the interests of these men Cicero is evidently very tender. The attack on Fonteius may perhaps, therefore, be taken as in some sense an attack on the *equites*. There are signs also that in the years between the first consulship of Pompeius and Crassus and the first triumvirate (70—59 B.C.) attempts were made to extend to the equestrian order the action of the *leges Corneliae*, which as they stood applied only to senators. Much of the motive of Cicero's defence of Cluentius in 66 B.C. is, I think, revealed in an instructive passage, §§ 143—160. "I will not," he says, "argue that the equestrian order is not bound by the provisions of the *lex Cornelia* in this matter. I should have done so but for the generosity of my client, who would not allow it. If, as Attius says, it is shameful that an *eques* should be able to offend where a senator may not, I answer that it is a far more serious matter to depart from the letter of the *leges*. Attius would himself complain if any one were to attempt to bring him, a mere *eques*, under the provisions of *lex Cornelia repetundarum*. Observe that the *lex Cornelia de veneficiis*, in the section relative to poisoning, includes all orders in liability to punishment: while in the section relative to conspiracy for procuring the condemnation of an innocent person it includes only certain high functionaries. Cluentius is not one of these

high functionaries; yet he refuses to take advantage of the *lex*. I follow his instructions in the matter, although I do not approve of them.

"Attius may think it unfair that all orders are not alike included under the same *lex*. But surely the case of a senator is different from that of an *eques;* the former has greater privileges, and therefore ought to have greater responsibilities. The law under which we are now acting here—*ne quis iudicio circumveniretur*—was passed by Gaius Gracchus, and in the interest, not against the interest, of the *plebs*. When Sulla came into power and took over this *lex* with its provisions into his own *lex*, he still did not venture to extend its provisions beyond the class of high functionaries, although his hatred of the equestrian order would have made him willing enough to do so. The fact is that an attempt is being now made to include the equestrian order in the provisions of the *lex Cornelia*. Only, be it observed, by a few factious individuals, who wish to separate the interests of the *equites* from those of the senate, and who are using this engine to terrify the *equites*. Seeing how much the verdicts of the equestrian order are respected, they wish to take the sting out of them by making it impossible for an *eques* to give a fearless verdict. Remember how the *equites* resisted Livius Drusus when he tried to bring the *iudices* of their order within the reach of a *quaestio* of this kind. They argued rightly that, as they had renounced the honours and advantages of public life, so they ought to be relieved from its responsibilities."

From this passage it would appear that the clause of the *lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis*, under which Cluentius was now accused, did not technically apply to the equestrian order. That clause referred not to murder, but to the procuring, by corrupt means, the condemnation of an innocent man. It is difficult in the absence of anything like full and direct evidence to ascertain the exact state of the law with perfect clearness. Cluentius was being tried under a clause of the *lex Cornelia:* yet Cicero says, § 154, *illi* (*equites*) *non hoc recusabant ea ne lege accusarentur qua nunc Habitus accusatur, quae tunc erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia:* and again, § 151, *hanc ipsam*

legem ne quis iudicio circumveniretur *C. Gracchus tulit.* I infer from these passages that the clause against conspiracy in the *lex Cornelia* was taken over from a *lex* of Gaius Gracchus referring to the same point. Again, if Cicero may be trusted, this *lex* of C. Gracchus did not apply to the equestrian order. § 154, *illi enim non hoc recusabant, ea ne lege accusarentur quae nunc Habitus accusatur, quae tunc erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia, intellegebant enim ea lege equestrem ordinem non teneri.* The inference would apparently be that the *lex* of C Gracchus was an enactment against conspiracy on the part of persons in high office to procure the corrupt condemnation of innocent mĕn. And this supposition would agree with Cicero's language § 151, *eam legem pro plebe, non in plebem tulit.*

I do not think that the Sempronian law in question can be identical with that quoted in the *pro Rabirio Perd.* § 12: *ne de capite civium Romanorum iniussu vestro iudicaretur.* The wording of the titles is entirely different: *iudicio circumvenire* must surely mean *to set a judicial process in motion in order to compass a person's ruin;* a provision *ne de capite civium iniussu populi Romani iudicaretur* would be intended to prevent a special *quaestio* or *iudicium* being set up without the consent of the people in their *comitia.*

The *lex* of C. Gracchus not applying to the equestrian *iudices* whom he created, but only to the nobility, had therefore nothing to do with his *leges iudiciariae:* and in consequence it was of no assistance to Livius Drusus when he proposed to transfer the *iudicia* to his newly constituted senate. The great obstacle in the way of the reforms of this statesman was the determined opposition of the *equites:* Appian *B. C.* 1 35 *τήν τε βουλὴν καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας, οἳ μάλιστα δὴ τότε ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὰ δικαστήρια διεφέροντο, ἐπὶ κοινῷ νόμῳ συναγαγεῖν ἐπειρᾶτο, σαφῶς μὲν οὐ δυνάμενος ἐς τὴν βουλὴν ἐπανενεγκεῖν τὰ δικαστήρια, τεχνάζων δ' ἐς ἑκατέρους ὧδε. τῶν βουλευτῶν διὰ τὰς στάσεις τότε ὄντων μόλις ἀμφὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους, ἑτέρους τοσούσδε αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἐσηγεῖτο ἀριστίνδην προσκαταλεγῆναι, καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε πάντων ἐς τὸ μέλλον εἶναι τὰ δικαστήρια. εὐθύνας τε ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι δωροδοκίας προσέγραφεν, ἐγκλήματος ἴσα δὴ καὶ ἀγνοουμένου διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς δωροδοκίας ἀνέδην ἐπι-*

πολαζούσης. Drusus then added to his *lex iudiciaria* a clause, both retrospective and prospective as it would appear, creating a new *quaestio* to deal with cases of judicial corruption. The measure was vehemently opposed by the corrupt *ordo equester*, and naturally enough, for as retrospective it threatened the peace of those who had already offended, evidently a very numerous class; as prospective it would include all those members of the order who under the *lex Livia* should be from time to time drafted into the senate. *O viros fortes,* says Cicero *Cluent.* § 153, *equites Romanos, qui homini clarissimo ac potentissimo M. Druso tribuno plebis restiterunt, cum ille nihil aliud ageret cum illa cuncta quae tum erat nobilitate, nisi uti qui rem iudicassent huiuscemodi quaestionibus in iudicium vocarentur...ne nova lege alligarentur, laborabant.* Pro Rabir. Post. 16 *potentissimo et nobilissimo tribuno plebis M. Druso, novam in equestrem ordinem quaestionem ferenti* si quis ob rem iudicandam pecuniam cepisset, *aperte equites Romani restiterunt.*

Whether the *lex Plotia iudiciaria,* brought forward during the Civil War, contained any clause against conspiracy to procure a corrupt verdict is not known: that such a clause, taken from the *lex* of C. Gracchus *ne quis iudicio circumveniretur,* was added by Sulla to his *lex de sicariis et veneficiis,* we have already seen: but there is no sign that the matter was seriously taken up by the authors of the new revolution in the *iudicia* brought about by the *lex Aurelia* of 70 B.C. This *lex,* which restored to the *equites* some of their old influence in the law-courts, does not seem to have increased their liabilities. Thus the law with regard to conspiracy for procuring a corrupt verdict was in the year 66 B.C.—the date of our speech—in an anomalous state. Any one, not being one of the high functionaries named in the *lex Cornelia,* who should enter into such a conspiracy, was technically safe as against the provisions of that *lex.* The enemies of the unjust privileges of the equestrian order had no intention of letting matters rest in this position; they made efforts to bring the *equites* under those provisions of the *leges Corneliae* from which they had previously been exempted. The case of Oppius seems, from what little evidence remains on the subject, to have been

similar in this respect to that of Cluentius. Cicero's speech in defence of Oppius is generally assigned to a time not earlier than three years, and perhaps not more than two or even one, before the year of the *pro Cluentio*. According to Quintilian 5 13 21, Cicero made an appeal to the *iudices* on behalf of his order of precisely the same character as that which he made in the *pro Cluentio*. *Pro Oppio monet pluribus ne illud actionis genus in equestrem ordinem admittant.* Perhaps Oppius was accused under the *lex Cornelia repetundarum*, which like the *lex Iulia* on the same subject afterwards only applied, technically, to high officials: *Rab. Post.* § 11 *sed est arreptus* (*Postumus*) *unus eques Romanus de pecuniis repetundis reus.*

I think therefore that Cicero's attitude in the *Pro Cluentio* may be explained by the altered position of the equestrian order. Eight years before, in 74 B.C., they were excluded from the *iudicia*, and were therefore willing enough to take any opportunity of attacking the exclusive privileges of the senate. The unjust condemnation of Oppianicus gave them such an opportunity. But the same facts wore a different complexion in the eyes of the *equites* in 66 B.C. To attack the officials who had taken part in the *iudicium Iunianum* in 74 was one thing: it was quite another thing to use the case of Cluentius eight years afterwards as a precedent for bringing the *equites* under the provisions of the conspiracy clause in the *lex Cornelia de sicariis.*

The position taken up by Cicero in the *pro Oppio* and the *pro Cluentio* is well illustrated by his action in the case of Rabirius Postumus twelve years later. Rabirius was a simple *eques*, who was charged with having received part of the money unlawfully taken from Ptolemy by Gabinius as the price of restoration to his kingdom. Cicero contends that the *lex Iulia de repetundis*, like the *lex Cornelia* and the *lex Servilia*, applied only to the holders of certain high offices (§§ 13—18). Compare *Cluent.* § 148. Turning to the *equites* on the bench he adds, *scitis me ortum e vobis omnia semper sensisse pro vobis; nihil horum sine magna cura et summa caritate vestri ordinis loquor. Alius alios homines et ordines, ego vos semper complexus sum.*

II.

Analysis and examination of Cicero's present account of the iudicium Iunianum and its consequences.

§§ 66—116.

§§ 66—76. "Oppianicus," says Cicero, "frightened by the condemnation of Scamander, had recourse to Staienus, as a man who had already (76 B. C.) taken six hundred *sestertia* from a *pupillus* in the case of Safinius Atella, and then kept it himself. He encourages Oppianicus to give him 640 *sestertia;* then determines to keep the money and let Oppianicus be condemned. His method of proceeding is to promise, but not to give, the money to some of the most worthless of the *iudices,* thus rendering them hostile to Oppianicus. When Bulbus, one of these *iudices,* asks him for it, he says that Oppianicus had played him false, and that he accordingly meant to vote *guilty.* Some suspicion arising in court on the matter, Cannutius, the accuser of Oppianicus, suddenly gets the *iudex quaestionis* to declare the argument at an end; Staienus, who happened to be absent and engaged in a private case, is brought back into court by Oppianicus and Quinctius his advocate. In the open voting which followed, Bulbus, Staienus, and Gutta at once vote *guilty.* (There were only a few corrupt *iudices* on the bench, but all of these were incensed against Oppianicus: *nummarii pauci sed omnes irati*). Some prudent men, namely (see § 107) Octavius Balbus, Q. Considius, M. Iuventius Pedo, L. Caulius Mergus, M. Basilius, C. Caudinus, L. Cassius, Cn. Heius, P. Saturius (nine in all), say in the *prima actio, not-proven:* five vote *not-guilty,* the rest (eighteen in all) vote *guilty,* some because they were bribed, some because, in spite of the corruption of these others, they thought it their duty to stand by their former verdicts given in the *praeiudicia.*"

On this it seems natural to observe that the account of the conduct of Staienus towards Oppianicus, Bulbus and Gutta is exceedingly strained and unnatural, and hardly to be accepted without further warrant than the mere statement of Cicero.

But supposing Staienus and the rest to have been also bribed by Cluentius, all becomes plain. As to Cannutius, the accuser of Oppianicus, suddenly declaring the argument at an end, the fact can very well be explained by supposing that he was in league with the *iudex quaestionis* to procure the condemnation of his adversary. The conduct of Staienus in voting *condemno* is far more simply accounted for by Cicero himself, *Verr.* Act. 1 37, *quod inventus est senator qui cum iudex esset, in eodem iudicio et ab reo pecuniam acciperet quam iudicibus divideret, et ab accusatore ut reum condemnaret.* It is clear from this passage that in the general opinion at least there had been bribery on both sides. Cicero observes in § 83 that it was Cluentius and Cannutius who allowed Staienus to go out of court, Oppianicus and his advocate who wanted him and brought him back again; and that the vote of Staienus was explained by the fact that he wished to convince Bulbus and the rest that Oppianicus had failed him. This really proves nothing. Supposing it true that Staienus was brought back, not by Cluentius, but by Oppianicus, all that need be supposed is either that Cluentius and his friends thought Staienus' absence immaterial, his money having been promised to a sufficient number of *iudices;* or that they feared the counter-efforts of Oppianicus, and had begun to distrust Staienus in the matter. Oppianicus on the other hand may either have been ignorant of the bribery practised by Cluentius, or, if he knew of it, he may have thought that his own counter-efforts had influenced Staienus in his favour.

On Cicero's account of the way in which the various *iudices* voted it may be remarked that it is not absolutely consistent with a sentence in the *pro Caecina* § 29. There were thirty-two *iudices:* according to Cicero in the *pro Cluentio* five voted *not-guilty* and nine (§ 107) *not-proven:* eighteen therefore must, according to this statement, have voted *guilty.* Had Staienus been absent Oppianicus would thus have been condemned by a majority of 17 to 14. But in the *pro Caecina* we are told that Fidiculanius Falcula was in a hurry to give his vote *guilty* because it was necessary to make up the majority: *cum si uno minus damnarent, condemnari reus non posset, non ad cognoscendam causam, sed ad explendam damnationem praesto fuisse.*

Is Cicero simply forgetful, or is he in the *pro Cluentio* purposely exaggerating the numbers of the *iudices* who voted *guilty?* Certainly, if his earlier account in the *pro Caecina* be correct, there was motive enough for Oppianicus and his friends to send out of court for Staienus. One vote might have made all the difference.

Cicero's argument from § 77—82 proceeds as follows: "The occasion was at once seized on by the tribune Quinctius as a means of attacking the senatorial tribunals. Staienus met Oppianicus at the house of T. Annius, and promised to restore him the money; some respectable individuals overheard the interview, the money was found in Staienus' possession, and he was forced to disgorge it. The populace had and could have no idea that Staienus had in reality taken the money to vote *not-guilty,* and then kept it back; all that they saw was that Staienus had voted *guilty,* and from their knowledge of his character they supposed that his vote was not given *gratis.* So with Bulbus, Gutta and others. Nor again did they know the character of Oppianicus. All this, aided by the fiery agitation of Quinctius, raised such a strong popular feeling that Iunius was clamoured out of his expected praetorship, and finally driven into exile. At that time so strong was the excitement that no one saying what I am now saying would have had a chance of a hearing: at the present time, on the contrary, all is quiet, and men will listen to the voice of reason. What are the real facts? All agree that there was bribery somewhere. The prosecutor pleads 'I had very serious charges to bring; my adversary had already been as good as condemned in two *praeiudicia;* had he been acquitted, I had nothing to fear.' The defendant replies, 'My conscience made me afraid; I had been as good as condemned twice already; I had everything to fear from an adverse verdict.' If, again, you will examine Cluentius' accounts, you will find that he has kept them carefully; this matter has now been sifted and discussed for a period of eight years. No trace of any corrupt expenditure can be found in Cluentius's books; whereas at the house of Staienus there were found 640 *sestertia.*"

On this it may be remarked that the interview of Oppiani-

cus with Staienus has nothing to do with the question. There was no doubt that Staienus had received money from Oppianicus, and under the circumstances it was very natural that Oppianicus should wish for an interview with his treacherous friend. Oppianicus may have gone to the house of Annius to convict Staienus, and the *viri boni* may have been there to detect him in Oppianicus' interest. The remark about the account-books of Cluentius may be dismissed as unworthy of serious consideration. The only strong point in Cicero's case seems to be the condemnation of the accessories to the supposed guilt of Oppianicus in two *praeiudicia:* yet how can we be sure that there was no foul play in these cases? Cicero had himself defended Scamander: and Quintilian, 11 1 74, justly observes, *difficilior ei ratio in iudicio Cluentiano fuit, cum Scamandrum necesse haberet dicere nocentem, cuius egerat causam.*

§§ 84—88. "But, you say, granting that Oppianicus gave the money, it was not to bribe the jury but to effect a compromise. I am surprised at so foolish an argument being used at this time of day; Staienus naturally said this at the time, perhaps on the advice of his advocate Cethegus; but the plea was laughed down; no compromise was possible between two such enemies; there was no chance on the one hand of Oppianicus escaping by the setting up of a man of straw to accuse him (*elabi alio accusatore*), nor on the other hand could Cluentius abandon the case without incurring the odium of *calumnia.*

"Again, it may be said that Oppianicus was trying to arrange a *praevaricatio,* and therefore offered the money to Staienus. In that case, why should he have gone to a *iudex* as *sequester* and not rather to some respectable friend? But in fact this argument requires no answer: for the sum of 640 *sestertia* found at the house of Annius speaks for itself: 16 *iudices,* to receive 40 *sestertia* apiece."

There is no antecedent improbability that the money was offered *conciliandae gratiae causa,* for the sake of effecting a compromise: none again that Oppianicus was trying to arrange a *praevaricatio.* Cicero here merely trifles with his opponent's statement; and, as to the number of 640 *sestertia,* how do we know that that was all the money that was offered to Staienus?

§§ 88—96. "I now come to the many *iudicia* which were brought to bear upon this case.

(1) "The condemnation of the *iudex quaestionis* C. Iunius. No time was allowed him by the tribune Quinctius; he was hurried off to trial without mercy. According to the general opinion, the reason for this was that he had corruptly procured the condemnation of an innocent man. In that case I say that he ought to have been accused under the *lex Cornelia de sicariis*. If this was on technical grounds impossible, Quinctius might have waited a few days: but this he would not do for fear of losing the flood-tide of popular feeling. He preferred to take formal grounds; asked for a *multa* because Iunius had omitted to take his oath of office, and because there was some irregularity about a *subsortitio*. Trivial grounds enough, shewing that Iunius was condemned not on the merits of the case, but owing to the accident of the time and circumstances (*non causa sed tempore*). And what has his case to do with that of Cluentius? Iunius, you virtually say, was condemned under one *lex* because he had offended against another. How can you call that a *iudicium?* It was all due to popular excitement, fanned by the employment of that dangerous engine the *tribunicia potestas*."

The answer to this argument would be, I suppose, that it was easier and more convenient to attack Iunius on formal grounds, and that in fact this method of attack proved perfectly effective, for Iunius was never able to take part in public life from the time of his condemnation.

(2) §§ 97—103. "Bulbus" you say "was condemned. He was, but it was on a trial for *maiestas*. You will argue that it was his conduct in the *iudicium Iunianum* which did him most harm in the eyes of his *iudices*. This, I reply, is merely your inference.

(3) "You urge the condemnation of P. Popillius and Ti. Gutta. But these men were condemned not for tampering with *iudices* but for *ambitus*, for their accusers were men who had themselves been condemned on a charge of *ambitus* and had subsequently turned king's evidence. These accusers were restored to their civil rights as a reward for their conduct; but

their restoration was, I maintain, due to the fact that they had informed against Popillius and Gutta, not for taking bribes, but for *ambitus*. Their case then, being a case of *ambitus*, has nothing to do with that of Cluentius.

(4) "Staienus was found guilty: yes, of *maiestas*. All that I will say here is that the plea which he then used, that the money was offered him for the purpose of effecting a compromise, met at that time with a very different reception from that which is now accorded to it: it was in fact laughed down; in spite of it Staienus was found guilty, and the Cominii, taking the same ground as I am taking, gained their point. I have shewn that if Oppianicus was guilty of bribery, Cluentius was not, and *vice versa*. But there is no trace of any corrupt act on the part of Cluentius: it is clear then that the condemnation of Staienus is all in favour of my client.

(5) § 103 foll. "Fidiculanius Falcula was accused mainly on the ground that he had sat on the bench as a substitute, and had only heard part of the case. First his enemies tried to get him fined because he had acted as a *iudex* out of his own *decuria* and in violation of the *lex* by which the proceedings of the *quaestio* were regulated. In the first *actio* he was easily acquitted: but subsequently he was in due form accused under the *lex repetundarum*, and acquitted; the *iudices* holding it sufficient that a *iudex* should be acquainted with the *praeiudicia* bearing on the case.

§§ 113, 114. "You who quote *iudicia*, what do you make of the acquittal of Fidiculanius Falcula? It is not to the point to collect instances of men who were condemned for *ambitus*, who ought rather to have been tried by the *quaestio repetundarum*."

From this passage it would appear that all the *quaestiones* were set in motion for the purpose of reaching various persons who had been implicated in the scandal of the *iudicium Iuniannum*. Bulbus was prosecuted and found guilty by the *quaestio maiestatis;* P. Popillius and Ti. Gutta by the *quaestio ambitus:* others by the *quaestio peculatus:* Verr. Act. 1 37 *quod in C. Herennio, quod in C. Popillio, qui ambo peculatus damnati sunt ...hoc planum factum est, eos pecuniam ob rem iudicandam accepisse.* The only two *quaestiones* under which their cases

could technically have come would seem to have been the *quaestio de sicariis* and *repetundarum*. The *lex de sicariis* contained, as we have seen, a clause against conspiracy to procure a corrupt verdict: the *lex repetundarum* must, if Cicero's argument here can be trusted (and there seems no reason in this case for distrusting it), have contained clauses against a *iudex* receiving a bribe, such as appear later in the *lex Iulia repetundarum;* Dig. 48 11 7, *lex Iulia de repetundis praecipit ne quis ob iudicem arbitrumve dandum mutandum iubendumve ut iudicet, neve ob non dandum non mutandum non iubendum ut iudicet... neve quis ob hominem condemnandum absolvendumve, neve ob litem aestimandam, iudiciumve capitis pecuniaeve faciendum vel non faciendum aliquid acceperit.*

Fidiculanius Falcula seems to have been prosecuted and acquitted under the *lex repetundarum*. It is not clear how the trials of the others under the *quaestiones ambitus, peculatus,* and *maiestatis* were made to bear on the question of judicial corruption. We have Cicero's own admission or very nearly his own admission, that though Bulbus was accused under the *lex maiestatis* it was his conduct in the matter of the *iudicium Iunianum* that prejudiced his case more than anything else. What is exactly meant by this is not clear; whether for instance it was the statements of witnesses during the course of the trial that brought out these damaging facts. Nor is it indeed plain why, when these men might have been legally tried either by the *quaestio de sicariis* or by the *quaestio repetundarum,* their cases should have been brought before the other *quaestiones.* It is manifest however that in the Roman usage of this epoch a man might be prosecuted under one *lex,* and condemned partly in consequence of the revelations of misdeeds which would properly have brought him under another. Thus Cicero says with regard to the *iudicium Iunianum,* Verr. Act. 1 37, *quod in C. Herennio, quod in C. Popillio, qui ambo peculatus damnati sunt, quod in M. Atilio qui de maiestate damnatus est, hoc planum factum est, eos pecuniam ob rem iudicandam accepisse.*

In § 98 Cicero lays stress upon the fact that P. Popillius (not to be confused with the C. Popillius of *Verr.* l. c.) and Ti. Gutta were condemned for *ambitus,* and proceeds to observe that their accusers were men who had themselves been con-

demned for *ambitus*. The thread of the reasoning in the text of our oration is not very clear: *qui causam de ambitu dixerunt, qui accusati sunt ab iis*, &c. The gist of the argument as given by Quintilian 5 10 108 is as follows: *Cicero pro Cluentio P. Popillium et Ti. Guttam dicit non iudicii corrupti sed ambitus esse damnatos. Quid signi? quod accusatores eorum qui erant ipsi ambitus damnati, e lege sint post hanc victoriam restituti.* They must have been condemned not for tampering with *iudices* but for *ambitus, because* their accusers, who had themselves been condemned for *ambitus,* were subsequently restored to their civil rights. Cicero does not put the case exactly in this way, but says that these accusers, who had been condemned for *ambitus,* were in his opinion restored to their civil rights, not because they had revealed a case of judicial corruption, but because they had publicly shewn their disapproval[1] of an offence similar to their own, namely *ambitus.* Some link is required between the clauses *qui causam de ambitu dixerunt* and *qui accusati sunt,* &c. Taking into consideration the passage in Quintilian, I would suggest the possibility that the second clause began with *quia,* not with *qui,* and that between the two clauses some words have been lost. *Qui causam de ambitu dixerunt* [non de iudicio corrupto] *quia accusati sunt,* &c.

The argument of these sections is worth very little. The fact that some of these offenders were accused under *leges* not strictly pertinent to their offence is technically in Cicero's favour: but only technically. Cicero had himself, eight years before (*Verr.* Act. 1 § 37), used the very same argument which he now tries to parry when employed against him. The fallacy of the dilemma (§ 102) "either Cluentius or Oppianicus must have been guilty of bribery, and if one, not the other" need not be pointed out. With regard to Fidiculanius Falcula, it is sufficient to refer to the *pro Caecina* § 29.

§ 115. "You say that damages were assessed against P. Septimius Scaevola on the count of his having received money for his judicial vote (*litem eo nomine esse aestimatam*). I need hardly remind you that a *litis aestimatio* is not a *iudicium.* It

[1] *Reprehendere* is apparently used here as in *Pro Fonteio* § 3 *atqui homines, si qui* [*tenentur*] *hoc genere quaestionis, accusatos et reprehensos videmus primum testibus.*

often happens that after a man is found guilty, his judges think that he is thereby made their enemy, and therefore (lest they should be acting under the influence of personal feeling?) refuse to admit an assessment which involves his civil *status* (*litem capitis*). Or it may happen that they think that having once done their duty, they need not trouble much about the further proceeding of the *litis aestimatio*. And so it often happens that when a man is found guilty *de pecuniis repetundis*, and an assessment involving the offence of *maiestas* is entered against him, he is acquitted on the charge of *maiestas*. Again, in cases of *repetundae*, persons who are mentioned in the *litis aestimatio* as accessories to the guilt of the principal offenders are often subsequently acquitted on a regular trial by the very *iudices* who tried the first case. Scaevola was found guilty on other charges, but every effort was made to make this *litis aestimatio* involve his civil *status*. Had this proceeding really carried with it the moral weight of a regular *iudicium*, he would have been brought to trial afterwards under the *lex Cornelia de sicariis*."

It will be observed that in this difficult passage I have followed Classen's two best MSS., not the old vulgate defended by Ramsay. I suppose the case to stand thus. The *litis aestimatio* was in all cases a proceeding following upon the verdict of guilty (*iudicium*) and quite distinct from it. It was not a mere assessment of damages, but might also contain a statement that the accused was guilty of an offence which should be tried under another *quaestio*. Thus a man found guilty under the *lex repetundarum* might in the *litis aestimatio* be said to have been guilty of offending against the *lex maiestatis* or *de sicariis*. Or again, the *litis aestimatio* might state that other persons besides the accused were guilty of the same offence for which he had been tried. In either case the result might or might not be a new trial on the new charges. These statements, going beyond the subject immediately in question, were not made without previous discussion between the prosecution and defence. And in a case where persons other than the accused were charged (*appellati*) as accessories in the *litis aestimatio* it seems to have been considered fair that they should be present and have the chance of defending themselves then and there, or, if they preferred it, of studying the bearings of the case with a

view to defending themselves later. The proceeding is clearly described in the *pro Rabirio Postumo* § 9. *Ita contendo, neminem unquam* quo ea pecunia pervenisset *causam dixisse, qui in aestimandis litibus appellatus non esset. In litibus autem nemo appellabatur nisi ex testium dictis aut tabulis privatorum aut rationibus civitatum. Itaque in inferendis litibus adesse solebant qui aliquid de se verebantur, et cum erant appellati, si videbatur, statim contradicere solebant; sin eius temporis recentem invidiam pertimuerant, respondebant postea. Quod cum fecissent, permulti saepe vicerunt.*

I suppose the case of Septimius Scaevola to have been as follows: He was accused and condemned under the *lex repetundarum*, and was stated in the *litis aestimatio* to have been guilty of conspiracy to corrupt a jury, which offence would have rendered him liable to prosecution under the *lex Cornelia de sicariis. Verr.* Act. 1 37 *quod Septimio senatore damnato, Q. Hortensio praetore de pecuniis repetundis, lis aestimata sit eo nomine quod ille ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepisset.* But Scaevola, it would appear, was not brought to trial again on the strength of this *litis aestimatio.* Well, says Cicero, it is notorious that a *litis aestimatio* is not a *iudicium;* and he was right on the technical point, which had, however, very little to do with the real bearings of the case.

Cicero's whole argument is a mere web of fine legal technicalities skilfully arranged so as to hide the real facts at issue. Even with our imperfect knowledge of the facts it is, as I hope I have in some measure shewn, not impossible to divine where his fallacies lie; and I am sometimes tempted to think that the *iudices* were not really so blind as Cicero supposed that he had rendered them, and that the acquittal of Cluentius, like Cicero's advocacy of his cause, may have been due to political calculations.

In § 82 the two best MSS. read *an ad ipsum cubile, vobis iudicibus, venire possumus?* The other MSS., followed by Baiter, read *ducibus* for *iudicibus.* The true reading I suspect to be *indicibus:* Verr. 2 1 § 105 *iste praetor designatus, utrum admonitus, an temptatus, an, qua est ipse sagacitate in his rebus, sine duce ullo, sine indice, pervenerit ad hanc improbitatem, nescio.*

H. NETTLESHIP.

TONE AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE.

THE following short paper[1] was suggested by what seemed to me an imperfect apprehension of certain characteristics of Chinese on the part of some comparative Philologers; and it was some sentences in Mr Peile's interesting 'Primer' which directly suggested my remarks. The importance of tone, and the paucity of the vocables, in Chinese, are admitted facts. Mr Peile, from a combination of these facts, seems to have concluded that the Chinese succeed in talking intelligibly on all subjects, difficult as the feat must be, with their poor five hundred vocables eked out and defined by variety of intonation. Collocation, indeed, is mentioned by him as an additional help, but he assigns the chief efficacy to tone.

He says (Primer, p. 47) 'There are less than 500' vocables 'in all in Chinese, but they are eked out by difference of tone in pronunciation : *the same sound represents different parts of speech, connected with the same general idea, according as it is spoken in a high or low, a rising or a falling tone.*' (The italics are my own.) After an illustration of the effect of intonation in English in varying the meanings of the component words in the sentence *John who is there,* he proceeds ; "There is no rule in English fixing the variation of tone, it is only a common use. But you may see from it that it would be easy to lay down rules of the sort, so that the same sound should have different meanings according to its tone, and *in this way* the Chinese manages to be perfectly intelligible.'

Mr Sayce in his 'Principles of Comparative Philology' writes to the same effect, although more cautiously and cer-

[1] Originally a letter to Professor Cowell.

tainly with less clearness. He says (p. 31) 'Chinese depends almost wholly upon tone, and its syntax may be compressed into a few lines.' Again (pp. 141, 142), 'Phonetic decay has been at work at the (Chinese) vocabulary, dialects have sprung up in the empire, new words have been applied to denote the relations of grammar' [whatever that may mean] '(more especially in writing), and yet the sentence is still confined to the individual vocable, and position and tone must determine the meaning of the speaker.'

Both writers, I think (in spite of one doubtful clause of Mr Sayce's and in spite of Mr Peile's illustration (p. 47) *wo-chae*, which is literary, not colloquial Chinese), had in view Chinese as a spoken language. Otherwise they could hardly have failed to take account of the function of the word-symbols or 'characters' in multiplying the capacity of the language for literary purposes. This is too well known to need illustration; but the following, taken from Dr Wells Williams'[1] Syllabic Dictionary, will serve, besides, as an illustration of the need of something besides tone to discriminate vocables of the same sound. Dr W.'s article on the syllable I (Ee) embraces 145 different characters of the same sound (if we disregard tone). Eighty of these belong to the first tone, twenty to the second, and forty-five to the third. The first and third tones are subdivided; so that five tones share amongst them the 145 characters; giving an average of nearly 30 characters to each tone or semitone!

In the *literary* Chinese, tone is rather a grammatical tradition than a living reality; in this respect something like the Greek accents, or the Hebrew points, but of infinitely less service than the latter in respect of intelligibility. Chinese composition, both prose and verse, is read or recited aloud, not to be understood, which it can hardly be unless you have the characters before you or know them by heart, but as an exercise of memory, or for the pleasure of the rhythm. For rhythmic purposes there is a strict tonic prosody, observed in due measure in prose as well as verse. And a false tone, though it *may* vitiate sense as well as rhythm, is only *sure* of spoiling the

[1] I have followed the orthography of Dr Williams throughout this paper.

latter. For intelligibility the essentials are the choice of words and their collocation.

The tones, one of which is *inherent in* every word, are four, the Level, Rising, Vanishing, and Entering, which I will call the First, Second, Third, and Fourth tones. For purposes of prosody however they are reduced to two main divisions; the *oblique*, consisting of the second, third, and fourth, and the *level* division, coinciding with the first tone. Verse rhythm depends on the due proportion and arrangement of *levels* and *obliques;* and dictionaries with a view to tone are furnished to tiros, of the same nature as our Gradus ad Parnassum.

In the North and West the fourth tone, which comprises all the *short* syllables, disappears; all words assigned to it in the Standard Dictionaries being distributed among the other three tones. In the South-eastern provinces the short syllables all end in *k*, *p*, or *t*; and each of the four tones is subdivided into an upper and lower class, making eight tones or semitones in all. It will be seen that, excepting the regions where the *northern* idiom prevails, the fourth tone virtually increases the number of vocables distinguishable by European orthography; and Syllabic dictionaries accordingly treat such vocables separately, e.g. *ko* and *kōh*, where the final *h* is written by way of representing the *k*, *p*, or *t*, still heard in Fuhkien and Kwangtung, and believed to have been anciently universal.

One more remark as to literary Chinese.—Table A which I append to my paper will shew I think that *ditonic* words—words in which one character is read in two tones—are but a small percentage of the materials of a literary composition; barely (taking my example) five per cent. And it would be hard to infer any such rule, as Mr Peile seems to have thought of, from these remains of primitive Chinese. It attained to intelligibility and precision, not by the tone system, but by choice of words and word symbols, and by their arrangement in the sentence.

Spoken Chinese, the Colloquial in its many dialects, is undoubtedly much more beholden to tone than is the language of books ancient or modern. I have mentioned the eight tones of the South. In Chekeang, my own province, five or rather six

are well recognized; and we have besides the use of the initials *b*, *d*, *g*, *z* and *dz* (unknown in the South) in addition to *p*, *t*, *k*, *s*, and *ts* both aspirated and unaspirated. Table B, constructed at random out of Dr Williams' Dictionary, will serve as a specimen of the real importance of tone, and the liability to mistake when it is neglected. It will help to shew also, I think, the absence of any general principle associating certain tones with certain parts of speech; since very many words in each tone are nouns, adjectives, and verbs, according to circumstances; and of words limited to one part of speech, examples may be found under each tone. It must be borne in mind, of course, that several of the syllables illustrated have, each, a large number of meanings different from and unrelated to those given, discriminated, when written, by their *word-symbols*, but *not by tone*. For example*, *Chăn*, which in Williams has but one or two representatives *in the upper division* of the first tone, has *in the lower division* six of widely different meaning, *all in common use*, besides others less usual.

The analogy between tone in colloquial English and in Chinese is, I think, real only so far as to illustrate the fact of one and the same word being sometimes variable by intonation. In English this depends always on some emotion, or some process of thought, in the speaker's mind. In Chinese there are a few cases of this kind, but they (I think my tables will shew it) have very little to do with the tonic system in Chinese. The pronoun *na-ko* spoken (*as to its first syllable*) in the *second* tone is *interrogative* (who? or, what?); spoken in the *third* it is *demonstrative* (that). But the vast majority of words have their tones independent alike of sentiment and of logic. Here, for instance, are four nouns meaning Father, Mother, Elder and Younger brother, *Fu*^{3}, *Mu*^{2}, *Hiong*^{1}, *Ti*^{2}, whose tones are marked by the numerals on the right. Good and Evil (*shan*^{3}, *ngoh*^{4}) are respectively of the third and fourth tones, but the synonyms *hao*^{2}, *tai*^{2} are both of the second. Once more in *k'an*^{3} to look, *t'ing*^{1} to hear, *hiu*^{3} to smell, *k'ih*^{4} to taste, it would be hard, I think, to account logically for the *difference* in tone assigned to 'hearing.'

* In the Chekeang dialects, the *Chăn* I have given would be *Tsăn* (or *Tsing*), the six of the lower-level tone would sound *Dzăn* (or *Dzing*).

'smelling,' 'tasting' (or 'eating'), and the *identity* in this respect between 'looking' and 'smelling.'

The part of speech is certainly not indicated with any regularity or precision by the tone. This is done, as Marshman, Julien, and others earlier and later than either, have observed, *almost wholly by the context.* Julien, after illustrating by means of the English word *set*, says (Syntaxe Nouvelle, p. 4), 'Tout mot Chinois peut passer par les mêmes états (i.e. as those instanced in the case of *set*) et changer aussi souvent de signification *suivant les mots auxquels on l'associe.*'

Under the general idea of *context*, however, two methods of arrangement deserve a special notice, as they are of essential service in promoting intelligibility, and characteristically Chinese, though perhaps partial analogies to each of them may be observed elsewhere. When it is borne in mind that e.g. the vocable *sin*, *without change of tone*, may mean 'bitter,' or 'new,' or 'firewood,' or 'the heart,' it will be seen that mere arrangement of words will hardly preclude confusion, without some special device besides. The two characteristic methods I mean are, *Classifiers* and *Coupling.*

Numerals, in Chinese colloquial, seldom stand alone before the noun they qualify. 'One man' is not *yĭh jin* but *yih*-KO *jin; ko* (seen in *na-ko* just above) nearly answering to 'unit' or 'individual,' and corresponding much more nearly to a real enclitic than Mr Peile's *chae* (Primer p. 47). For 'four horses' they say *sz*-P'EIH *ma*, where *p'eih* has a meaning connected with 'pairing' or 'matching.' And 'two towers' is *rh*-TSO *leu, tso* being akin to 'seat' or 'place.' A heart *sin* and a star *sing* in several dialects are almost identical in sound, the *g* being added to both, or omitted in both, alike. They are effectually distinguished however by the *classifier*, or special affix to the numeral, a heart being *yih*-KO *sin*, a star *yih*-K'O *sin;* where *ko* is the common enclitic mentioned above, but *k'o* a special one used of spherical objects, pearls, fruits, and the like, including stars. So much for the *classifiers*, or enclitics which attach themselves to the numerals and to pronouns also in some cases.

By *coupling* I mean the association of one vocable with another of kindred meaning so as to form a disyllable. Refer-

ring to table B, *chăn*, a pillow, in colloquial takes the affix *teu* a head, perhaps for euphony, but probably by allusion to its use. *Chăn*, to shake, associates *t'ung* to move, forming the disyllable *chăn-t'ung* to shake. *Chang*, the palm, prefixes *sheu* the hand (*sheu-chang*). *Chi*, knowledge, occurs as *chi-shih* or *chi-hwui* with very slightly different meanings, *shih* and *hwui* having senses akin to 'knowledge.' *Ling* is 'spirit' and also 'subtile'; in the latter sense it often affixes *k'iau* clever, and becomes *ling-k'iau*. *Ling*, a 'pass,' has its meaning fixed by the prefix *shan* a mountain, and *Ling* an order, by *hao* 'a call,' 'password,' &c., making the disyllables *shan-ling*, *hao-ling* respectively. *Mai*^{2} 'to buy,' and *Mai*^{3} 'to sell,' both belonging to the general branch of *oblique* tones, are not always said so accurately as to leave no room for mistake; but the affixes *tsin* 'to enter,' or *lai* 'to come' for the first, and *ch'uh* 'to go out,' or *k'ü* 'to depart' for the other, put them out of doubt; as *mai-tsin* 'to buy,' *mai-ch'uh* 'to sell.' *Rh'* 'a child' usually has as affix *tsz* its synonym, but sometimes another synonym *hai* as prefix (*Rh'-tsz* or *Hai-rh'*). *Rh'* 'an ear' takes *to* 'a lobe,' &c. after it (*Rh'-to*), and *Rh'* 'two' agglutinates *ko* or one of the many other classifiers, as *rh'-ko* 'two (men),' *rh-teu* 'two (cows),' *rh'-wei* 'two (gentlemen, guests, et sim.)' &c.

The usefulness of this tendency to form disyllables by a prefix or affix of kindred meaning is great and various. It distinguishes between vocables of identical tone, or of similar tone, or where the tone (as often in the case of foreigners) is wrongly given. It also forms abstract nouns, by coupling two words of contrasted meaning; thus 'newness' *sin-k'iu* (lit. 'new-old'); 'height' *kaou-ti* (lit. 'high-low'); 'distance' *yuen-kin* (lit. 'far-near'); and 'intercourse' *lai-wang* (lit. 'come-go').

I imagine these features of Chinese are to be found in all manuals, grammars, &c. on the subject, though I have none at hand to refer to. It was because they seemed to me to have been undervalued, or perhaps overlooked, by English comparative philologers, whose attention was attracted too exclusively to the *tones*, which, at the same time, they appeared partly to misunderstand, that I have ventured to write this very imperfect paper.

The chief practical use of tone—it is this I wished to point out—*is in the colloquial,* not the literary, language. In that its services are rendered *rather in the vocabulary than the grammar.* And for even that limited service it is inadequate, and *has to be supplemented by the context, by the* method of *classifiers* (or enclitics to numerals) and that of *coupling.* This last may perhaps be illustrated though very imperfectly by the bi-lingual compounds found in English, e.g. Hampstead, Hampton, where one syllable helped, I suppose, to give definiteness to the other. And the *classifiers* find a *partial* analogy in the specific numeral words, a couple or pair or brace, a leash, a dozen, a score; as also a head (of cattle), a flock, a covey, a drove, etc. Only none of these words in English are as indispensable as the corresponding words are in Chinese.

Tone in the *literary* language is a valuable and interesting tradition, and is *cultivated* by native scholars *for the sake of rhythm,* and the logical force or poetical grace which rhythm subserves. It contributes something to the enlargement of the dictionary, and something much less to the grammar. The strength of the dictionary for literary purposes, however, lies in its vast array of word-symbols; and, to quote Marshman as quoted by Julien, nearly 'the whole of the grammar depends on position.'

G. E. MOULE, *Missionary C. M. S.*

TABLE A.

Words affected by tone in the 'Great Learning,' 'Doctrine of the Mean,' and 'Analects' of Confucius, as shewn in Dr Legge, Vol. I. Index.

Vocable[1].	First (or Level) Tone.	Second (or Rising)	Third (or Vanishing)	Fourth (or Entering)
C.				
Chăn	...	A pillow	To pillow	...
Chăn	(lower) To arrange	...	Ranks, Array	...
Ch'ang	Long	Elder	More than	...
Chao	(upper) Morning (lower) Court, Dynasty	...	...	...
Chi	To know	...	Knowledge	...
Chi	To rule	...	To be ruled	...
Ching	Title of first Month	...	Correct	...
Ch'ing	To designate	...	To weigh	...
Ch'u	...	To place	A place	...
Chung	The middle	...	To hit (target or other mark)	...
F.				
Fang	To accord with	...	To let go	...
Feu	...	...	To cover	*Făh*, To overturn
Fu	(upper) a man (lower) initial particle 'as to...'	...	...	...
Fu	...	Father	'Good Father'	...
Fuh	...	...	(*Feu*) Again	To repeat
H.				
Hao	...	Good	To approve	...
Hi	(read *Hu*) Alas! affixed to another syllable	...	A play. To play	...
Hia	...	Below	To descend	...
Hing	To walk or do	...	Conduct	...
Hwa	Flower, Glorious	...	Name of mountain	...
Hwa	...	...	A picture	(*Hwăh*) to draw
Hwo	Peace, Harmony	...	To accord, sing with	...
I.				
I	Clothes	...	To dress	...
I	...	...	Easy	(*Yih*) to change
J.				
Jän	To endure	...	To entrust, an officer	...

[1] It should be understood that each vocable in this column stands for one Character, read, according to context, in either of the two or more tones and meanings given in the other columns. It has not been possible to print the Chinese characters.

Vocable.	First (or Level) Tone.	Second (or Rising)	Third (or Vanishing)	Fourth (or Entering).
K.				
Kiang	(*K'iang*) To compel	Violent	...	...
Kien	...	...	To see, read *Hien* To shew	...
Kien	A crack	...	To separate	...
Kung	...	To turn towards, To give	(lower) Together	...
K'ung	Empty	...	To empty	...
K'ü	...	To dismiss	To depart	...
Küen	...	To roll up	A scroll (also used as verb)	...
Kwan	A cap	...	To invest with the cap of manhood	...
Kwo	To pass by	...	To transgress, A transgression	...
L.				
Li	To part	...	To leave	...
Liang	Used in a technical phrase about mourning	...	Certainly	...
M.				
Moh	...	...	(*Mu*) Quiet, Evening	Negative particle
N.				
Nan	Difficult	...	Difficulty	...
Ni	Mud	...	Bigoted	...
P.				
Pi	...	To compare	To harmonize	...
S.				
San	Three	...	To do thrice	...
Sang	To mourn	...	To lose	...
Shang	...	To ascend	Above (cp. *Hia*)	...
Shao	...	Few	Young	...
She	...	...	To shoot	(*Shih*) to aim at
Sheu	...	The head	To confess	...
Shi	...	To send	A messenger	...
Shi	To grant	...	To distribute	...
Shih	...	...	(*Sz'*) To feed	To eat
Shih	...	...	(*Chi*) To remember	To know
Shing	To ride	...	A team, A carriage	...
Shing	Able	...	To conquer	...
Shu	...	To count	An account	(*Shŏh*) frequently
Shwai	...	...	A chief	(*Suh*) to lead on
Siang	Mutual	...	To assist	...
Sien	...	First, Former	To lead	...
Sun	A grandson	...	Docile	...

Vocable.	First (or Level) Tone.	Second (or Rising)	Third (or Vanishing)	Fourth (or Entering)
T.				
Taou	...	Way, Principle	To speak	...
Tu	...	...	A measure	(*Tuh*) to estimate
Tsang	To hide, store	...	A storehouse *Pitāka*	...
Tsao	...	...	To make,(*Ts'ao*) To arrive at	...
Ts'i	A wife	...	To give in marriage	...
Ts'oh	...	...	(*Ts'ŏ*) Wrong, To wrong	To file
Tsuh	...	...	(*Ts'ü*) Excessive	A foot, Full
W.				
Wăn	Lines, Literature	...	To gloss	..
Wăn	To hear	...	To be heard of	...
Wang	A prince	...	To rule	...
Wei	To make	...	On account of	...
Wu	(Int^{n}.) Ah !	...	To hate	(*Ngŏh*) malicious
Y.				
Yang	...	To nourish	To support one's parents or elders	...
Yen	(upper) How ? (lower) forsooth [1]	...	...	...
Yin	...	To drink	To give to drink	...
Yoh	...	...	(*Yaou*)Delight in	Music
Yiu	...	To have	And	...
Yu	...	To tell, A word	To speak, A saying	...
Yuen	...	Distant	To retire from	...

[1] Here Dr Legge inverts Dr Williams's statement.

The words exhibited above are 76 in number, occurring amongst 1520 which form the Index to Dr Legge's Ch. Classics, Vol. I. The spelling is that of Dr Williams.

TABLE B.

A few examples of tone distinction important in the Colloquial; taken at random from Dr Williams's Dictionary.

Vocable [1].	First Tone.	Second.	Third.
Chăn	True	Pillow	To shake
Chang	A chapter	Palm of hand	A bill
Chao	To beckon	To seek	To radiate
Chi	A branch	Paper	Knowledge
Ling	Spirit, Subtile	A pass in hills	To order, An order
Ma	Hemp	A horse	To scold
Mai	To cover with earth	To buy	To sell
Pin	Betel, Areca	A petition	Hair-locks
Ping	Soldier	Cake	A handle
Rh	Child	Ear	Two
Si	West	To wash	Fine
Siao	To melt	Small	To laugh
Sing	A star	To awake	Nature
Sz	Silk	To die	Four
Tan	Single	To brush off	Morning
Tăng	A lump	To wait, A class	A bench
Tao	A knife	To upset	To arrive
Ti	To lower, Low	The bottom	Ruler, God
Tien	To upset	A canon	A shop

[1] In this table each vocable stands for a *different Character* in each of the three successive columns. No fourth tone is exhibited. These are virtually distinct vocables, and are so arranged by Dr Williams. The Chinese however connect them with the tone system, reckoning, e.g., Pin (1), Pin (2), Pin (3), Pĭn (4), to form a set.

I.—ON LICENTIA POETICA (ποιητικὴ ἐξουσία or ἄδεια).

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society 1 May 1879.)

THE lexicons under *licentia* cite one example from Cicero and one from Quintilian. No commentator, so far as I know, has felt called upon to illustrate the phrase. It seems worth while therefore to submit to our society such examples as I have met with, in the hope of eliciting further information.

Cic. de or. III § 153 inusitata sunt prisca fere ac vetusta ab usu cotidiani sermonis iam diu intermissa, quae sunt *poetarum licentiae* liberiora quam nostrae.

Phaedr. IV 24 = 25 8 usus *poetae*, ut moris est, *licentia* (Müller *poetae more est et*).

Sen. n. q. II 44 § 1 *poeticam* istud *licentiam* decet.

Colum. IX 2 § 2 ea, quae Hyginus fabulose tradita de originibus apum non intermisit, *poeticae* magis *licentiae* quam nostrae fidei concesserim.

Quintil. II 14 § 3 ut sit ea [narrandi ratio] neque arida prorsus atque ieiuna...neque rursus sinuosa et arcessitis descriptionibus, in quas plerique imitatione *poeticae licentiae* ducuntur, lasciviat. § 19 graecis historiis plerumque *poeticae similis licentia* est.

X 1 § 28 meminerimus tamen, non per omnia poetas esse oratori sequendos nec libertate verborum nec *licentia* figurarum. ib. 5 § 4 verba *poetica libertate* audaciora.

Tert. adv. Marc. I 3 pr. principalis itaque et exinde tota congressio de numero, an duos deos liceat induci, si forte, *poetica* et pictoria *licentia* et tertia iam haeretica.

Mamertini paneg. Maximiano dictus 1 neque enim fabula est de *licentia poetarum*.

Lact. VII 22 § 6 corruperunt igitur *poetica licentia* quod acceperant.

Auson. grat. act. 4 ades enim locis omnibus nec iam miramur *licentiam poetarum* qui omnia Deo plena dixerunt.

Macrob. comm. II 8 § 5 an forte *poetica licentia* particulam pro simili paene particula posuit et pro *sub ambas* dicere maluit *per ambas?*

id. Sat. VI 9 § 13 scire vellem in equi fabrica casune an ex industria hoc genus ligni nominaverit? nam licet unum pro quolibet ligno ponere *poeticae licentiae* sit, solet tamen Vergilius temeritatem licentiae non amare.

Martianus Capella § 297 *poetarum* vero *licentia* haec nomina pluraliter dixit.

Serv. Aen. I 15 ingenti arte Vergilius, ne in rebus fabulosis aperte utatur *poetarum licentia*, quasi opinionem sequitur.

ib. 54 translatio est per *poeticam licentiam* facta. So ib. 227. 550 (p. 169 8), III 3. 349.

Beda de metris 2 ad fin. (XC 153[a] Migne) *r* littera liquens, eodem modo sicut et *l*, cum in medio sermone brevem sequitur vocalem, praecedente qualibet consonante, potest hanc *poetica licentia* facere longam. ib. 3 bis (153[a c]).

For what follows I have used the note of Marcilius on Hor. a. p. and Erasmi adagia.

In Greek we find *ἐξουσία* ascribed to poets: Diphil. in Ath. 223[b]

> *ὡς οἱ τραγῳδοὶ φασίν, οἷς ἐξουσία*
> *ἔστιν λέγειν ἅπαντα καὶ ποιεῖν μόνοις.*

Strabo p. 25[1] *καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Μήνιγγι δὲ τοῖς περὶ τῶν Λωτοφάγων εἰρημένοις συμφωνεῖν. εἰ δέ τινα μὴ συμφωνεῖ, μεταβολὰς αἰτιᾶσθαι δεῖν ἢ ἄγνοιαν ἢ καὶ ποιητικὴν ἐξουσίαν, ἢ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἱστορίας καὶ διαθέσεως καὶ μύθου.*

Luc. Dem. enc. 10 *καίτοι λαβόμενος ἂν ἐγὼ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἐξουσίας ἐπεισῆγον ἂν ἔρωτας θεῶν καὶ κρίσεις καὶ κατοικήσεις καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα*: and a little below *τὸ μὲν δὴ ποιητικὸν φῦλον ἐλεύθερον.*

[1] I was guided to Strabo and Luc. Dem. enc. by Marcilius. If I had looked in the lexicon of Sophocles earlier, I might have been spared a good deal of research.

Freedom of poets also in Hermotim. 72 *οὐδὲν τῶν ἱπποκενταύρων καὶ χιμαιρῶν καὶ γοργόνων διαφέρει, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ὄνειροι καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ γραφεῖς ἐλεύθεροι ὄντες ἀναπλάττουσιν οὔτε γενόμενα πώποτε οὔτε γενέσθαι δυνάμενα.*

Irresponsibility in pro imag. 18 *παλαιὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀνευθύνους εἶναι καὶ ποιητὰς καὶ γραφέας.*

The technical term in the grammarians is *ἄδεια*. Fix in HSt. has five references and Sophocles two. Add (regulae de prosodia 122 fin. in Herm. de emend. rat. gr. gr. 448) *τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν πτωτικῶν οὕτως μηκύνεται, ὡς ἔχει τὸ ἀκονιτί...ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ποιητικῇ ἀδείᾳ συνεσταλμένον προφέρεται.*

Compare also:

Ov. amor. III 12 41 42

exit in immensum fecunda *licentia vatum*,
obligat historica nec sua verba fide.

Hor. ad Pis. 9 10

pictoribus atque poetis
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.

Prudent. c. Symm. II 39 40

aut vos pictorum docuit manus adsimulatis
iure poetarum numen componere monstris.

Cf. Quintil. I 5 § 12 in eiusdem vitii geminatione Mettoeo Fufettioeo dicens Ennius *poetico iure* defenditur.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

II.—ON HEMINA SANGUINIS IN SENECA AND JEROME.

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society 1 May 1879.)

Seneca tranq. an. 14 § 3 minabatur Theodoro philosopho tyrannus mortem et quidem insepultam: "habes," inquit, "cur tibi placeas. *hemina sanguinis* in tua potestate est: nam quod ad sepulturam pertinet, o te ineptum, si putas mea interesse, supra terram an infra putrescam." Hieron. ep. 147 8 pr. (I 1091[b] ed. Ven. 1766, a severe letter to Sabinianus a deacon, who had been guilty of adultery) iaces itaque advolutus genibus meis et *heminam,* ut tuis verbis utar, *sanguinis* deprecaris. The editor's note is "sic legendum videtur ad Veronensis exemplaris fidem *heminam,* non, ut vulgo hactenus obtinuit, *misericordiam.* est autem hemina mensura fere omnium minima, quae sextarii dimidia pars est. ei Sabinianus qui et *marcidulus, pallidus et exsanguis* supra dicitur, ad movendam Hieronymo misericordiam, sanguinem suum comparat . . . vocem obscuriorem aut minus obviam critici depraverunt." Had the editor known of the passage of Seneca (which I had noted in my lexicon, and can find in no lexicon but Mühlmann's[1]), he might have added authority to the grounds which make the new reading certain. For *misericordiam sanguinis* is nonsense; whereas *heminam sanguinis deprecaris* makes good sense whether you take *deprecaris* in the sense of 'beg off,' 'pray against,' 'pray to be let off' as in *letum deprecor,* or in that of 'pray for,' 'pray not to be

[1] This very day the new edition of Georges vol. I has come to hand, which contains this passage.

deprived of;' cf. *vitam, pacem deprecari.* In the first case the meaning is, 'you beg me to be content with your present mortification, not to reduce you to a half-pint of blood, to mere skin and bone.' In the second case translate: 'you beg me not to rob you of the half-pint of blood which alone remains to you.' The palaeographical interest of the variant *misericordiam* is very great. Either the *he*[1] of *heminam* was omitted by accident, and *mīam* which remained was expanded as usual into *misericordiam,* or the *mīam* was first expanded into the well-known word, and then *he*[1] omitted as unintelligible. It is plain that *hemina sanguinis* became proverbial and it is not likely that it is extant only in these two texts.

[1] Or rather *e*. Georges has two examples of *emina*.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

III.—ON CONDICIO AND CONDITIO.

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society 15 May 1879.)

Antonio Augustino, abp. of Tarragona in the 16th century, asked the question (dial. ant. ix) whether *condicio* should be written with *c* or *t*, 'et quaesito contentus est.' The Jesuit Claude Dausque in his *antiqui novique LatI orthographica* (Tournai 1632 fol. ii 92) is more dogmatic: 'conditio consona T, nec aliter. Ratio in exemplis est, *amatio, lectio, dictio, latio,* alia, quibus urgetur competentia. Origo sic imperat, *conditus, conditor, conditrix, conditio. Conditi sumus bona conditione,* inquit Seneca l. 5 de consol. (?) Qui libros veteres aut epigrammata in contrarium iurant, scripti crimen iurant. Pandectae Flor. cum C, uti lapis Ancyranus per C.'

The Jesuit's reasoning falls to the ground with his derivation of the word. Isidore (origg. v 24 29) conditiones sunt proprie testium, et dictae conditiones a condicendo, quasi condictiones, quia non ibi testis unus iurat, sed duo vel plures... item conditiones, quod inter se conveniat sermo testium, quasi condiciones. It is now generally allowed that *condicio* and *dicio* belong to the family of *δείκνυμι, dico, disco, dicis causa* Curtius I^4 134. Corssen I^2 52. Vaniček I^2 330. Yet of the lexicographers only Klotz and his pirate Corradini (in his Forcellini) spell the word with a *c*, and separate it entirely from *condĭtio*[1]. Faber and Gesner class it among derivates of *do*, and even Georges follows Scheller Freund and De-Vit's Forcellini in the

[1] Corradini's slavish dependence on Klotz appears in his assigning (what is amazing in an editor of Cicero, as Klotz was) to this head a passage of Cic. which is rightly given under *condĭtio*.

spelling *conditio*. Fleckeisen (Fünfzig Artikel, Teubner 1861 p. 14) yields to authority, but with a bad grace; '*condicio* nicht *conditio*, so ungern man sich auch den von Döderlein (Reden u. Aufsätze I 368) für die Schreibung mit *t* geltend gemachten inneren Gründen entziehen mag; aber die Autorität der Inschriften (s. E. Hübner in den Jahrb. f. class. Philol. 1858 S. 354 ff. 1859 S. 437) und der ältesten Handschriften (Ambrosianus des Plautus, Bembinus des Terentius, die besten des Vergilius, die Palimpsesten von Cic. de re publica und Gaius) ist durchaus für *condicio*'. A brief comparison of the examples collected in the lexicons of *condicio* and *condico*, will shew that the terms belong to one another; still we find in many editions, as Haase's Seneca, the old *mumpsimus* holds its ground.

A very few traditional examples of *conditio* from *condo* are given by the lexicons. They will be found with others in Rönsch Itala u. Vulgata 309 (from vulg. and Tert. Iren. Prud.). I have noticed the following:

Commod. apol. 121 sic deus omnipotens, dominus suae conditionis.

Tert. adv. Marc. I 15 pr. cum dixeris esse et illi [creatori] conditionem suam et suum mundum et suum caelum.

ib. 16 p. m. conditionis universitas. id. apol. 19 pr. [the passage from cod. Fuld.] Moyses, qui mundi conditionem et generis humani pullulationem...exorsus est.

Victorini tractatus de fabrica mundi pr. (Cave hist. lit. Basil. 1741 I 148) in libro Mosis quem de conditione ipsius [mundi] scripsit, qui genesis appellatur.

Iren. III 6 § 1 deum patrem et filium eius, qui dominium accepit a patre suo omnis conditionis. id. V 18 § 1 saepe. 2.

Aug. de gen. ad litt. IV § 43 illi tres dies, qui ante conditionem istorum luminarium commemorati sunt.

id. tract. in Io. ep. I § 4 quantum deus a creatura, quantum conditor a conditione, quantum sapientia ab eo quod factum est per sapientiam, longe ultra omnia debet esse lux ista.

id. civ. dei I 12 (I 22 24 Dombart) proinde ista omnia, id est curatio funeris, conditio sepulturae, pompa exequiarum, magis sunt vivorum solacia quam subsidia mortuorum.

Hier. comm. in Eph. 1 4 (VII 548[b] ed. Ven. 1769) volens itaque Paulus ostendere quod deus universa sit machinatus ex nihilo, non conditionem, non creaturam atque facturam, sed *καταβολήν*, id est, initium fundamenti ad eum rettulit.

ib. 2 10 (578[e]) ita et in nobis et in Christo per singula opera et profectus creatura atque conditio accipi potest.

ib. 4 23—4 (626 fin.) creatio quippe apud nos generatio vel nativitas dicitur: apud graecos vero sub nomine creationis verbum facturae et conditionis accipitur. et quod apud nos conditio, hoc apud graecos creatio sonat.

Oros. II 2 et a primo anno Procae, cum regnare coepit, usque ad conditionem urbis.

ib. VII 20 p. 514 Hav. millesimus a conditione Romae annus impletus est. ib. 43 p. 586 fin. si quid a conditione mundi usque ad nunc simili factum felicitate doceatur. cf. Beda h. e. I 11.

Phoebad. c. Arian. 1 ad hanc tractatus conditionem necessitate descendimus. Barth ad loc. (pp. 57—8 Francof. 1623, cf. advers. VI 27 p. 306) conditio non est id quod vulgo solet, sed compositio, conditura, scriptio. condere autem peculiare librorum scriptoribus attribuitur, quod ii nimirum in lucem producant quid cuius antea non erat nota conditio. ..... conditio autem pro conditura aut opere quo condito Tertulliani est de corona militis c. 4 [read 6 and compare a little before 'naturalem usum conditionis'] 'quaeris an conditioni eius fruenda natura nobis debeat praeire, ne illa rapiamur qua dei aemulus universam conditionem certis usibus homini mancipatam cum ipso homine corrupit?' idem adversus Hermogenem cap. 10 [read 11] 'cum praeses eius diabolus abierit in ignem quem praeparavit illi deus et angelis eius, prius in puteum abyssi relegatus quam revelatio filiorum dei redemerit conditionem a malo, utique vanitati subiectam, cum restituta innocentia et integritate conditionis pecora condixerint bestiis, et parvuli de serpentibus luserint,' hoc est 'omnem creaturam' ut vocat apostolus quicquid vivit, sic etiam capiam apud Valerianum Cimelenensem sermone I 'vereor dicere ne nostram neglegentiam pulset ista sententia. non autem cognoscit dominum qui conditionis suae non agnoscit officium.'

Hil. in ps. 53 12[1] (IV 344[b] Migne) et quamquam passio illa non fuerit conditionis et generis, quia indemutabilem dei naturam nulla vis iniuriosae perturbationis offenderet.

ib. 68 25[1] (486[a]) quia neque evacuatio illa ex dei forma naturae caelestis interitus est, neque formae servilis assumptio tamquam genuinae originis conditionisque natura est.

Druthmar expos. in Matt. c. 12 pr. (CVI 1314[b] Migne) duobus modis est nobis pater deus: conditione, quia condidit et creavit nos.

In some passages it may be a question whether we should read *conditio* 'creation, make,' or *condicio* 'state' (e.g. Tert. apol. 48 p. m. 'ergo' inquitis 'semper moriendum erit et semper resurgendum.' si ita rerum dominus destinasset, ingratis experieris condicionis tuae legem.) But it seems plain that editors and lexicographers should distinguish words of such different origin and use, and that the modern languages should follow the example of Spanish in writing 'condicion' and all its family with a medial *c*.

[1] Possibly I owe these two examples to Paucker.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

ON THE DATE AND INTEGRITY OF A LETTER ASCRIBED TO D. BRUTUS. (AD FAMILIARES XI. 13 a.)

THERE is no direct evidence in this letter as to the date of its composition. The superscription found in some editions 'Scr. Pergae IV. Nonas Iunias A. U. C. 711' is clearly wrong, and has perhaps been transferred by an oversight from ad Fam. XII. 15 which is placed next to this letter in chronological order by Schütz.

Can then the date of the letter be inferred from its contents?

§ 4 seems to show

1. That the writer had crossed the Alps—(neque ex Italia tam cito exercitum traici posse credebant).

2. That Plancus was on the right bank of the Isara, and we learn from ad Fam. X. 23, 3 that he recrossed that river from its left bank on June 4.

§ 5 seems to imply that the armies of D. Brutus and Plancus were, if not united, at least within easy reach of each other. Now Plancus, writing on June 6, expected D. Brutus to join him in three days (ad Fam. X. 23, 3).

§§ 4 and 5 both seem to imply that D. Brutus had heard of the defection of Lepidus, which took place on May 29 (cp. ad Fam. X. 23, 2). For though the concluding words of this letter (qui quidem...converterunt) may seem to describe the behaviour of Octavian more accurately than that of Lepidus, yet there does not appear to be any evidence that the disaffection of Octavian had shewn itself in an active form before the date of this letter—(cp. ad Fam. XI. 10, 4; XI. 20, 1 and 4), and Plancus even on July 28 does not seem to have given up all hope of his support—cp. ad Fam. X. 24, 4—6.

It seems then that the portion of this letter beginning with the words 'in spem venerant' in § 4, can hardly have been written before the 7th or 8th of June. A further question arises, viz. whether all the letter was written at one time.

Now in § 2 the writer speaks in a very slighting way of his forces, 'recurri ad meas copiolas ...sunt extenuatissimae'— but in ad Fam. XI. 23, 1, a letter written on May 25, while he still entertained hopes of Lepidus, and therefore before § 5 of the present letter, D. Brutus speaks of his forces as forming one of three considerable armies—'tribus tantis exercitibus'.

It seems therefore that § 2 of this letter was written before ad Fam. XI. 23. Perhaps it was written soon after the writer had received information of the discontent caused at Rome by his apparent dilatoriness.

Now such discontent would not be expressed at Rome before reports had arrived there that D. Brutus was wasting the days which immediately followed the relief of Mutina: and as Mutina was probably relieved on April 27 (cp ad Fam. XI. 9, 2), such reports would not leave its neighbourhood before April 29, nor arrive at Rome before May 4, as a message seems to have taken about five days to reach Rome from Mutina (cp. ad Fam. 10. 30, 1 and Philipp. 14. 5).

The criticisms then to which the earlier part of this letter seems to have been a reply can hardly have been made before May 4 or 5, nor can they at the very earliest have reached D. Brutus before May 11; between which date and May 25 the earlier portion of the present letter seems to have been written. It must have been written at some place visited by D. Brutus on his march from Pollentia to Eporedia. He was at Eporedia on May 24 (cp. ad Fam. XI. 20, 4).

The Medicean MS. (M), from which Mr C. B. Heberden has been good enough to make a transcript of this letter for me, does not appear to suggest any doubt as to the continuity of the letter; nor, so far as I have been able to discover, has any previous editor been struck by its internal inconsistencies.

I must add (1) that the conclusion of the first of the two

fragments which, according to my view, make up the present letter is very abrupt — whether we suppose it to end at 'cum equitibus', or at 'consistere': (2) that the beginning of the second fragment is, on either supposition, equally abrupt: (3) that on any supposition the language of § 2 with regard to the state of the writer's forces is hardly reconcileable with that of ad Fam. XI. 10, which is dated May 5, and must therefore have been written before any portion of the present letter. In ad Fam. XI. 10, D. Brutus speaks of his difficulty in finding supplies for an army of seven legions.

I append a list of the dates of D. Brutus' letters written after the relief of Mutina.

Ad Fam. XI. 9, April 29, Regium [Lepidum] (Reggio).
„ „ „ 10, May 5, Dertona (Tortona).
„ „ „ 11, „ 6, ex castris, finibus Statiellensium.
„ „ „ 13 a, the letter now under consideration.
„ „ „ 19, „ 21, Vercellae (Vercelli).
„ „ „ 20, „ 25, Eporedia (Ivrea).
„ „ „ 23, „ „ „ „
„ „ „ 26, June 3, ex castris.

A. WATSON.

JUVENAL X. 54, 55.

Mr Munro seems to me to have been less happy than usual in the two emendations he has proposed for l. 54. According to that which he now prefers he would read

ergo supervacua aut ut perniciosa petuntur,
propter quae fas est genua incerare deorum?

translating "Well then, to come back to our subject, even as superfluous or hurtful things are, as we have seen, asked for in prayer, what things may we with propriety ask for?" His other emendation was to read *haut, haut* after *supervacua*, translating "Are then the things asked for in prayer not superfluous, not pernicious, things for which we may with propriety petition the gods?"

I think we may get a more simple and natural meaning by adopting Doederlein's *aut vel* and changing *petuntur* into *putantur*,

ergo supervacua aut vel perniciosa putantur
propter quae fas est genua incerare deorum.

which I should translate "accordingly (i.e. in accordance with the blindness which has been illustrated in the preceding part of the Satire) those things for which it is really right to pray (such as honesty and modesty) are reckoned superfluous or even injurious." They had so perverted their judgment by indulging in wishes for what was wrong, that what was right seemed no longer desirable.

I confess that this reading leaves a harshness in the connexion both with what precedes and with what follows; but that is a general defect of Juvenal's style, and I think the passage is open to the same objection on any interpretation yet proposed.

Perhaps an easier form of Mr Munro's emendation might be *ergo supervacua ut vel perniciosa petuntur.*

JOSEPH B. MAYOR.

ADFECTUS AND ADFICTUS.

Under the word *adficio* the Lexicons quote from Cicero's *Topica* § 8 the following words: *in iis locis in quibus argumenta inclusa sunt, alii in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, alii adsumuntur extrinsecus. In ipso tum ex toto, tum ex partibus eius, tum ex nota, tum ex iis rebus quae quodam modo* adfectae sunt *ad id de quo quaeritur.* The last words recur in § 11. The words *adfectae sunt* are explained by the lexicographers, who follow Boethius, as = *standing in relation to.*

An unknown commentator on Cicero's *De Inventione* 1 cap. 24—28 (ap. Halm, *Rhet. Lat. Min.* p. 305 foll.) has an apparently similar use of *adfectus* (Halm, p. 309), *quae res possunt in ipsum factum adfectione quadam convenire, has res* adfecta *nominamus: verum* adfecta *accipimus nunc de ipso negotio, id est de omni causa rebusque in causa gestis, nunc ad res in causa gestas alia quasi quodam modo extrinsecus quae convenire videantur, aut inde ut proveniant aut ad illa coniuncta sint.* In the passage of Cicero (*Inv.* 1 § 37), on which the commentator is remarking, we find however the following words: *negotiis autem quae sunt attributa, partim sunt continentia cum ipso negotio, partim in gestione negotii considerantur, partim adiuncta negotio sunt, partim gestum negotium consequuntur. Continentia cum ipso negotio sunt ea, quae semper* adfixa *esse videntur ad rem neque ab ea possunt separari.*

I would suggest that the word *adfecta,* which cannot, without great straining, be made to give the required sense, was written by pure mistake for *adficta.* The MS. of Cicero which the commentator had before him probably contained *adfecta,* i. e. *adficta,* and, not understanding the word, he ex-

plained it as = *quae res possunt in ipsum factum adfectione quadam convenire. Adfictus = adfixus* occurs in Varro, *R. R.* 3 3 2; 3 9 7; Cic. *De Orat.* 2 325: *fictus = fixus* in Lucr. 3 4, where see Munro. But the passage in the *De Inventione* throws some light on that in the *Topica,* where it appears to me that we should read *ex iis rebus quae quodam modo* adfictae sunt *ad id de quo quaeritur:* "things which may be said to be inseparably connected with the question." At least I do not find that the lexicons quote, from classical Latin, any other instance of *adfectus* in a similar context, or in the sense required.

H. NETTLESHIP.

THE NUMBER OF PLATO.

Rep. p. 546. *ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι, ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν· ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρὶς αὐξηθείς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυεῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος· ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων κ.τ.λ.*

This passage is part of an answer supposed to be given by the Muses to the question, put to them in Homeric fashion, how strife first entered the State, and caused it to fall away from its ideal condition. The language is mock-oracular; the Muses treat the enquirers like children, and provoke them by talking loftily and gravely when all the time they are only jesting (*ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παῖδας παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν*). And the oracle which they utter is to this effect :—

"All that is created is liable to perish, our State like the rest. And since all creatures have their orbits or periods of fertility and decay, as plants have their seasons, it will come to pass some day that our rulers with all their philosophy will miss the secret law which governs human seasons, and will allow children to be born out of season. Now this period

is not expressed by a perfect number (since the State is only a human product) but by a number"—and then follows the passage in question.

§ 1.

The first clause (*ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ...ἀπέφηναν*) speaks of a series of four terms, which most interpreters have taken to be a geometrical progression, formed by two cube numbers with the two mean proportionals between them, such as 8 : 12 : 18 : 27 (Schneider[1]), or 27 : 36 : 48 : 64 (K. F. Hermann[2]). This view is supported by the wording of the clause, so far as it can be explained, and by the great importance which Plato elsewhere attaches to this kind of progression. In the *Timaeus* he bases the ratios of the musical intervals on the two series 1 : 2 : 4 : 8 and 1 : 3 : 9 : 27[3], and he applies the same principle to the four elements, earth and fire being the extremes, and water and air the mean proportionals which unite them (p. 32 B). And the Pythagorean writer Nicomachus says (*Introd. Arithm.* p. 143) that solid figures are called *τριχῇ διαστατά*, plane figures *διχῇ διαστατά*, and that this receives full light from the *Republic* of Plato, *κατὰ τὸν τοῦ λεγομένου γάμου τόπον*.

In the expression *δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι* all that is certain is that *δυνάμεναι* implies the process of finding either a square or a square root. A number is said 'to have the power of' (*δύνασθαι*) its square: and accordingly numbers are 'commensurable in power' (*δυνάμει σύμμετροι*) when their squares (*τὰ ἐπίπεδα ἃ δύνανται*) are commensurable. So *κατὰ δύναμιν* means 'when the square is taken' (opposed to *κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν* 'in the linear number,' *Rep.* p. 587 D). Again, *δύναμις* is applied in the concrete to denote an irrational

[1] *De Numero Platonis Commentationes duae*, I. p. 21.

[2] *Indices lectionum*, Marburgi, 1839: cp. Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.* II[2]. p. 546.

[3] The term *ἀπόστασις* is applied to these series, *Tim.* p. 43 B: *τὰς τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τριπλασίου τρεῖς ἑκατέρας ἀποστάσεις*. The more general sense of 'ratio' or 'interval' appears in *Phaed.* p. 111 B, *ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ὅπερ ἀὴρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκε καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα.*

square root, because the root is only known as that which has the 'power' to produce an actual number. But the combination *αὔξησις δυναμένη* is not found elsewhere, and its meaning is hardly to be elicited from any of the uses mentioned.

It appears from the *Theaetetus* (p. 147 D) that the enquiry into the irrational quantities had made some progress before Plato's time. The geometer Theodorus is there said to have shown the irrational character of the square roots from $\sqrt{3}$ to $\sqrt{17}$. The proof that $\sqrt{2}$ is irrational had probably been given long before. Aristotle quotes it as a stock example of *reductio per impossibile* (*Anal. Prior.* p. 41 *a* 26, p. 50 *a* 37). And the importance of understanding irrational quantities is insisted upon in the *Laws* (VII. p. 820) *τὰ τῶν μετρητῶν τε καὶ ἀμέτρων πρὸς ἄλληλα ἦτινι φύσει γέγονε κ.τ.λ.*

The Verb *δυναστεύεσθαι* is found in two places, viz. :—

Procl. *in Eucl.* p. 2 (ed. Bas.) *καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀναφαίνεται πᾶσιν ὁμοίως προσήκει τοῖς μαθήμασι, τῶν μὲν δυναμένων τῶν δὲ δυναστευομένων.* Proclus has been saying that the abstract principles of Mathematics meet us alike in Arithmetic, Geometry, and the science of Motion, and the words quoted exemplify this from the properties of squares, which are necessary in all branches of Mathematics, 'one set of quantities being capable of producing, the other of being produced, by the process of squaring.'

Alexander Aphrod. *in Arist. Metaph.* p. 35 (Berol. 1837), *ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἡ ὑποτείνουσα ἴσον δύναται ἀμφοτέραις ἅμα, διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν δυναμένη καλεῖται αἱ δὲ δυναστευόμεναι.* According to this statement, in the right-angled triangle whose sides are as 3, 4, and 5, the hypotenuse 5 is the *δυναμένη*, and the two sides 3 and 4 the *δυναστευόμεναι*.

The result of examining these two passages is purely negative. It is pretty evident that they are both suggested by the passage in the *Republic*, and as they give contradictory explanations it would seem that nothing was known of the meaning of the term *δυναστευόμεναι* from any independent source. Probably it was adopted by Plato, simply to express the reverse process to the process denoted by *δυνάμεναι*, whatever that may be.

The words *ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων* describe the terms (*ὅρους*) of the progression. For the use of the genitive compare *Rep.* p. 443 D *ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς.....νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης* 'like the three terms, which consist of the *νεάτη*, the *ὑπάτη* and the *μέση*.' The meaning is to be sought in the Pythagorean theories; cp. Proclus *in Eucl.* p. 7: *τούς τε καιροὺς τῶν πράξεων ἀναμετρουμένην καὶ τὰς ποικίλας περιόδους τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τοὺς προσήκοντας ἀριθμοὺς τοῖς γενέσεσι, τούς τε ἀφομοιωματικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῆς ἀνομοιότητος αἰτίους, τούς τε γονίμους καὶ τελείους, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τούτοις, τούς τε ἐναρμονίου ζωῆς χορηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῆς ἀναρμοστίας παρεκτικοὺς καὶ ὅλως φορᾶς καὶ ἀφορίας οἰστικούς.*

What, then, are the numbers that 'make like' and 'make unlike'? It seems that 'like' and 'unlike' are the same as 'square' and 'oblong' numbers, as K. F. Hermann shows from Iamblichus *ad Nicom.* p. 115, *οἱ δὲ παλαιοὶ ταυτούς τε καὶ ὁμοίους ἐκάλουν τοὺς τετραγώνους διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰς πλευράς τε καὶ γωνίας ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἰσότητα, ἀνομοίους δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ θατέρου τοὺς ἑτερομήκεις.* And the numbers that *make* these two sets like and unlike are themselves the odd and even numbers respectively: for the Pythagoreans attached great importance to the property by which the odd numbers produce the series of squares, and the even numbers the series of 'oblongs.' The two series are as follows :—

Squares	Oblongs (*ἑτερομήκεις*)
$1 + 3 = 4$	$2 + 4 = 6\ (= 2 \times 3)$
$4 + 5 = 9$	$6 + 6 = 12\ (= 3 \times 4)$
$9 + 7 = 16$, &c.	$12 + 8 = 20\ (= 4 \times 5)$, &c.

(Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.* 1^2. p. 253 *note*).

It is possible that *αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων* is only another way of describing the antithesis odd and even. The odd numbers were regarded by the Pythagoreans as 'generative.' On the question why the Romans named their male children on the ninth day from birth, and the females on the eighth, Plutarch says (*Qu. Rom.* 102, p. 288 C), *ἢ καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τὸν μὲν ἄρτιον θῆλυν ἄρρενα δὲ τὸν περιττὸν ἐνόμιζον*;

γόνιμος γάρ ἐστι καὶ κρατεῖ τοῦ ἀρτίου συντιθέμενος. And in the Pythagorean συστοιχία, 'odd' and 'square' are on the side of good, 'even' and 'oblong' on the side of evil.

§ 2.

The series so obtained is now submitted to a further process, described by the words ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο παρέχεται ἁρμονίας τρὶς αὐξηθείς, κ.τ.λ. These words are quoted, as being the kernel of the whole problem, by Aristotle, *Pol.* v. 12, 8, with the explanation, λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός 'when the number of this figure becomes solid.' Aristotle apparently thinks it needless to say what figure is intended. Later writers are unanimous in taking the figure to be the right-angled triangle in which the sides are in the proportion 3, 4, and 5 (since $3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$). This figure, often called the Pythagorean triangle, was probably used in practical geometry from a very early period. It is found in a Chinese work on geometry the date of which is at least some centuries earlier than our own era (Hankel, *Zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, p. 82). According to Heron of Alexandria (*Geom.* 12), and Proclus (*in Eucl.* I. 47), Pythagoras gave a general method of finding right-angled triangles with commensurable sides, and Plato himself was the author of another. The method of Pythagoras proceeds by taking an odd number. Let n be such a number, then the three sides are represented by the numbers n, $\frac{1}{2}(n^2-1)$, and $\frac{1}{2}(n^2+1)$. The method of Plato takes an even number, and gives as sides n, $\left(\frac{n}{2}\right)^2 - 1$, and $\left(\frac{n}{2}\right)^2 + 1$. Both are probably generalised from the equation $3^2+4^2=5^2$. (See also Plut. *Is. et Os.* p. 373 F; Aristides Quintilianus, p. 152 Meib.)

The word πυθμήν is employed by Theon Smyrnaeus to denote the first and simplest of a series of equal ratios (*De Mus.* c. 29 ἡμιολίων μὲν λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμὴν ὁ τῶν γ̄ πρὸς τὰ β̄, ἐπιτρίτων δὲ ὁ τῶν δ̄ πρὸς τὰ γ̄). Thus the ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν is the pair of numbers 4 and 3, regarded as the basis of the ratios 8 : 6, 12 : 9, and so on.

These two numbers are 'coupled by 5' in the Pythagorean triangle, since they form the two sides while 5 is the hypotenuse. The word *συζυγείς* seems chosen expressly to avoid suggesting either addition (*σύνθεσις*) or multiplication (in Plato *αὔξησις* or *πολλαπλασίωσις*): cp. Plut. p. 1017 E *αἱ συζυγίαι... κατά τε σύνθεσιν καὶ πολλαπλασιασμὸν ἐξ ἀλλήλων.*

Next, in what sense can the Pythagorean triangle be said to be *τρὶς αὐξηθείς*?

The phrase *τρὶς αὐξηθείς* may be translated 'raised to the third dimension,' since it may imply either 'solid' numbers (products of three factors) in general, or the cube, which is the solid number *par excellence*. (For the former use, see *Rep.* 528 B; for the latter, *Rep.* 587 D.) Aristotle (*l. c.*) paraphrases *τρὶς αὐξηθείς* by the words *ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός*. By the 'number of this figure' he cannot well mean any single number; probably he uses *ἀριθμός* in the sense of 'linear measurement,' as opposed to surfaces or solids (cf. *Rep.* p. 587 D, where *κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν* is opposed to *κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην*). Now the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of the sides; and this process leads us at once to the remarkable fact that $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216 = 6^3$.

It is difficult to resist the impression that this is what was in the mind of Plato, though there is singularly little evidence that the property in question was known. It is mentioned by Aristides Quintilianus, who says, speaking of the Pythagorean triangle (*De Mus.* p. 151 Meib.), *ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἑκάστην κατὰ βάθος αὐξήσαιμεν—βάθος γὰρ ἡ σώματος φύσις —ποιήσαιμεν ἂν τὸν σις'*. Also, it is said, on the authority of several Pythagorean authors referred to by Anatolius (*Theol. Arithm.* p. 41), that 216 years was the period of the metempsychosis.

§ 3.

We have next to consider how the process now applied to the triangle 3, 4, 5 can be said to give two 'harmonies,' one square and one 'oblong.' The most obvious difficulty is that *ἁρμονία* does not mean a number at all, but a *relation* between

quantities, especially a *proportion*. The nearest approach to the use of *ἁρμονία* for a single number seems to be in a passage of Plutarch *περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας* (p. 1017 ff.). In Pythagorean language, according to Plutarch,—

5, being 2 + 3, was called *τροφός* or *φθόγγος*.

13, being $2^2 + 3^2$, was called *λεῖμμα* (a musical term).

35, being $2^3 + 3^3$, was called *ἁρμονία*, because it is the sum of the first two cubes, and also of the series 6 : 8 :: 9 : 12, which gives the musical consonances. Similarly Nicomachus (*Theol. Arithm.* p. 47) says that the best of *ἁρμονίαι* is *κατὰ τὸν λε' ἀριθμόν* (not that the number 35 *is* a harmony), because that number is not only made up of the two cubes $2^3 + 3^3$, but is also the sum of the three first perfect numbers, 1 + 6 + 28, and again of those which exhibit in the lowest terms (*πυθμενικῶς*) the scheme of the musical consonances, viz. 6 + 8 + 9 + 12. Something of this sort is what we look for in the words *δύο παρέχεται ἁρμονίας* — some coincidence arrived at through progressions or series of numbers.

What then are the two 'harmonies'? They are described in a sentence which may be arranged as follows:

τὴν μὴν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις,
τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ,
ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ....δυεῖν,
ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος.

The only satisfactory explanation of this part of the passage is given by K. F. Hermann (p. VIII.), who is followed by Otto Weber[1] and Zeller. The first 'harmony' is a square, viz., 100 times 100. The second is 'of equal length one way,' i. e. one factor is 100, as before; the other factor is given in two parts, each described as multiplied by 100 (*ἑκατὸν μὲν...ἑκατὸν δὲ...*). It would have been more natural to have said *ἑκατὸν ἑκατοντάκις*, but the parallelism with *ἴσην ἰσάκις* leaves no doubt that *τοσαυτάκις* means 'a hundred times.' So *ἑκατὸν ἀριθμοί ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ.* is a slightly awkward way of saying 'a hundred times the number.' Plato is evidently avoiding the word *ἑκατοντάκις*, which perhaps was not in use in his time.

[1] *De Numero Platonis*, Cassel, 1862.

The first of the two parts of this unequal factor of the oblong is the 'number from the rational diagonal of 5' (i.e. the square of the rational diagonal of 5, used as a 'linear' number), less by one. This, as I shall proceed to show, gives us $7^2 - 1 = 48$.

Theon Smyrnæus, in his chapter *περὶ πλευρικῶν καὶ διαμετρικῶν ἀριθμῶν* (*De Arithm.* c. 31) shows how to form a double series, composed of numbers and their respective 'rational diagonals,' such that the square of each rational diagonal is either greater or less by unity than the square of the true diagonal; thus $2 \times 5^2 = 7^2 + 1$, $2 \times 12^2 = 17^2 - 1$. &c. Some such series may have been known to Plato; cp. *Polit.* 266 A *τῇ διαμέτρῳ δήπου καὶ πάλιν τῇ τῆς διαμέτρου διαμέτρῳ.* Formulae of this kind would naturally be discovered in the course of attempts to find an expression for the ratio of the diagonal to the side, i.e. for $\sqrt{2}$. In any case we may be sure that by the 'rational diagonal of the number 5' Plato means 7, which is the nearest whole number to $5\sqrt{2}$.

The words *ἀρρήτων δὲ δυεῖν* have caused some difficulty from the doubt—to put it shortly—whether *δέ* means 'and' or 'but.' If we complete the sentence in strict parallelism to the preceding clause, only putting *ἀρρήτων* for *ῥητῶν*, and *δυεῖν* for *ἑνός*, we obtain *ἑκατὸν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ ἀρρήτων διαμέτρων πεμπάδος δεομένων δυεῖν ἑκάστων.* '100 into the square of the irrational (or *true*) diagonal of 5, less by 2.' Now the square of the diagonal of 5 is $2 \times 5^2 = 50$; hence we have $50 - 2 = 48$, the same number as before. It seems to follow that the words *ἀρρήτων δὲ δυεῖν* give an *alternative* calculation: 'but if irrational, then deduct 2.'

The second of the two parts of the other dimension or factor of the oblong is the cube of 3. Thus the oblong or second harmony is $100 \times (48 + 27) = 7500$.

Adding the two harmonies (as implied by the words *ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος* 'this makes in all'), we obtain $10000 + 7500 = 17500$: and this is now called 'a geometrical number,' determining the issue spoken of, 'the better or worse bearing of children.' For the phrase *τοιούτου κύριος* refers us back to the beginning of the passage, where it was said that a

certain number represented the orbit or period of the *ἀνθρωπεῖον γεννητόν*. This 'geometrical number' then is the secret which the Guardians must know in order to make the right use of the seasons of growth and decay in the State.

§ 4.

It remains to enquire whether this total number can be connected with the provisional interpretations which have been given of the earlier clauses. It is evident that if those interpretations are right, the number obtained from the two harmonies must fulfil two main conditions: (1) it must be a number *in* which a geometrical series can be formed in the manner described by the first clause (*ἐν ᾧ ... ἀπέφηναν*); and (2) it must be somehow connected with this series by means of the relation $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 6^3$ (*ὧν ἐπίτριτος ... αὐξηθείς*).

The first of these conditions is best fulfilled perhaps by the series

$$6400 + 4800 + 3600 + 2700 \ (= 17500),$$

which was put forward by Weber. The two harmonies are obtained in it by taking the terms in pairs, $6400 + 3600 = 10000$, and $4800 + 2700 = 7500$. As two of the terms are squares and two are 'oblongs,' a fair meaning is given to the words *ὁμοιούντων καὶ ἀνομοιούντων*. And if (with Weber), we take the explanation of *δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι* given by Alexander Aphrod. (*supra*), and translate *αὐξήσεις δ. τ. κ. δ.* 'products of the numbers 3, 4, 5,' it will be found that this series is the 'first,' *i. e.* is in the lowest terms, fulfilling the conditions (1) that each term is a product of *some* powers of 3, 4, 5, and (2) that the first and third terms are products of *even* powers (and are consequently squares[1]).

It seems probable so far that Weber's numbers are those which were in the mind of Plato. We have to consider how

[1] Weber's statement of these conditions (p. 24, l. 19 ff.) is obscure, if not incorrect. He says: 'ex potentiis quibuslibet quinarii quaternarii ternarii inter se multiplicatis minor numerus quadratus quam is quem tertius progressionis terminus continet non producitur.' But 900 ($= 5^2 \times 4 \times 3^2$) satisfies the conditions so stated.

they fit the next clause. Weber explains ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς as the ratio or pair of numbers $4 \times 5 : 3 \times 5$, and takes τρὶς αὐξηθείς to mean that each is multiplied separately by the numbers 3, 4, and 5; the result being—

from 4×5 (= 20), the 'solid' numbers 60, 80, 100,
from 3×5 (= 15), the 'solid' numbers 45, 60, 75.

Each of these sets of three numbers also represents a Pythagorean triangle; and accordingly, by squaring the first three numbers we get the square terms of the geometrical series, with their sum (3600 + 6400 = 10000), and by multiplying each of these three numbers by the corresponding one in the next set we get the 'oblong' terms and their sum; for

$60 \times 45 = 2700$, $80 \times 60 = 4800$, and $100 \times 75 = 7500$.

Tempting as these results are, it is impossible to reconcile them with the language of Plato, especially with the phrase τρὶς αὐξηθείς. Weber rightly maintains that these words do not necessarily imply *cubing* of the sides of the supposed figure: but they must denote the process of multiplying three factors together, and not three separate multiplications. Moreover the three numbers 3, 4, 5, by which 20 and 15 are multiplied, are chosen arbitrarily. They appear to be suggested by the words ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς, to which Weber's scheme gives a different meaning. Finally, the striking relation $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 6^3$ is ignored by him.

It may be affirmed with some confidence that the explanation proposed by Weber is the nearest approach possible to a solution of the problem on the basis which we have adopted, viz., the assumption that the two 'harmonies' are 10000 and 7500 respectively. All attempts starting from that assumption must fail to account for the phrase τρὶς αὐξηθείς in the sense in which Aristotle understood it.

On the other hand the solutions which start with the notion of the Pythagorean triangle 'becoming solid,' i.e. with the relation $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 6^3 = 216$, fail to give a plausible interpretation of the two 'harmonies.' For example, Schneider points out that $216 = 8 \times 27$, and that these two cubes give the series 8 : 12 : 18 : 27, which offers a tolerable key to the

first part of the passage. But the concluding sentence (from δύο παρέχεται ἁρμονίας to the end) is explained by him in a way that is violent in the last degree.

§ 5.

If, then, there is no solution—if the conditions of the problem are inherently contradictory or impossible — are we to fall back upon the supposition that the passage is a deception, a mere jargon of mathematical phrases?

Mr Jowett has given strong reasons against this view of the case. "Some have imagined" he says (Vol. III. p. 113) "that there is no answer to the puzzle, and that Plato had been practising upon his readers. But such a deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in which Aristotle speaks of the number, and would have been ridiculous to any reader of the Republic who was acquainted with Greek mathematics." And we may be sure that Plato would not have left the passage in his text unless it had contributed either to the argument or to the artistic form in which it is presented.

But between these alternatives it may be possible to find a middle course. Although there is no complete solution—because there was no consistent meaning in Plato's mind—it does not follow that partial and inconsistent solutions, such as have been given above, are without value. It is plain that Plato made a serious effort to base the cycles of growth and decay in States upon a mathematical expression; and this passage may represent the results or suggestions which he had arrived at in his enquiries. He was especially attracted by the cases in which properties of number had been found susceptible of a geometrical meaning, and accordingly we find the passage dealing mainly with two groups of such properties—those of the geometrical series of the form $x^3 + x^2y + xy^2 + y^3$, and those of the 'Pythagorean' triangle. It is not unnatural to suppose that, failing to satisfy himself, and yet persuaded that he was on the right track, he chose to throw some of the most promising *formulae* into the half-playful form of an arithmetical puzzle. And it may be shown (I believe) that this view of the passage

is in harmony both with the style in which it is composed and with other examples of Plato's philosophical method.

The language is characterised by affected obscurity. Mr Jowett indeed denies this, and considers that 'the obscurity only arises from our want of familiarity with the subject' (p. 113). But the manner in which the passage is introduced seems to show that it was intended to be a puzzle, whether there is an explanation or not. The Muses are represented as pretending to speak seriously when all the time they are only mocking us. Such a preface would be out of place if it were followed by a piece of ordinary mathematics. I do not suppose indeed that the language is quite unintelligible, but that Plato assumed a mock-oracular style, as being well suited to set off to advantage a certain number of curious coincidences, and at the same time to disguise the gaps and contradictions in the scheme.

As indications of deliberate obscurity of language I would mention the following points:—

(1) *δυναστεύεσθαι* is probably a fanciful word, devised for the occasion. It is very unlikely that any common mathematical term of Plato's time should have fallen out of use again. Euclid, it must be remembered, is only about half-a-century later.

(2) The combination of words in *αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναι* is open to the criticism that both are words denoting operations, not quantities. Hence it is like speaking of the square of a multiplication. And the same may perhaps be said of *ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν τρὶς αὐξηθείς*—a phrase in which Aristotle evidently felt some obscurity, if we may judge from his paraphrase in the *Politics*.

(3) The word *ἁρμονία* means a relation between quantities, especially a proportion, and cannot with any propriety be applied to single numbers. To speak of a harmony as a square or oblong number is a clear departure from ordinary usage.

These instances show that the language of the passage is not such as Plato would have used if he had had a coherent scheme in his mind. If he had merely fragments of such a scheme, there was an obvious motive for dressing them up in the convenient disguise of a piece of playful irony.

It will probably strike readers of Plato that this view of the famous Number is not alien to his philosophical manner. It would be interesting, if space permitted, to examine other instances in which he appears to be putting forward speculations of a tentative kind, and to consider how far they indicate the adoption of a method, either of enquiry or of exposition. It occurs to us at once that such a method was found by Plato in the use of mythology. The myth derives its probability or 'likeness to truth' from the circumstance that it is a copy or 'shadow' of truth; it is therefore a type of probable or popular reasoning, a form adapted to those cases in which scientific knowledge is unattainable, or in which the mind is unable to grasp the 'reality' (i.e. the truth in its abstract form). Hence the usefulness of myths in education. So, too, the persuasion of rhetoric is spoken of as a kind of mythology, *Polit.* p. 304 C: *τίνι τὸ πειστικὸν οὖν ἀποδώσομεν ἐπιστήμῃ πλήθους τε καὶ ὄχλου διὰ μυθολογίας ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ διδαχῆς; φανερόν, οἶμαι, καὶ τοῦτο ῥητορικῇ δοτέον ὄν* (see Dr Thompson's *Phaedrus*, p. xvi.). In the *Timaeus*, again, the whole cosmogony, with its elaborate numerical schemes, is expressly said to be only a conjecture or likelihood or piece of mythology. Since the visible world is an image (*εἰκών*) of the real, our 'words' in order to correspond with it need only be 'likely' (*εἰκότας ἀνὰ λόγον τε ἐκείνων*), representing not truth but persuasion (*πίστις*). We are human, and should be satisfied with a probable myth (*τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους*). The Number in the *Republic* may be similarly explained as a piece of 'mythical' arithmetic. It differs indeed from the arithmetic of the *Timaeus* in being put forward ostensibly as a mere jest, not as a serious conjecture. But this makes less difference from Plato's point of view than from ours. Plato draws no clear line between the scientific probability of a good hypothesis and the *vraisemblance* of a pious fraud, or of a story which conveys a true moral. And the bantering tone of the passage is in harmony with this account. Playfulness is a distinguishing mark of the order of thought of which the myth is the type; cf. *Phaedr.* p. 276 D: *παιδιὰν .. τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.* It is opposed to the earnestness of dia-

lectic (σπουδὴ . . ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, κ.τ.λ.). The jesting of the Muses therefore, is not a mere illusion, but a likeness or reflexion (εἰκών), the fruit of the faculty of 'likening' or guessing (εἰκασία), which may serve to guide us towards the reality.

§ 6.

It remains to notice one serious objection to which the foregoing theory appears to be open, viz. that it is inconsistent with the manner in which Aristotle speaks of the Platonic Number in the *Politics*. Aristotle, it is said, was evidently in possession of the key to the puzzle; and there was therefore a key.

An examination of the passage in the *Politics* (v. 12, 8) hardly bears out the supposition that Aristotle had a distinct view of Plato's meaning. Aristotle is arguing against the Platonic scheme of the stages of degeneracy through which States pass, from the Ideal State down to Tyranny. His first point is that the suggested cause of change is not appropriate (οὐ λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἰδίως). To prove this he quotes the words ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται, with the explanation λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός, and then, admitting that the natural inferiority of a particular generation may be a cause of decay, he asks how this cycle in human things explains the degeneration of Plato's State more than of any other state, or any other human creation. His objection is an *à priori* one, valid without reference to the particular number or cycle proposed. He therefore notices the numerical scheme very cursorily: the short explanation which he gives seems intended only to show that Plato's theory turned upon a geometrical figure and the numbers furnished by it. It does not seem unlikely that in such a case Aristotle would hardly enquire whether the scheme was intelligible as a whole, or not.

In the time of Cicero the obscurity of the passage had passed into a proverb (*Ep. ad Att.* VII. 13, 5 *est enim numero Platonis obscurius*). Later arithmetical writers, especially the

Neo-Pythagoreans (as Nicomachus, Theon, Iamblichus, Proclus), refer to it in cautiously mysterious language, which leads us to suspect that they were as far from being able to explain it as the rest of the world.

'The point of interest,' as Mr Jowett says, 'is that Plato should have used such a symbol.' To which I may add that the mathematical ideas, which Plato sought to combine and apply in so fruitless a manner, had a history of which enough remains to furnish a study of genuine interest[1]. The Number of Plato, like other dreams, was woven of fragments from waking realities, and may still serve to indicate what these realities were.

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[1] Two books on this subject may be mentioned: C. A. Bretschneider, *Die Geometrie und die Geometer vor Euklides*, Leipzig, 1870; H. Hankel, *Zur Geschichte der Mathematik in Alterthum und Mittelalter*, Leipzig, 1874.

ON THE GENUINENESS OF THE *SOPHIST* OF PLATO, AND ON SOME OF ITS PHILOSOPHICAL BEARINGS.

[The following paper is reprinted nearly as it appears in the *Cambridge Philosophical Transactions*, Vol. x. Part i. As these bulky and rather expensive volumes are not generally in the hands of classical scholars, persons whose judgment I respect have more than once urged me to reprint it. I had already obtained the permission of the Council of the C. P. S. to make what use I pleased of the paper, but have hitherto felt unwilling to expose to the criticism of persons better acquainted with the most recent Platonic literature a fugitive production like the present. I am told however that its publication is desired by some of our younger students, to whom the dialogue seems a maze still in need of a clue. If it should appear to any one that there is an unfairness in printing a partly controversial paper without at the same time reprinting that which it is designed to impugn, I may answer that my able predecessor has stated his views of the *Sophist* and similar dialogues with his usual vigour in his *Platonic Dialogues for English readers*. W. H. T.]

In selecting the *Sophist* of Plato for the subject of this paper, I have been influenced by certain passages in an interesting contribution to our knowledge of some parts of the Platonic system which was read by the Master of Trinity at a former Meeting[1]. I have principally in view to assert what was then called in question, the genuineness of this dialogue, and the consequent genuineness of the *Politicus*, which must

[1] *Cambridge Philosophical Transactions*, Vol. ix. Part iv.

stand or fall with it; but I am not without the hope of throwing some new light upon the scope and purpose of the *Sophist* in particular, and upon the philosophical position of Platonism in reference to two or three now forgotten, but in their day important schools of speculation. Such an inquiry cannot fail, I think, to be interesting to those members of the Society whose range of studies has embraced the fragmentary remains of the early thinkers of Greece, as well as the more polished and mature compositions of Plato and Aristotle: for such persons must be well aware that it is as impossible to account for the peculiarities of these later systems without a clear view of their relation to those which went before them, as it would be to explain the characteristics of Gothic architecture in its highest development without a previous study of those ruder Byzantine forms out of which it sprang; or to account for the peculiar form of an Attic tragedy without a recognition of the lyrical and epic elements of which it is the combination. Nor is this all. The writings both of Plato and Aristotle abound with critical notices of contemporary systems, with the authors of which they were engaged in lifelong controversy: and whoever refuses to take this into account will miss the point and purpose not only of particular passages, but, in the case of Plato, of entire dialogues. In the search for these allusions to the writings or sayings of contemporaries, we have need rather of the microscope of the critic than of the sky-sweeping tube of the philosopher: and a task so minute and laborious is not to be required of any man whose literary life has loftier aims than the elucidation of the masterpieces of classical antiquity.

I say then at the outset of this inquiry, that I not only hold the *Sophist* to be a genuine work of Plato, but that it seems to me to contain his deliberate judgment of the logical doctrines of three important schools, one of which preceded him by nearly a century, while the remaining two flourished in Greece side by side with his own, and lasted for some time after his decease. I hold the *Sophist* to be, in its main scope and drift, a critique more or less friendly, but always a rigorous and searching critique of the doctrines of these schools, the relation

of which to each other is traced with as firm a hand, as that of each one to the scheme which Plato proposes as their substitute. These positions I shall endeavour to substantiate hereafter, but I shall first produce positive external evidence of the authenticity of the dialogue under review.

1. The most unexceptionable witness to the genuineness of a Platonic dialogue is, I presume, his pupil and not over-friendly critic Aristotle. Allusions to the writings of Plato abound in the works of this philosopher, of which the industry of commentators has revealed many, and has probably some left to reveal[1]. These allusions are frequently open and acknowledged; the author is often, the dialogue occasionally named[2]: but in the greater number of instances no mention occurs either of author or dialogue, and the φασί τινες of the philosopher has to be interpreted by the sagacity of his readers or commentators. I shall begin with an instance of the last kind, where however the identity of phraseology enables us to identify the quotation. In the treatise *De Anima*, III. 3. 9, we read thus: φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη. A "combination of judgment and sensation" is evidently the same thing as "judgment with sensation;" why then this tautology? It is explained by a reference to Plato's *Sophist*, § 107, p. 264 B, where we are told that the mental state denoted in a previous sentence by the verb φαίνεται is "a mixture of sensation and judgment," σύμμιξις

[1] "Quo diligentius Aristotelem evolvo, eo frequentius, ut aliorum, ita Platonis sententias circumspectas invenio....Haec quidem loca, ubi tacite Plato respicitur, magis ut res fert, in Platone refellendo et diiudicando, quam exponendo et enucleando versantur." Trendelenburg, *Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina*, p. 21.

[2] Sometimes without Plato's name, as ἐν τῷ Ἱππίᾳ, ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι. It is remarkable that these are the only two dialogues quoted by name in the *Metaphysics:* though Plato's entire system comes under review in that work, of which one book is appropriated to the theory of ideas alone. The *Parmenides*, which is largely drawn from, is not once named. It may be observed generally that whenever the author's name is omitted before the title of a work cited, the allusion is always to the most generally celebrated of works so entitled. Thus when Aristotle speaks of *the* Antigone, he means the *Antigone* of Sophocles, not of Euripides.

αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης; and just before, that when a judgment is formed, one of the terms of which is an object present at the time to the senses, we may properly denote such judgment as a φαντασία. Ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἀλλὰ δι' αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος, ἆρ' οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν; A φαντασία is, it will be seen, according to Plato a variety of δόξα. The distinction was perhaps not worth making, but it is perfectly intelligible; and in restricting a popular term to a scientific sense, Plato is taking no unusual liberty. Aristotle, however, needs the word for another purpose, and accordingly pushes Plato's distinction out of the way.

The only word used by Aristotle which Plato does not use is συμπλοκή: Plato wrote σύμμιξις, but it is remarkable that the word συμπλοκὴ does occur two or three times over in this part of the dialogue; hence Aristotle, writing from memory, substitutes it for the σύμμιξις of the original. One of the most learned and trustworthy of his commentators, Simplicius, has the gloss: τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἔν τε τῷ Σοφίστῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ τὴν φαντασίαν ἐν μίξει δόξης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως τιθεμένου, ἐνίστασθαι πρὸς τὴν θέσιν διὰ τούτων δοκεῖ. Now in the *Philebus* the definition in question does not occur, though the mental act which Plato calls φαντασία is graphically described, and the cognate participle φανταζόμενον is used in the description (p. 38 c). The passages quoted from the *Sophist* are therefore here alluded to, for there are none such in any other dialogue, and the restricted use of the term is peculiar to the author of the *Sophist*.

2. The next passage I shall quote refers not to the *Sophist*, but to the *Politicus* or *Statesman*, which is a continuation of it. It is familiar to readers of the *Politics*, in the first chapter of which Aristotle writes thus: Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν· πλήθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἴδει τούτων ἕκαστον...ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ σμικρὰν πόλιν. "Those persons are mistaken who pretend that the words statesman, king, housemaster and lord mean all the same thing, differing not specifi-

cally, but only in respect of the number of persons under their controul; for, say they, a large household is but a small state." With this compare Plato's *Politicus*, 258 E: *πότερ' οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλέα καὶ δεσπότην καὶ ἔτ' οἰκονόμον θήσομεν ὡς ἓν πάντα ταῦτα προσαγορεύοντες, ἢ τοσαύτας τέχνας αὐτὰς εἶναι φῶμεν, ὅσαπερ ὀνόματα ἐῤῥήθη*; "Are we then to identify the statesman with the king, the lord, or the master of a family; or are we to say that there are as many separate arts as we have mentioned names?" The young Socrates is not prepared with an answer, whereupon he is further asked: "What? can there be any difference, as regards government, between a household of large and a town of small dimensions?" (*τί δέ; μεγάλης σχῆμα οἰκήσεως, ἢ σμικρᾶς αὖ πόλεως ὄγκος μῶν τι πρὸς ἀρχὴν διοίσετον;*). "There can be none," says the facile respondent. "Is it not then clear," rejoins the other, "that there is but one science applicable to all four, and that it is a mere question of words whether we choose to call such science Kingcraft or Politic or Œconomic?" (*εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικήν τις ὀνομάζει μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερώμεθα*).

3. There is a passage in Aristotle's treatise *De Partibus Animalium* (I. c. 2), too long for quotation, in which he describes and criticizes that method of division or classification of which the author of this dialogue gives us specimens, styling it *μεσοτομία* or *διχοτομία*, the method of *mesotomy* or *dichotomy*. "Some persons," says Aristotle, "get at particulars by dividing the genus into two differentiæ: but this method is in one point of view difficult, in another impracticable." "It is difficult in this process," he observes, "to avoid discerption or laceration of the genus (*διασπᾶν τὸ γένος*); for example, to avoid classing birds under two distinct heads, an error is committed in the 'written divisions' (*γεγραμμέναι διαιρέσεις*), in which some birds come under the genus Terrestrial, and some under that of Aquatic Animals (*ἐκεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν μετὰ τῶν ἐνύδρων συμβαίνει διῃρῆσθαι τοὺς δ' ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει*), so that birds and fishes are both classed under the term Aquatic Animals." In a zoological treatise, nothing could have been worse than such a classification; which occurs both in this dialogue and in the *States-*

man[1]. Again, in the latter work, (264 A,) animals are divided into tame and wild, *διῄρητο ξύμπαν τὸ ζῷον τῷ τιθάσῳ καὶ ἀγρίῳ.* This distinction does not escape Aristotle, who in the treatise referred to proceeds to observe that a classification of this popular kind mixes up creatures widely diverse in structure (*ὥσθ' ὁτιοῦν ζῷον ἐν ταύταις* [*ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν*] *ὑπάρχειν*), and not only so, but the distinction itself is a conventional one: for nearly all tame animals exist also in a wild state; for instance, man, the horse, the ox, *κύνες ἐν τῇ Ἰνδικῇ, ὗες, αἶγες, πρόβατα.* In the Aristotelian treatise itself I am not aware that any system of classification is proposed which would obtain the approbation of modern zoologists. The *Statesman* and the *Sophist* are not zoological works, and Aristotle's censure is therefore irrelevant. But the coincidences seem too special to have been accidental.

4. In a work similar in its scope to the *Sophist,* the curious treatise *περὶ Σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων,* occurs a definition of "Sophistic," which to my ear is an echo of the Platonic Dialogue. I allude to the often-repeated definition, *ἔστιν ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία ἀλλ' οὐκ οὖσα, καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσης* (*S. E.* I. 6). "Sophistic is a wisdom seeming but not real, and the Sophist is a tradesman, whose capital consists of such unreal wisdom." What is this but an abridgment of the *διαιρετικὸς λόγος* of the *Sophist,* a definition identical with the *νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής*—"the hireling hunter of the rich and young," with the very addition which Plato proceeds, with an affectation of logical accuracy, to graft upon it?

5. In the same treatise, c. 5, § 1, we read as follows: "Other paralogisms depend on an ambiguity in the terms employed, whether used absolutely or only in a certain sense: for instance, if you say "that which 'is not' may be a term

[1] *Soph.* 220 A: *τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους τὸ δ' ἕτερον νευστικοῦ ζῴου.* *Politic.* 264 C: *τῆς μὲν ἀγελαίων τροφῆς ἔστι μὲν ἔνυδρον, ἔστι δὲ ξηροβατικόν.* The words 'written divisions' are supposed to refer to a work now lost, a collection of Platonic 'Divisions' similar perhaps to that of the 'Definitions' attributed by some to Speusippus, which were probably compiled partly from the Dialogues and partly from Plato's oral teaching.

in a judgment," they infer the contradiction, 'That which is not, is:' but this is a fallacy, for 'to be this or that' and 'to be' in the abstract are not the same thing. Or conversely, they argue that that which *is*, is not, if you tell them that any entity *is not* so and so—say that A is not a man. For not to be this or that is not the same as absolute non-existence[1]."

This is but an Aristotelic translation of the following in the *Sophist:* "Let no one object that we mean by the μὴ ὄν the contrary of the ὄν, when we dare to affirm that the μὴ ὄν is: the truth being, that we altogether decline to say anything about the contrary of the ὄν, whether any such contrary is or is not conceivable by the reason." ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἐναντίου τινὸς αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ ὄντι) χαίρειν πολλὰ λέγομεν, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον, p. 258 E.

To this same passage I suppose Aristotle to allude in the *Metaphysica* (VI. 4. 13, Bekk. Oxon.) ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λογικῶς φασί τινες εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν, κ.τ.λ. (Where λογικῶς = 'sensu dialectico,' as distinguished from φυσικῶς.)

6. I shall have more to say on these passages hereafter: for the present they are mentioned for the sake of the coincidence. The φασί τινες, as already observed, is Aristotle's frequent formula of acknowledgment. If any one doubt that the τινὲς are in this instance a τίς, or if he doubt who the τὶς may be, let him hear Aristotle in another part of the same work; διὸ Πλάτων τρόπον τινὰ οὐ κακῶς τὴν σοφιστικὴν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔταξεν[2], *Met.* V. 2, § 3, and then turn to the *Sophist*, pp. 235 A, 237 A, 258 B, 264 D, passages which it would be tedious to quote, but the upshot of which is the very distinction to which Aristotle alludes. Add p. 254 A of the same dialogue, where the Sophist is described as "running to hide himself in the darkness of the Non Ens," (ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα), taking into account that the descrip-

[1] ἁπλῶς τόδε ἢ πῇ λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ κυρίως, ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰρημένον ληφθῇ, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐστι δοξαστὸν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναί τέ τι καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς, ἢ πάλιν ὅτι τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ὂν εἰ τῶν ὄντων τι μή ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ μὴ ἄνθρωπος.

[2] "Plato was right to a certain extent, when he represented the Non-ens as the province of the Sophist."

tion occurs in no other part of Plato's writings, and nothing will be wanting to the proof that Aristotle had not only read with attention two dialogues answering to those which bear the titles of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*[1], but that he knew or believed them to have been written by his Master.

The recognition of a dialogue by Aristotle is at least strong evidence of its genuineness: and it would require stronger internal evidence on the other side to justify us in setting such recognition at defiance[2]. Of the dialogues generally condemned as spurious, some owe their condemnation to the voice of antiquity; others betray by their style another hand; while those of a third class have fallen into discredit on account of the comparative triviality of their matter or the supposed un-Platonic cast of the sentiments they contain. To objections founded on the matter of a suspected dialogue I confess that I attach comparatively little weight, except when they are supported by considerations purely philological. We need have little scruple in rejecting a dialogue so poor in matter and dry in treatment as the Second Alcibiades, when we find the evidence of its spuriousness strengthened by the occurrence of grammatical forms which Attic writers of the best times avoid[3]. But it would be rash criticism to condemn the Second Hippias, (*the* Hippias of Aristotle,) merely because it contains paradoxes

[1] I cannot but think that had the Master of Trinity examined the *Statesman* with the same care which he has bestowed on the *Sophist*, he would have formed a different opinion of the genuineness of the two dialogues. The former contains passages full not only of Platonic doctrine, but of Platonic idiosyncrasy. I may mention, as a few out of many, the grotesque definition of Man as a "featherless biped" (*Pol.* p. 266 E. 99) which exposed the philosopher to a well-known practical jest, the somewhat wild but highly imaginative mythus, redolent of the *Timæus*, (p. 269 foll.); and finally, the fierce onslaught on the Athenian Democracy, (p. 299), breathing vengeance against the unforgiven murderers of Socrates. On reading these and similar passages, it would be difficult for the most sceptical to repress the exclamation, "Aut Plato aut Diabolus!"

[2] The *Sophist* is also recognized, as we have seen, by the vigilant and profoundly learned Simplicius, also by Porphyry (*ap. Simp. ad Phys.* p. 335, *Brandis*). Clemens Alexandrinus and Eusebius quote it as Plato's. If it is not named by Cicero, neither are the *Philebus* and *Theætetus*. The omission of any mention of this latter dialogue by the Author of the *Academic Questions* is remarkable.

[3] e.g. *ἀποκριθῆναι* for *ἀποκρίνασθαι*, *σκέπτεσθαι* for *σκοπεῖσθαι*.

apparently inconsistent with other parts of Plato's writings. Tried by this test, the *Lysis* and the *Laches*, and perhaps the *Charmides*, would fare but ill. Yet in them, those who have eyes to see have not failed to recognize the touches of the Master's hand, and the perfection of the form has outweighed the doubtfulness of the matter.

Now I am not aware that *any* philological objections have been urged against the *Sophist*. So far as the mere style is concerned, there is no dialogue in the whole series more thoroughly Platonic. In their structure the periods are those of Plato, and they are unlike those of any other writer. Throughout, as it seems to me, the author is writing his very best. His subject is a dry one; and he strives to make it palatable by a more than ordinary neatness of phrase, and by a sustained tone of pleasantry. His style is terse or fluent, as terseness or fluency is required: but the fluency never degenerates into laxity, nor the terseness into harshness. The most arid dialectical wastes are refreshed by his humour, and bloom in more places than one with imagery of rare brilliancy and felicity. Few besides Plato would have thought of describing the endless wrangling of two sects who had no principle in common, under the image of a battle between gods and giants; and fewer still, had they conceived the design, would have executed it with a touch at once so firm and so fine. What inferior master could have kept up so well, and with so little effort, the fiction of a hunt after a fierce and wily beast, by which the Eleatic Stranger sustains the ardent Theætetus amid the toil and weariness of a prolonged logical exercitation? Or who could so skilfully have interwoven that exercitation itself with matter so grave and various as that of which the dialogue in its central portion is made up? If vivacity in the conversations, easy and natural transitions from one subject to another, pungency of satire[1], delicate persiflage, and idiomatic raciness of phrase are elements of dramatic power, I know no dialogue more dramatic than the *Sophist*[2]. The absence of any elabo-

[1] As a specimen of this, take the argument with the γηγενεῖς, 246 D, *seq.*, and the mock solemnity with which the 'Ens' of the εἰδῶν φίλοι is described, 249 A.

[2] [One of the arguments against the

rate exhibition of character or display of passion is, under the circumstances, an excellence and not a defect: as such elements would have disturbed the harmony of the composition, and have been as much out of place as in the *Timæus*, or in some of the later books of the *Republic*—to say nothing of the *Cratylus* and *Parmenides*, which resemble this dialogue in so many particulars that those who condemn it, logically give up the other two also.

The *Sophist*, it is well known, is professedly a continuation of the *Theætetus*. The same interlocutors meet, with an addition in the person of an Eleatic Stranger, and they meet by appointment: for at the conclusion of the *Theætetus* Socrates bespeaks an interview for the following day, of which he is reminded by Theodorus in the opening sentence of the *Sophista*. The *Politicus* or *Statesman* is, in like manner, a professed continuation of the *Sophist*. The connexion, however, between these two is on the surface much closer than that between the *Theætetus* and the *Sophist*. In the *Theætetus* we are not informed what is to be the subject of the next day's talk, but in the *Sophist*[1] three subjects are proposed for consideration—the Sophist, the Philosopher, and the Statesman; and the choice is left to the new-comer, who selects the Sophist as the theme of that day's conversation. The third day is devoted to the Statesman, who is made the subject of an investigation similar to that pursued in the case of the Sophist. In both dialogues the professed object of the persons engaged is to obtain a definition, and the method pursued is that called by the ancient Logicians, and by the Schoolmen after them, the method of Division. We are left to infer that the Philosopher was to be handled on the fourth day in like fashion. Instead of this projected Tetralogy, we have only a Trilogy. No dialogue exists under the title of Φιλόσοφος, and the ingenuity of commentators has been taxed to account for the deficiency[2]. It is

dialogue advanced by Dr Whewell and its German impugners is founded on the alleged absence of the dramatic element.]

[1] P. 217 A.

[2] Schleiermacher, for instance, conceives that the omission is intentional, and that we must look for the missing portrait in the *Symposium* and *Phædo;* of which the first teaches us how a

tolerably certain that Plato never wrote a dialogue under this title, and it seems idle to speculate on the causes or motives of the omission. It is more to the purpose to observe, that there is no connexion apparent on the surface between the subject-matter of the *Theætetus* and that of the two succeeding dialogues: and no resemblance between the method of investigation pursued in the *Sophist* and in the *Theætetus*. A definition, it is true, is the professed object of both: the question proposed in the one being, "What is knowledge?" in the other, "What is a Sophist?" Each dialogue is, therefore, a hunt after a definition; but the instruments of the chase are not the same in both instances.

I propose the following as a plausible, though I do not put it forward as a certain explanation of the connexion between the two dialogues intended by Plato.

The art of Definition, it is well known, was an important constituent of the Platonic Dialectic. It held its ground in the Dialectic of Aristotle, who, however, devotes a larger share of attention to the Syllogism; a branch of Dialectic for which Plato had omitted to give rules. Both are elaborately investigated by the Schoolmen, as by Abelard in his *Dialectice;* nor was it, I believe, until the commencement of this century, or the end of the last, that Definition dropt out of our logic books[1], and the art of Syllogism reigned alone, or nearly alone. Now, in the *Phædrus* of Plato, a dialogue in which the art of dialectic is magnified at the expense of its rival, Rhetoric, occurs a passage in which two methods are marked out for the dialectician to pursue in searching for definitions[2]. Either, it is said, he may start from particulars, and from these rise to generals: or he may assume a general, and descend by successive stages to the subordinate species (the *species specialissima*)

philosopher should live, the latter how he should die. This is one of those "Schleiermachersche Grillen" which contribute to the amusement even of his admirers. Stallbaum seems to think that the title of the *Parmenides* may originally have been Φιλόσοφος, a conjecture which does not seem to me probable.

[1] It was first re-instated, so far as I know, by Mr J. S. Mill, whose father Mr James Mill highly extols Plato for insisting on the importance of its subsidiary διαίρεσις.

[2] See Appendix I. *Phædr.* 265 D, foll.

which contains the thing or idea which he seeks to define. He may begin, to take the example given in the dialogue, with examining the different manifestations of the passion of Love, and after ascertaining what element or elements they possess in common, and rejecting all those in which they differ, he may frame a definition or general conception of Love, sufficiently comprehensive to include its subordinate kinds, and sufficiently restricted to exclude every other passion. Or he may reverse the process, and divide some higher genus into successive pairs of sub-genera or species, until he "comes down" upon the particular kind of Love which he seeks to distinguish. The first of these processes is styled by Plato *συναγωγὴ*, Collection: by Aristotle *ἐπαγωγὴ*, Induction: the second is called by both Plato and Aristotle *διαίρεσις*, or the *διαιρετικὴ μέθοδος*, Division, or the Divisive method. Whoso is master of both methods is styled by Plato a Dialectician, and his art, the Art of Dialectic[1]. We have, therefore, in this passage of the *Phædrus* a Platonic organon in miniature.

Now it so happens, that the *Theætetus* and the *Sophist* pretend, each of them, to be an exemplification of one of these two dialectical methods: the *Theætetus* of a *συναγωγὴ*, the *Sophist* of a *διαίρεσις*[2]. It is this fiction which gives life and unity of purpose to the *Theætetus*, a dialogue which is in reality a critical history of Greek mental philosophy as it existed down to the fourth century, just as the *Sophist* is virtually a critique of the logic or dialectic of the same and previous eras. The one

[1] Those who are unskilled in the application of these processes are termed *ἐριστικοὶ* in the *Philebus*, 16 E. *οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἓν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει· οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.* It is needless to enlarge on the importance of this quotation towards the illustration of the *Sophist*, as well as of the passage from the *Phædrus* now under review. In the received text, it should be observed, we read *καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον, κ.τ.λ.* The sense manifestly requires the omission of *πολλά*. The Eristics admit a One and an Infinite: the Platonists divide the One into Many, and define the number of the Many (*Phileb. paulo supra*). In other words, they employ the method of Division or Classification, as well as that of Collection or Induction.

[2] Compare *Theæt.* 145 D—148, with *Sophist*, *init.* and 253, §§ 82, 83, Bekk.

dialogue exposes the unsoundness or incompleteness of the mental theories of Protagoras, of the Cyrenaics, whose founder Aristippus was Plato's contemporary and rival, and of certain other schools whose history is less known to us[1]. The *Sophist*, in like manner, passes under review the *logical* schemes of the Eleatics, of their admirers the semi-Platonic Megarians, and probably of Antisthenes and the Cynics. Both dialogues, as I have said, profess to be at the same time exemplifications of the processes which the true dialectician, or, as he is styled in the *Sophist*, 216 E, 253 D, the true philosopher, must adopt in his search for scientific truth. The one is a hunt after the true conception of ἐπιστήμη or science, the other an investigation of the genus and differentiæ of the conception implied in the term Sophist; and this fiction[2] serves in both cases to bind together the critical and polemical investigations which make up the main body of either dialogue. It lends to each the unity of an organic whole[3]; and infuses into a critical treatise on an abstruse branch of philosophy the vivacity and interest of a drama. Add to this, that the *Sophist* helps materially towards a solution of the question, What is Science? which is the professed aim of the dialogue which precedes it. It attains this object in two ways. First, by enlarging the conception of that which is *not* Science, treating the subject on its logical or dialectical, as the *Theætetus* regarded it chiefly on its real or psychological side: and, secondly, by giving rules, illustrated by example, for what Plato considered, as we have seen, one of the main elements of scientific method. And the same analogy holds in respect of the critical or controversial portion of either dialogue. As in the *Theætetus* it is shewn that the Protagorean

[1] The theory that "Science is right Opinion combined with Sensation" is given by Zeller to Antisthenes on grounds which seem not improbable.

[2] I would not be understood to mean that the pursuit of the Definition is a mere feint in either case, but only that it serves as a πρόφασις—a natural and probable occasion for the introduction of important controversial discussions. It constitutes the framework or "plot" of the drama. At the same time I conceive that the end Plato had most at heart in these two dialogues was the confutation of opponents. In the *Politicus*, on the other hand, a didactic or constructive intention appears to predominate.

[3] Comp. *Phædr.* 264 C: δεῖ πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι, κ.τ.λ.

dictum, that Truth exists only relatively to its percipient (*πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*), and the kindred, though not identical Cyrenaic dogma, that sense is knowledge, and the sensations the sole criteria of truth (*κριτήρια τὰ πάθη*), so far from furnishing tenable definitions of Science, in effect render Science impossible: so in the *Sophist* the Logic of the Cynics and Eleatics is proved to be more properly an Anti-logic, annihilating all Discourse of Reason, and rendering not only Inference but Judgment, or the power of framing the simplest propositions, a sheer impossibility.

I have said that the *Sophist* is first a dialectical exercitation, and secondly a critique more or less hostile of three rival systems of dialectic; two of which, it may be added, evidently sprang out of the third, and presuppose, if they do not assert, the false assumptions on which that third is founded. It may conduce to greater clearness if I take this critical portion of the dialogue first in order. In defending my position, I shall make no assertions at second hand; an indulgence to which there is the less temptation, as Plato himself tells us pretty plainly what he means, and where *he* fails us, Aristotle and the ancient historians of Philosophy supply all that is wanting.

The oldest, and in the history of Speculation the most important of these three schools was the Eleatic, founded, as the Stranger from Elea tells us in this dialogue, by Xenophanes[1], though its doctrines underwent some modification and received extensive development in the hands of Parmenides and Zeno, his successors. When Plato wrote this dialogue, there is every reason to suppose that the Eleatic school had ceased to exist. The latest known successor of Parmenides, Melissus, flourished, as the phrase is, about the year B.C. 440, and Zeno is placed a few years earlier. The earliest date which it is possible to assign to the *Theætetus*, and *a fortiori* to the *Sophist*, is about 392[2]. There can therefore be no question of an Eleatic author

[1] *Soph.* 242 D: *τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν* Ἐλεατικὸν *ἔθνος ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους...ἀρξάμενον.*

[2] Apuleius, *de Dogm. Plat.* 569, says that Plato took up the study of Parmenides and Zeno (inventa Parmenidis et Zenonis studiosius executus) after his second visit to the Pythagoreans in Italy: having been compelled to give up his intention of visiting Persia and India by the wars which broke out in

of this dialogue, an "opponent of Plato," resident in Athens, and writing in the Attic dialect. Socrates may have had such opponents, though we read of none; but the hypothesis is inadmissible in the case of his disciple.

The Eleatic Stranger however leaves us in no doubt of his intentions. In the course of his investigation of the attributes of the Sophist, he is on the point of obtaining from Theætetus an admission that his, the Sophist's, art is a fantastic and unreal one: but he affects to hesitate on the threshold of this conclusion, because, as he says, "The Phantastic Genus," to which they are about to refer the Sophist, is one difficult to conceive; and the fellow has very cleverly taken refuge in a Species the investigation of which is beset with perplexity[1]. Theætetus assents to this mechanically, but the Stranger, doubting the sincerity of his assent, explains his meaning more fully. The word *φανταστικὸς* implies that a thing may be *not* that which it seems, and it is a question with certain schools whether there is any meaning in the phrase, to say or think that which is false, in other words, that which *is not:* for, say they, you imply by the phrase that that which is not, *is*—that there exists such a thing as non-existence: and thus you involve yourself in a contradiction[2]. But if we assert that 'Not-being is' (quod Non Ens est), then, says the speaker, "we fly in the face of my Master, the great Parmenides, who both in oral prose and written metre adjured his disciples to beware of committing

Asia at the time. Does this imply that he visited Elea instead? If so, and if he composed the *Sophist* and its sister-dialogues on his return, we obtain a clue to the fiction of an Eleatic Stranger.

The circumstance that the conduct of the dialogue devolves upon this Stranger is pointed to as one proof that the *Sophist* was not written by Plato, whose custom is to make Socrates his Protagonist. The secondary part which Socrates plays in the *Timæus* and his entire absence from the colloquy in the *Laws* seem fatal to the major premiss in this reasoning. It should also be observed, that the author of the *Sophist*, if not Plato, took pains to pass himself off as Plato: else why did he tack on the *Sophist* to the *Theætetus?* But if the author of the *Sophist* wished to pass for Plato, why did he deviate from Plato's ordinary practice, by putting a foreigner from Elea into the place usually occupied by Socrates?

[1] Ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλ' εὖ καὶ κομψῶς εἰς ἄπορον εἶδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν. 236 D.

[2] Τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν. 237 A.

themselves to this contradiction[1]. To extricate ourselves then from the *ἀπορία* in which the Sophist has contrived to plant us, it is necessary," proceeds the Stranger, "to put this dictum of our Father Parmenides to the torture, and to extort from it the confession that the contradiction is in fact no contradiction, but that there is a sense in which the *μὴ ὂν* is, and in which the *ὂν is not*[2]." In this passage the Eleatic, who is Plato's mouthpiece, formally declares war against the logical system of his master Parmenides, in one of its most vital parts. His words, I conceive, admit of no other explanation. A question here suggests itself as to the meaning of this Eleatic denial of the conceivableness of non-entia. "You can never learn," says Parmenides, "that things which are not are[3]." Does he mean to forbid the use of negative propositions? His words will bear, I think, no other sense, and so, as we shall see, Plato understands them. In fact two misconceptions, both arising from the ambiguity of language, seem to lie at the root of the Eleatic Logic. Parmenides first confounds the verb-substantive, as a copula, with the verb-substantive denoting Existence or the Summum Genus of the Schoolmen. He secondly assumes that in any simple proposition the copula implies the identity of subject and predicate, instead of denoting an act of the mind by which the one is conceived as included in the other in the relation of individual or species to genus. It may seem strange that so great a man should have thus stumbled in limine. But enough is left of his writings to enable us to perceive that he was notwithstanding a profound, or if that be questioned, certainly a consistent thinker. In the first place he altogether repudiates the distinction of 'subjective' and 'objective.' "Thought," he says, "and that for which thought exists are one and the same thing[4];" and more distinctly still, "Thought and

[1] Ἀπεμαρτύρατο πεζῇ τε ὧδε ἑκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων·

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαῇς, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα,

ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα. *Ib.*

[2] Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι, καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ. p. 241 D. Comp. Arist. *Soph. El.* c. 5, § 1, quoted above.

[3] οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαῇς, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα.

[4] ταὐτὸν δ' ἔστι νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκέν ἐστι νόημα. *Frag.* v. 94, Mullach.

being are the same," *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι*: and, *χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι*[1], "Speech and thought constitute reality." A man who thus thought must therefore have repudiated the antithesis between Logic and Physics, between Formal and Real Science, a distinction which appears to us elementary and self-evident. Logic was to Parmenides Metaphysic, and Metaphysic Logic. That which is conceivable alone *is*, and that *is* which is conceivable. The abstraction "to be" is the same as Absolute Existence. The "Ens logicum" and the "Ens reale" are the same thing. The only certain proposition is the identical one "Being is," for "not-Being is Nothing[2]." Hence the formula which served as the Eleatic watchword: *ἓν τὰ πάντα*, "unum omnia."

If it be asked, what did Parmenides make of the outward universe? we are at no loss for an answer. He denied its claim to reality, or any participation of reality[3]. And on the principles of his Logic he was bound so to do. For every sensible object, or group of sensible objects, being distinct from every other object or group of objects, is at once an Ens and a Non-ens, it *is this* and it is *not that;* e.g. If Socrates is a man, Socrates is not a beast: for the genus "man" excludes the genus "beast." (*ἄνθρωπός ἐστι μὴ θήριον*, as Parmenides would have expressed it.) But a *μὴ θήριον* is, according to his logic, a *μὴ ὄν*; therefore all so-called *ὄντα* are at the same time *μὴ ὄντα*; non-existent, and therefore inconceivable, and so altogether out of the domain of Science.

From the dicta of Parmenides which I have been endeavouring to explain, the Eleatic Stranger in the dialogue proceeds to deduce various conclusions: the most startling of which is, that Being is, on Eleatic principles, identical with Not-being,—that the worshipt *ὂν* is after all a pitiful *μὴ ὄν*[4]! He is enabled to effect this reductio ad absurdum by the incautious proceeding of Parmenides, who instead of entrenching himself in the safe

[1] *Frag.* v. 43, ed. Mullach.

[2] ..... *ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ εἶναι.*
..... *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἄλλο παρὲκ τοῦ ἐόντος.* *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.* v. 110.

[4] *Soph.* 245 c, § 64 Bekk.: *μὴ ὄντος δέ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταὐτά τε ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι, καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι μηδ' ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ ὄν.*

ground of an identical proposition, and thence defying the world to eject him, must needs invest his Ens with a variety of attributes calculated to exalt it in dignity and importance. It is "unbegotten," it is "solitary," it is "immoveable," it is "a whole," it is even "like unto a massive orbed sphere[1]." (*Soph.* 246 E.) In one of these unguarded outworks the Stranger effects a lodgment, and by a series of well-contrived dialectical operations, succeeds, as we have seen, in carrying the citadel.

Having shewn the nothingness of the Eleatic Ontology, the Stranger proceeds to pass in review two other systems of speculative philosophy. "We have now," he says, "discussed—not thoroughly it is true, but sufficiently for our present purpose, the tenets of those who pretend to define strictly the ὄν and the μὴ ὄν: we must now take a view of those who talk differently on this subject. When we have done with all these, we shall see the justice of our conclusion that the conception of Being is quite as puzzling as that of Not-being[2]." Of one of the two sects who "talk differently," I venture to hold an opinion varying from that generally received—an opinion formed many years ago in opposition to that advanced by Schleiermacher and adopted by Brandis, Heindorf and others. Careful students of Plato are aware that his dialogues abound with matter evidently polemical, to the drift of which his text seems on the surface to offer no clue. I mean that, like Aristotle, he frequently omits to name the philosophers whose tenets he combats: characterising them, at the same time, in a manner which to a living contemporary, versed in the disputes of the schools and personally acquainted with their professors, would at once suggest the true object of his attack[3]. Such well-informed persons con-

[1] πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ. *Parm.* v. 103.

[2] ἵν' ἐκ πάντων ἴδωμεν ὅτι τὸ ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν. p. 245 E.

[3] This reticence, of which it is not difficult to divine the motives, is most carefully practised in the case of the living celebrities who claimed like himself to be disciples of Socrates, such as Euclides, Aristippus and Antisthenes. A cursory reader of Plato has no conception that such men existed as the heads of rival sects with which the Platonists of the Academy were engaged in perpetual controversy. On the other hand, Plato never scruples to name the dead, nor perhaps those living personages with whom he stood in no relation of common pursuits or

stituted doubtless the bulk of Plato's readers and formed the public for whom he principally wrote. It was they who applauded or smarted under his sarcasms, as they happened to hold with him or his adversaries. It is to place himself in the position of this small but educated public that the patient student of Plato should aspire: neglecting no study of contemporary monuments, and no research among the scarcely less valuable notices which the learned Greeks of later times have left scattered in their writings. Of these notices, emanating originally from authorities contemporary or nearly contemporary with the philosopher himself, many have been embalmed in the writings of Eusebius and Sextus Empiricus, the Aristotelian Commentators, Cicero, and others; not to mention the vast store of undigested learning amassed by Diogenes Laertius.

Now of the two sects who here come under revision, and who enact the part of Gods and of Giants in the famed Gigantomachy[1], which is familiar to most readers of Plato, the occupants of the celestial regions are rightly, as I think, judged to mean the contemporary sect of the Megarics. They are idealists in a sense, but their idealism is not that of Plato. They so far relax the rigid Eleatic formula "unum omnia" as to admit a plurality of forms (*εἴδη* or *ὄντα* or *οὐσία*). They are complimented in the dialogue as *ἡμερώτεροι*, "more civilized" or "more humane," than their rude materialistic antagonists: but they are at the same time taken sharply to task by the Eleatic Stranger: and for what? For the absence, from *their* scheme of Idealism, of that very element which constitutes the differentia of the Platonic Idealism. "They refuse to admit," says the Stranger, "what we have asserted concerning substance, in our late controversy with their opponents:" *οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν*

common friendships, e.g. Lysias, Gorgias, &c. The Pythagoreans, though remote in place, were his friends and correspondents, and in speaking of them he observes the same rule as in the case of his living Athenian contemporaries, indicating without expressly naming them. Thus, in the *Politicus*, p. 285, they are merely denoted as *κομψοί*, "ingenious persons." This, by the way, is a passage of great importance, as indicating the limits within which Plato "pythagorized," and the particulars in which he dissented from his Italic friends.

[1] *Soph.* 246 A, § 65 Bekk.

πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι, 248 B; the thing they refuse to admit being neither more nor less than that κοινωνία or μέθεξις τῶν εἰδῶν[1], which Aristotle cannot or will not understand in his critique of the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas. Like Plato, they distinguish the two worlds of sense and pure ideas, the γένεσις from the οὐσία (γένεσιν τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρίς που διελόμενοι λέγετε, 248 A), but, unlike him, they deny that the one acts or is acted upon by the other: they even deny that Being (εἴδη or οὐσία) can be said to act or suffer at all; nay, when pressed, they seem to admit that it is impossible to predicate of it either knowledge or the capacity of being known[2]. The arguments by which the "Friends of Forms" (εἰδῶν φίλοι, 248 A) are pushed to this admission may not ring sound to a modern ear; but our business is not with the soundness of Plato's opinions, but with their history: and it would be easy to produce overwhelming evidence both from his own writings and those of Aristotle to the truth of the statement, that however the phrase is to be interpreted, there is, according to Plato, a fellowship, κοινωνία, between the world of sensibles and the world of intelligibles, and that the conception of this fellowship or intercommunion distinguishes his Ideal Scheme from that of the Eleatics[3], and, as appears from

[1] Aristotle objects to the term μέθεξις on the ground that it is metaphorical. Now as a logical term, the Platonic μέθεξις is but the counterpart of ὕπαρξις, the Aristotelian word denoting the relation of subject to predicate. The one term is as metaphorical as the other, and not more so. "A belongs (ὑπάρχει) to B" and "B partakes of A" (μετέχει) are both in a sense metaphorical phrases, and the metaphor employed is the same in both cases. The Platonic term marks the relation between subject and predicate as *not* one of identity, and thus serves to distinguish the Dialectic of Plato from that of the Eristics, who denied that the "One" includes a "Many." The same purpose is equally well, but not better answered by the ὑπάρχει of Aristotle.

[2] Τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γιγνώσκεται κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν. p. 248 E.

[3] Compare 249 D, § 75: τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι πᾶσα ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἓν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἑστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τ' αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ἓν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχὴν, ὅσα (ὡς?) ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν, ξυναμφότερα λέγειν. This passage, as I understand it, expresses Plato's dissent alike from the Eleatics and Megarics, and from those Ephesian followers of Heraclitus whom he had discussed in the *Theætetus*. This is not the only echo of that dialogue heard in the *Sophista*.

this passage, from that of the semi-Platonic school of Megara also[1].

We pass now from the heavenly to the earthly; from the serene repose of the transcendentalists, *μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμυνομένων*, to the violence and fury of the giant brood below, who seek to eject these divinities from their august abodes, "actually hugging rocks and trees in their embrace," *ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες*, 246 A.

Of these materialists—for such in the coarsest sense of the word they are—I remark, first, that they are evidently the same set of people as those described in terms almost identical by Plato in the *Theætetus*, p. 155 E. At this point of the last-named dialogue Socrates is about to expound the tenets of the Ephesian followers of Heraclitus; whose sensational theory, as he afterwards shews, agrees with that of the Cyrenaics in essentials, though it was combined with cosmical or metaphysical speculations in which it may be doubted whether they were followed by the Socratic sect[2]. Before, however, he enters upon these highflown subtleties, he humorously exhorts Theætetus to look round and see that they were not overheard by "the uninitiated:" "those," he says, "who think nothing real, but that which they can take hold of with both hands[3]: those who ignore the existence of such things as 'actions,' and 'productions,'—in a word, of anything that is not an object of sight," (*πᾶν τὸ ἀόρα-*

[1] This epithet I conceive to be justified by Cicero's notice, "Hi quoque (sc. Megarici) multa a Platone," *Acad. Qu.* II. 42, and also by the brief statement of the Megaric dogmas which Cicero gives us in the context of this passage.

[2] In the *Philebus*—a dialogue which treats of the relation of *οὐσία* to *γένεσις* in its moral and physical, that is to say its real, in distinction from the purely logical or formal aspect under which it is presented in the *Sophist*—Plato postulates a Tetrad, composed of the principles he there denotes as Limit, the Unlimited, the Mixed or Concrete, and Cause. The third principle he calls *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν*, the possibility of which process is precisely what the *εἰδῶν φίλοι*—the pure idealists of this dialogue—deny. *Phileb.* p. 24, foll. The distinctness of the Causal Principle from the Ideas is clearly laid down in the *Philebus*, and is recognized in the *Sophist* also, p. 265, §§ 109, 110.

[3] Compare *Soph.* 247 C: *διατέλουντ' ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ ξυμπιέζειν εἶσιν ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν.*

τον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει). These persons are garnished with the epithets "hard," "stubborn," "thoroughly illiterate," σκληροὶ—ἀντίτυποι—μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι.

Now the only contemporary philosopher to whom these epithets of Plato are applicable is the founder of the Cynic school, Antisthenes, a man whose nature corresponded with his name, and to whose name, as well as to his nature, the ἀντίτυπος of the *Theætetus* would be felt to convey an allusion "intelligible to the intelligent." The μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι finds its echo in the synonymous epithet ἀπαίδευτοι, which Aristotle in the *Metaphysica* bestows on Antisthenes and his followers[1]. It seems to me obvious that the description in the *Theætetus* tallies in all points with that in the *Sophist* and that both are in agreement with what we know from Diog. Laertius and a host of others, of the moral characteristics of the Cynic school[2]. The materials of the comparison may be found in any manual of the history of philosophy. For our present purpose it were to be wished that some portion of the voluminous writings of Antisthenes had been preserved, in addition to the meagre declamations, if they are really his, which are commonly printed with the *Oratores Attici*. The notices, however, which Aristotle and his commentators have preserved to us, countenance the assumption just made, that the Earth-born are the Cynics. Hatred of Plato and the Idealists seems to have been the ruling passion of Antisthenes, and this passion drove him into the anti-Platonic extremes of Materialism in Physics, and an exaggerated Nominalism in Dialectic. "He could not see Humanity, but he could see a Man," is one of his recorded sarcasms upon the doctrine of ideas[3]. "Your body has eyes, your soul has none," was the curt reply of Plato. Many similar pleasantries were interchanged by the leaders of the two schools: and Antisthenes, less guarded than his antagonist, wrote a dialogue "in three parts,"

[1] VII. 3. 97: οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι.

[2] I have shewn in Appendix II. that the only other schools who can in fairness be called "materialist," are out of the question here.

[3] Tzetzes, *Chil.* VII. 605; Schol. *in Arist. Categ.* ed. Brandis, p. 66 *b*, 45 and 68 *b*, 26; Zeller, *G. P.* II. p. 116, note 1.

entitled Σάθων, which was avowedly directed against Plato in revenge for a biting reply (Diog. Laert. III. § 35 ; VI. § 16). The subject of this dialogue has been recorded, and it is not a little curious that it was written to disprove the very position which Plato devotes a large proportion of the *Sophista* to establishing ; viz. that there is a sense in which "the Non-ens is," in other words, that negative propositions are conceivable. Antisthenes maintained in this book, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν. If we add, that he also wrote four books on Opinion and Science (περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης), we shall hardly think the conjecture extravagant, that the remainder of this dialogue is, in the main, a critique of the Cynical Logic. Another paradox of this school, closely connected with the last, is recorded by Aristotle[1], and sarcastically noticed at page 251 B of the *Sophist*, in terms which leave little doubt as to the object of Plato's satire. If Antisthenes really pushed this paradox to its legitimate results—and from the character of the man it is not unlikely he did—he must be understood as maintaining that identical propositions are the only propositions which do not involve a contradiction: a theory which, as Plato shews, renders language itself impos-

[1] *Metaph.* v. 29: Ἀντισθένης ὤετο εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἓν ἐφ' ἑνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δ' οὐδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. Plat. *Soph.* 1. 1: οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. The latter passage explains the οἰκείῳ λόγῳ of Aristotle, and the allusion is further determined by the ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου applied to the upholder of the similar sophisms noted at p. 259 D. In the latter passage occur the following words: οὔ τέ τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς, ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν. "This is no genuine or legitimate confutation: but the infant progeny of a brain new to philosophical discussion." This hangs together with the γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι—"the old gentlemen who have gone to school late in life," p. 251 B, and both passages are illustrated by a notice in Diog. Laert. VI. 1, *init.* that Antisthenes, having been originally a hearer of Gorgias, became at a later period a disciple of Socrates, and brought with him as many of his pupils as he could induce to follow his example. A similar sarcasm is flung at Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, in the *Euthyd.* p. 272 C, which not improbably was designed to glance off from them upon some contemporary Eristic. Antisthenes, we know, was present at the battle of Tanagra, in B.C. 426. He may therefore have been Plato's senior by some 20 years.

sible[1], as well as that inward "discourse of reason[2]," of which language is the antitype.

The resemblance of the Cynical Logic to the Eleatic is usually accounted for by the circumstance that Antisthenes had been a hearer of Gorgias, who wrote a treatise, preserved or epitomized by Aristotle, in which the paradoxes of Parmenides and Zeno are put forward in their most paradoxical form, and pushed to their consequences with unflinching consistency. Gorgias was also a speculator in physics, and so was Antisthenes[3]; in whom, moreover, we may observe other characteristics of those ingenious men of letters of the fifth century, who are usually called "the Sophists." His ethical opinions on the other hand were borrowed from Socrates; but in passing through his mind they took the tinge of the soil, and seem to the common sense of mankind as startling as any of his dialectical paradoxes. It is remarkable, however, that when Plato handles the Cynical Ethics, he treats their author with far more leniency than in this dialogue. In comparing it with the Pleasure Theory of Aristippus, he speaks of the Cynical system with qualified approbation. Δυσχερὴς[4] "austere or morose," is the hardest epithet he flings at Antisthenes in the *Philebus:* he even attributes to him a certain nobleness of character (*φύσιν οὐκ ἀγεννῆ*), which had led him, as Plato thought, to err on the side of virtue. The *Philebus* is a work of wider range and

[1] *καὶ γὰρ ὦ 'γαθὲ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν, ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου. Θ. τί δή; Ξ. τελειοτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. Soph.* 259 D.

[2] *διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια. Soph.* 263 E. Van Heusde first pointed out the infamous etymology lurking in this passage (*διάνοια = διάλογος ἄνευ*). The sentiment, without the etymology, occurs in *Theæt.* 189 E: (*τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καλῶ*) *λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ.*

[3] Hence the explanation of *Philebus*, 44 B: *καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν.*

[4] *Phil.* 44 C: *μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς, λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν, καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές.... σκεψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τἆλλα αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα. Ib.* D: *κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἴχνος.* The accomplished and unfortunate Sydenham first pointed out the reference in these epithets to the Cynics and their master. The *οὐ τέχνῃ* of Plato tallies with the *ἀπαίδευτοι* of Aristotle, and with his own *ἄμουσοι*, &c.

profounder bearings than the *Sophist*, but the dialogues have this in common, that in both the broad daylight of reason is shed on regions which had been darkened by the one-sided speculations or the wilful logomachy of earlier or inferior thinkers. The way in which, at the close of the present dialogue, Antisthenes is dragged from his hiding-place among the intricacies of the Non-existent into the light of common-sense, is a favourable specimen of Plato's controversial ability; and the broad and simple principles on which he founds the twin sciences of Logic and Grammar[1] stand in favourable contrast to the sophistical subtlety of his predecessors and contemporaries.

At this point of the discussion I would gladly stop: but I feel bound to say a few words on what I have ventured to call the "logical exercise," which is the pretext under which Plato takes occasion to dispose of the doctrines of his formidable antagonists. That the διαιρετικοὶ λόγοι, the "amphiblestric organa[2]," in which he endeavours to catch and land first the Sophist and then the Statesman, were regarded by Plato himself in this light, we learn from his own testimony in the *Politicus*, 285 D, § 26 Bekk. "Is it," asks the Eleatic Stranger, "for the Statesman's sake alone, that this long quest has been instituted, or is it not rather for our own sake, that we may strengthen our powers of dialectical enquiry upon subjects in general? S. J. It was doubtless for this general purpose. E. S. How much less then would a man of sense have submitted to a tedious enquiry into the definition of the art of weaving, if that had been his sole or principal object!" He then proceeds to apologize for the prolixity of this method of classification: but adds, "The method which enables us to distinguish according to species, is in itself worthy of all honour; nay, the very prolixity of an enquiry of this kind becomes respectable, if

[1] P. 262 D. Simple as the analysis of the Proposition into ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα (subject and predicate in logic, noun and verb in grammar) may seem to a modern reader, it appears to have been a novelty to Plato's contemporaries. Plutarch expressly attributes the discovery to Plato (*Plat. Qu.* v. l. 108, *Wyttenb.*), Apuleius *Doctr. Plat.* III. p. 203. Comp. Plat. *Crat.* 431 B.

[2] *Soph.* 235 B.

it render the hearer more inventive. In that case we ought not to be impatient, be the enquiry short or long." If we say it is too long, "we are bound to shew that a shorter discussion would have been more effectual in improving the dialectical powers of the student, and helping him to the discovery and explanation of the essential properties of things[1]." "Praise or blame, founded on any other consideration, we may dismiss with contempt."

This passage, the importance of which for the appreciation of these two dialogues it is superfluous to point out, derives unexpected illustration from an amusing fragment of a contemporary comic poet, preserved by Athenæus[2]. In this passage we are introduced into the interior of the Academic halls, and the curtain rises upon a group of youths who are "improving their dialectical powers" by a lesson in botanical classification.

[1] *ὡς βραχύτερα ἂν γενομένα τοὺς σύνοντας ἀπειργάζετο διαλεκτικωτέρους καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων λόγῳ δηλώσεως εὑρετικωτέρους. Polit.* 286 E.

[2] II. p. 59. As this fragment has not yet received the attention it deserves, it is printed in full.

A. Τί Πλάτων
καὶ Σπεύσιππος καὶ Μενέδημος,
πρὸς τίσι νυνὶ διατρίβουσιν;
ποία φροντίς, ποῖος δὲ λόγος
διερευνᾶται παρὰ τοῖσιν;
τάδε μοι πινυτῶς, εἴ τι κατειδώς
ἥκεις, λέξον, πρὸς γᾶς† * *
B. *ἀλλ' οἶδα λέγειν περὶ τῶνδε σαφῶς·*
Παναθηναίοις γὰρ ἰδὼν ἀγέλην
[τῶν] μειρακίων
ἐν γυμνασίοις Ἀκαδημίας
ἤκουσα λόγων ἀφάτων ἀτόπων·
περὶ γὰρ φύσεως ἀφοριζόμενοι
διεχώριζον ζῴων τε βίον
δένδρων τε φύσιν λαχάνων τε γένη.
κᾆτ' ἐν τούτοις τὴν κολοκύντην
ἐξήταζον τίνος ἐστὶ γένους.
A. *καὶ τί ποτ' ἄρ' ὡρίσαντο καὶ τίνος*
γένους
εἶναι τὸ φυτόν; δήλωσον, εἰ κάτοισθά τι.
B. *πρώτιστα μὲν οὖν πάντες ἀναυδεῖς*
τότ' ἐπέστησαν, καὶ κύψαντες
χρόνον οὐκ ὀλίγον διεφρόντιζον.
κᾆτ' ἐξαίφνης ἔτι κυπτόντων
καὶ ζητούντων τῶν μειρακίων
λάχανόν τις ἔφη στρογγύλον εἶναι,
ποίαν δ' ἄλλος, δένδρον δ' ἕτερος.
ταῦτα δ' ἀκούων ἰατρός τις
Σικελᾶς ἀπὸ γᾶς κατέπαρδ' αὐτῶν
ὡς ληρούντων.
A. *ἦ που δεινῶς ὠργίσθησαν*
χλευάζεσθαί τ' ἐβόησαν·
τὸ γὰρ ἐν λέσχαις ταῖσδε τοιαυτί
ποιεῖν ἀπρεπές.
B. *οὐδ' ἐμέλησεν τοῖς μειρακίοις·*
ὁ Πλάτων δὲ παρὼν καὶ μάλα πράως,
οὐδὲν ὀρινθείς, ἐπέταξ' αὐτοῖς
πάλιν [ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν κολοκύντην]
ἀφορίζεσθαι τίνος ἐστὶ γένους·
οἱ δὲ διήρουν.

Com. Græc. Fragm. v. III. p. 370, ed. Meineke.

† L. *πρὸς γᾶς καὶ θεῶν, coll. Athen.* III. p. 118 E. *ἀλλ' ἐπριάμην παρ' ἀνδρός, ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί.*

The subject proposed is not a Sophist, but a pumpkin, and the problem they have to solve is, to what genus that natural production is to be referred. Is a pumpkin a herb? Is it a grass? Is it a tree? The young gentlemen are divided in opinion—each genus having its supporters. Their enquiries, however, are rudely interrupted by a "physician from Sicily," who happened to be present, and who displays his contempt for their proceedings in a manner more expressive than delicate. "They must have been furious at this," says the second speaker. "Oh!" says the other, "the lads thought nothing of it: and Plato, who was looking on, quite unruffled, mildly bade them resume their task of defining the pumpkin and its genus. So they set to work dividing."

The result of these researches, could it be recovered, would probably add little or nothing to our knowledge of pumpkins. But one thing the passage proves; and that one thing is enough for our present purpose. The διαιρετικοὶ λόγοι of the *Sophista* and *Politicus* represent what really occurred within the walls of the Academy: and we can have no doubt that Plato regarded such long-drawn divisions in the light of a useful exercise for his pupils. They became "more inventive" and "more dialectical" by the process.

I may add that the invention of the Divisive Method is traditionally attributed to Plato by the Greek historians of philosophy. Aristotle devotes several chapters of his *Posterior Analytics* to the discussion of this method: he points out its uses and abuses, and defends it against the cavils of Plato's successor Speusippus, who abandoned the procedure because, as he alleged, it supposed universal knowledge on the part of the person employing it. The method discussed is that which we have been considering, for Aristotle describes it as Division by contradictory Differentiæ[1]. He also replies to the objection that

[1] *Anal. Post.* II. c. XIII. § 6, and *Schol. in loc.* So Abelard (*Ouvrages Inédits. Op.* 569, ed. Cousin: coll. pp. 451, 461) distinguishes between those divisions which imply dichotomy and those which do not: *e.g.*



this process is not demonstrative—that it proves nothing—by the remark that the same objection applies to the counter process of collection or induction. This defence, I presume, would not in the present day be accepted as satisfactory; for, as the able translator of the *Analytics* observes, "This is the chief flaw in Aristotle's Logic: for some more vigorous method than the Dialectical, the method of Opinion, ought to be employed in establishing scientific principles." At the same time, I must confess my inability to discover the flaw in the principle of dichotomy, as a principle of classification, in cases where the properties of the objects to be classified are supposed to have been ascertained. A Class can exist as such only by exclusion of alien particulars. The Linnean Class Mammalia for instance, implies a dichotomy of Animals into Mammal and Non-Mammal—into those which give suck and those which do not. The distinction may or may not be a natural or convenient one, but in any other which may be substituted, some "differentia," some property or combination of properties must be fixed upon, which one set of species or individuals possesses, and which all others want. And this is all that is essential in "dichotomy," or the "method of Division by contraries[1]." The application

Porphyry attributes the latter or dichotomous method to Plato. It could not be "Eleatic," for each of the contraries would be in that scheme a "non-ens." It is remarkable that a similar Divisio Divisionum occurs in the *Politicus*, p. 287, § 27, where in lieu of the regular dichotomy a rougher form of classification is for once adopted. This Plato, keeping up the original metaphor in the *Phædrus*, describes as a *μελοτομία*. *Κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἷον ἱερεῖον διαιρώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν, δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὅτι μάλιστα τέμνειν ἀριθμὸν ἀεί.* The division he proceeds to make is a distribution of "accessory arts," *συναιτίοι τέχναι*, into seven co-ordinate groups. A similar relaxation is permitted in the *Philebus*, p. 16 D: *Δεῖ οὖν ἡμᾶς.....ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν...ἐὰν οὖν [μετα]λάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τιν' ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν ἑκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποσα.* I understand this passage as conveying Plato's distinction between his own method and that of the Eleatics and their Eristic successors, who acknowledged only a *ἓν* and an *ἄπειρον*.

[1] For the *length* of the process will evidently depend on the distance, so to speak, between the Species generalissima and the Species specialissima, between the remote and the proximate class in the tabulation of species. The very brief dichotomy in the *Gorgias*,

of the method will, as Plato acknowledges, be more or less successful in proportion to the insight and knowledge of the person employing it. The specimens with which he favours us in these dialogues may be arbitrary, ill-chosen, or even grotesque: but as logical exercises they are regular—and logic looks to regularity of form rather than to truth of matter. And even in judging of these particular divisions, we must bear in mind the object in view. In the *Sophist* it is Plato's professed intention to distinguish the Sophist from the Philosopher, the trader in knowledge from its disinterested seeker: surely no unimportant distinction, nor one without its counterpart in reality, either in Plato's day or in our own. The ludicrous minuteness with which the successive genera and sub-genera of the "acquisitive class" are made out in detail, would not sound so strange to ears accustomed to the exercises of the Schools; while it subserves a purpose which the philosophic satirist takes no pains to conceal, that, namely, of lowering in the estimation of his readers classes or sects for which he harboured a not wholly unjust or unfounded dislike and contempt. It serves, at the same time, to heighten by contrast the dignity and importance of the philosophic calling, and in either point of view must be regarded as a legitimate artifice of controversy in a dialogue unmistakeably polemical.

p. 464, is evidently the same in principle as the long-drawn divisions in the *Sophist*, as will be seen from the following scheme:



Where it is implied that all "tendance" is either corporal or mental; that all tendance of the body is comprised in the "antistrophic arts" of the gymnast and the physician, and all tendance of the soul in those of the legislator and the judge. There is, therefore, no room under either for the four pretended arts of the sophist, the rhetorician, the decorator of the person, and the cuisinier. In *Politicus*, 302 E, the dichotomy is comprised in a single step: ἐν ταύταις δὴ τὸ παράνομον καὶ ἔννομον ἑκάστην διχοτομεῖ τούτων.

[In all this I have no desire to impugn the soundness of Dr Whewell's theory of classification as given in his *Philosophy of Inductive Science*, indeed so far as I understand his views, they seem not essentially inconsistent with my own. His main theory is Platonic in spirit, though founded on a scientific experience quite inaccessible to Plato.]

APPENDIX I.

In the foregoing discussions it is assumed that the method of Division sketched in the *Phædrus* is the same with the Dichotomy or Mesotomy of which examples are furnished in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. This I had never doubted, until the Master of Trinity gave me the opportunity of reading his remarks on the subject, in which a contrary opinion is expressed. I have therefore arranged in parallel columns the description of the process of Division, as given in the *Phædrus*, and in the two disputed dialogues; from which it will appear that the *onus probandi*, at any rate, lies with those who deny that the processes meant are the same. I must premise that the Master of Trinity's question, "If this," viz. the method in the *Sophista*, "be Plato's Dialectic, how came he to omit to say so there?" has been already answered by anticipation in p. 15, note 3, but more fully in *Soph.* 253, quoted presently.

Phædrus, 265 *e*, § 110.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα, ᾗ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὼ λόγω τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἕν τι κοινῇ εἶδος ἐλαβέτην, ὥσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἑνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὁμώνυμα πέφυκε, σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἓν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος ἡγησαμένω τὼ λόγω, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος μέρος, πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανῆκε, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρὼν ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τιν' ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησε μάλ' ἐν δίκῃ. ὁ δ' εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς, ὁμώνυμον μὲν ἐκείνῳ θεῖον δ' αὖ τιν' ἔρωτα ἐφευρὼν καὶ προτεινάμενος ἐπῆνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν.

Sophist, 264 E.

ΞΕ. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ παντὰ περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκείαν λιπόντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν.

Ib. 253 D, § 83. Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήθ' ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτὸν μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι; Θ. [Ναί,] φήσομεν... Ξ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.

Ib. 229 B, § 31. Τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς τομὴν ἔχει τινά. διπλῆ γὰρ αὐτὴ γιγνομένη δῆλον

ΦΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τ' ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δύνατον εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὁρᾶν, τοῦτον διώκω "κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο." Καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω θεὸς οἶδε, καλῶ δ' οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς.

ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, ἓν ἐφ' ἑνὶ γένει τῶν αὐτῆς ἑκατέρῳ.

Politicus, 263 B. Εἶδος μὲν ὅταν ᾖ του, καὶ μέρος αὐτὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος ὅτου περ ἂν εἶδος λέγηται· μέρος δὲ εἶδος οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη. (This explains the κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκε of the *Phædrus*.)

Ib. 265 A. Καὶ μὴν ἐφ' ὅ γε μέρος ὥρμηκεν ὁ λόγος ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δυο τινὲ καθορᾶν ὁδὼ τεταμένα φαίνεται, τὴν μὲν θάττω, πρὸς μέγα μέρος σμικρὸν διαιρούμενον, τὴν δ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεσοτομεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα, τοῦτ' ἔχουσαν μᾶλλον, μακροτέραν γε μήν.

Ib. 262 D, occurs a specimen of the "unskilful carving" (κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπον) of the *Phædrus*. Εἴ τις τἀνθρώπινον ἐπιχειρήσας δίχα διελέσθαι γένος διαιροίη καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ...τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν (τὸ δὲ) βάρβαρον...ἢ τὸν ἀριθμόν τις αὖ νομίζοι κατ' εἴδη δύο διαιρεῖν μυριάδα ἀποτεμνόμενος ἀπὸ πάντων ὡς ἓν εἶδος ἀποχωρίζων, κ.τ.λ.

In allusion to Xen. *Mem.* IV. § 11, a passage noticed by the Master of Trinity, p. 595 of his paper, I may observe that the etymology of Dialectic, *ἀπὸ τοῦ διαλέγειν*, is undoubtedly vicious, and is nowhere countenanced by Plato. On the contrary, Dialectic is described in the *Philebus*, 58 E, as *ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις*. He could not have adopted Xenophon's etymology, for, as we have seen, the Platonic Dialectic includes *συναγωγὴ* as well as *διαίρεσις*. The etymology was tempting, and Xenophon, who writes very much at random upon philosophical subjects, was unable to resist the temptation. A similar error is that of Hegel, who in his *History of Philosophy*, derives *σοφιστὴς* from *σοφίζειν* instead of *σοφίζεσθαι*, an error in which he has been followed by English scholars who ought to have known better.

APPENDIX II.

On the Earth-born (γηγενεῖς) of Sophist 246.

Of the three contemporary sects professing some form of Materialism, I have singled out the Cynic as that which alone answers the conditions of Plato's description. The following extracts from the fragments of Democritus, and from Aristotle's notices of his opinions, seem conclusive against his claim to a share in the Gigantomachy.

1. The sect in question held that, *τοῦτο μόνον ἔστιν, ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα.*	1. Democritus, on the contrary, says, *νόμῳ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐτεῇ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.*—*Frag.* ed. Mullach, p. 204.
2. *ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὡρίζοντο·* they defined "substance" to mean corporeal substance only.	2. Democritus denies that the sense of touch conveys any true knowledge. *Ἡμεῖς τῷ μὲν ἐόντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκὲς ξυνίεμεν, μεταπῖπτον δὲ κατά τε σώματος διαθιγὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων.*
3. They *despised τοὺς φάσκοντας μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι.*	3. Democritus held "*ὅτι οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔστιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ κενὸν τοῦ σώματος.* – Arist. *Met.* I. 4. In other words, that *vacuum* (*his μὴ ὄν*) was in every respect as real as corporeal substance.

The Cyrenaics are not the *γηγενεῖς*, for they admit nothing to be real except the affection (*πάθος*), of which we are conscious in the act of sensation, an affection produced by some cause unknown. The *objects* of sense are to them as unreal as they were to Berkeley. Sext. Empir. *adv. Matth.* VII. 191: *Φασὶν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη, καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιαψευστὰ τυγχάνειν· τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιαψευστόν.*

The case of the Ephesian *ῥέοντες* is not worth considering, for they acknowledged no *οὐσία*, as the Earth-born know nothing of *γένεσις*, which they properly class with the *ἀόρατον*.

The view I have adopted, that the passages in the *Theætetus* and *Sophist* both refer to Antisthenes, and that the latter dialogue is in the main a hostile critique of his opinions, occurred to me in the course of my lectures on the *Theætetus* in 1839, as I find from MS. notes in an interleaved copy. I mention this, because Winckelmann in his *Fragments of Antisthenes*, published in 1842, observes in a note: "Omnino in multis dialogis ut in Philebo, Sophista, Euthydemo, Platonem adversus Antisthenem celato tamen nomine certare, res est nondum satis animadversa." Some of the allusions to this philosopher which Winckelmann detects in the *Theætetus* appear to me doubtful, but I observe that he acknowledges the double bearing of the epithet ἀντίτυπος. The doctrines of Antisthenes were harsh and repulsive enough—only less so than those of the "dog" Diogenes. The objection that the person or persons alluded to are described in *Theætetus* as δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν, whereas Antisthenes can hardly be so characterized, may be met by the fact that he did write a treatise περὶ φύσεως, and that a sneering allusion to this may be implied in Plato's words.

W. H. THOMPSON.

PRINCEPS or PRINCEPS SENATUS?

THE title of 'princeps' borne by the Roman Emperors has been generally explained as an abbreviation of the fuller title 'princeps senatus' and the latter is usually supposed to have been conferred upon or assumed by Augustus as a conveniently constitutional designation and one which would not be likely to wound Roman susceptibilities by any military or despotic associations connected with it. Now that the majority of the emperors, and very possibly all, at any rate all the earlier ones, were 'principes senatus' may be granted at once, but are we to look in this quarter for the origin of the widely-used title of 'princeps' or is this something perfectly distinct and independent?

That 'princeps' was merely 'princeps senatus' written short, is the view taken by Merivale, Romans under the Empire, chap. 31, by Bekker and Marquardt, in their Römische Alterthümer II. iii. 282, 293, and I believe by most authorities (e.g. Capes, Early Empire, p. 13). The opposite theory that 'princeps' is a perfectly distinct title is adopted by Rein (Pauly, Real-Encyclopädie, s. v. Princeps) and more recently by Prof. Mommsen in his Römisches Staatsrecht II. ii. 711, 733. By neither however are their reasons for their own view given at all fully, or the rival hypothesis and its grounds discussed. Yet the issue involved is not merely the precise origin of a particular title, for with each of the two theories we have mentioned is naturally connected a particular view of the system of government which Augustus established, and in this respect it becomes extremely important to decide whether Augustus really posed before the Roman public as 'Father of the Senate,' or as

'First Citizen[1],' in other words, as the leader of the Roman nobility, or as the elect of the Roman people. Did he, as for instance Pertinax did afterwards, merely profess to associate the senate with himself in the government of the empire, or did his constitutionalism rest on a wider and a more popular basis?

The first of the two theories we are considering is most fully stated by Merivale (l. c.). According to him the title of 'princeps senatus' or 'princeps' was selected as conveying "the idea of the highest civil preeminence consistent with the forms of the old constitution," an idea, by the way, conveyed as we shall see by 'princeps,' but not at all by 'princeps senatus.' "It was the policy of Augustus to lead the senate, the chosen instrument of his will, by indirect agency." The title moreover was "modest and constitutional" and at the same time connected its bearer with the aristocratical party. Then, according to our author, followed the abbreviation of the title, the original character of the appellation was forgotten and its proper limits merged in a vague and general notion of preeminence. And this change is already accomplished early in the reign of Tiberius, so that after the death of Augustus at any rate the title, on Merivale's own showing, is simply 'princeps' and nothing more, and implied or was understood to imply no sort of connection with the senate in particular. According to the other and as I believe the truer view, this notion of general preeminence is the original and the only one contained in the title, and the supposed abbreviation is simply a myth.

Is there then any evidence for the assumption that 'princeps' was originally 'princeps senatus'? Merivale apparently thinks the abridgment so easy and natural a one as scarcely to require any external proof, but on turning to Bekker and Marquardt, it becomes clear that virtually the only ancient authority for this view is Dio Cassius, from whom three passages are quoted in support of it. The first is in Bk. 53. 1, where Dio is describing the measures taken by Augustus in 726 A. V. C., 28 B. C. He there states that the latter *καὶ τὰς ἀπογραφὰς ἐξετέλεσε, καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς πρόκριτος τῆς γερουσίας ἐπεκλήθη*, a

[1] Momms. Röm. Staatsrecht, II. ii. 711, "der erste der Bürger."

statement which proves nothing more than the acknowledged fact that Augustus was 'princeps senatus' and does not necessarily identify this title with that of 'princeps.' Secondly in Bk. 57. 8, we are told that Tiberius adopted for general use the title of Cæsar, adding occasionally that of Germanicus, and that further *πρόκριτος τῆς γερουσίας κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὠνομάζετο.* Here Dio does apparently intend to identify the general title of 'princeps' with the more special 'princeps senatus:' for he goes on to quote in illustration a common saying of Tiberius *ὅτι δεσπότης μὲν τῶν δούλων, αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, τῶν δὲ δὴ λοιπῶν πρόκριτός εἰμι,* which however is if anything unfavourable to his own view, in so far as Tiberius himself here connects the title not with the senate, but with the general mass of citizens. In the third passage Bk. 73. 4, we are told that Pertinax (193 A.D.) *ἔλαβε τάς τε ἄλλας ἐπικλήσεις τὰς προσηκούσας καὶ ἑτέραν ἐπὶ τῷ δημοτικὸς εἶναι βούλεσθαι· πρόκριτος γὰρ τῆς γερουσίας κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐπωνομάσθη.* And this passage implies that in fact Pertinax assumed the new or rather the obsolete title of 'princeps senatus' and not the ordinary title 'princeps.' That he really did so is proved, as will be seen further on, by the evidence of the inscriptions: and I hope to show also why the assumption of this title was naturally regarded by Dio as expressive of Pertinax' popular tendencies, and may even have been so regarded by that emperor himself. But as evidence for the connection between 'princeps' and 'princeps senatus' the passage is of little value. Granting however, what these three passages barely prove, that Dio himself believed in such a connection, this belief of his may have been a mistaken one, and in Dio's time such a mistake was eminently natural and likely.

But setting aside for the moment the opinion of Dio, let us pass to one or two other considerations which appear to tell strongly against Merivale's theory.

And first of all, if 'princeps' is an abbreviation of 'princeps senatus,' the abbreviation must have taken place remarkably early, for no trace exists of the full title as applied even to Augustus. So far as the evidence of literature and of the inscriptions goes the title is from the first 'princeps' and nothing

more. Ovid and Horace use 'princeps' but with no hint of an understood 'senatus'[1]. It must have been 'princeps' alone that Strabo translated by ἡγεμών, nor can it be the principate of the senate merely to which he refers when he tells us that his country committed to Augustus τὴν προστασίαν τῆς ἡγεμονίας[2]. The title is 'princeps' only in Velleius Paterculus, as well as in Tacitus and Suetonius. And by no writer of the first century after Christ is the slightest hint dropped that this familiar appellation of 'princeps' had any connection whatever with its supposed original.

Now had the 'princeps senatus' of Republican times been generally known and addressed in Rome as simply 'princeps,' the suppression of the latter half of the title in the case of the Emperors would have been quite intelligible. But of this there is no proof whatever: and on the contrary when Republican writers use the term 'princeps' by itself, in no case is any reference intended to the 'princeps senatus': whereas in the comparatively few passages where the latter is mentioned the title is given in full[3].

Turning to the inscriptions, we find in the first place that 'princeps senatus' occurs in connection with one emperor only, the emperor Pertinax[4], of whom we are explicitly told that he assumed this title. Secondly had 'princeps,' as Merivale's theory would imply, been strictly an official designation, we should have expected to find this form at least, if not the fuller one, among those imperial titles which are usually prefixed or appended to the emperor's name. But only in one instance during the first century do we find 'princeps' included in these almost stereotyped lists of imperial honours and offices[5]. This is intelligible enough if it was merely a title of courtesy, expressive of nothing more special than preeminent dignity, and that this was so is made clearer still by its use in the comparatively few

[1] Ovid, Fasti, 2. 142. Hor. Od. I. 2. 50. Momms. Staatsr. II. ii. 733 note 6.

[2] Strabo, xvii. 3, for ἡγεμονία as equivalent to principatus, see Momms. *l. c.*

[3] Except in such a passage as Livy 27. 11, where the context places the meaning beyond doubt.

[4] C. I. L. II. 4125.

[5] A decree of the senate in honour of Titus, Willmanns, Ex. Inscr. Lat. 922. For the emperors' full official style, see Acta Fratrum Arvalium passim.

inscriptions in which it occurs. On consulting the Monumentum Ancyranum, we find that on p. i. 44 Augustus mentions his having been for 40 years 'princeps senatus' *πρῶτον ἀξιώματος τόπον ἔσχον τῆς συκλήτου*, but when p. ii. 45 he alludes to his general principate, the Latin version has simply 'me pri[ncipe],' which the Greek consistently renders *ἐπὶ δὲ ἐμοῦ ἡγεμόνος*. Similarly p. v. 44, we get in the Latin '[a]nte me principem,' and in the Greek *πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἡγεμόνος*. The other inscriptions in question suggest the same idea of a title of courtesy which was 'princeps' and nothing more, e.g. C. I. L. v. 4867. Commodus is 'princeps nobilissimus,' *ib.* 4318; 'princeps fortissimus,' C. I. L. II. 2038, where Tiberius is spoken of as 'principis et conservatoris;' so of Domitian 'pro salute optimi principis' (Willm. Ex. Inscr. Lat. 95). In short there is nothing in the inscriptions to suggest that the title was ever anything but 'princeps,' or that it ever denoted any specific official functions.

Lastly Merivale himself allows[1] that in post-Augustan literature the term never conveys any idea but that of constitutional preeminence, though he contends unreasonably, as I think, that this later use was a perversion of its original meaning.

We have next to consider how far it was likely that Augustus would have selected 'princeps senatus' as the appellation by which above all others he was to be known and addressed. For this a title was needed that should not merely be inoffensive, but should at once carry with it the requisite amount of dignity and clearly express the leading idea of the new system. For these purposes 'princeps senatus' would have been utterly inadequate and misleading. It is not clear that any great prestige had ever attached to the position of 'Father of the Senate' outside the walls of the senate-house itself. Nor had the office ever played a prominent part in Roman politics, while it had recently become almost obsolete[2]. And if its general reputation was neither very exalted nor very widespread, the actual powers it conferred were extremely limited and shadowy, for after all the possible privilege of giving his 'sententia' before the rest

[1] Romans under the Empire, chap. 31.

[2] Since the death of Q. Lutatius Catulus, 60 B.C.

was of little value to the emperor who as consul could state his views fully in introducing a question to the senate at the very opening of the sitting[1]. That the emperor's name should head the roll of senators was natural enough, but that Augustus should have made this position typical of his presidency of the Roman Commonwealth it is difficult to believe. But the fact that 'princeps senatus' was too weak a title to bear the strain which Merivale puts upon it, is not the only objection to his theory. The attitude implied in its adoption would have been inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Augustus' policy. He professed to be restoring the old Republic in its entirety, and not merely, as Sulla had temporarily succeeded in doing, establishing a senatorial government. What his advent to power marked was not the final triumph of one of the two parties whose rivalry had for a century distracted the state, but the absorption of them both in a united and restored Republic. The adoption by Augustus of the title of 'Father of the Senate' would have been a direct challenge to the democrats and almost a confession that after all he was at heart a Sulla. For we must remember that when Augustus inaugurated the principate, the senate was still associated inseparably with one party in the state: and was by no means generally regarded as representing the Republic as a whole. It was not till the comitia had ceased to exist, and the 'Populus Romanus' become a mere name, that the senate stood forth as the one centre of Republican sentiment in Rome, and the one representative of the institutions of the free commonwealth. It was natural enough that Pertinax, living in days when the struggles of optimates and populares had been forgotten, and when the senate seemed the only remaining obstacle to absolute despotism, should adopt as a popular measure the title of 'princeps senatus[2].' It is equally inconceivable that Augustus should have done so in the presence of men who remembered the Sullan restoration, and

[1] According to the usual procedure in Cicero's day, not only had the "consules designati" a preferential claim to be asked first, but in default of these the presiding magistrate seems to have exercised his own discretion in the matter. See Rein, Paul. Real-Encycl. s. v. Senatus.

[2] Dio Cass. 73. 4.

who must have associated the supremacy of the senate not with Republican freedom, but with the rule of a hated oligarchy.

And the same change in the condition of affairs which explains the policy of Pertinax, explains also Dio Cassius' misconception of the true significance of the title 'princeps.' He wrote, as Pertinax ruled, when all Republican traditions had been absorbed by the senate as the only surviving Republican institution which retained even the show of independence. And finding, as he must have done, that the title symbolized a constitutional and civil government as opposed to a military despotism, he easily enough inferred that its constitutionalism consisted in recognising what the opponents of Imperialism in the second century so ardently upheld, the right of the senate to be regarded as joint-sovereign with the emperor himself. But this 'duarchy' of emperor and senate[1] is post-Augustan, its commencement dates from the suppression of the comitia by Tiberius, and it is utterly inconsistent with that complete restoration of the old Republic which Augustus himself claimed to have accomplished.

But what are the arguments for the rival theory, for the view that 'princeps' is a complete title, with the meaning not of 'Father of the Senate', but of 'First Citizen'? It has in its favour first of all the use of the term by Republican writers. Instances will be familiar to all in which 'princeps' and 'principes' are applied to a citizen or to citizens holding at the time a foremost place in the state; but it has not been sufficiently noticed that we find also instances in which there is a very close approximation to the Augustan sense of the term—and an almost literal anticipation of the Augustan 'principatus.' In other words it seems that before the time of Augustus men had already grasped the idea of placing at the head of the Republican system a constitutional primate—a first citizen—as the best means of securing administrative stability and

[1] As to the claim of the senators to be ὁμότιμοι with the emperor, see Dio, 67. 2. Momms. Staatsrecht, II. ii. 900, speaks of "der Dyarchie August" but apparently only with reference to the coordinate criminal jurisdiction of emperor and senate. In any wider sense, the term is certainly inapplicable to the Augustan system.

order without relinquishing Republican freedom. No man could be more entirely devoted to the old constitution than Cicero, and yet Cicero himself seems to have contemplated with approval the addition to the existing system of a 'princeps,' as necessitated by the anarchical confusion which prevailed. The De Republica was apparently written between the years 54 B.C.—51 B. C.[1], a period during which the powerlessness of the old constitutional authorities to enforce order had become only too evident. Rumour in Rome suggested the appointment of Pompey as dictator[2], and in 52 he was actually made sole consul. In significant connection with this state of affairs we find that Cicero introduced into his sketch of an ideal polity a novel figure, that of a single 'moderator reipublicae[3];' such, no doubt, as he hoped Pompey might have proved himself, but such, as by Cicero's own reluctant confession, he signally failed in being[4]. An important link between this 'moderator reipublicae' and the Augustan 'princeps' is supplied by a passage in Augustine, de civ. Dei, v. 13, where he alludes to that part of Cicero's De Republica, "ubi loquitur de instituendo principe civitatis." It is at least possible that Augustine is here quoting the actual title of this part of the work, but even if he is not, clearly Cicero's 'moderator' must have been sufficiently like a 'princeps' as Augustine understood the term, to suggest the latter as its equivalent. That Cicero, however, may himself have used 'princeps' or 'princeps civitatis' in this sense is rendered more probable by a passage in his letters, where the word is distinctly used to express the idea of constitutional primacy in a free state. Cicero, writing in 46 B. C., is contrasting Caesar's unconstitutional position as dictator, with what might have happened had his own advice been taken three years before, and the final rupture thus avoided. Caesar would never have put

[1] Teuffel, Gesch. d. Röm. Lit. 281, where the authorities are fully given.

[2] Plut. Pomp. 54.

[3] Ad Att. 8, 11, "tenesne igitur moderatorem illum reipublicae quo referre velimus omnia? nam sic quinto, ut opinor, in libro loquitur Scipio: *Ut enim gubernatori cursus secundus,... sic huic moderatori reipublicae beata civium vita proposita est.*"

[4] Ad Att. *l. c.* "hoc Gnaeus noster cum antea nunquam tum in hac causa minime cogitavit."

himself out of court by crossing the Rubicon—he would not it is true have been the military despot he had since become—but he might have enjoyed the great position of first citizen, "esset hic quidem clarus in toga et princeps" (ad Fam. 6. 6). The idea of simple primacy, though without the distinctive element of constitutional rule, appears again ad Att. 8. 9 (49 B.C.), where Caesar is said to wish for nothing better than "principe Pompeio sine metu vivere[1]," and ad Fam. 9. 17 (46 B. C.), where Caesar himself is spoken of as "ipsum principem." Once more, if Suetonius may be trusted, Caesar actually used the term 'princeps civitatis' of himself in 51 B. C., "difficilius se principem civitatis a primo ordine in secundum quam ex secundo in novissimum detrudi" (Suet. Jul. 29). It may then be safely assumed that the notion of a First Citizen at the head of affairs, of a 'princeps' or 'princeps civitatis,' was already familiar to the Roman public when Augustus set to work to reorganise the shattered fabric of the state.

And it is easy to show how closely the 'principatus' which he established corresponded with the ideas already connected with the term. By Imperial writers it is carefully distinguished from 'dominatio,' 'regnum,' and 'dictatura' as a constitutional authority[2]. It describes in particular the emperor's relation to his fellow-citizens, as himself only the foremost among them, "dominus in servos, imperator in milites, princeps in cives[3]," or as Pliny puts it[4], "obsequeris principi civis, legatus imperatori." Of Vespasian's letters to the senate Tacitus remarks[5], "ceterum ut princeps loquebatur civilia de se et reipublicae egregia." Again, the title clearly carried with it the notion rather of general pre-eminence and supervision than of any specific official authority. With Strabo's *ἡ προστασία τῆς ἡγεμονίας*[6], we may compare on this head the

[1] Cf. ad Fam. 1. 9, "cum autem in republica Cn. Pompeius princeps esset."

[2] Tac. Ann. i. 9, "non regno tamen neque dictatura sed principis nomine constitutam rempublicam." Ovid, Fasti, 2. 142.

[3] The obvious original of the passage in Dio, 57. 8.

[4] Plin. Paneg. 9, cf. *ib.* 45, "scio ut sunt diversa natura dominatio et principatus."

[5] Tac. Hist. iv. 3.

[6] Strabo, xvii. 3.

words of Tiberius himself[1], "non aedilis aut praetoris aut consulis partes sustineo, majus quidem et excelsius a principe postulatur."

With this view of the nature of the 'principatus' agrees also what we know of Augustus' own aims in its establishment. The problem before him was that of reconciling with the old Republican system an executive authority capable of ensuring order. That the latter was needed the anarchy of twenty years sufficiently proved[2], that the former could not be violated with safety had been shown by the fate of Julius. His solution of the problem was, as I have said, much what we may imagine Cicero to have sketched by anticipation in the De Republica. The old system was restored, "restituta vis legibus, senatui majestas, antiqua reipublicae forma revocata[3]," or as he says himself, "rempublicam ex mea potestate in Senatus Populique Romani arbitrium transtuli[4];" but to it was added a chief magistrate chosen by the people and subject to the laws, but pre-eminent above all others in the state, "post id tempus praestiti omnibus dignitate[5]." To this high dignitary belonged special powers, and therefore special titles, he was imperator, consul, etc.; but to describe his general relation to the whole citizen body—as merely the first of themselves—no term was so suitable as that of 'princeps,' recalling as it did what Pompey for a short time was, and what Julius might have been. Such was the system established by Augustus, "quis pace et principe uteremur[6]." It was an attempt to reconcile the requirements of a vast empire and a distracted commonwealth with the cherished traditions of the Republic. By the side of the senate, at the head of the magistracy, was placed the 'princeps,' the elect of the people like his fellow-magistrates[7], like them bound by the laws

[1] Tac. Ann. iii. 53.

[2] Tac. Ann. i. 9, "non aliud discordantis patriae remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur."

[3] Vell. ii. 89.

[4] Mon. Ancyr. 6. 14, 15.

[5] Mon. Ancyr. 6. 21, 22.

[6] Tac. Ann. iii. 28.

[7] Tac. Ann. i. 7, of Tiberius, "ut vocatus electusque potius a republica videretur." Suet. Otho 7, "gesturus communi omnium arbitrio." Cf. Gaius, i. 5, "cum ipse Imperator per legem imperium accipiat."

unless specially exempted[1], and known to the Roman community not by the inappropriate title of 'Father of the Senate,' but as the First Citizen of the State. It was a solution of the great difficulty which besets a popular government, which more recent Republics have in principle adopted. The Presidents of the United States[2] and of the French Republic so far hold the position which Augustus claimed for himself. That the Augustan principate remained for a short time only true to its original theory was a result due to the same causes which led to the absorption of the Republic of Rome in the Roman Empire.

H. F. PELHAM.

[1] For the case of Vespasian, see Momms. Staats. II. ii. 711, note 2.

[2] See De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, i. 128.

CATULLUS' 68TH POEM.

THO' I would gladly discuss here a number of passages in Catullus, yet 'spatiis exclusus iniquis' I hasten, as in duty bound, to make a retractation and to do justice to Mr Ellis in a case where he was right and I was wrong. In my book on Catullus I have given a copious exposition of both parts of the long and difficult 68th poem, an exposition to which I still adhere in all its essential features. There are however two obscure, perhaps designedly obscure, passages, closely connected with one another, of parts of which I now perceive that I have missed the true meaning. These passages are 66—69

> Tale fuit nobis Allius auxilium.
> is clausum lato patefecit limite campum,
> isque domum nobis, isque dedit dominam,
> ad quam communes exerceremus amores:

and 155—160

Sitis felices et tu simul et tua vita,
et domus in qua *nos* lusimus, et domina;
et qui principio nobis terram dedit aufert,
a quo sunt primo *mi* omnia nata bona;
et longe ante omnes, mihi quae me carior ipso est,
lux mea, qua viva vivere dulce mihi est.

The first passage I give exactly as it is in the Mss. and I now think that not a letter is to be changed: 'Allius threw open a fenced field and made a broad way through it; he gave to me a house, he gave to me the lady of that house, in whose mansion he and I might both indulge in common each his own love'. Allius therefore rendered Catullus the same essential service of which I spoke so fully; but not in the way spoken of. It was not his own house to which he brought Catullus and Lesbia, but the house of a lady his friend, who allowed him and Catullus each to meet his mistress there. Ellis is therefore right in his explanation of 'Ad quam' and 'dominam'. But why does he give so strange an interpretation to v. 67, which I have fully illustrated in my Elucidations? 'Ad quam (domum)' in fact could hardly have any other meaning than 'beside which', as Plaut. truc. II 2 26 quid ad nostras negoti, mulier, est aedis tibi. I could increase the number of examples from Plautus, in Draeger quoted by Ellis, of *ad aliquem = apud:* a good one for our present purpose is Asin. 825 Cum suo sibi gnato unam ad amicam de die Potare. And what is more to the point for Catullus, Cicero has 'fuit ad me', 'in Cumano ad te'. Perhaps Livy VII 7 4 neque segnius ad hostes bellum apparatur, is also to the purpose. What led me to think Catullus might use 'domina' for 'amica' was his very marked employment of 'erae' for Lesbia in v. 136. But Tibullus seems to be the first who thus abuses the noble 'domina', and Propertius and others probably follow him. Horace keeps strictly to its older meanings, manifestly so in most of his instances, but really just as much in od. II 18 19; 12 13; epist. I 2 25.

I now come to the other passage which I have printed as it is in the Mss., only adding the *nos* and *mi* in Italics, tho' 157 is

of course corrupt. 'A blessing on you one and all, on you and her who is your life'—his mistress of course, not his wife as I once explained it—'and the house in which you and I toyed'—referring back to v. 69—'and the lady of that house, and on him who in the beginning gave to you and me'—I am disposed now to think 'terram' genuine—'firm ground', tossed about before as we had been on the sea of uncertainty, unable to meet our mistresses. *πιστὸν γῆ, ἄπιστον θάλασσα,* says Thales. Comp. too for instance Plaut. most. 737 (Tr.) Set, Simo, ita nunc ventus navem nostram deseruit...(Si.) Quaene subducta erat tuto in terram?; id. mercat. 195 Nequiquam mare subterfugi...Equidem me iam censebam esse in terra atque in tuto loco: Verum video me iterum ad saxa ferri saevis fluctibus; rudens 824 Non hercle quo hinc nunc gentium aufugiam scio: Ita nunc mi utrumque saevit et terra et mare; Cic. pro Murena 4 quo tandem me esse animo oportet, prope iam ex magna iactatione terram videntem, in hunc cui video maximas reipublicae tempestates esse subeundas? Virgil's 'In manibus terrae' and the similar passage in Eur. Heracl. 427 are also perhaps in point. I freely confess that Catullus' use of the metaphor would be bolder than any of the above, tho' he aims here at nervous brevity[1]. If it be judged inadmissible, then I would not give up my 'te et eram dedit' for any of the other editors' corrections. For the manifestly corrupt 'aufert' it is probable enough that a proper name such as 'Anser', or my 'Afer' is to be read. It is possible too that Catullus may have chosen to conceal the name, as he has concealed that of the 'domina'; in which case I would suggest 'auctor, A quo etc.'; the 'quo' being then neuter: 'the first author of that blessing from which all my happiness first flowed'. In any case the 'qui principio' was he who first brought Allius and through him Catullus into communication with the 'domina'[2].

H. A. J. MUNRO.

[1] In the mercator, quoted above, 'atque in tuto loco' defines and explains 'in terra'; and 'tutum locum' is precisely what 'terram' in Catullus ought to mean.

[2] I have just read Mr Palmer 'on Ellis' Catullus' in the Hermathena, no. VI. I have neither space nor time to shew how highly I value much of his criticism; tho' I hope to

find another occasion to point out both what I admire and what I disagree with in his remarks. His criticism however of our 68th poem I am quite unable to accept, both its details and the theory that the Allius of the second part is a pseudonyme for the Manlius of the first; tho' I remember that a year or two ago Professor Nettleship casually suggested the same to me. But Mr Palmer's arguments appear to me totally inadequate to meet the far stronger arguments on the other side. But here I must touch only on what is personal to myself. With reference to my remark that it was 'bold to assert that any one in Catullus' days could have borne two gentile names', Mr Palmer (p. 348) observes: 'Mr Ellis never asserted this, and I do not think he ever entertained such an idea'. This has indeed taken me by surprise. We have, first, this negative proof to the contrary, that Mr Ellis never hints throughout his commentary that Allius is a pseudonyme for Mallius; next his express words, cited too by Mr Palmer, 'that the Mallius of the first part is the *Mallius and Allius* of the second'; thirdly the fact that in v. 66 (68) all his texts give us 'Tale fuit nobis *Mallius* auxilium'; just the very verse which introduces the most compromising lines in the poem. Again (p. 349) Mr Palmer's explanation of 'tua vita' seems to me not to be Latin, or, if Latin, the direst prose. I am certain the words mean 'your darling'. Every Roman must have made daily use of this 'vita' in a hundred ways; tho' we can only expect to meet with it in certain written styles. We find the vocative 'mea vita' three times in Plautus, not in Terence; twice in Cicero in two impassioned letters to Terentia; in Catullus, Propertius and Ovid, not in Tibullus—perhaps too in other places unknown to me. Twice Propertius, rather strikingly, has the voc. 'vita' without 'mea'; twice too Ovid, probably after him, in amor. III 8 11 Hunc potes amplecti formosis, vita, lacertis? Huius in amplexu, vita, iacere potes? once Apul. apol. 9 salva, Charine, Pars in amore meo, vita, tibi remanet. We find the word so used more than once, not in the vocative; Plaut. asin. 614 certe enim tu mihi vita es; Stich. 372 tuum virum et vitam meam; Ter. ad. 330 nostrumne Aeschinum? Nostram omnium vitam? Catullus here, and 104 1 Credis me potuisse meae maledicere vitae? What difference is there here? From the nature of the case 'mea' is likely to be more common than 'tua'; but, just as Catullus addresses Allius, so surely Calvus could have said to Catullus 'potesne tuae maledicere vitae?'; or the woman addressed in the Stichus could have answered 'meum virum et vitam tuam'; as Terence says 'nostram omnium vitam'. Quintus or Atticus must have said to Cicero 'tua vita Terentia', 'Tulliola tua vita' as often as Cicero said to them 'mea vita Terentia, ect.' Mr Palmer's conjecture 'dominae' 'our ladies (your Aurunculeia, my Lesbia)' gives me a qualm.

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